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framework. An evaluation of the Interim Criminal Procedure Code 2004 and the 
Counter Narcotics Law 2005 
 
 
Summary of the Thesis 
 
 
The criminal law frameworks of countries that have been the subject of international 
peacekeeping operations and military interventions often reveal an urgent requirement 
for reform. Destabilised by conflict, existing frameworks may be discriminatory and 
inconsistent with international human rights and due process standards. New law may 
be imperative to promote the development of fair and effective justice systems, rule of 
law and transitions from conflict to peace. While the transplantation of readily-available 
law can be an appealing solution a fundamental concern for legislators is whether it 
represents a reasonable and effective mechanism for developing vital post-intervention 
criminal law reform. This thesis addresses this issue by examining the Interim Criminal 
Procedure Code 2004 and the Counter Narcotics Law 2005, two laws developed by 
legal transplantation in Afghanistan, the most recent example of a country where the 
international community is engaged in post-intervention criminal law reform. It does this 
by firstly developing a new evaluative test developed from an examination of theoretical 
perspectives on transplant feasibility. It then applies this test using quantitative data 
supported by original qualitative research from interviews with senior Afghan and 
international legal personnel. It finds that neither law has been successful. Their 
transplanted content and the processes of transplantation have reduced the extent to 
which they have been accepted and achieved their objectives and have increased their 
potential to be ‘lethal’ transplants capable of promoting injustices, generating 
destabilising discontent and moderating rule of law promotion. This study questions the 
assumption that it should always be reasonable to develop post-intervention criminal 
law by means of legal transplantation. The reasonableness of relying on legal 
transplantation will depend on the sensitivity with which it is employed, requiring 
knowledge of legal transplant feasibility, local history and legal traditions and the prior 
application of the proposed evaluative test to assess potential receptivity. 
 1 
1  Introduction 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Establishing the rule of law has become an imperative concern for agencies engaged 
in peacekeeping operations and international development assistance programmes in 
countries seeking to effect transitions from conflict to peace. Regarded as a universal 
tool for developing a range of ideals including economic expansion, democratic 
governance, law and order, security and adherence to international standards of 
human rights, it has been prescribed by foreign policymakers engaged in its promotion 
as ‘a panacea for the ills of countries in transition.’1  
 
Its significance for transitional countries grew during the 1970’s when extensive law 
and development programmes were undertaken by foreign donors, academics from the 
United States (US) and agencies engaged in African and Latin American countries to 
assist socio-political transitions from autocratic and repressive rule to liberal 
democracies built on US political and legal ideals.2 Its popularity was later maintained 
during the 1990’s when the collapse of socialist systems under the former Soviet Union 
triggered a surge of further rule of law assistance programmes in countries in eastern 
Europe and the Balkans designed to augment legislative, constitutional and judicial 
transitions in accordance with western liberal ideologies.  
 
In the same decade a series of ethnic conflicts, human rights crises and civil wars in 
countries such as Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo, and East Timor resulted in international 
interventions motivated by humanitarian rationales. These fostered a significant 
investment in post-interventionist programmes designed to assist transitions from 
conflict to peace by establishing rule of law.3 Between 1990 and 2006 the World Bank 
(WB) supported 330 rule of law projects costing more than $2.9 billion.4  During the 
same period two-thirds of the United Nation’s (UN) 60 peacekeeping operations 
                                                 
1
 Carothers, T. ‘The Rule of Law Revival,’ (1998) 77(2) Foreign Affairs, 95-106, p.95. 
2
 Mertus, J. ‘From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of 
Transnational Civil Society’ (1998-1999) 14 American University International Law Review, 1335-1389 
3
 I refer to the situation in Afghanistan in this paper as ‘post-intervention’ and ‘seeking to emerge from 
conflict’ rather than ‘post-conflict’ which is normally associated with the cessation of organised, armed 
struggle and the signing of peace agreements, neither of which have yet occurred since 2001. See Call 
C.T. Constructing Justice and Security after War, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. 
(2007), p379 
4
 Trubek, D. (2006) ‘The Rule of Law in Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future’ in Trubek, D. 
and Santos, A. (eds.) The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (2006), Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, p.74 
 2 
included rule of law development programmes.5 In the 1990’s alone the UN engaged in 
15 separate peace-building operations undertaken following armed conflicts, most of 
which led to post-intervention criminal justice activities.6 It participated in negotiations to 
create a new police force in El Salvador in 19927 and oversaw the organisation and 
training of civilian police forces in Somalia in 19948 and Sierra Leone in 1998.9 It also 
facilitated police training programmes in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1997.10 In Cambodia 
its mandate was enlarged beyond police support programmes to include control for law 
enforcement and establishing law and order with human rights protections.11 In 
Rwanda and former Yugoslavia it established international war crimes tribunals that led 
to the creation of a new International Criminal Court. Later, in 1999 it was designated 
with full legislative and executive authority during assistance missions in East Timor 
and Kosovo and tasked with the reform of their national criminal justice systems.12  
 
The growth in UN peacekeeping operations during the 1990’s resulted in post-
intervention societies becoming the main focus of rule of law promotion programmes,13 
a trend sustained in the 2000’s following US-led military interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.14 The international community,15 and the UN in particular, approached the 
immense challenges presented by these post-interventionist states, often characterised 
by damaged infrastructure, barely functioning institutions, traumatised societies with 
                                                 
5
 O’Connor, V. ‘Rule of Law and Human Rights Protections through Criminal Law Reform: Model Codes for 
Post-Conflict Criminal Justice (2006) International Peacekeeping, 13 (4), 517-530, p.521 
6
 During the 1990’s the UN was engaged in peacekeeping operations in Namibia (1989-1990), Nicaragua 
(1989-1992), Angola (1991), Cambodia (1991), El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992), Liberia (1993), 
Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1995), Croatia (1995), Guatemala (1997), Democratic Republic of Congo (1999), 
East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999) and Sierra Leone (1999); see Weiss et al, The Oxford Handbook on the 
United Nations, Oxford University Press (2007), p. 407 
7
 Call, note 3, p.37.  
8
 S/RES/897 (1994)  
9
 S/RES/1181 (1998)  
10
 S/RES/1144 (1997)  
11
 Details of various relevant Agreements available at 
http://www.usip.org/files/file/resources/collections/peace_agreements/agree_comppol_10231991.pdf 
12
 S/RES/1272 (1999) for East Timor; S/RES/1244 for Kosovo; Call, note 3, p.17; Rausch, C. and 
O’Connor, V. ‘Model Codes: Laying the Foundations of the Rule of Law,’ in Hurwitz, A. and Huang, R. 
(eds.) Civil War and the Rule of Law. Security, Development, Human Rights (2008), Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, Inc 115-138, p.116 
13
 There has been considerable academic scholarship on rule of law and state-building following 
international intervention. In addition to Call, note 3, see Dobbins, J. Jones, S.G., Rathmell, A., Steele, B., 
Teltschik, R. and Timilsina, A. The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation (2005); Dobbins, J., Jones, S.G., Crane, K. and De Grasse, B.C. The Beginner’s 
Guide to Nation-Building, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation (2007); Ghani, A. and Lockhart, C. Fixing 
Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding and Fractured World, New York: Oxford University Press 
(2008); Rausch, C. Combating Serious Crimes in Postconflict Societies. A Handbook for Policymakers and 
Practitioners, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C. (2006); Stromseth, J., Wippman, D. 
and Brooks, R. Can Might Make Rights? Building the Rule of Law After Military Interventions, Cambridge 
University Press (2006); Van Hippel, K. Democracy by Force: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War 
Era, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2000)  
14
 Stromseth et al, note 13, p.65 
15
 I adopt the term ‘international community’ in this thesis to refer to western states, the US and NATO 
powers.  
 3 
critical human development needs and atomised security and political control, by 
endorsing the emerging orthodoxy that establishing the rule of law is key to promoting 
successful reform16 or, more significantly, according to Carothers, ‘a solution to the 
world’s troubles,’17 apparently based, Tamanaha suggests, on the premise that it ‘is 
good for everyone.’18 Reflecting the increasingly high regard that the UN had for rule of 
law promotion in conflict states Lord Ashdown, the former High Representative for the 
UN, acknowledged with regard to Bosnia and Herzegovinia that: 
 
 ‘we should have put the establishment of rule of law first, for everything else 
 depends on it: a functioning economy, a free and fair political system, the 
 development of civil society, and public confidence in police and courts. We 
 should do well to reflect on this as we formulate our plans for Afghanistan, 
 and, perhaps, Iraq. This position has been widely supported by the UN with 
 the rule of law being acclaimed as lying at the heart of [its] work in rebuilding 
 war-torn countries.’19 
 
Similarly, in 2003 the UN Under-Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations confirmed that 
the UN regarded rule of law the ‘sine qua non for the sustainable resolution of conflict 
in the rebuilding of secure, orderly and humane societies,’20 and in 2004 the UN 
Secretary-General urged member states in  to ‘restore and extend the rule of law 
throughout the world’21 because ‘[I]t is by re-introducing the rule of law, and confidence 
in its impartial application, that we can hope to resuscitate societies shattered by 
conflict.’22 
 
Notwithstanding the growing consensus amongst the UN and the international 
community that rule of law is an important device for building peace and security in 
post-interventionist countries there remains no internationally accepted agreement on 
the meaning of the concept.23 While this remains the case, it represents an 
unsatisfactory pitfall for rule of law reform efforts as lack of clarity over this issue may 
                                                 
16
 Samuels, K. Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries. Operational Initiatives and Lessons Learnt, 
Social Development Papers. Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction. Paper No. 37 (October 2006) 
available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2006, p.3 
17
 Carothers, note 1, p. 98 
18
 Tamanaha, B.Z. On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press (2004), p.1 
19
 Lord Ashdown, P. ‘What I Learned in Bosnia’, Press Office, Office of the High Representative 
08.10.2002 in ‘Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq’ (2002) USIP Special Report 104, available at 
https://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr104.html 
20
 Press Release SC/7884 of 4835 Meeting of the Security Council 30.09.2003. Guehenno, J-M, reporting 
to the Security Council as it considered ‘Justice and the Rule of Law: the role of the United Nations,’ 
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2003/sc7884.doc.htm  
21
 UN Secretary-General’s address to the General Assembly, 21.09.2004 available at 
http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1088 
22
 ibid  
23
 Belton, R. K. ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law,’ in Carothers, T. (ed.) Promoting the Rule of 
Law: In Search of Knowledge (2006), Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, p.31-75, p.32; Mani, 
R. Beyond Retribution: Seeking Justice in the Shadows of War, Blackwell Publishing Co. (2002), p.26 
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encourage conflicting goals, values and targets during promotion programmes and 
confusion over what is actually being promoted. Moreover, recipient countries of donor 
assistance should be entitled to a clear understanding of the requirements they are 
expected to fulfil during rule of law reform agendas as well as the consequences of 
breaching them.24  
 
Numerous definitions have been suggested, the content of which vary depending on 
the political, legal and social context in which it is being examined.25 Different 
organisations engaged in rule of law programmes in post-conflict states have 
developed their own definitions, adding to the confusion.26 These range from minimalist 
conceptions which view rule of law as equally applicable, predictable legal rules 
capable of resolving disputes27 to maximalist interpretations which allow for fairness 
and observance of human rights standards.28 Practitioners have also sought to define it 
with reference to the attributes rule of law institutions should be aspiring to or the legal 
goals they should seek to achieve.29   The UN has attempted to minimise the confusion 
by suggesting a broad, ends-based definition which holds it out to be:  
  
‘a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 
 and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
 promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
 consistent with international human rights, norms and standards. It requires, 
 as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, 
 equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of 
 the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
 certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’30 
 
This guidance emphasises the technical requirements of ensuring that there are 
applicable laws, fairly enforced and consistent with international standards.31  However, 
as Kuovo points out ‘for a rule of law-based society to function, it is not only necessary 
                                                 
24
 Sannerholm, R.Z. In Search of a User Manual: Promoting the Rule of Law in Unruly Lands (2007) 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1068781, p.5 
25
 ibid, p.6 
26
 Dakolias et al, Legal and Judicial Reform: Observations, Experiences and Approach of the Legal Vice 
Presidency, Working Paper 31.07.2002, available at 
http://www.wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523
679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187511&siteName=WDS&entityID=000094946_021126040
1346.; UNDP, Building Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice (2007) available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf, p.37  
27
 Carothers, note 1, p.96  
28
 Mani, note 23, p.28 
29
 Belton, R.K. ‘Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners,’ Paper No.55, 
(January 2005) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP55.Belton.FINAL.pdf 
30
 United Nations, ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Societies,’ U.N. Doc. 5/2004/616 (23.08.2004) available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement 
31
 Belton, note 29, p.27; Dobbins, Beginner’s Guide, note 13, p.73.  
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that laws are adopted and applied, they also have to enjoy public legitimacy and reflect 
shared values.’32  
 
Stromseth’s approach to rule of law promotion offers an attractive solution to dealing 
with the complex issues that the concept of rule of law involves. It advocates that rule 
of law reform requires an understanding of how local institutions are related, how they 
operate as a system and the political influences on reform (systemic approach); a clear 
perception of strategic goals of reform, taking into account not only legal and 
institutional reform but also relevant cross-cutting issues such as gender discrimination 
and informal approaches which may contribute to or constrain rule of law promotion 
(ends-based and strategic approach); and a desire to constructively build on 
processes, laws and institutions that already exist, recognising their appeal and 
limitations and how they might be adapted in ways that ensure legitimacy (adaptive and 
dynamic approach).33 This ‘synergistic’ model offers a useful framework guideline for 
rule of law development in states seeking to emerge from conflict as it acknowledges 
that with regard to the crucial issues of legitimacy and shared values, in addition to 
formal codified law, existing justice mechanisms that incorporate local customary and 
religious norms may be significant. 
 
 
1.1 The Centrality of Criminal Justice to Rule of Law Promotion 
 
On a practical level rule of law is inextricably linked to a functioning criminal justice 
system normally including institutions such as courts, the police, prosecution, judiciary 
and the government ministries that support them as well as legislation that guides their 
behaviour.34 Criminal justice is acknowledged as one of the key areas underpinning 
rule of law development in post-intervention states. According to the UN, ‘effective 
criminal justice systems can only be developed based on the rule of law and … the rule 
of law itself requires the protection of effective criminal justice measures.’35  
 
                                                 
32
 Kuovo, S. State-building and rule of law: lessons from Afghanistan? NDC Forum Paper Series (Rome: 
NATO Defence College, 2009) available at http://www.ndc.nato.int, p.16 
33
 Stromseth et al, note 13, p.81-84 
34
 Strohmeyer, H. ‘Policing the Peace: Post-Conflict Judicial System Reconstruction in East Timor,’ (2001) 
24(1), University of New South Wales Law Journal, 171-182, p.171; Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
Report, Assistance to Justice and the rule of law in Afghanistan. A strategic analysis, (February 2004) 
available at http://www.hdcentre.org/publications/assistance-justice-and-rule-law-afghanistan-strategic-
analysis, p. 12 
35
 Economic and Social Council, Res 2005/21; UNODC, The Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit, United 
Nations, New York (2006) available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-
reform/cjat_eng/CJAT_Toolkit_full_version.pdf, p.v 
 6 
Post-intervention countries seeking transitions from conflict to peace are often typified 
by challenges to law and order and increased criminal activity capable of threatening 
efforts to establish peace and security.36 East Timor experienced a rise in all types of 
crime following stabilization of the territory by the International Force in East Timor 
(INTERFET).37 Homicides tripled in El Salvador within three years of the 1992 
ceasefire38 and increased in Guatemala by 20% within two years of the end of its civil 
war in 1996.39 The cessation of conflict and civil war does not entail an end to violence 
and crime. Rather it changes their nature and tends to lead to increased criminal 
activity, which can represent serious challenges to the legitimacy of a new government 
and any attempts it may make to promote access to justice.40  
 
To counter the threat of increased criminality in countries recovering from conflict and 
provide effective criminal justice systems, thus enhancing rule of law, the UN has 
suggested that a number of key tasks must be undertaken. Derived from experience 
gained in enforcing domestic criminal law,41 training,42 performance monitoring43 and 
the reconstruction of criminal justice systems44 during multi-dimensional peacekeeping 
operations, these include strengthening national police forces, improving correctional 
facilities and enhancing the capacity of defence and prosecution lawyers and the 
judiciary.45  
                                                 
36
 Rausch, note 13, p.3; Darby. J. The Effects of Violence on Peace Processes, USIP, Washington D.C. 
(2001); p.63 
37
 Call, note 3, p.378 
38
 ibid, p. 377 
39
 Ibid, p.378 
40
 Ashdown, P. International Humanitarian Law, Justice and Reconciliation in a Changing World, The 
Eighth Hauser Lecture on Humanitarian Law, New York, 03.03.2004 available at 
http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/lordpaddyashdown.pdf  
41
 A UN military force  (KFOR) enforced domestic criminal law in Kosovo for a year before handing over 
authority to an international civilian police force (CIVPOL) who then assumed an executive policing role in 
Kosovo, S/RES1244 (1999), para 9(d); Capt. Gwaltney, A.L. ‘Law and Order in Kosovo: A Look at Criminal 
Justice During the First Year of Operation Joint Guardian,’ in Wentz, L. Lessons from Kosovo: The KFOR 
Experience, CCRP Publication Series (2002); p.233 available at  
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/12th_ICCRTS/CD/library/html/pdf/Wentz_Kosovo.pdf 
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In addition, the UN recommends that criminal justice systems must be supported by 
adequate legal frameworks consisting of modern laws.46  The legal framework of a 
state incorporates its domestic laws and those international treaties that are binding on 
it.47 According to the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations ‘a national legal 
framework or penal code, consonant with international human rights norms and 
standards, is the basis for establishing the rule of law and is the starting point for 
effective law enforcement and criminal justice.’48 This view is widely shared by 
international donor agencies involved in rule of law reform programmes in societies 
emerging from conflict. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) refers to the legal 
framework as ‘the backbone of a criminal justice system.’49  
 
What, however, should the criminal law framework consist of? In East Timor, it was felt 
that it should comprise ‘rules of criminal procedure (ie, on arrest and detention) and 
substantive criminal law, as well as rules governing the activities of the 
police…consistent with recognised international standards.’50 Ideally, therefore, post-
intervention states should have domestic procedural and substantive criminal laws that 
provide a ‘box set’ of provisions containing definitions for criminal activity and 
procedures for the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences which conform to 
international human rights expectations and which may provide additional ‘modern’ 
measures allowing for such matters as the improved safety and privacy of witnesses 
and covert surveillance techniques. Crucially, domestic laws are required that set out 
the powers of and limitations on judges, police and prosecutors; that promote fair trial 
standards, due process and adequate international human rights protections in 
adherence to international treaties;51 and that provide guarantees such as the 
availability of legal representation, respect for rights to liberty and protection from 
unlawful and arbitrary detention.  
 
Guidelines prepared by international experts for international organisations involved in 
rule of law reform in post-interventionist states suggest that a comprehensive needs 
assessment should be conducted at the early stage of international involvement to 
examine the extent to which the legal framework of the criminal justice system 
                                                 
46
 ibid, para 30; O’Connor, note 5, p.521-522 
47
 Rausch, note 13, p.42  
48
 United Nations, Handbook on UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping Best 
Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, (2003), New York available at 
www.peacekeepingbestpractices.unlb.org/…/Handbook%20on%20UN%20PKOs.pdf, p.95 
49
 Rausch, note 13, p.39 
50
 Strohmeyer, note 34, p.181  
51
 For example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted by General 
Assembly resolution 2200A, 16 December 1966, which came into force on 23 March 1976 available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm 
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correlates with the ‘box set’ ideal of necessary measures and provisions.52 Dobbins, a 
former U.S. envoy to Afghanistan, advocates that the review and establishment of 
interim criminal laws should be ‘an indispensable initial step for international actors’53 
as part of best practice procedure for promoting rule of law in post-conflict societies. 
Reviews should involve the assessment not only of substantive and procedural 
applicable law but also of international treaties ratified by the state which compel it to 
ensure and protect fair trial, due process and human rights54 and oblige it to criminalise 
certain activities, including organised crime, terrorism and illicit narcotic production and 
trafficking.55  
 
 
1.2 Meeting the Need for Legislative Reform 
 
Reviews of the criminal justice systems of post-interventionist countries often reveal an 
urgent requirement for the reform of domestic law. Stromseth confirms that the ‘reform 
of criminal law and procedure is often particularly urgent.’56 Similarly, a 2004 UN report 
cautioned that in post-intervention settings ‘legislative frameworks often show 
accumulated signs of neglect and political distortion, contain discriminatory elements 
and rarely reflect the requirements of international human rights and criminal law 
standards.’57 Domestic criminal law may fall short of sufficiently criminalising activities, 
allowing them to be committed with impunity, weakening rule of law promotion. The 
1976 Liberian criminal code was insufficient to deal with human trafficking prevalent 
following the cessation of violence in 2003.58 Similarly, the Angolan 1886 Penal Code 
and the 1925 Haitian criminal code were insufficient to deal with contemporary local 
and transnational criminal realities and in need of ‘modernisation.’59 In Angola money 
laundering and corruption became endemic because they were not recognised as 
criminal activity in any domestic law.60 The UN assistance mission in East Timor 
revoked a number of laws from the still applicable Indonesian Criminal Code for being 
discriminatory to women and contrary to international human rights standards. 
                                                 
52
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53
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or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) 
55
 For example, the UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
(1988), the UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime (2004), the UN International 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2002)  
56
 Stromseth, note 13, p.247 
57
 UN, note 30, para 27 
58
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Moreover, criminal law in Kosovo required reform as the still applicable laws of the 
former Yugoslavian regime, which had been used as a tool of repression and 
discrimination against the Kosovar Albanian population, would have been politically 
repugnant to that section of the local population following the cessation of hostilities. 
The applicable laws also needed modernising to criminalise human trafficking, extend 
provisions in relation to terrorism and increase penalties for organised criminal 
activity.61  
 
Post-intervention countries, it is apparent, require substantial programmes of legislative 
reform, including reform of procedural and substantive criminal law. Notably, the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) passed 257 regulations between 1999 
and 2004, many of which were designed to reform Kosovo’s criminal justice system.62 
Similarly, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
passed 71 regulations during its four-year mandate, during which it undertook a 
comprehensive amendment of East Timor’s criminal procedure.63 These extensive 
programmes are a consequence of reviews by international actors of applicable 
legislation and criminal law frameworks through the lens of international human rights 
standards. They are also, however, indicative of a trend of opportunism normally 
perpetuated by international actors geared towards changing the legislative status quo 
in post-interventionist states to conform with international expectations for the 
promotion of rule of law. Stromseth notes that ‘a window of opportunity for significant 
change exists after intervention.’64 Similarly, Carlson has observed that ‘the most 
opportune moment in which to work for change is in the immediate post-conflict 
period.’65  
 
Because new law is likely to be required in transitional states they have become test 
sites for international actors seeking ways to promote change through legislative 
reform.66 This has become a growth industry, particularly in the last two decades, which 
                                                 
61
 ibid 
62
 See UNMIK Regulations and Administrative Directions, Official Gazette, available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/index.htm.  
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 For example, On Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, UNTAET Reg. No. 2000/30 (25 September 
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of a Legal Aid Service in East Timor, UNTAET Reg. 2001/24 (5 September 2001) 
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65
 Carlson, S.N. Legal and Judicial Rule of Law Work in Multi-Dimensional Peacekeeping Operations: 
Lessons Learned Study, (March 2006), UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, available at 
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have witnessed a huge expansion of international interest in supporting and developing 
opportunities for social and legal transition and the promotion of rule of law in post-
intervention societies. In addition to the UN, foreign assistance agencies such as the 
Department for International Development (DFID) and Germany’s Agency for Technical 
Assistance (GTZ) have provided technical support for legislative drafting programmes. 
Similar initiatives have been undertaken by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
such as the American Bar Association Central European and Eurasian Law Initiative 
(ABA/CEELI), the International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) and the 
International Legal Assistance Consortium (ILAC), all of which have developed reform 
programmes and provided actors offering technical expertise in drafting legislative 
frameworks.67  
The assumption by the international community of a central role in legislative reform in 
these states is a consequence of its custodianship of a new rights framework, 
developed from transformations in human rights law and international criminal and 
humanitarian law since World War Two (WWII), which has provided international actors 
with a perceived legitimacy in determining the normative content of required laws.68 
Nevertheless, this legitimacy, and indeed the legitimacy of international interventions 
and consequent legislative reform programmes to establish rule of law is likely to be 
measured against the effectiveness of the laws and frameworks that are subsequently 
introduced. While the interventions of the 1990’s and 2000’s were ostensibly motivated 
by humanitarian and national as well as international security concerns their legitimacy 
to local populations, judged against criticisms of invasion, imperialism and colonialism, 
can be dependent on the success of resulting new legislative reform that promotes rule 
of law.  
This legitimacy risks being seriously undermined when mistakes are made. UNMIK, 
was criticised for failing to take ‘a coherent approach to criminal justice reform’ to the 
extent that it put ‘at risk the transition as a whole.’69 Its delay in identifying an 
acceptable body of criminal law led to violations of human rights norms and impairment 
to the credibility and legitimacy of international efforts to promote rule of law in 
Kosovo.70 Care, then, is needed in contemplating how criminal law reform should 
                                                 
67
 Tolbert, D. and Solomon, A. United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict 
Societies,’ (2006) 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 29-62, p.55-56 
68
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Law-Making Powers,’ (2005) 50 McGill Law Journal, 285-326, p. 299  
69
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70
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the Lessons Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law,’ (2000-2001) 22, Michigan 
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properly be conducted and received by local populations, requiring reflection on the 
most effective means of introducing new criminal legislation considered necessary to 
promote legal change. 
 
One solution is to amend existing applicable criminal law to ensure its compliance with 
international standards of human rights.71 Recycling pre-existing criminal legislation 
may be an attractive solution. It is cost-efficient and whole or partial reliance on tried 
and tested law may promote legitimacy for a new government amongst the local 
population.72 Difficulties can be encountered, however, when identifying existing 
criminal law, leading to confusion in application, a problem encountered in Afghanistan 
following 23 years of civil war and the destruction of legal texts by the Taliban regime. It 
may also be problematic locating suitable criminal codes capable of local acceptance. 
UNMIK’s stipulation that the Serbian Criminal Code was to be applied in Kosovo was 
rejected by the Kosovar judiciary, forcing changes to the law. Similarly, in East Timor 
the Timorese were dissatisfied with UNTAET’s insistence on applying pre-existing 
Indonesian law.73 Applicable law may also be completely inadequate for domestic 
requirements, as was the case in Cambodia where the criminal law at the time of the 
establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
consisted of only one decree containing 12 brief articles.74  
 
If local criminal law cannot be recycled and amended new law may be required. How, 
though, should this be done? Law reformers may take the view that the most effective 
means of promoting legal change is to transplant law into the domestic criminal legal 
framework of the post-interventionist country – to employ legal transplants. The term 
‘legal transplant’ is a metaphor for the act of one country creating by means of 
borrowing75, adopting,76 copying77 or imposing78 a legal institution79, norm80 or rule81 
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 Friedman, L. ‘Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants’ in Nelken et al, note 75, 93-98. 
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that has been successfully established in another country and incorporating – or 
literally transplanting it, in a similar manner to a surgical transplant – directly into the 
domestic legal system.82 Legal transplantation, referred to by Beckstrom as an ‘old 
exercise,’83 is certainly an established means of creating criminal law and a number of 
international experts have advocated their use for post-intervention reform. Dobbins 
endorses the transplantation of readily applicable criminal law and procedure as part of 
a ‘quick-start package’ in the initial phases of post-conflict operations,84 a proposal 
supported by the UN in its Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(the Brahimi Report),85 which recommended the deployment of ‘quick response’ legal 
teams and the development of a set of interim criminal codes which could have 
temporary application in generic post-conflict environments pending a process of fuller 
reform.86 In response to this, the Model Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice87  have 
been developed comprising a compendium of draft laws and procedures for key 
elements of the criminal justice system – the courts, police and prisons – available for 
immediate transplantation in post-intervention states, an innovation that suggests that 
the way forward for criminal law reform in these environments is the transplantation of 
readily available foreign-designed codes.88 
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It is to be hoped that the Codes emerge as a useful guide for legislative drafters when 
addressing the reform of applicable criminal law in post-intervention situations. It is not 
stretching the imagination too much, however, to suggest that the easy availability of 
the Codes may encourage them to tailor their methodology for promoting legislative 
reform by selecting transplantable models from this standard menu of laws, embracing 
a universalistic ‘one size fits all’ philosophy.89 As Mani has observed, ‘if you only have a 
hammer it is very tempting to see every problem as a nail, rather than developing 
different tools to deal with different problems.’90  
 
This approach to law reform would risk being construed as a neutral and technical 
process, detached from any social or political consequences.91 It presupposes that 
newly introduced formal criminal laws will reliably lead to an improved societal 
commitment to the formal criminal justice processes they promote, rendering as 
unnecessary any consideration of cultural issues that could ultimately prove to be vital 
to the prospects of any new criminal laws achieving the objectives for which they are 
enacted. Brooks argues that ‘rule of law promotion efforts stumble when they come up 
against countervailing cultural commitments that are resistant to clumsy and formalistic 
efforts to change them.’92 According to Brooks, international actors who introduce new 
law into post-conflict states face a limited prospect of their new laws creating or 
changing societal norms unless they are aligned to the cultural traditions of the society 
into which they are placed. International law reformers should ‘know the culture at 
issue and take it seriously,’93 counsel supported by Krygier and Mason who maintain 
that ‘if institutions and rules are to endure and take on strength, then they owe their 
solidity to understandings and expectations – many of then borne by and grounded in 
cultural traditions within which the institutions and rules take on meaning and 
significance.’94  
 
These positions caution against a formalistic and technocratic approach to rule of law 
reform and argue for one which is dependent on a full understanding of the cultural 
norms of the society into which new law is to be introduced. These norms, it is 
maintained, will directly affect the reception of any new law. This was evidently the 
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case in Somalia where the UN’s declaration that the criminal laws in use prior to its 
mission would be applicable provoked protest amongst the legal community in the 
north of the country who regarded the existing Penal Code as a tool of oppression 
under Siad Barre’s former regime. Similarly, in Kosovo several Kosovo-Albanian judges 
refused to apply the law following the UN’s declaration that the laws in force prior to the 
UN mission were applicable mutatis mutandis, as they considered them repugnant to 
their own community.95  
 
If the success of new law, including transplanted law, depends on its close alignment 
with the cultural traditions of the country into which it is introduced, this suggests that 
law reformers should proceed to introduce new law only when they are sensitive to 
local social, political and legal issues, including existing legal traditions.96 In the context 
of criminal law these may include not only cultural interpretations of formal criminal 
justice – state and constitutional law - but also local use and reliance upon religious law 
and informal justice mechanisms,97 which often operate parallel to formal systems in 
developing countries and states seeking to emerge from conflict.98 In Kosovo, for 
example, judicial institutions were established by the Albanian population during the 
Milosevic regime which led to the creation of parallel municipal courts, ruled by Kosovo 
Serbs, following the UN intervention.99 Similarly, in Somalia traditional customary law 
(xheer) applied by tribal elders and shari’a courts operate as functioning dispute 
resolution mechanisms distinct from any formal legal institutions.100  
 
International criminal justice reformers have been cautious in their approach towards 
existing local justice mechanisms and procedures during reform programmes in some 
post-intervention countries, not least because some traditional justice practices are 
considered anathema to internationally acceptable standards. Informal justice may be 
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dispensed by leaders who have not been selected by democratic processes, whose 
rule may be unfettered and whose decisions are immune from processes of 
transparency and accountability. They may furthermore be influenced by local 
powerholders, susceptible to bribes, and endorse practices that discriminate against 
ethnic groups and women. In Guatemala, concerns of this nature led the UN to 
conclude that traditional justice mechanisms were incompatible with the western liberal 
ideals they were trying to install.101  
 
Nevertheless, local structures of justice may be advantageous to post-intervention 
reform efforts. They may be more accessible to the local population, helping to fill any 
legal vacuums during the initial stages of reform while formal justice institutions are 
being built and personnel trained. International reformers may achieve better results if 
they assess these systems and their potential for complementing the reforms they 
intend to introduce.102 Notably, Chad and Zaire have both retained justice systems that 
combine customary with modern centrally administered courts. Similarly, the benefit of 
having a customary system in place was demonstrated in Rwanda where the 
government made use of the traditional gacaca process and amended it to produce a 
locally legitimate process for trying genocide suspects.103 Mani maintains that 
international law reformers must consider whether law reform can be facilitated by 
enhancing ‘legal pluralism’ of this nature that blends western with locally acceptable 
practices.104  
 
The experiences of Chad, Zaire and Rwanda suggest that customary law can be a 
dynamic and flexible instrument for promoting access to justice that law reformers of 
post-conflict criminal justice should understand and consider. Indeed, to ignore 
customary justice practices may damage the legitimacy of international innovations in 
criminal law reform, particularly if new formal law and institutions are regarded as 
threats to the legitimacy of established cultural justice norms. New legislation which 
conflicts with traditional justice approaches may be more likely to be locally perceived 
as a foreign imposition with colonial designs, undermining the reception of the law and 
the legitimacy of general rule of law efforts.105  
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The perception of imposition, which is a challenge to the legitimacy of internationally-
led law reform, can be heightened when new law is regarded by local populations as 
‘foreign’ and created by international actors who have been brought in temporarily to 
provide their expertise, but whose conceptions of ‘successful’ law reform are not tied to 
its alignment with local legal traditions. New law is, nevertheless, less likely to be 
regarded as imposed when local actors are involved at the drafting stages.106 However, 
the dependence by post-interventionist states on foreign assistance can create an 
unequal relationship between international donors and local officials that can translate 
into the way in which legislative reform is carried out. Local concerns may be 
marginalised against larger international requirements to ensure compatibility with 
acceptable procedures and human rights standards and in the legal vacuum that often 
prevails, typified by damaged infrastructure and limited personnel, laws drafted by 
international ‘experts’ are perhaps less likely to be subject to close local scrutiny and 
more likely to be enacted without local challenge. In this environment of reduced local 
accountability international legislators can approach legislative reform in a way that 
measures success with reference to the goal of enactment rather than effectiveness 
and use. According to Holmes, 
 
‘foreign legal consultants and experts report the greatest rate of success (that 
is, their advice is swallowed whole and the laws they draft are actually passed 
by parliaments) in societies where law is virtually unenforced. This is 
natural…where laws are not enforced, legislative drafting can be donated as an 
amusement park for foreign lawyers (I once met a lawyer sitting in the lobby of 
the IMF who boasted: ‘I wrote the Civil Code of Afghanistan.)’107  
 
Perhaps in response to earlier legislative reform shortcomings the UN’s 2004 Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict States (Rule of Law) report108 
made recommendations quite at odds with those in the Brahimi Report, advocating 
moving from dependence on ‘foreign experts, foreign models and foreign-conceived 
solutions’109 to reform supporting ‘national assessments, national needs and 
aspirations.’110 Now, reformers were advised to ‘eschew one-size-fits-all formulas and 
the importation of foreign models.’111 A report by the UN Secretary-General in 2009 
confirmed this approach by underlining ‘the imperative of national ownership’ to 
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peacebuilding efforts in the aftermath of conflict.112 This appears to augment a 
movement by the UN away from support for staple-on legal transplantation as a means 
of reforming post-intervention criminal law frameworks to a process more in tune with 
local contextual issues and legal traditions. In recognition of this change of approach 
the Model Codes, originally designed to ‘create a skeletal emergency body of law’ for 
post-conflict states, were held out by their authors as ‘sources of law for inspiration’ 
rather than imposition.113 Guidance for the Codes now stresses that they are ‘not 
intended to be used in whole or to be parachuted into a post-conflict state as a quick-fix 
solution or as an emergency law.’114 They are, in essence, not designed to be imposed 
by external actors but are available as a ‘pick and mix’ package for legislators to use in 
order to select required legislation.  
 
This change of approach by the UN, evidenced by the contrasting recommendations in 
the Brahimi and Rule of Law reports, is indicative of a wider shift in policy towards its 
role as a peace-keeping actor in post-intervention states which has seen it move from 
leading reform, as in the case of Kosovo and East Timor, to facilitating it, as has been 
its stance more recently in Afghanistan. However, the volte face of the UN in its 
approach towards rule of law and criminal justice reform also reflects a lack of certainty 
amongst the principle actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction about the best 
means of bringing about effective and successful legal change. It is estimated that 39% 
of states emerging from conflict experience a return to conflict in the first 5 years and 
that another 32% return to it in the succeeding 5 years.115 Rule of law programmes do 
not come with a guarantee of success. In spite of all the numerous attempts by 
international organisations to promote rule of law and develop new legal frameworks 
since the 1990’s there remains insufficient knowledge and understanding about how 
legal change can effectively be facilitated.116 As Carothers has observed: 
 
 ‘Aid providers know what endpoint they would like to help countries achieve – 
 the Western style, rule-oriented systems they know from their own countries. 
 Yet, they do not really know how countries that do not have such systems 
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 attain them. That is to say they do not know what the process of change 
 consists of and how it might be brought about.’117 
 
 
1.3 The Significance of and Motivations for this Study 
 
This problem assumes a fundamental significance in the context of Afghanistan where 
the international community and the UN have been engaged in substantial 
programmes to reform the justice system and strengthen the rule of law since the US-
led defeat of the Taliban regime in 2001. The political future of Afghanistan is a vital 
and important question on the geo-political world stage, a focal point for the US and 
United Kingdom (UK) ‘war on terror’ and a testing ground for the foreign policies of 
international countries, particularly those that supported its invasion in 2001. The 
stakes could perhaps not be higher than for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO), involved in its first deployment outside Europe and whose future legitimacy 
may depend on the success of security control and international reform efforts in 
Afghanistan.118 
 
With reconstruction efforts now into their tenth year, Afghanistan remains important as 
a litmus test for the efficacy of international assistance efforts in societies seeking to 
achieve transitions from conflict to sustainable peace. This transition depends on 
establishing rule of law and the creation of an effective criminal justice system. 
Afghanistan therefore represents the most recent example of a country where the 
international community are actively engaged in post-intervention legislative reform of 
the criminal law framework as part of an agenda to promote and enhance rule of law. 
 
The UN response to the situation in Afghanistan was to highlight once again the 
importance of rule of law, declaring that its re-establishment was ‘essential to the 
peace process.’119 There was a consensus amongst the international community that 
constructing a functioning justice system would be central to achieving this ideal. At a 
conference in Rome in 2002 numerous international countries pledged their support for 
the reconstruction of the judicial system and agreed that:  
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 ‘the development of a fair and effective justice system in Afghanistan is a vital 
 requirement to meet the needs of the Afghan people and to protect their 
 human rights…an effective justice system is essential not only for the 
 successful development of Afghan society as a whole, but also to achieve 
 lasting peace and security in Afghanistan.’120  
 
At the time neither human rights nor opportunities for human development were 
guaranteed for the vast majority of Afghans.  The Afghan economy had collapsed. 
Traditional trade routes were destroyed and the agricultural market had crashed, 
reducing food production by as much as 50%.121 Human development opportunities 
were ranked amongst the lowest in the world.122 Akin to the situations in South Africa, 
Guatemala and El Salvador, criminal activity increased following the cessation of the 
civil war and the transition from Taliban rule to democratic government in 2001. Poppy 
cultivation and opium production also expanded rapidly, establishing Afghanistan as a 
world centre for the trafficking of illicit narcotics.123  
 
Against this background the reform of the justice system, including the criminal justice 
system, presented a formidable challenge to international actors and Afghan 
stakeholders. Following years of unrest since the Soviet invasion in 1979 the formal 
justice sector lacked institutional infrastructure, material and human resources. A report 
in January 2003 confirmed that ‘Afghanistan’s legal system has collapsed. Never 
strong to begin with, it has been destroyed by 23 years of conflict and misrule.’124 Law 
reformers encountered a criminal justice system influenced by plural legal traditions 
consisting of Islamic religious law, customary law and state legislation. An informal 
system of criminal justice, adhering to local customary and tribal practices as well as 
Islamic religious law, existed alongside a formal system derived from constitutional and 
legislative reform and developed by various state rulers and regimes. There was, 
however, a complete lack of clarity over the nature and applicability of existing formal 
law. According to the USIP the state justice system consisted of a ‘patchwork of 
overlapping laws [and] elements of different types of legal systems, and an incoherent 
collection of law enforcement…structures.’125  
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Legislators faced practical questions such as how new positive law guaranteeing 
international human rights and criminal law standards could be reconciled with 
Afghanistan’s cultural and legal traditions? As long ago as 1845 a general serving in 
the Anglo-Indian army in Afghanistan warned that: 
 
 ‘there is no nation in the world more turbulent and less under subjection; the 
 difficulties in rendering them submissive to a code of just laws would be 
 almost insurmountable…they hate all governments which introduce law and 
 order into a country, or enter into peace with their neighbours; to do so in their 
 eyes is an attack upon their rights.’126  
 
Could, then, applicable criminal law be relied upon and purged of provisions contrary to 
international human rights standards? Or if new law had to be introduced should it be 
transplanted from accepted western templates?  
 
New positive codes were assessed as required by international donors in order to fill 
the legal vacuum that existed in respect of Afghanistan’s criminal law framework and 
promote rule of law. With substantial international assistance new laws were 
consequently introduced, two of the most significant of which were the Interim Criminal 
Procedure Code 2004 (ICPC), which provided new procedural rules governing the 
arrest, detention and trial of criminal suspects and the Counter Narcotics Law 2005 
(CNL) which established new powers and procedures designed to prevent the 
cultivation, production and trafficking of illicit narcotic drugs. The ICPC precedes the 
UN Rule of Law report and the CNL was drafted after it was published. Both of these 
laws are legal transplants. The legislators who contributed to drafting them chose to 
rely heavily on borrowed foreign legal principles and rules and transplant them into 
domestic Afghan state law. They assumed that transplanting law was the most 
effective method for promoting legal change to strengthen Afghanistan’s criminal law 
framework in an effort to enhance rule of law. 
 
This thesis evaluates these two transplanted laws in order to address a central 
question: was it reasonable for legislators to rely on legal transplantation to develop the 
ICPC and the CNL when seeking to reform Afghanistan’s criminal law framework in 
order to promote rule of law? In order to consider this matter, this study: 
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1. explores legal transplants as tools for legal change and assesses ‘transplant 
justification,’ namely the motivations for adopting them generally and in the context 
of post-intervention criminal law reform; 
 
2. considers theoretical perspectives on the value of legal transplants and develops 
an original evaluative test for application to the transplanted ICPC and CNL, based 
on an historical examination of transplant evaluations and the experience of 
criminal law reform involving legal transplantation;   
 
3. examines criminal justice in Afghanistan and the plural legal traditions that 
influence it, the history of state justice reform and contemporary challenges that 
may impact on transplant reception and therefore the effectiveness of the ICPC and 
the CNL and 
 
4. evaluates the ICPC and the CNL, applying the new evaluative test, in order to 
determine whether they have been successful post-intervention reforms for 
Afghanistan’s criminal law framework and the promotion of rule of law.  
 
The motivation for this study is that it acts as a response to Carother’s criticism about 
the paucity of understanding amongst aid providers about how to bring about legal 
change. This is an area of research lacking in authoritative evaluative studies. DFID 
reported in 2002 that ‘many initiatives in the justice sector have not been subject to 
careful monitoring and evaluation.’127 Similarly, the UN’s Rule of Law report lamented 
the ‘scant attention’128 that has been paid to post-conflict rule of law reform, an 
observation supported by Kirsti Samuels in 2006 who noted that ‘despite two decades 
of experimenting, little is known about how to bring about legal change in developing or 
post-conflict countries.’129 If international actors are drafting new laws to revise the 
criminal legal frameworks of states seeking to emerge from conflict as part of a general 
rule of law promotion agenda, they must consider how legal change can most 
effectively be achieved and, to that extent, whether legal transplantation would be the 
most effective and reasonable means of producing change. More research is required 
in this vital area to provide improved guidance for legislators on mechanisms for 
reforming criminal law in societies seeking transitions form conflict to peace following 
                                                 
127
 DFID, Safety, Security and Accessible Justice: Putting Policy into Practice, (July 2002) at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/documents/publications/safesecureaccj
ustice.pdf 
128
 UN, note 30, para. 24 
129
 Samuels, note 16, p.18 
 22 
international intervention.130 Evaluating the ICPC and the CNL can shed light on the 
role of legal transplants as tools for developing criminal law frameworks in states 
attempting to emerge from conflict131 and contribute to scholarly theoretical 
understanding about them which, according to some commentators, remains ‘fairly 
rudimentary.’132  
 
 
1.4 Definitions and Concepts 
The term ‘post-conflict’ implies an ‘end of organised, armed political struggle’133 and in 
some circumstances the signing of a peace accord. These conditions have yet to be 
fulfilled in Afghanistan where political violence between the Taliban and forces 
supporting the Afghan government has been ongoing since 2001. I regard Afghanistan 
instead to be a ‘post-intervention’ state and I employ this term to refer to countries 
where the international community has intervened in an effort to enhance rule of law 
and to assist a transition from conflict to peace. This broad definition is intended to 
include countries seeking to emerge from conflict as well as post-conflict states where 
the international community has been engaged in rule of law promotion. As a result, 
while the research for this thesis is located in Afghanistan, it is anticipated that the 
conclusions reached will be relevant to the use of legal transplants for criminal law 
reform in states seeking to emerge from conflict and post-conflict states following 
international intercession. 
 
The 2004 Constitution contains a number of cornerstone principles and guidelines that 
are significant for defining ‘human rights’ in Afghanistan and their relationship with 
criminal law. It guarantees internationally recognized standards relating to procedural 
fairness such as equality before the law,134 the right to legal representation,135 the right 
to silence,136 the right to be tried without undue delay,137 the presumption of 
innocence138 and freedom from torture.139 It also binds the Afghan state to conform to 
the UNDHR and other international treaties to which the country is a signatory, 
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including the ICCPR. This has further implications for human rights and criminal 
legislation because, as a result, all criminal law, transplanted or not, must be consistent 
with the requirements for procedural fairness and due process contained in articles 5, 7 
and 9 of UNDHR and articles 6, 9 and 14 of the ICCPR.  
 
I have employed the term human rights in this thesis in a narrow sense to relate to the 
specific rights enshrined in the Constitution and international treaties that relate to 
procedural fairness. This is because the two laws I evaluate are concerned in particular 
with criminal procedure. Furthermore, the human rights protected by international 
treaties are, by virtue of the Constitution, non-negotiable and must form part of the 
normative content of codified criminal law in Afghanistan, such as the ICPC and the 
CNL.  
 
In doing so, however, I recognize that many Afghans are not familiar with the concepts 
of human rights enshrined in the Constitution, international treaties and codified law.140 
Most Afghans also refer to popular justice mechanisms to resolve their disputes, the 
practices of which contravene some of the international conceptions of human rights 
and procedural fairness standards established in the Constitution and protected by 
state law. Their lack of procedural transparency, exclusion of women and punishments 
of forced marriage are of particular concern.  
 
There is then a dichotomy between those human rights protected by state law and 
those familiar to the majority of Afghans. These include, according to research by the 
AIHRC involving more than 4,000 respondents, ‘the right to live and the right to its 
necessary components of food, shelter, clothing, and basic health care; freedom of 
thought and speech; ethnic, religious and gender equality; political rights such as the 
right to participate in free and fair elections; and the right to education.’141 There is also 
a distinction between the rights provided to Afghans through traditional justice 
mechanisms and the human rights ideal established by state law. While developing 
commitment to the latter is fundamental to the promotion of rule of law it is important for 
rule of law promotion programmes to acknowledge that in post-intervention states 
insistence on enforcing international standards of human rights and procedural fairness 
over and above community-based justice can often conflict with the vital goal of trying 
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to win support for new rule of law promotion measures from the local population. 
Stromseth’s synergistic model for rule of law development underlines the importance of 
recognising this challenge and working over time with traditional justice processes to 
find means of providing oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance with international 
standards of human rights principles.  
 
 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
The thesis is organised into 6 chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 
examines legal transplants as mechanisms for promoting legal change. It considers 
what I term ‘transplant justification’ and determines, from an examination of historical 
evidence on the use of legal transplants, their practical utility and the motivations for 
employing them, that the actors responsible for drafting the ICPC and the CNL were 
justified in considering adopting the legal transplant mechanism in order to develop 
these laws. In order to be able to ascertain whether it was reasonable for them to 
proceed to rely on legal transplantation, judged against whether or not they were 
‘successful,’ I also consider ‘transplant evaluation’ and develop a new evaluative test 
for application to the ICPC and the CNL following an examination of theoretical 
perspectives on transplant feasibility, the conditions necessary for successful 
transplantation and the reception experience of previous criminal law transplants, 
including those in post-intervention states.  
 
This test acknowledges that the reception of these laws will be affected by local 
contextual concerns which influence the application of criminal justice in Afghanistan. 
Therefore, evaluating the reception of these laws requires an understanding of 
Afghanistan’s criminal justice system, which I examine in Chapter 3. This chapter 
reflects on the legal traditions which influence criminal justice in Afghanistan and the 
historical development of the state system, which has involved the transplantation of 
foreign models. It also seeks to place the evaluation of the ICPC and the CNL in real 
time and place by documenting the progress of the reform of the state system post-
2001 and by noting the challenges that the system faces, which may constitute 
potential constraints to the reception of these transplants.  
 
Chapter’s 4 and 5 are concerned with evaluating the ICPC and the CNL to determine 
whether or not they have been successful legal transplants and whether legal 
transplantation was an effective and reasonable means of developing these laws. 
These chapters examine the manner in which they have been applied, the extent to 
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which they are considered meaningful and appropriate, the impact on the reception of 
the laws of the motivation for developing them by legal transplantation and the extent to 
which they have achieved their objectives.   
 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 6, draws together the issues explored and the 
findings of the study before developing practical and theoretical conclusions and 
providing recommendations for legal transplantation in future post-intervention states.  
 
1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1 Research Strategy 
I began this research project in April 2007. In order to explore the issue of whether 
legal transplants might be appropriate tools for developing legislation designed to 
reform the legal frameworks of post-intervention states to promote rule of law I 
developed  the following criteria in order to select the legislation that would become the 
focus of my research: 
 
1. The legislation must be a legal transplant. To that extent, it had to comply with my 
definition for legal transplants proposed in Chapter 1; 
 
2. The legislation must be adopted as a means of developing the criminal law 
framework of a post-intervention state in order to promote the rule of law;  
 
3. The legislation must be an example of a recent legal transplant which has not yet 
been the subject of in-depth research evaluation.  
 
Both the ICPC and the CNL met this criteria and I determined to evaluate them both in 
order to give more depth to the study. Both laws were legal transplants, dependent on 
legal rules borrowed from foreign sources legal and neither had been the subject of an 
evaluation. Furthermore, they were introduced to reform the criminal law framework in 
Afghanistan which represented a significant contemporary example of a post-
interventionist state seeking to emerge from conflict where the international community 
has been engaged in substantial assistance programmes designed to promote the rule 
of law. In addition, the timing of their introduction was significant in that one pre-dates 
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and the other post-dates the UN Rule of Law report and its recommendation that 
reform in post-conflict states should avoid ‘the importation of foreign models.’142  
 
There were also practical considerations involved in the decision to evaluate the CNL. 
The UK was the lead nation for counter narcotics policies and reform and UK actors 
were involved in drafting the law. Furthermore UK actors have been engaged in 
mentoring work at the CJTF. Following a meeting with a UK Afghan policy adviser who 
attended the Rule of Law Conference in Rome in July 2007 I was able to generate 
some useful contacts and sources for interviews of UK actors with experience of the 
application of the CNL. It was anticipated that some of these actors would be available 
for interview in London following periods of engagement in Afghanistan, which would 
be beneficial in terms of saving research costs and time given my work base at London 
Metropolitan University.   
 
Having established the primary aims of the study and the central question that I wished 
to address, elucidated in Chapter 1, I undertook a comprehensive review of literature 
relating to legal transplants in order to develop an evaluative test which I could apply to 
the ICPC and the CNL to determine whether or not they have been successful legal 
transplants. This review included an examination of theoretical perspectives on their 
feasibility, value and the conditions of their success, the motivations for adopting them 
and their application in the context of criminal justice. From this I determined that a 
suitable evaluative test would entail examining four key areas. These were: 
 
1. the manner in which the laws were applied;  
2. the extent to which they have been considered meaningful and appropriate;  
3. the motivations for their adoption, and  
4. the degree to which they have achieved their objectives.  
 
I also determined that the success or failure of the laws would be linked to local 
contextual concerns, challenges and constraints connected to the criminal justice 
system in Afghanistan and its plural legal traditions.  
 
The literature review and the development of this evaluative test informed the 
methodological processes that have been adopted in order to undertake this research 
study. The central strategic approach to the research has been one that has involved 
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interpretative phenomenological analysis using primarily qualitative data and a limited 
amount of quantitative data. I identified this approach as appropriate for this study as it 
is centres around the application of the evaluative test to the two laws and the 
interpretation of the results. This necessitated an in-depth study of these pieces of 
legislation, guided by all 4 of the strands of the evaluative test, the nature of which 
were such that they could appropriately be investigated by collecting valuable 
information and data from the participants and actors actually engaged in the 
application of the laws and capturing their experiences, thoughts and views in relation 
to the manner in which it has been applied, the extent to which it is meaningful and 
appropriate, why they were adopted and developed by legal transplantation and 
whether they have achieved their objectives. This data could then be interpreted to 
ascertain whether or not the ICPC and the CNL had been successfully received and 
also to address the central question of whether it was appropriate for them to have 
been developed by legal transplantation.  
 
1.6.2 Methods of data collection 
The methods of data collection used in this study were: 
 
1. Semi-structured interviews;  
2. Questionnaires, and  
3. A review of literature and documentary data.  
 
The decision to employ these different methods of data collection was informed by the 
research process of triangulation, defined by Jupp as ‘the use of different methods of 
research, sources of data or types of data to address the same research question.’143 
Triangulation is achieved by gathering accounts or feedback from two or more different 
sources which have a common interest in terms of the subject matter of the research. 
Triangulation was achieved by in this study by simultaneously collecting data by means 
of semi-structured interviews, literature review and questionnaires.  The rationale of 
employing these different methods of data collection was that they would help to 
provide as much information as possible relative to the four aspects of the evaluative 
criteria. Furthermore, it was anticipated that obtaining information from three sources 
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would improve the accuracy and authenticity of findings available from any one source, 
thereby enhancing the validity of any data collected. 
 
After collecting the data from the semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and 
documentary review I systematically arranged it relative to the four aspects of the 
evaluative test for each law. This enabled me to respond to the evaluative 
requirements of the test and I was able to interpret the data in a logical manner and 
reach conclusions relative the reception of each law and he central question of the 
study. 
 
1.6.3 Questionnaires 
I developed questionnaires for both international and local actors for the ICPC and the 
CNL. After preparing initial drafts I distributed them to a number of colleagues at the 
Law Department at London Metropolitan University for their comments. I explained the 
aims of the thesis and the nature of the central research question and asked the 
reviewers for their comments regarding the questionnaires and, in particular, whether 
they felt that the questions would be understood by the respondents, were relevant to 
the aims of the research study and were framed in such a way as to invite response, 
taking into account the length of time it might take to complete them.  
 
The questionnaires were re-shaped according to the feedback that I received. They 
were simplified and shortened considerably. Feedback suggested that the original 
drafts were too complicated and lengthy, and that they would take too long to complete. 
I was concerned that they did not comply with the recommendation of Simmons that 
questionnaires should take no more than half an hour to complete.144  To that end, I 
reduced the questionnaires in size. The CNL questionnaire, which initially contained 26 
questions was reduced to 11 and the ICPC questionnaire was scaled down from 24 to 
9 questions. Ultimately, each questionnaire was no longer than 3 pages of A4 paper. 
The final versions were short, concise and respectful of the limited amount of time 
respondents would wish to devote to answering a questionnaire out of goodwill. 
 
Each questionnaire started with an initial section asking 6 closed questions designed to 
ascertain the expertise of the respondent while ensuring that they would retain their 
anonymity.  Respondents were asked to clarify the nature of the organisation for which 
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they worked, the length of time for which they had worked there, their job 
responsibilities, citizenship and involvement with Afghanistan’s criminal justice system. 
A series of open and closed questions then followed specifically relating to each piece 
of legislation and structured around the central themes of the evaluative test for legal 
transplants proposed in Chapter 2. Each questionnaire ended with an open question 
inviting any further comments relating the legislation in question. 
 
There is a general reluctance on the part of many people to respond to 
questionnaires145  and this was evident in relation to the recipients of the 
questionnaires prepared for this study. This may because of lack of accessibility to 
computers or online facilities that might facilitate easy responses. Responses are 
heavily dependent on the goodwill of recipients, without any reward and many may not 
have had the inclination or time to respond or may alternatively have been suspicious 
of their design in spite of the promise of anonymity.  
 
 
1..6.4 Review of literature and documentary data 
I undertook an extensive review of reports and surveys that have been conducted by 
Afghan ministries, international organisations and NGO’s on various areas of the 
justice system in Afghanistan, some of which relate to criminal procedure. These 
surveys have adopted a variety of qualitative and quantitative research techniques and 
have involved monitoring of criminal case files and interviews with respondents, both 
men and women, from a variety of socio-economic, cultural and ethnic backgrounds 
who have had experience with the formal criminal justice system in Afghanistan and 
with the application of the ICPC and the CNL. This includes government authorities, 
members of the general public, and members of the legal community, including 
prosecutors, the police, judiciary and defence lawyers across the country.146 The 
following  are some of the reports referred to:  
1. AIHRC’s ‘ A Call for Justice’ (2005) involved interviews of 4,150 respondents 
across 32 provinces;147  
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2. Asia Foundation’s, ‘Afghanistan in 2008. A Survey of the Afghan People’ 
interviewed 6,500 respondents;148  
3. Carter and Clark’s ‘No Shortcut to Stability. Justice, Politics and Insurgency in 
Afghanistan’ (2010) involved 40 interviews with a range of Afghan and international 
actors;149  
4. Integrity Watch’s ‘Afghanistan, Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption. 
A National Survey (2010) interviewed 6,500 respondents;150  
5. UNAMA’s ‘Arbitrary Detention in Afghanistan. A Call for Action’ (January 2009) 
reviewed 2,000 detention cases and completed 1,000 prisoner interviews;151  
6. Women and Children Legal Research Foundation’s ‘Women’s Access to Justice. 
Problems and Challenges (2008) interviewed 1,350 respondents;152  
7. Roder’s ‘Provincial Needs Assessment: Criminal Justice in Uruzgan Province’ 
(2010) interviewed judges, prosecutors and justice ministry officials;153 and  
8. Walker’s ‘Culturally-Attuned Governance and Justice in Helmand Province, 
Afghanistan’ (2010) contained 50 interviews with Afghan justice officials.154  
 
 
The information from these reports provided valuable evidence relevant to the four 
strands of the evaluative test for each law. From my review of this documentary data I 
also collated some quantitative data in respect of crime statistics which was significant 
in terms of its contribution to assessing the application of both the ICPC and the 
CNL.155   
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 Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2008. A Survey of the Afghan People (2008) available at 
http://asaifoundation.org/publications/pdf/418 
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 Carter, S. and Clark, K. No Shortcut to Stability. Justice, Politics and Insurgency in Afghanistan, 
Chatham House, (2010) available at www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/985 
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154 Walker, E.L. Culturally-Attuned Governance and Justice in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 
International Media Ventures (April 2010) available at 
http://www.Governance%20and%20Justice%20in%20Hlemand%20-%20WALKER1.pdf  
155
 Nau, D. ‘Mixing Methodologies: Can Bimodal Research be a viable Post-Positivist Tool?’ (1995) The 
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1.6.5 Semi-structured Interviews 
I conducted 24 interviews for this research between November 2006 and April 2011. I 
interviewed a range of actors with experience of the application of the ICPC and the 
CNL. These actors included representatives from the Afghan judiciary, prosecution and 
defence service, personnel from organisations including UNAMA, DFID, IJPO, the 
CJTF and ADIDU and local Afghan politicians.  
 
Of the 24 interviews, 12 were conducted in person and the rest by telephone and 
skype. The interviews were semi-structured and I adopted the relevant questions 
contained in the questionnaires as a framework for the issues discussed during them. 
The interviews lasted between half an hour and three hours. In some cases, I 
interviewed the same person more than once. Records of the interviews were made 
where possible by cassette recordings with the consent of the interviewee. In the 
alternative, with the consent of the interviewee, I made contemporaneous hand written 
notes. Recordings and handwritten notes were then later typed up.  
 
Table 2 confirms the dates of the interviews and the organisation to which they are 
affiliated or their position.  I offered anonymity to the interviewees in order to protect 
their identities. With regard to those who wished to remain anonymous I have indicated 
only their position or institutional affiliation at the time of interview. In some instances I 
have used a generic term to refer to their position (e.g. legal consultant) when 
disclosing their real job description or role in an organisation would reveal their identity.  
 
I also attended the international Conference on the Rule of Law Conference in 
Afghanistan in Rome in July 2007 chaired by the United Nations. In addition I took part 
in a roundtable discussion on 26 April 2011 at Whitehall, London chaired by Alistair 
Burt MP, Minister for Middle East and South Asia, as part of an advisory panel to 
advise on UK policy on justice and rule of law in Afghanistan in the transition period 
leading up to 2014. I was able to have a number of informal discussions with a range of 
UK and international actors and NGO delegates involved in justice and rule of law 
issues during these two events. This includes personnel from the UK Helmand PRT, 
DFID, the CPS, the UK Ministry of Defence, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
International Crisis Group, Penal Reform International, and Transparency International.   
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Table 2 
 
Name   Designation/Organisation   Date 
 
Sayed Banouri156 Afghan Judge and Legal Adviser  10.11.2006 
  
 
Sari Kuovo157  Head of Afghanistan Programme  31.05.2007 
   International Centre for  
   Transitional Justice and former  
   Researcher for Amnesty International  
 
Nazia Hussain158  UNAMA Human Rights officer  06.06.2007 
 
Sophie Goodrick159  Afghan Policy Adviser    25.07.2007 
   Crown Prosecution Service, London 
 
   Senior UNAMA Rule of Law    17.10.2007 
   officer160  
 
   Senior member of UK Rule of Law team 29.02.2008 
    British Embassy, Kabul161     
  
 
     
   UK senior prosecutions adviser   25.06.2008 
   British Embassy Drugs Team, Kabul162  
 
 
 
   Former senior Italian government adviser;  17.07.2008 
   Adviser to the Italian Ministry of Foreign  
   Affairs on Afghan issues and the IJPO163  
 
 
 
   International Drugs and    02.12.2008 
Development Adviser164  
    
 
                                                 
156
 interview by meeting, Sussex 
157
 interview by meeting, London 
158
 interview by meeting, London 
159
 interview by meeting, London. Additional email correspondence 30.07.2007 and 01.08.2007 
160
 interview by meeting, London. Additional email correspondence 19.11.2008 
161
 interview by meeting, London. Additional telephone interview 25.03.2008 
162
 interview by meeting, London 
163
 interview by meeting, Rome. Additional email correspondence 18.07.2008, 06.10.2008 and 23.10.2008 
164
 telephone interview. Additional email correspondence 29.11.2008 and 28.01.2009  
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   International Drugs and   09.12.2008 
   Development Adviser165   
 
    
    
   PRT Justice Adviser,     12.12.2008 
Helmand Province166       
 
 
 
   CNTF Prosecutions Casework Advisor 06.02.2009  
British Embassy, Kabul167 
      
 
Ahjmal Khan168 Afghan Tribal Chief and   01.10.2009 
   Parliamentary candidate  
 
   Rule of Law counsel, 
   US Dept of the Attorney General169  16.11.2009 
   
 
 
   Senior member of Rule of Law Team,  09.02.2010 
   ADIDU, London170      
 
    
   PRT Justice Adviser,  
Helmand Province171    24.02.2010 
 
 
   CNTF Senior Prosecutions Adviser   23.02.2010 
British Embassy, Kabul172  
 
 
   Senior Afghan defence lawyer173    25.04.2010 
   
    
   Senior member of Rule of Law Team,  31.03.2011 
   ADIDU, London174    
 
    
   Defence and Security Counter Corruption 26.04.2011 
   Team, Transparency International  
 
                                                 
165
 telephone interview. Additional email correspondence 13.12.2008 and telephone interview 18.06.2009 
166
 telephone interview. Additional telephone interview 25.03.2010 
167
 interview by meeting, London. Additional telephone interview 24.12.2008 
168
 interview by meeting, London 
169
 interview by telephone. Interviewee based in Kabul 
170
 interview by meeting, London 
171
 interview by meeting, London 
172
 telephone interview. Interviewee based in Kabul 
173
 telephone interview. Interviewee based in Kabul. Additional telephone interview with interpreter 
09.05.2010  
174
 telephone interview 31.03.2011 
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1.6.6 Limitations 
The main limitations encountered during the conduct of the research were costs, work 
commitments and security concerns in Afghanistan. I have had to organise my 
research around my full-time employment commitments, which have prevented the 
potential for placements with organisations based in Afghanistan for any extended 
periods of time from which I might have been able to generate data.  
 
On two occasions I did attempt to make short trips to Afghanistan when work permitted 
with the intention of conducting personal interviews with personnel in the criminal 
courts and at the CJTF. However, both trips were aborted due to security issues and 
costs.  
 
In February 2009 I had made arrangements to travel to Kabul to interview Judges at 
the CNT. The interviews were to be facilitated by a representative from UK Foreign 
Office who agreed to arange travel to and from the Courts and to organise the 
interviews with an interpreter. I would arrange my own travel to Kabul and 
accommodation. Having organised this, security issues at Kabul prevented the trip. On 
11 February 2009 the Taliban attacked government buildings, including the Directorate 
of Prisons and the Ministry of Justice. Following the attack, the Foreign Office 
representative stated that the Office could no longer organise my travel to the Courts. 
Furthermore, the Sussex Institute Research Governance and Ethics Committee at 
Sussex University took the decision that it was not possible to sanction the trip and 
proposed data collection.  
 
I made further arrangements to visit the CNT in February 2010, with the assistance of a 
prosecutions casework adviser based at the British Embassy in Kabul. I contacted 
recommended companies for quotes for arranging security for trips to and from the 
Courts as well as safe accomodation and was informed that the estimated costs would 
amount to £7,500 for a four-day trip, which was prohibitive as I simply could not afford 
this expense.  
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2  Legal Transplants: Justification and 
Evaluation  
 
Introduction 
The ICPC and the CNL were, in their separate ways, designed to contribute to the 
development of Afghanistan’s criminal law framework by introducing new procedural 
rules and more contemporary means of preventing the production, consumption and 
trafficking of illicit narcotics. In both instances international actors responsible for 
drafting them chose to be influenced by western templates rather than Afghan 
legislative sources. Moreover, while looking abroad for inspiration they decided that the 
most effective mechanism for developing these laws was that of legal transplantation.  
To address the issue of whether this was a reasonable response to the challenges that 
the legislators of the ICPC and the CNL faced, which is the central concern of this 
thesis, this chapter examines legal transplants as tools for promoting legal change. It is 
organised into two sections. Section 2.1 seeks to determine whether there was any 
justification for relying on legal transplantation to develop these laws. If legal 
transplants are unpromising devices for constructing new legislation it would suggest 
that the law reformers responsible for the ICPC and the CNL were unjustified in 
employing the legal transplant mechanism and, as a result, that it was unreasonable to 
have developed these laws in this way. In examining this issue of what I term 
‘transplant justification’ this section of the chapter considers the practical utility of legal 
transplants as mechanisms for criminal law reform as well as relevant motivational 
rationale for employing them to create legislation, including criminal legislation in post-
intervention states. 
Section 2.2 is concerned with the key issue of what I refer to as ‘transplant evaluation.’ 
In order to properly address the wider issue of whether reliance on legal transplantation 
was an effective response to the legislative challenges that the particular drafters of the 
ICPC and CNL faced it is necessary to apply to these laws a suitable evaluative test to 
determine whether or not they have proved to be successful. If they have been 
unsuccessful it would also suggest that it was unreasonable for them to have been 
developed by means of legal transplantation. This section of the chapter explores 
theoretical perspectives on transplant feasibility, the conditions required for successful 
legal transplantation and the experience of previous criminal law legal transplants 
before proposing a suitable evaluative test for application to the ICPC and the CNL.  
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Section 2.1 Transplant Justification: The ICPC and The CNL   
 
2.1.1 Legal Transplants as Mechanisms for Criminal Justice Reform 
Evidence would suggest that legislators have a natural professional inclination to turn 
to legal transplants to solve legislative difficulties when creating new law. Following an 
examination of the transplantation of criminal evidence law from Anglo-American to 
continental jurisdictions Damaska noted that ‘in their search for new solutions, lawyers 
are prone to focus almost exclusively on normative aspects of foreign arrangements, 
trying to ascertain whether they hold promise of advantages over domestic law.’1 
Damaska concluded that ‘in seeking inspiration for change, it is perhaps natural for 
lawyers to go browsing in a foreign law boutique.’2 There is a wealth of evidence 
available to substantiate a claim of professional leaning towards legal transplantation 
for legislative problem solving. Historically, legal transplants have contributed to legal 
development in most areas of law and in a large number of the world’s legal 
jurisdictions.3 Examples range from the Code of Hammurabi in 17th century BC4 to law 
and development ‘legal transplant projects’5 undertaken after WWII in countries such 
as Japan, later during the 1960’s and more recently following the collapse of the Soviet 
empire when attempts were made, according to Mertus, ‘to transplant laws and, in 
some cases, entire legal systems from one place to another.’6  
 
The ubiquity and significance of legal transplants as tools for promoting legal change is 
particularly evident in the field of criminal law. The remarkable influence of the 
Napoleonic Code d’Instruction Criminelle (CIC) illustrates the power of the legal 
transplant phenomenon as an instigator for legal development.  Since its enactment in 
1808 it has served as a pervasive precedent for criminal justice reform around the 
world.7 Within 60 years of being passed, versions of it were transplanted into most of 
                                                 
1
 Damaska, M. ‘The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and Continental 
Experiments’ (1997) 45 American Journal of Comparative Law, 839-852, p.839 
2
 ibid, p.852 
3
 For examples of legal transplants and (1) corporate law: see Kanda et al, note 77, chapter 1, p.887-902; 
(2) disabilities law: see Heyer, K.C. ‘The ADA on the Road: Disability Rights in Germany’ (2002) 27 Law 
and Social Enquiry, p.723-772; (3) copyright: see Geller, P.E. ‘Legal Transplants in International Copyright: 
Some Problems of Method’ (1994) 13 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal, p.199-230; (4) financial law: 
Nichols, P.M. ‘The Viability of Transplanted Law: Kazakhstani Reception of a Transplanted Foreign 
Investment Code’ (1997)  18 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, p.1235-
1280; and (5) criminal law: Beckstrom, note 83, chapter 1, p.557-583  
4
 Miller, note 79, chapter 1, p.839 
5
 A phrase adopted by Julie Mertus in ‘From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights 
and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society’ (1998-1999) 14 American University International Law 
Review, 1335-1389, p.1377 
6
 ibid, p.1378; Graziadei, M. ‘Transplants and Receptions’ in Reimann, M. and Zimmermann, R. (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, Oxford University Press (2006), p. 442-474  
7
 Vogler, note 103, chapter 1, p.59 
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the criminal jurisdictions of continental Europe. The Italian criminal codes of 1808 and 
1848 were heavily influenced by it, as were codes in Prussia 1851, Russia in 1864 and 
Holland in 1867.8 Beyond Europe its provisions were borrowed by Japan in 18829 and 
it was a significant influence on criminal procedural reform during the 19th and 20th 
centuries in a number of Muslim countries.10  
 
Legal transplants have also been employed as mechanisms to reform inquisitorial 
criminal justice systems by introducing adversarial procedures. In a wave of post-
revolutionary liberal idealism inspired by the French Revolution a host of countries with 
inquisitorial traditions transplanted adversarial procedures during the 19th century in 
order to introduce jury trials based on the English trial system into their own criminal 
systems. Jury trials were imported into French criminal procedure in 1789, and 
implanted into Spain in 1820, Portugal in 1830, Germany in 1848, Italy in 1860 and 
Russia 1864. More recently they were re-introduced in Russia in 1991 and in Spain in 
1995 by means of legal transplantation.11 Italy radically reformed its inquisitorial system 
by adopting significant adversarial procedures based on the Anglo-American model in 
its 1989 Code of Criminal Procedure.12  Similarly, Russia’s Criminal Procedure Code 
2001 borrowed models from western Europe and the US13 and incorporated Italy’s 
plea-bargaining procedures.14  In addition, a number of eastern European countries 
have instigated or are currently in the process of undertaking similar reforms of their 
procedural codes to adopt adversarial procedures. Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Moldova and Georgia have all recently transplanted adversarial trial elements into their 
criminal procedures.15  
 
Similar criminal procedure ‘revolutions’ have taken place in several Latin American 
jurisdictions over the last 20 years, assisted by legal transplantation. It was estimated 
                                                 
8
 ibid, p.58-59 
9
 Watson, A. ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) 92 Law, Quarterly Review, p.82 
10
 The Ottoman Empire introduced a Penal Code in 1858 based on the CIC and a later procedural Code 
(1879) represented a translation of the French code. Persia’s 1912 Criminal Code was also based on the 
CIC and Egypt’s first criminal code (1882) was similarly dependent on it; see Vogler, note 7, p.115-118 
11
 ibid, p.233-253 
12
 Marafioti, L. ‘Italian Criminal Procedure: A System Caught Between Two Legal Traditions’, in Jackson J., 
Langer, M. and Tillers, P. (eds) Crime, Procedure and Evidence in a Comparative and International 
Context: Essays in Honour of Professor Damaska (2008) Oxford UK: Hart, p.81-98, p.81 
13
 Orland, L. ‘A Russian Legal Revolution: The 2002 Criminal Procedure Code, (2002) 18(1), Connecticut 
Journal of International Law,133-207.  
14
 Burnham W., Maggs, P.B. and Danilenko, G.M. Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation, 
Yonkers, New York, Juris Publishing, 2
nd
 ed. (2004), p.531 
15
 Krapac, D. ‘Some Trends in Continental Criminal Procedure in Transition Countries of South-Eastern 
Europe’ in Jackson, note 12, p.134; Alkon, C. ‘Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant: A Good Idea for 
Troubled Criminal Justice Systems?’ (2010) 19, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, 355-418, 
p.371; and Vogler R.K. and Jokhadze, G. ‘Plea Bargaining in Georgia: A Utilitarian Perspective,’ Tiblisi, 
Georgian Ministry of Justice (2011) 
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in 2003 that 80% of Latin American countries were involved in criminal procedure 
reform to replace their inquisitorial systems with adversarial ones.16 New criminal codes 
importing Anglo-American adversarial procedures by transplantation were introduced in 
Venezuela in 1998-1999, Chile in 2000, Ecuador and Bolivia in 2001 and Nicaragua 
and Honduras in 2002.17  
 
Legal transplants appear to be ubiquitous in the field of criminal law. However, while 
their prevalence underlines their significance as tools for promoting legal development 
it does not fully explain why criminal law legislators might have a ‘natural’ professional 
inclination to rely on them when creating new law. Why do legislators find them so 
appealing? 
 
 
2.1.2 Motivations for Transplanting Law 
 
Foreign transplanted law may be attributed with symbolic significance making it 
attractive to legislators and members of the legal profession who are often recognised 
as the purveyors of legal change.18 Miller’s useful typology refers to these types of 
transplants as ‘legitimacy-generating.’19 The motivation for borrowing foreign law – and 
indeed the prospects of the transplant being successful - is related to the degree of 
prestige that the new law carries.20 A new law may be regarded as more prestigious 
and authoritative if it has been borrowed from a foreign country where it has been 
successfully applied.21  Conversely, according to Watson, who observes that ‘all law 
making ...desperately needs authority,’22 transplanted law enhances the authority of 
those who administer it.23 Graziadei appears to agree, his study of the adoption of 
German criminal law thinking among US scholars concluding that ‘prestige motivates 
imitation.’24 The prestige attached to a law, deriving from legal system from which it is 
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 Haftez, J.L. Latin America: Views on Contemporary Issues in the Region. Pre-Trial Detention, Human 
Rights and Judicial Reform in Latin America (2003), 26(6), Fordham International Law Journal, 1754-77, p. 
1754-5 
17
 Argentina prepared a model penal code for Latin America – the ‘Codigo Procesal Penal Modelo para 
Iberoamerica,’ which reflected German procedures and was adopted by Paraguay in its 1999 criminal 
code; Vogler, note 7, p.172.  
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 Friedman, L. (2001) ‘Some Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants,’ in Nelken, note 75, chapter 
1, 93-98, p. 96 
19
 Miller, note 4, p.839-854 
20
  Watson, A. ‘Aspects of Reception of Law’ (1996), 44, American Journal of Comparative Law, 335-352; 
p.335 
21
  Kanda et al, note 3, p.889 
22
 Watson, note 20, p.335  
23
 Watson, A. (1978) ‘Comparative Law and Legal Change,’ Cambridge Law Journal, 37, p.313-336, p. 
315; Watson, A. The Evolution of Law John Hopkins University Press (1985), p.119. 
24
 Graziadei, M. ‘Transplants and Receptions’ in Jackson, note 12, p. 442-474; p.458 
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sourced 25 or to the perceived global importance of the law provides it with the 
important ingredient of legitimacy.26 The prestige and the authority-enhancing effect of 
foreign law can, then, be a powerful motivation for transplanting it to the extent, 
according to Miller, that it may override any concern about whether or not adopted law 
might actually be appropriate for the receiving criminal system.27  
 
There are also ‘cost-saving’ motivations for transplanting foreign law. They represent 
cheap and easy solutions to legislative problems that have been tried and tested 
elsewhere.28 They have, Watson explains, ‘practical utility.’29 It is simply easier to 
borrow than to create a new law as exemplified by the recent importation of US-
inspired plea-bargaining procedures into the criminal justice systems of Moldova, 
Georgia and Bosnia Herzegovinia in order to reduce pre-trial detention overcrowding.30 
 
Economic development and globalisation are also powerful motivational forces for legal 
transplants. Legislators in developing countries, encouraged by international 
institutions and foreign governments, are increasingly looking to foreign legislative 
models to enable international commerce and investment. According to Miller 
‘economic development, democratization and globalization have today so sharply 
increased the number of legal transplants that at least in developing countries, most 
major legislation now has a foreign component.’31 Theoreticians such as Langer and 
Kahn-Freund agree that the increase in circulation of legal ideas and institutions 
through globalisation has supplemented reform by transplantation.32  Heydebrand goes 
further, suggesting that globalisation is in itself a larger form of the whole process of 
legal transfer.33  
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27
 Miller, note 4, p.858 
28
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 Langer, M. ‘From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the 
Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure,’ (2004), 45, Harvard International Law Journal, 1-64, p.29; 
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Modernisation is also a key justification for transplanting law.34  Countries, particularly 
developing countries, are motivated to borrow foreign law to both modernise their 
justice systems and ensure that they comply with the standards of more economically 
powerful countries. Japan enacted codified law in the 1890’s, including a criminal 
procedure code based on the French CIC, to facilitate the building of a modern nation 
state.35  Between 1839 and 1970 many countries with Muslim majorities adopted 
codified laws from continental Europe in efforts to modernise their criminal justice 
systems.36 Turkey, intent on creating a secular state and marginalising the influence of 
Islamic and customary practices, transplanted European models to modernise its 
criminal justice system in the 1920’s. Its 1926 Penal Code was based on the 1899 
Italian code and the 1928 Criminal Procedure Code was influenced by German 
models.37  Egypt underwent similar ‘modernising’ reforms in 1956 to develop a semi-
secular criminal justice system,38 as did Tunisia in 1958.39  
 
Modernisation is also at the heart of more recent transplants involving the adoption of 
measures to ensure compliance with western-approved international standards of 
human rights and due process. For example, Russia’s 2002 Criminal Procedure Code, 
which included due process provisions, protections for defendants, a bail system and 
plea-bargaining borrowed from the Italians, was specifically designed to ‘make the 
Russian Criminal Justice System more compatible with the requirements of the 
Western democracies’ and to ‘facilitate the integration of Russia into the western 
community.’40 Similarly, reform of the 2009 Georgian Criminal Procedure Code was, 
according to a recent report, ‘directed towards the strengthening of adversarial 
principles as well as bringing the Georgian justice system into compliance with 
international and European human rights standards.’41 
 
International rule of law and development programmes intent on establishing peaceful 
liberal democracies have resulted in law reform initiatives to introduce new ‘modern’ 
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 Beckstrom, note 3, p. 583 
35
 Tanase, T. ‘The Empty Space of the Modern in Japanese Law Discourse’ in Nelken, note 18, p. 190 
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 Vogler, note 7, p.126 
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 Coulson, N. A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press (1999); p.152 
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 Etling, B. Legal Authorities in the Afghan Legal System (1964-1979) (2003) available at 
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Ambassador Vershbob, Opening Remarks at the All Russia Academic Conference on Implementation of 
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law to enhance western and US conceptions of the democratic ideal.42 For adopting 
countries, seeking conformity with US law may be deliberately affected to mark 
symbolic transitions from former regimes or contrived to declare geo-political 
affiliation.43 Mertus identifies distinct waves of law and development movements when 
international actors embarked on large-scale legal transplantation as a result of 
technical assistance programmes for the development and legal regeneration of 
various countries throughout the world.44 In the aftermath of WWII legal actors from the 
victorious nations engaged in projects to revise constitutions of the defeated powers.45 
Moreover, in the 1960’s an explosion of law and development activity took place when 
US academics and private foundations sent lawyers to countries, principally in Africa 
and Latin America, to train lawyers and promote US law as a vehicle for creating liberal 
democracies.46 These programmes aspired ‘to promote US-style legal education and 
the use of law as a positive instrument of socio-political change’47 in such a way that it 
would engender in the developing countries48 US liberal ideals such as the protection 
of individual freedoms, the expansion of local participation in decision-making and the 
enhancement of social equality.49 The modernisation of the various legal systems with 
which the external US-promoting agents were involved was processed by significant 
transplantation of foreign law.50 
 
A further wave of law and development programmes followed the collapse of socialist 
systems under the former Soviet Union in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s when legal 
experts, largely from Western democracies, engaged in major constitutional and legal 
reform projects51 which, once again, involved the adoption of legal transplants.52  More 
recently, as noted in chapter 1, multiple NGO’s and the UN have been actively 
engaged in various legal technical assistance in post-intervention states to promote 
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rule of law promotion and transitions from conflict to peace. In the process they have 
engaged in projects of legal and institutional transplantation to initiate reform, not least 
with regard to enhancing the criminal law frameworks of these countries.  
2.1.3 Motivation and Post-Intervention Criminal Law Reform 
 
Any of the previously noted motivations for transplanting law may be at stake during 
criminal law reform initiatives in post-intervention states. New transplanted law may 
ensure prestige and legitimacy, or may be the result of simple expediency. The quick 
practical utility of legal transplants as tools for legal reform can also render them 
attractive to criminal law reformers intent on developing criminal law frameworks to 
promote rule of law. Adopting tried and tested legal transplants can save valuable time 
in circumstances where there is an urgent requirement for new criminal law in countries 
emerging from conflict and to help to fill any ‘rule of law vacuum’ resulting from 
ineffective or insufficient applicable law.53   
 
Globalisation is also a significant motivational force for post-intervention criminal law 
legal transplants. Just as globalisation facilitates the expansion of transnational crime 
such as drug trafficking in post-intervention states, as has been the case in 
Afghanistan,54 at the same time it can guide the development of legislative processes 
to tackle it. Post-intervention states lacking suitable preventative law risk becoming 
safe havens for organised criminal and terrorist activity. The content of new law created 
to counter threats of this nature can be steered by the requirements of multilateral 
conventions, instruments and bilateral treaties which promote legislative similarity 
between signatory countries to enhance international co-operation in the investigation 
and prosecution of transnational criminal activity. The consequent drive for global 
legislative uniformity can be usefully accommodated by legal transplantation.55  
 
In addition, outdated laws in post-intervention states may need to be replaced by more 
‘modern’ legislation equipped with tools to deal with contemporary criminal realities. 
UNTAC drafted a new criminal law for Cambodia, enacted by the Supreme National 
Council in 1992, to replace inadequate domestic legislation.56 Bosnian criminal law 
lacked definitions for relevant crimes, such as corruption and money laundering, and 
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failed to provide mechanisms to restrict these activities, such as the confiscation of 
profits, necessitating legal changes by a new criminal procedural code.57 In a similar 
manner, the CNL was designed to introduce modern investigative procedures into 
Afghanistan’s criminal law framework in order to tackle increasingly sophisticated illicit 
drug production and trafficking.58 
 
Whether prestige, globalisation, modernisation or efficiency are implicated, one of the 
key objectives of employing legal transplants to facilitate criminal law reform in conflict 
states has been the necessity of ensuring compliance with international due process 
and human rights standards. The development since WWII of areas such as 
international criminal law, transitional justice and human rights law has created a 
globally recognised rights framework which influences the normative content of new 
domestic criminal law. New law must be consistent with internationally approved fair 
trial standards, such as those provided for in the ICCPR, easily realisable by 
transplanting provisions from foreign laws that already conform with these 
requirements.59 In East Timor, UNTAET revoked sections of the existing Indonesian 
Criminal Code in 1991 lacking compliance with international human rights standards 
and later promulgated a more appropriate criminal law into which were transplanted 
provisions in tune with international human rights expectations.60  Similarly, in addition 
to modernising Cambodia’s criminal justice system by providing new rules for 
detention, substantive law and procedure, UNTAC’s 1992 Criminal Code ensured the 
protection of citizen’s human rights.61 In Afghanistan, the ICPC was designed to 
provide a uniform criminal procedure while also guaranteeing compliance with 
international legal and human rights obligations. The development of these laws was 
facilitated by the adoption of legal transplants, highlighting their motivational attraction 
to legislators intent on ensuring that new criminal law in post-intervention states 
complies with international human rights and due process standards.  
 
The variety of reasons why legal transplants are attractive mechanisms for legal 
development and the historical frequency with which legal transplantation has been 
responsible for developing new criminal law would appear to support an argument that 
criminal law reformers in post-intervention states are indeed justified in relying on the 
transplantation of foreign solutions and, therefore, that the same must be said of the 
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legislators responsible for the ICPC and the CNL. However, before reaching any 
conclusions in this respect it is helpful to examine theoretical perspectives on 
transplant feasibility, which provide valuable insights on the legitimacy and constraints 
of legal transplants as tools for promoting legal change.62 If legal transplants can be 
adjudged to be valueless or even unfeasible tools for legal change there is perhaps no 
justification for employing them at all.  
 
 
2.1.4 Theoretical Perspectives on Legal Transplants as Tools for Legal Change 
 
The value of legal transplants as tools for creating legal change and as explanatory 
devices for trans-national legal development has been the subject of considerable 
academic debate and, perhaps unhelpfully for law reformers, disagreement. The 
debate was triggered to a large extent by the publication in 1974 of Alan Watson’s 
‘Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law.’63 Watson suggested that legal 
transplants have the exalted distinction of being the one fundamental device for 
explaining legal development across the world’s jurisdictions. According to him, 
‘transplanting is …the most fertile source of development. Most changes in most 
systems are the result of borrowing.’64   
 
Much of the academic literature on legal transplants that has followed Watson’s thesis 
has been concerned with the association between a transplanted law and its importing 
and exporting environments; in a wider context the relationship between law and 
society as an explanation for the development of law. To a large extent disagreements 
over the existence and feasibility of legal transplants have reflected conflicting 
perspectives over the relationship between law and the society in which it exists.65 
Watson’s controversial theory on legal transplants represents one extreme. His 
historical analysis of legal development and the prevalence of legal transplantation as a 
mechanism for promoting legislative change leads him to conclude that there is only a 
tenuous relationship between law and the society in which it operates, the significance 
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of which is at best limited.66 The recipient system simply ‘does not require any real 
knowledge of the social, economic, geographical and political context of the origin and 
growth of the original rule.’67 Law, for Watson, consists of prepositional statements and 
rules which have an autonomous existence separate from environmental concerns, 
affording them a nomadic character that enables them to be easily transplanted from 
one jurisdiction to another. Drawing on numerous examples of the pervasive influence 
of Roman law on the development of law in continental Europe he concludes that ‘the 
picture that emerge[s] [I]s of continual massive borrowing…of rules.68 Indeed, the many 
examples of successful borrowing and transplantation of legal rules over the course of 
legal history, rules which have not experienced change in their new environment, 
demonstrate the autonomous nature of law and its independence from external 
influences69. Similarly, rules which might seem deeply entrenched in their political 
context are capable of being successfully transplanted to countries with quite different 
socio-political cultures.70   
 
Legrand offers a perspective on transplant feasibility entirely at odds with that proposed 
by Watson, asserting that legal rules are so dependent on the national environment in 
which they exist that they are incapable of travelling at all. Law, then, cannot be 
transplanted. A rule’s very existence is dependent on the meaning ascribed to it by its 
interpretative community, its ‘invested meaning,’71 which is conditioned by cultural and 
historical dynamics. Because the meaning of rules are so culture-specific, they cannot 
be transferred between countries simply because ‘meaning does not survive the 
journey.’72 Legrand contends that if an attempt is made to transfer a legal rule 
wholesale from one country to another the only thing that would survive the trip would 
be ‘a meaningless form of words.’73 The relationship between legal rules and society is 
so interdependent that essentially, for Legrand, transplants are ‘impossible.’74 If law 
reformers are to follow Legrand’s advice, they should abandon completely any notion 
of attempting to create new law through the advent of legal transplantation.  
 
Several other theories have been proposed on the existence, cause and relevance of 
legal transplantation as an explanation for legal development, which lie somewhere 
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between the opposing views of Watson and Legrand, each offering different variations 
on the key factors that play a part in transplant feasibility. Most of these positions owe 
their heritage to Charles Montesquieu, who in the mid-18th century, declared that: 
  
‘the political and civil laws of each nation should be so closely tailored to the 
people for whom they are made, that it would be pure chance [‘un grand 
hazard’] if the laws of one nation could meet the needs of another…’75 
 
Montesquieu’s interpretation of the development of law has found resonance among a 
large number of theoreticians76 all advocating that law corresponds with societal 
features or is an expression of social interests or needs and that its growth and 
development are dependent on any number of physical, cultural and political 
ingredients unique to the particular society it serves.77  
 
Socio-legal theoreticians of this persuasion have a shared perception of law not as a 
Watsonian autonomous entity but as something that is relative, molded by various 
itinerant features of the society it serves. Law is bound so closely to its habitat by a 
potent mixture of physical, sociological, cultural and economic forces that it can rarely 
have validity in any other environment. Twining usefully sums up this contextual view of 
the relationship between law and society, which submits that: 
 
‘a legal system ... should become part of the landscape rather than appear as 
an alien imposition; and it should embody and express local values in a 
coherent fashion. In short it should be in harmony with its context.’78 
 
This interdependence between law and society makes the adoption of foreign law 
problematic. While law may travel, the processes that foster and enable the trip are 
complicated and multifarious and dependent on stimuli that are more relevant than 
legal transplants alone for motivating and shaping legal change, such as society, 
culture, economy,79 politics and power.80 Context is everything for legal development.  
 
The positivist approach of Watson, which assumes that legal transplants are the very 
mechanisms of legal change, contrasts sharply with Montesquieu and reductionist 
perspectives of legal sociology and development which argue that law develops as a 
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reflection of social dynamics.81 These opposing stances have led to occasionally 
heated academic debate on the relationship between law and society and indeed the 
value and even existence of legal transplants. Friedman warns that Watson’s 
perspective on legal development ‘leads us down a blind alley’82 to no more than a 
‘ludicrous’83 dead end; Abel condemns Watson’s judgements as ‘vague’84 and his 
reasoning as ‘simplistic’.85 Even Ewald, one of Watson’s more avid supporters, admits 
to reservations, conceding that the more extreme or ‘strong’ version of Watsonian 
theory is ‘a menace,’86 as it relies too much on ‘categorical and…one-dimensional’87 
examinations of private law rules to the extent that it promotes a form of scholarship 
that is ‘bankrupt.’88 
 
In addition to controversy surrounding issues such as the value and even the existence 
of legal transplants there has been considerable academic disagreement about the 
validity of the legal transplant metaphor as an accurate tool for describing the transfer 
of law. Is it a sufficiently flexible descriptive mechanism for describing exactly what is 
going on when law travels from one society to another? Like any metaphor it has its 
limitations. Friedman regards it as an inappropriate term for what really amounts to a 
‘diffusion of rules, codes or practices from one country to another’89 by processes of 
begging, borrowing, stealing or imposition brought about by forces of modernisation 
and industrialisation.90 Perhaps it does not adequately capture the realities of what 
happens with some legal transfers, where ideas and institutions may be imitated at 
some levels but not at others. Perhaps also the metaphor of legal transplant is too 
much of a blunt instrument to adequately describe what is going on when law is 
transferred between different legal systems. Langer prefers ‘legal translation’ as an 
explanatory device for analysing the transfer of law, submitting that the transformations 
that occur when law is transferred are the result of actions taken by translators and 
legislators or due to differences in procedural language between original and recipient 
countries.91  Teubner suggests that actually law is transferred by a process of irritation 
that prompts a new set of events and a series of transformations in receiving legal 
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systems.92 This concept avoids some of the problems associated with the legal 
transplant metaphor as it can explain how the transfer of a legal rule may stimulate a 
series of transformations in receiving legal systems. However, because Teubner 
argues that irritants do not necessarily derive from legal systems external to the system 
it is irritating, his ‘legal irritant’ metaphor loses a comparative dimension that makes the 
legal transplant metaphor such a powerful comparative tool. 
 
It is important to acknowledge the shortcomings of the legal transplant metaphor. 
Nevertheless, no one metaphor is likely to be able to encapsulate everything that is 
important about the way law develops. While acknowledging its limitations, the legal 
transplant metaphor still retains considerable relevance at a theoretical level. It is a 
valuable heuristic device for explaining the transfer of legal institutions, norms and 
rules between countries and jurisdictions.93 It is a powerful analytical tool as it enables 
comparison between transferring and receiving legal systems and between existing 
and newly transplanted rules, norms or institutions.94 It is also a focal point for debate 
on the wider issue of the relationship between law and society. Although this debate 
has at times been abrasive and unconstructive, it must nevertheless be welcomed for 
highlighting both the power and weakness of legal transplantation as a mechanism for 
legal reform.  It also provides valuable lessons on the constraints of legal 
transplantation as a mechanism for promoting legal change. 
 
2.1.5 Theoretical Lessons 
 
What lessons can be learned from the various theoretical perspectives on legal 
transplants to help to determine whether the legislators responsible for the ICPC and 
the CNL were justified in employing legal transplants to reform the criminal law 
framework in Afghanistan?  
 
Legrand’s advice that legal transplants should be regarded by post-intervention law 
reformers as irrelevant is refuted by considerable evidence demonstrating their 
existence and longevity across a wide range of subject matter including, as I have 
noted, criminal law. Overwhelming historical evidence suggests that far from being 
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impossible it is certainly possible for criminal law to develop by means of legal 
transplantation.  The same evidence, as well as the variety of motivations for relying on 
legal transplants to develop law, challenges sociological theories that maintain that law 
can develop only as a mirror of society. Moreover, as a consequence of the necessity 
for prestigious or ‘quick’ law, and of the processes of modernisation and globalisation 
Montesquieu’s assertion that the transfer of culturally embedded laws between nations 
would be ‘un grand hazard’ would seem to be no longer tenable.95 Globalising 
processes, such as international human rights standards, have created world-wide 
networks of legal reference points which have reduced the interdependence between 
national cultural identity and legal development and increased the attraction to 
reformers of transplanting legal solutions to legislative problems. 
 
What of Watson’s stance on legal change? His premise that the legal transplant is the 
one device that accounts for legal development would suggest that those responsible 
for the ICPC and the CNL were certainly justified in borrowing foreign law. For Watson, 
law reformers need only consider transplanting law as a means for creating new 
legislation and developing new legal institutions. The baggage that might be known as 
‘societal influences’ and ‘local context’ is largely inconsequential. 
 
Although it is perhaps arguable that Watson’s conclusions should only have application 
to the field of private law from which he draws most of his data, his contention that legal 
transplants are ubiquitous is difficult to rebut. Moreover, Watson’s conviction that the 
antiquity of legal transplants demonstrates that they have been a major source of legal 
development is supported by the experience of many of the world’s criminal justice 
systems.96  His work is undeniably useful for criminal law reformers in post-intervention 
states in that it at least encourages them to respect legal transplants as potentially 
viable promoters of legal change. 
 
Where Watsonian theory is less useful is that it fails to properly consider what factors 
might be important for the successful transplanting of law. For the most part, Watson is 
non-committal on this issue.97 He prefers to concentrate on output rather than 
outcomes and has generally been more concerned with demonstrating that legal 
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transplants are the primary source of legal development98 than with the finer details of 
what may or may not make them successful sources.99 Ultimately, Watson’s message 
for criminal legal reformers in post-intervention states would appear to be this: if you 
are creating new law you are certainly justified in considering employing legal 
transplants. In fact, this is how law develops. If you are also concerned about whether 
or not the new law will actually succeed, there is a presumption that it will, based on the 
experiences of legal history. The result is a bias towards transplant success and 
ultimately, a theoretical stance that promotes transplant justification but which is 
fettered by the obvious criticism of unrealistic prejudice towards the effect and use of 
the legal transplant mechanism.  
 
If the theories of Watson, Legrand and Montesquieu do not have all the answers to 
legal development where does this leave us on the issue of transplant justification and 
the ICPC and the CNL? It is perhaps more advantageous to balance the more 
constructive features of the various theoretical outlooks on legal transplantation rather 
than being concerned with their differences. Evidence from criminal law reform in post-
intervention states and the motivational rationale for employing transplants supports 
Damaska’s observation that lawyers appear to be naturally inclined to transplant law to 
promote legal change. Indeed, as Sannerholm maintains ‘charged with the task of 
supporting criminal law reform…an international expert would be hard pressed not to 
look at models and international benchmarks.’100  
 
Reformers drafting new law in post-intervention states, such as those responsible for 
the ICPC and the CNL are, it would seem, justified in considering using legal 
transplants to develop law, a position that positivist approaches such as Watsons 
would endorse. However, whether it is realistic for them to go on to do so will depend 
on their potential for successful reception, an argument that draws on sociological 
positions that insist that successful legal development is inextricably linked to local 
context. This premise acknowledges a relationship between law and the society in 
which it exists. It also acknowledges that law can develop by way of legal 
transplantation, but that the prospects of it being successfully received are related to 
local contextual concerns. However, if criminal law reformers are to evaluate the 
prospects of a transplanted law being successfully received before deciding whether it 
might be realistic to adopt it, what are the conditions of success? How is transplanted 
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law to be evaluated and what are the variables which might contribute to its successful 
reception? These issues need to be addressed. The drafters of the ICPC and the CNL 
may well have been justified in considering using the legal transplant mechanism to 
develop their laws. But to assess whether it was realistic for them to do so necessitates 
the application of a suitable evaluative test for these laws to determine whether or not 
they have been successful. 
 
Section 2.2  Transplant Evaluation: Developing an evaluative test for the ICPC 
  and the CNL 
2.2.1 The Conditions of Success 
 
A number of useful theories have been developed identifying the determinants for the 
successful transplantation of law and suggesting ways in which success can be 
measured. Kahn-Freund has maintained that not all rules can be successfully 
transplanted.101 Environmental issues matter and they conspire to create ‘degrees of 
transferability’102 of legal provisions and institutions. Whether law can be successfully 
transplanted depends where on a spectrum ranging from ‘mechanical’ (easy to 
transplant) to ‘organic’ (not easy to transplant) they sit. Successful transplants can 
occur but it is the quality of the political relationship between the donating and recipient 
countries that determines their success or failure. Some rules which might have a weak 
connection to the socio-political structure of the society where they exist may be easily 
transplanted, whereas other rules with close connections to their socio-political 
environment are less likely to be transplantable.103 Successful transplantation, then, 
depends on new rules being put in the right socio-political plot.104  
 
Kanda’s views on transplant evaluation also emphasise the need to find ‘the right plot’. 
He defines success as the ‘use of the imported legal rule in the same way that it is 
used in the home country, subject to adaptations to local conditions,’105  and argues 
that a transplant fails when it is not used or when its application and enforcement result 
in unforeseen consequences. Success and failure are determined by the ‘fit’ between 
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the adopted rule and the host environment and the fewer alternatives there are to the 
transplant, the greater the prospects of success.106   
 
Other evaluations of legal transplants rely less on comparative analyses between host 
and foreign countries and are confined more closely to assessments of their 
acceptance within the host country. Turkey’s successful adoption of the Swiss civil 
code in 1926 depended, according to Lipstein on its ‘organisation, education and ... 
flexible system of administration and judicial practice.’107 The transplantation of labour 
exchanges in Holland during German occupation in WWII could be construed as 
successful, Jettinghoff maintains, relative to the extent to which the Dutch had forgotten 
the origins of the new rules or institutions.108 In a similar vein, Harding’s review legal 
development in South East Asia revealed that transplanted laws would successfully 
‘stick’ if they were subject to ‘serial cultural absorption and accommodation’ in recipient 
countries.109  
 
Berkowitz’s analysis of the reception of transplanted law in 49 different countries during 
the 19th and early 20th centuries, a particularly useful contribution to the issue of 
transplant evaluation, revealed that transplanted law may work successfully if it 
contains principles familiar to the local population and if it is capable of adaptation by 
local users.110  From this Berkowitz deduced that the conditions for success are related 
not so much to the fact that any law is transplanted, but to the manner in which it is 
introduced. Moreover, Berkowitz surmised, legal transplants that develop ‘internally 
through a process of trial and error, innovation and correction, and with the 
participation and involvement of users of the law, legal professionals and other 
interested parties …tend to be highly effective.’ 111 
 
Berkowitz’s findings suggest that law can certainly develop effectively through the 
process of legal transplantation. However, the processes adopted for transplantation 
have to be right and these entail proper and due consideration of local context and 
ownership. In addition, countries which are familiar with transplanted legal concepts are 
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more likely to adopt them successfully and rules capable of being modified to account 
for local considerations have a better prospect of success. Transplant success is, 
therefore, essentially a socio-legal concern, dependent on an inter-relationship 
between law and society. 
 
These findings resonate with those of De Lisle following his assessment of the effect of 
US legal assistance programmes in former Soviet Bloc countries and China in the 
1990’s. De Lisle concluded that the successful importation of legal transplants, while 
tied to their approximation with the legal culture of the importing country, could be 
facilitated by close collaboration between domestic and foreign legal experts, reliance 
on local expertise to determine the content of transplanted law and commitment by the 
importing country to implement its provisions.112 
 
The conclusions by both Berkowitz and De Lisle are insightful but perhaps their use in 
the context of assessing criminal law legal transplants, which are the focus of this 
thesis, is questionable. The majority of the legal transplants observed in both studies 
involved civil and commercial rather than criminal legislation. This reflects a trend 
among theories on transplant success and evaluation. None of the aforementioned 
theories have derived from evaluations of criminal law legal transplants, or indeed 
those connected to the reform of post-intervention criminal law frameworks. This is 
potentially significant because there is an important distinction to be drawn between 
civil law and criminal law transplants which may impact on evaluations of their success 
or failure. In the former, different forms of procedure are entirely optional, diverse and 
not subject to determining international precepts. In the latter case, however, all 
transplantation is subject to the imperative demand to respect international human 
rights norms. The international human rights framework provides benchmarks for the 
normative content of criminal law. The provisions which ensure conformity with this 
framework, and with instruments such as the ICCPR, are not negotiable on ‘cultural’ 
grounds but are regarded as an absolute necessity irrespective of the economic, 
political or sociological environment of the receiving country. To that extent, if 
provisions included in transplanted criminal law are consistent with international human 
rights and due process standards, it is generally because they have to be included. 
There is no legislative choice on this issue. Therefore, it would be difficult to maintain 
that they should be judged against measurements of ‘efficiency’ or ‘competition’ or 
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criticised relative to the extent that they ‘find the right plot’, ‘fit’ or have become 
‘unstuck’.  
 
It would, however, be unwise to dismiss entirely the value of the aforementioned 
theoretical perspectives on transplant feasibility when trying to develop a suitable 
evaluative test for post-intervention criminal law transplants. They do not lead to a 
complete theoretical cul-de-sac but instead carry important messages. Perhaps most 
noteworthy of all is the fact that most of the premises on transplant evaluation 
represent revisionist interpretations of Montesquieu’s basic assertion that 
environmental factors are related to the development of law and hence are critical to 
transplant feasibility. Even Watson appears to make concessions in this respect. In 
what Ewald alludes to as the ‘weak’ version of his theory Watson allows for a link 
between society and legal development.113 Here, Watson takes a more moderate 
stance on their inter-relationship, one which accepts that ‘no reasonable person would 
wish to deny that to some extent a people’s law is peculiar to it, that the law does 
reflect that people’s desires [and that… it is easy to agree that a legal rule is often the 
result of social engineering.’114 Perhaps the gap between Watson and his sociological 
critics on the influence of local conditions on transplant feasibility is not so large. This 
confirms the premise that success is fundamentally related to local environment.  
 
While this is undoubtedly useful, if we are to find a suitable means of evaluating the 
reception of transplanted criminal law, including post-intervention criminal law, and 
understand the variables that might contribute to successful and failed reception, it is 
constructive to reflect on the experience of criminal legal reform that has involved legal 
transplantation. This provides further valuable insight into the determinants of 
transplant feasibility, useful for developing a suitable evaluative test for transplanted 
law, such as the ICPC and the CNL, designed to reform the criminal law frameworks of 
conflict states. 
 
2.2.2 Evaluations of transplanted criminal law  
 
Evaluations of the effect of some of the legislation introduced by legal transplants 
during various law and development and rule of law promotion movements have 
revealed mixed results. The movement that witnessed the exportation of US law in the 
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1970’s has been condemned by some commentators as a failure.115 Although driven by 
well-intentioned US academics and lawyers it was undermined by adherence to 
arrogant assumptions of the effectiveness of laws and legal systems that were flawed, 
untested and found ultimately to be unsuitable.116 More recent legislative efforts to 
promote rule of law in post-intervention societies involving transplanting templates have 
been criticised as ‘disappointing,’117 their potential for succeeding reduced by a failure 
to properly consider the relationship in recipient countries between formal law and 
cultural norms. Brooks’ analysis of rule of law development in Kosovo led her to 
conclude that ‘changes in formal law matter where prevailing cultural norms say that 
formal law matters. But when formal law has little resonance for people, changes in 
formal law cannot by themselves create new normative commitments to the rule of 
law.’118  
 
A number of commentaries on criminal reform involving the transplantation of 
unfamiliar foreign models into established procedures have also revealed disappointing 
results. Reichelt suggests that the introduction of plea-bargaining in the Republic of 
Georgia was a well-intentioned but ultimately ill-conceived transplant largely because it 
did not have a sufficiently equipped defence bar at the time of the adoption of the new 
system to render it fair and equitable. Rather than the transplanted procedure 
achieving the desired effect of reducing trials it increased the potential for corruption 
and alienated the public against the state justice system.119 A weak defence bar also 
hampered the successful transplantation of western European and US adversarial 
procedures into the Russian Criminal Procedure Code in 2001. Drawing from lessons 
from the Russian experience, Vogler maintains that the imposition of adversariality and 
due process norms by law on its own is unlikely to bring about significant procedural 
change.120 Alkon reaches similar conclusions with regard to the transplantation of U.S.-
style plea-bargaining into the Moldovan criminal justice system and refers to it as a 
‘transplant failure,’ perpetrated by lack of support from local legal professionals.121   
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Other studies on criminal justice reforms involving transplantation offer different 
insights into and occasionally more optimistic appraisals of transplant feasibility. 
Krapac suggests that recent criminal law reform conducted by European countries, 
notably Croatia, involving the adoption of adversarial procedures, has been successful, 
resulting in better human and defence rights protections that meet international 
standards.122 Krapac also notes that new criminal law in these countries has often been 
subject to repeated amendment, indicating that legislators initial choices of 
transplanted law may not always be realistic and may often be resisted.123 This is 
supported by the experience of criminal justice reform in Italy. The 1989 Code of 
Criminal Procedure imported significant adversarial features into Italy’s inquisitorial 
system, but the model intended by the original reformers has since been eroded by the 
Constitutional Court and legislature. The Italian experience underlines the difficulties of 
transplanting procedures from different legal traditions.124 According to Marafioti 
‘different legal traditions and cultures foster different responsibilities within a system, 
thus encouraging different expectations,’125 which may impact on whether or not a 
transplant is successfully received. Cultural resistance to a transplant may adversely 
affect its prospects of achieving its intended outcome.126 The same may be said of a 
lack of genuine commitment to reform amongst the legal authorities of the host country 
responsible for applying the provisions of any transplanted law introduced to promote 
legal change.127 
 
Studies have also revealed that the existence (or not) of a culture of legality in the 
receiving country is also an important variable which can impact on transplant 
feasibility. No matter how potentially effective a transplanted criminal law may be, its 
prospects of succeeding is likely to be reduced in societies where the legitimacy of 
state law and adherence to state concepts of criminal justice are weak. The 
transplantation of laws to promote criminal justice and rule of law are less likely to be 
successful in the absence of a commitment to establishing these ideals.128  
 
What conclusions can be drawn from these examples of transplanted law to effect 
criminal justice reform to help determine the manner in which legal transplants intended 
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to effect criminal justice reform in post-intervention states should be evaluated? Some 
criminal law transplants have been successful, while others have encountered 
reception difficulties, attributable to variables such as the capacity and commitment of 
legal professionals and the progress of related infrastructural and capacity-building 
reform efforts. The concept of success generally emerges, however, as controversial 
and difficult to measure.129 It may depend on whose point of view is considered. An 
international reformer may regard a law that they have drafted, dependent on foreign 
texts, has been a success merely because it has been enacted, while a judge applying 
it may regard it as a failure. Furthermore, some aspects of transplanted laws may be 
successful, while others are not.130 It is difficult to judge accurately the effect of any law, 
let alone transplanted criminal law or the variable that will determine its success or 
failure. In this regard it is hard not to sympathise with Grazl’s experience of ‘the ubiquity 
of uncertainty during transplantation’131 or to agree with Beckstrom’s observation that 
‘the identification of performance indicators for a transplanted legal system is a 
perplexing business as best.’132  
 
While acknowledging this, it is nevertheless perhaps useful to note that the experience 
of legal transplants in the field of criminal law largely confirms Watsonian optimism over 
the significance of the legal transplantation medium for developing law. They also verify 
sociological perspectives of the centrality of local environment to legal development. 
Ultimately, they confirm the premise that law can develop by legal transplantation, but 
that the fundamental issue of whether or not they will succeed is tied to local contextual 
concerns. Furthermore, the weight of academic evidence on this field suggests that the 
criteria that are adopted for evaluating the success of any proposed or actual legal 
transplant must ultimately be fundamentally related to the environment into which the 
new law is imported. The same rule of thumb must apply for assessing legal 
transplants adopted for criminal law reform in post-conflict situations. 
 
2.2.3 An evaluative test for the ICPC and the CNL 
 
What yardsticks should, then, be adopted for evaluating the ICPC and the CNL? As 
noted, what emerges from evaluative studies of legal transplants in general and from 
the experience of criminal law reform involving legal transplantation is that local 
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environment matters. Success or failure is connected to local contextual concerns such 
as local ownership, participation and commitment to reform. Evaluations of legal 
transplants in post-intervention states must therefore be responsive to the idiosyncratic 
legal requirements of the country concerned at the time of its introduction and during 
the course of the evaluation, placed in the wider context of its legal traditions, cultural 
considerations and social, economic and political concerns. These issues, then, must 
be addressed in the context of Afghanistan and its criminal justice system at the time of 
the enactment of the ICPC and the CNL and during the period of their application for 
the purposes of evaluating the success of these laws.133  
 
While these wider issues must be borne in mind, I suggest that two fundamental 
questions should also be addressed. Firstly, has the legislation established by way of 
legal transplant been accepted by the local population of the recipient post-conflict 
country? And secondly, has it achieved the objectives for which it was enacted in the 
context of the post-conflict situation in which it was introduced?  
 
The issue of a laws ‘acceptance’ is connected first and foremost to the manner in which 
it is applied. The choice of appropriate performance indicators for assessing the 
application of a law will depend on the institutional capacity and infrastructure available 
to enable data collection. Objective performance indicators such as offending levels, 
detention rates, prison populations, trial length data, human rights abuses conviction 
and acquittal rates can be important for assessing the manner in which criminal 
legislation is being applied.134 These quantitative variables are certainly informative. 
Nevertheless, they are dependent on the availability of reliable data and data collection 
systems which may not be available or which may make take considerable time to 
establish in post-interventionist states such as Afghanistan, where the implementation 
of criminal law has been conditioned by severely damaged infrastructure and 
institutional capacity.135 A key factor, however, in assessing the application of law is 
gauging the manner in which a law is being applied by local practitioners.  Beckstrom’s 
study in Ethiopia noted that ‘judges and lawyers practicing new laws are in the front line 
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of the confrontation between new laws and the nation. The acceptance and 
effectiveness of the entire legal order depend in the first instance and for the most part 
on these men.’136 The acceptance of transplanted criminal law in conflict states will, it is 
proposed, be fundamentally linked to the way in which it is being applied by local 
police, prosecutors, defence lawyers and Judges.  
 
A law is more likely to be applied, and therefore accepted, if it is valued and considered 
meaningful and appropriate by its local users. Berkowitz suggests that for law to be 
effective ‘it must be meaningful in the context in which it is applied so citizens have an 
incentive to use the law.’137 The more familiar that the legal authorities of the receiving 
country are with the transplanted legal concepts, the more likely it is that they will be 
successfully adopted. This resonates with Dezalay’s argument that the success of a 
transplant is tied up in the extent to which the local society will deem it worthy of 
investment.138 It also connects with the work of Brooks on ‘norm-change’ promotion in 
rule-of-law projects. Brooks argues that ‘formal law will be most successful when its 
rituals are widely acknowledged as meaningful and appropriate.’139  
 
This strand of the proposed evaluative test for legal transplants advocates 
contemplation about justice being acceptable to the local population. In line with 
Beckstrom’s views on the value of local legal practitioners to legal transplantation, a 
transplanted law will have an improved prospect of being successful if it is considered 
meaningful and appropriate by the citizens it affects and the legal actors and law 
enforcement agents who are applying it. This includes the police, prosecutors, judges 
and defence lawyers. The more meaningful and appropriate a law is considered to be 
by this cohort of the local population the easier it will be for them to understand and 
enforce, improving the prospects of it being successfully transplanted. In evaluating the 
ICPC and the CNL it will be important therefore, to guage as far as possible the extent 
to which this section of the local population consider them meaningful and appropriate 
in the context counter-narcotics and criminal justice in Afghanistan. It is likely that this 
will be largely conditioned by the degree to which these two laws are considered to be 
compatible with the country’s established legal order as regards criminal procedure and 
counter-narcotics. The more compatible a transplanted law is with the established legal 
order of the host country, the more likely it is to acquire meaning by the local population 
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and be considered appropriate for use by them, to the extent that it is accepted and 
successfully absorbed into the legislative framework for the country.140 This resonates 
with the findings of both Berkowitz and De Lisle’s studies that advocate close 
approximation between the legal traditions of an adopting country and a legal 
transplant in order to ensure the transplantation of effective laws. It is essential, then, to 
consider these laws closely within the context of the plural legal traditions that make up 
Afghanistan’s criminal justice system.  
 
Assessing the acceptance by the local population of a law transplanted to reform the 
criminal law framework of a post-conflict country does not in itself provide sufficient 
information to evaluate whether it has failed or succeeded. It is also necessary to 
consider a law’s objectives and the extent to which they have been achieved. The 
objectives may be discerned from the reasons behind the development of the law or 
articulated within its provisions or by those involved in drafting it. If law reformers 
choose to rely on legal transplants as mechanisms for legal reform it is reasonable to 
assume that they do so for a reason with specific objectives in mind which they believe 
the transplanted law can fulfil. An assessment of these identifiable objectives and the 
extent to which they have been fulfilled allows for consideration of the particular 
country-specific, post-intervention complexities with which law reformers are faced 
when drafting new law.  
 
This proposed test urges that transplanted is evaluated within its socio-legal context.  
Its acknowledges, therefore, that the legal history and traditions of a country will inform 
the extent to which a transplanted law may be regarded as meaningful and appropriate 
and that variables such as available infrastructure, development and capacity building 
can impact on its application and potential for achieving its objectives.141  
 
This test also insists that the motivations for relying on borrowed foreign law, and the 
identity of the motivators, require analysis because they can affect both the process of 
transplantation and transplant success. As previously noted, transplants may be 
employed by law reformers for reasons of expediency and efficiency or to save costs. 
Grazl has recommended that it is more cost-efficient to ‘free-ride on the investments of 
other jurisdictions’ and adopt transplants than to develop laws indigenously.142 This 
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supports positive Watsonian theory that law is autonomous and can develop by 
transplantation without recourse to the local context of recipient jurisdictions. More than 
this, in terms of the efficiency of lawmaking, Grazl maintains that ‘a transplant, even if 
externally-driven and a poor match to local reality, may be better for society than 
pursuit of home grown legal solutions.’143 This runs against the grain of arguments that 
lawmaking and in particular that connected to the reform of criminal justice systems is 
always a cultural endeavour that should be critically attuned to local conditions. 
However, what is ‘better’ for a society in terms of efficiency, does not necessarily 
ensure successful legal reform. As Miller points out, ‘cost-savings hardly guarantee 
success.’144 Furthermore, law-making that is motivated purely by speed and finances 
can be associated with negative connotations of ‘lazy’ lawmaking and legislative reform 
strategies geared towards quick-fix. According to Miller transplantation of this nature 
‘involves a drafter who when confronted with a new problem pulls a solution from 
elsewhere off the shelf of the library to save having to think up an original solution.’145 
Motivations of expediency can result in reduced consideration of local context and 
needs which may impact negatively on potential transplant success. 
 
I have noted in chapter 1 that post-intervention rule of law reform programmes have 
been motivated to adopt transplants to modernise criminal justice systems in order to 
install international human rights standards. Similar modernisation programmes 
undertaken in Japan in the 19th century and Turkey in the 1920’s were nationally-led, 
whereas recent criminal justice reforms in post-intervention states, including that 
undertaken in Afghanistan, of which the ICPC and the CNL are examples, have been 
driven by agents, countries and bodies external to the countries receiving them. 
Modernising transplanted reform driven by external agents and motivated by 
international concepts without the endorsement of nationalism may lack legitimacy and, 
as a consequence, struggle to be accepted by local populations.146  
 
Modernising legal reform that is ‘externally-dictated,’147 and which involves legal 
transplantation can either be received with gratitude or regarded as an imposition, 
depending on the circumstances of reform. Imposed legal transplants can certainly 
result in legal change. The 19th and early 20th century witnessed extensive 
transplantation of legal systems from European nation states such as England, France, 
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Germany, Spain and Holland to various recipient countries through processes of 
colonisation and imperialism.148 The spread of trial by jury is largely the result of British 
imperialism.149 The common law jury system was transplanted from Britain to North 
America in the seventeenth century150 and was introduced into India in the late 
eighteenth century.151 British expansionism also led to the adoption of the criminal trial 
jury in South Africa in 1828 and Australia in 1832.152 More recently, legislation required 
to introduce a new criminal procedural code, criminal code and laws on witness 
protection had to be imposed by Bosnia’s high representative in 2002 because the 
Bosnian Parliament was unable to gain sufficient votes to promulgate these necessary 
reforms.153 International rule of law initiatives, while seeking to benefit the populations 
of the societies involved are certainly valuable and worthy. Nevertheless, they can also 
reflect western and more particularly US motivations of promoting stability and 
combating concerns such as terrorism and international drug trafficking. This can be 
translated into legislative reform which, on the one hand appears to augment national 
development, while on the other hand serves western and US foreign-policy 
stabilisation interests. The requirement for rule of law reform can motivate US legal 
intervention and indeed hegemony, which has been articulated through agencies such 
as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and CEELI that 
actively promote US interests by dominating criminal procedure reform. The motivation 
to extend influence on legislative rule of law and criminal justice reform can result in the 
transplantation of US-based and western legal models which, as the ICPC and the 
CNL demonstrate, has been relevant to the Afghan experience following 2001.154 
 
There is, furthermore, a better prospect of imposed foreign laws promoting the desired 
technical and societal changes to the receiving countries if a large proportion of the 
population accepts, understands and implements them.155 The prospects of them doing 
so are reduced in situations where they are regarded negatively by local populations 
and politicised as tools of imperialism and expansion.  This is more likely to be the case 
when the capacity of the receiving states is so weak that they have little choice but to 
accept the transplanted reforms. The perception of a transplanted law being imposed in 
                                                 
148
 Berkowitz, note 51  
149
 Vogler, note 7, p.125 
150
 ibid, p.126 
151
 ibid, p.129 
152
 ibid, p.226 
153
 Call, note 3, chapter 1, p.250 
154
 In addition to the ICPC and the CNL, a Juvenile Justice Code was introduced in March 2005, and a 
Law on prisons and Detention Centres in May 2005, both of which were drafted by a team coordinated by 
the Italian Justice Project Office (IJPO). See UNAMA, Justice Sector Overview (April 2007), held on file, 
p.6 
155
 Samuels, note 16,  chapter 1, p.12  
  
63 
the interests of foreign colonialism can be increased when law reform is backed by 
military force, which is often the case during rule of law promotion programmes in post-
conflict countries, such as that undertaken in Afghanistan. Visible foreign armies can 
provide coercive authority for lawmaking, but at the cost of local scepticism and, worse, 
contempt, which can undermine the effectiveness of transplanted law and ultimately, 
efforts to promote rule of law. Brooks warns that ‘in Afghanistan claims to represent 
and advance the rule of law will inevitably be contrasted with our often ham-handed 
use of coercion.’156  
 
There is perhaps a greater risk of new modernising positive criminal law transplanted to 
reform state law in a country with plural influences on its criminal justice system being 
regarded as a foreign imposition when the procedures it introduces are perceived as 
threatening to non-state legal influences, such as religious or customary practices. 
Transplanted law may serve only to highlight and increase the differences between the 
competing systems of justice resulting in greater polarisation between the adherents to 
them.157  Perhaps some prior account needs to be taken, therefore, of the extent of the 
impact that transplanted state criminal law, such as the ICPC and the CNL, will have on 
other legal traditions affecting criminal justice. If not, according to Suhrke this form of 
modernisation risks amounting to ‘a form of Western dominance that leaves the 
recipients little genuine choice and delivers destructive forms of development.’158  
 
The motivations for relying on legal transplantation can, then, have implications for the 
process of making law by transplantation and on transplant reception. The need for 
urgent and expedient legal reform can motivate legal transplanted solutions but at the 
risk of limited consideration for local context and legal traditions. The requirement for 
modernisation can also motivate legal transplantations, but at the risk of creating law 
perceived locally as an imposition, particularly when combined with a foreign military 
presence. Moreover, if reformers are motivated to rely on legal transplants to develop 
law in countries with plural legal traditions greater sensitivity towards the complexity of 
the relationship between the various sources of law may be required. Without any 
consideration of these consequences, legal transplants risk developing into ‘lethal’ 
transplants that can promote injustices as opposed to justice. These issues also 
demand analysis in the context of my proposed evaluative test. 
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This is an original test designed to achieve a balance between the positivist position of 
Watson, which emphasizes the practical utility of legal transplants as means for 
developing logically applied legal rules, and socio-legal viewpoints, espoused by 
commentators such as Kahn-Freund, Kanda and Milhaupt and Berkowitz, which 
highlight the impact of legal traditions, legal culture, local participation, economy and 
politics on transplant success.  
 
It brings both of these positions together. Those limbs of the test that consider a law’s 
application relative to objective performance indicators and the extent to which it has 
achieved its objectives require positivist examinations of the law’s provisions as 
logically applicable rules and the collection of quantitative data to measure its 
application performance. The other limbs of the test which explore the extent to which a 
law is considered meaningful and appropriate to the legal actors responsible for 
enforcing it and the manner in which it is being applied by them require socio-legal 
inquiries into variables such as compatibility with legal tradition, local interpretation, 
capacity, training, commitment to the law and social, political and economic concerns. 
The success of a transplanted law can be gauged by taking an overall perspective 
following assessments of all limbs of the test. The greater the extent to which a law has 
been accepted and achieved its objectives the more successful it will have been.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The number and variety of motivational forces for legal transplantation underlines the 
practical significance of legal transplants for criminal law reformers and their 
importance as a form of legal development.159 Moreover, the overwhelming historical 
evidence that legal transplants have been responsible for the development of new 
criminal law for a considerable period of time in many of the world’s criminal justice 
systems demonstrates that it is, as Damaska has observed, ‘natural’ for legislators to 
rely on them, particularly when engaged in the reform of criminal law frameworks of 
post-intervention states. Indeed, the ubiquity of legal transplants in the field of criminal 
law implies that it would be bad practice not to consider them as vehicles for 
developing new law. As Jhering cautions ‘no one bothers to fetch a thing from afar 
when he has a good or better at home, but only a fool would refuse quinine because it 
didn’t grow in his back garden.’160 While academic literature on legal transplantation 
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reveals fundamental disagreement over transplant existence and feasibility, which 
reflect differences of opinion on the wider relationship between law and society, the 
more constructive aspects of these conflicting theories suggest that criminal law can 
certainly be developed by legal transplantation. Taken together, these factors would 
suggest that post-intervention advisors looking for solutions to legislative dilemmas 
when drafting new criminal law, such as the ICPC and the CNL, are justified in 
considering employing the legal transplant mechanism. 
 
Assessing whether it was actually reasonable for the legislators responsible for the 
ICPC and the CNL to proceed to develop these laws by legal transplantation demands 
the application of a suitable evaluative test in order to determine whether or not they 
have been successfully received in Afghanistan. The weight of evidence from 
evaluative studies of criminal law and theoretical assessments of transplant feasibility 
suggests that the success or failure of legal transplants will be intimately related to the 
local contextual concerns of the receiving countries at the time of their introduction and, 
subsequently, during their application. Bearing this in mind, it is proposed that an 
evaluation of the ICPC and the CNL necessitates assessing the extent to which they 
have been accepted and achieved their objectives. This entails examining the manner 
in which they have been applied by local legal practitioners, whether they are regarded 
as meaningful and appropriate, the motivations behind their enactment and whether 
their objectives have been realised. In order to apply this test to these two laws and 
examine these variables it is essential, precisely because of the acknowledged 
influence of local concerns on transplant reception, to examine them within the context 
of the environment into which they were introduced in Afghanistan between 2004 and 
2005 and during the period of their application.  
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3  Criminal Justice in Afghanistan: Context, 
Reform and Contemporary Realities 
 
 
Introduction 
I have suggested in chapter 2 that while legal transplantation can be employed to develop 
post-intervention criminal law, the reasonableness of adopting this reform tool can be 
assessed relative to the successful reception of the new legislation it helps to create. This 
can be measured with reference to the extent to which the law is accepted and achieves 
its objectives. These variables in turn will be affected by local contextual issues which 
influence the application of criminal justice in the adopting country at the time of the 
adoption of the law and during the period of its application. As a consequence, 
understanding the criminal justice system into which transplanted criminal law is 
introduced and is enforced is indispensable to evaluate its reception and determine how 
legitimate and reasonable it was for it to have been developed by means of legal 
transplantation.1   
 
This chapter examines criminal justice in Afghanistan. It is organised in five sections. 
Section 3.1 considers the early political reform following US military intervention in October 
2001. Section 3.2 examines the legal traditions which influence criminal justice in 
Afghanistan and both procedural and substantive customary and Islamic criminal law. 
Section 3.3 reflects on the development of Afghanistan’s state criminal justice system by 
the absorption of Islamic law, constitutional reform and the codification of positive law, 
which involved the transplantation of foreign legal models. Section 3.4 examines the 
nature of existing applicable state criminal procedure and substantive law in 2001 and 
documents the progress of post-intervention reform with regard to legal education, 
capacity building and the reconstruction of the justice sector. Finally, section 3.5 considers 
relevant cultural factors which may affect the reception of transplanted laws such as the 
ICPC and the CNL and outlines some of the key challenges facing the state criminal 
justice system that may constrain their successful application. 
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Section 3.1 Early post-intervention reform  
 
Following the removal of the Taliban from power in December 2001 Afghanistan was, 
according to one report, ‘a truly devastated state with its human, physical and institutional 
infrastructure destroyed or severely damaged.’2 Against this background the international 
community embarked on a programme of reform. Consequently, the UN convened a 
conference in Bonn where agreement was reached on establishing a framework for the 
political, constitutional, governmental and legal reconstruction of the country. This ‘Bonn 
Agreement’ set a path for political reform which it determined should be undertaken with 
an adherence to ‘the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism and social justice,’3 which 
the delegates felt would best serve Afghanistan’s future political interests. To this extent it 
set out a procedure for the establishment of an interim administration and a timetable for 
the transition of power from what was to become the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) to a 
fully representative government.   
 
Following influential lobbying by the United States, Hamid Karzai, a Durrani-Polpolzai 
Pashtun tribal leader, was selected as the leader of the Interim Authority. It was proposed 
that the AIA would rule for 6 months pending the convention of an Emergency Loya Jirga 
which would within that timescale elect members to a new Afghanistan Transitional 
Authority. Alongside this, the Bonn Agreement called for a Constitutional Loya Jirga to be 
convened within 18 months4 of the establishment of the Transitional Authority to assist in 
the creation of a new Constitution and for presidential elections to be held within 2 years of 
the first Emergency Loya Jirga.5 The Emergency Loya Jirga duly took place in June 20026 
and soon after a Transitional Administration was created with elected members and Karzai 
installed as its President.7  
 
In addition to establishing an early political road map, the Bonn Agreement sought to 
provide a legal framework for Afghanistan in the context of its immediate post-intervention 
future which would have ramifications for the administration of criminal justice and indeed 
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for the development of the ICPC and the CNL.  Afghanistan’s state criminal justice system 
had not escaped the devastation caused by Soviet occupation and civil war. By 2001 it 
was, according to the UN, ‘effectively non-existent.’8 Judicial buildings had been damaged, 
judicial and legislative administration was deficient and correctional facilities were poor or 
absent in rural areas. Moreover, no complete record of the country’s criminal laws existed. 
As a guideline for the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s criminal justice system, Bonn 
recommended that reform should be undertaken ‘in accordance with Islamic principles, 
international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions.’9  Under this ideal 
legislative reform of the criminal law framework would have to be compatible with 
international human rights instruments ratified by Afghanistan and seek some form of 
articulation with the plural legal traditions which inform criminal justice in the country. To 
understand the reasoning behind this guidance it is essential to examine the legal 
traditions to which criminal justice owes its heritage in Afghanistan.  
 
 
Section 3.2 Legal Traditions and Criminal Justice in Afghanistan 
 
There have been three distinct legal traditions that have shaped criminal justice in 
Afghanistan. These consist of a mix of social norms and traditions practised as customary 
law, legal rules enacted by state legislation and Islamic religious law. Each of these legal 
traditions influencing criminal justice practices has distinct substantive and procedural 
norms. Before the introduction of positive codified law by the Afghan state in 1923 during 
efforts to create a centralised criminal justice system, the primary cultural materials 
creating the norms that constituted Afghan ‘criminal justice’ were Islamic law (‘Shari’a’) and 
local customary and tribal law (rawaj), particularly pashtunwali. The state system 
developed during programmes of modernisation undertaken by various rulers and by 
means of Constitutional reform and the introduction of codified law of a predominantly civil 
law tradition. Aspects of Shari’a were absorbed as legitimising tools. These plural legal 
traditions co-exist alongside each other but the state system has occasionally met with 
resistance from adherents to Afghanistan’s other legal traditions and its appeal has 
historically been conditioned by the extent to which the centralised state has been able, or 
unable, to extend its power and control from urban areas to the countryside, where the 
majority of Afghans have always lived. These issues require further examination as they 
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have implications for the potential reception of laws such as the ICPC and the CNL, 
transplanted only to assist the development of the state criminal justice system.  
 
3.2.1 Customary approaches to criminal justice  
Afghanistan’s customary law developed from a need by communities to create and 
maintain norms and rules to regulate and control behaviour amongst themselves and with 
other social and tribal groups. Tribal allegiances and geographical remoteness combined 
to create introspective and conservative communities that became self-sufficient in 
administering justice as a means of maintaining community cohesion.10 The legal norms 
that developed derive from local customs, tribal laws, Islamic law and state law and vary in 
accordance with the multi-ethnic and segmented nature of Afghanistan’s largely rural 
population, resulting in different regional customary legal practices.11  
 
Numerous informal mechanisms for dealing with criminal matters have evolved, the most 
common of which are the jirga, frequently used in Pashtun areas, and the shura which 
operate in Afghan Uzbek, Tajik and Hazar localities. 12  There are substantive and 
procedural variations of the criminal law and practices interpreted and applied by these 
justice councils. Pashtun jirgas are inclined to be ad hoc gatherings convened to deal with 
a particular criminal offence, whereas shuras have a more fixed status and are generally 
attended by a permanent membership who hold regular meetings. 13  On the whole, 
however, there are extensive conceptual similarities between them 14  and they usually 
involve a gathering of local people or elders (marakachian) to reach a collective binding 
decision (prika) that will result in the resolution of a dispute by reference to local 
interpretations of Shari’a and unwritten penal tribal customary codes.15   
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3.2.1.1 Customary approaches: procedural issues 
Jirgas and shuras are predominantly held in open areas or at local mosques. 16 
Adjudicating members are exclusively male. 17  They do not require professional 
qualifications, but must command local respect, acquired perhaps through a reputation 
within the community for expertise, honesty and ability or because of their recognised 
influential status. 18  Members are volunteers rather than elected or appointed 
representatives19 and there are no prescribed rules on the number of people required for 
any jirga/shura to be convened or on the length of the proceedings which may last anytime 
from hours, days and weeks depending on the nature of the issue in question.20 
 
At the commencement of jirga/shura proceedings cash or property (machilgha or baramta) 
is collected from the parties to the case and given to a trusted third-party for safe-keeping. 
This acts as a form of surety which may be forfeited if a party refuses to abide by the 
judgement that the jirga/shura reaches.21 Proceedings may then commence with each 
member of the jirga/shura ‘sharing short stories, narratives, examples and proverbs’22 
following which the matter in question is openly discussed. Alleged offenders and victims 
may be represented or argue their own cases. In forming a judgement jirga/shura 
members may choose to rely on previous decisions handed down through the generations 
that have become established as general rules with precedential value (tselay).23  On 
criminal issues they will refer to interpretations of Shari’a and unwritten customary penal 
laws to assist them in reaching a conclusion to proceedings. Jirga/shura decisions, 
communicated orally, are reached by consensus 24  and to that extent are considered 
binding only when they are deemed to be fair by all participants, including the victim and 
the offender.25  
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Aggrieved participants are entitled to appeal to another jirga against an unfair prika and 
there is a right for a third review by jirga (takhm), where the decision reached is considered 
final.26 Failure to adhere to this judgement may result in a range of punishments decided 
upon by the community or tribe which may vary from cash fines, the burning down of the 
guilty party’s house and, most serious of all, expulsion from the tribe.27 The enforcement of 
decisions is generally the responsibility of a select group of individuals within communities 
known as arbakai whose authority is absolute and normally provided with the consensual 
support of local commanders.28  
 
3.2.1.2  Customary approaches: substantive issues 
In majority Pashtun areas the predominant customary code for regulating traditional 
criminal justice norms is pashtunwali. Other ethnic groups rely on their own local customs 
to inform their approaches and decisions on criminal justice issues.29 Pashtunwali is an 
integral aspect of Pashtun social identity, providing a code of honour and behavioural 
practice which permeates into decision-making and procedure in informal Pashtun 
approaches to criminal justice and which often supersedes both Islamic and governmental 
dictates.30  
 
Traditional pashtunwali attitudes towards criminal justice provide for retributive penalties 
that enable the victims of crimes and their families to pursue justice by way of a blood 
feud. However, retaliatory punishments may in some cases be avoided by demonstrating 
contrition through the payment of compensation (poar) to the victim or their family and 
seeking their forgiveness (nanawati).   
 
Appropriate levels of poar are determined with reference to tribally-prescribed damages 
(nerkhs) established relative to the nature of an offence. These involve not only cash 
transactions, but also the provision of services, the transfer of livestock and, of more 
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concern, the handing over of women, a process known as baad.31 Crimes against property 
require a special poar involving the return of stolen items and additional damages known 
as sharm.32 Poars for assault-related crimes typically vary depending on the part of the 
body that is injured and the extent of the assault (Table 1).  
 
In addition to honouring the judgement of the jirga regarding appropriate poar penalties, 
perpetrators of crimes may be required to seek forgiveness from the victim or their family. 
The custom of forgiving, or nanawati, involves the seeking and acceptance of admission 
and pardon and is rooted in principles of restorative justice rather than the retributive 
justice commonly practiced in most western criminal justice systems.33 It aims to reduce 
enmity and foster reconciliation in a manner that allows for the reintegration of the 
perpetrator within their community following their public accountability for the crime and in 
the light of their noticeable adherence to the judgment of the jirga.34 The action to be taken 
to achieve a pardon varies relative to the offence and there are also tribal and regional 
variations relative to the amount and type of compensation that might be payable for any 
particular offence, a consequence of the oral communication and non-codification of 
customary legal norms.35  
 
Afghanistan’s customary approaches to criminal justice frequently attract criticism as being 
discriminatory, for lacking transparency and for failing to meet international standards of 
due process. No written records of proceedings are kept, hindering transparency. The 
male exclusivity of jirgas/shuras discriminates against women and some of the 
punishments that are meted out promote their subjugation. Furthermore, the vulnerability 
of jirga proceedings to abuse and coercion by warlords inhibits due process.36  
 
The criticisms of discrimination, coercion and arbitirariness are not unique to Afghanistan’s 
customary justice system but are typical of those often directed at justice systems based 
on popular participation. It is, nevertheless, important to acknowledge the global attraction 
                                                          
31
 For details on tribal baad penalties relative to particular criminal offences see Drumbl, note 17, p.385; ILF, 
note 10, p.11-13 
32
 ILF, ibid, p.16 
33 Rzehak, L. Doing Pashto. Pashtunwali as the ideal of honourable behaviour and tribal life among the 
Pashtuns, Afghanistan Analysts Network (2011) available at http://www.aan-
afghanistan.org/index.asp?id=1567; p.18. For additional information see Appendix 2 
34
 UNDP, note 15, p.95; ILF, note 10, p.10 
35
 Rzehak, note 33, p.18.  
36
 Wardak, A. ‘Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan,’ (2004) 41 Crime, Law & Social Change, 319-
341, p.328; see also Appendix 2  
73 
 
of popular justice mechanisms and that justice systems of this nature have received 
international validation. 37  Furthermore, on a local level, customary procedural and 
substantive criminal law and the institutions in which they are conducted continue to be 
vital parts of the fabric of Afghan life, regulating social behaviour and attitudes towards 
crime. The United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development 
Report noted that 82 % of respondents considered jirgas/shuras to be ‘fair and trusted’ and 
‘effective at delivering justice.’ 38  The same respondents also found these informal 
institutions for resolving disputes to be more accessible, less corrupt and better able to 
promote human rights than the state justice system. In addition, Asia Foundation noted in 
2008 that ‘a significant proportion of the Afghan population still relies on informal tribal or 
traditional systems of justice to address issues of crime.’ 39  Afghans clearly have 
confidence in the informal justice system and its means and methods of resolving criminal 
disputes, which do not involve paperwork, lengthy delays, travel and costs and which 
result in decisions that, although based on a retaliatory ethos, are essentially restorative in 
nature and tied to the collective consciousness of their communities. Typical of traditional 
justice systems globally, Afghanistan’s substantive customary approaches to criminal 
justice are motivated by the need to promote reconciliation between the families of victims 
and offenders in an effort to restore balance and cohesion within the community.40 To that 
extent the system remains both meaningful and appropriate to victims, offenders and the 
communities in which they live, all of which contributes to sustain its legitimacy. 
 
3.2.2  Islamic Approaches to Criminal Justice 
Given that 99% of Afghanistan’s population are Muslim it is perhaps not surprising that 
Islam is a central feature of Afghan society.41 Amongst Afghanistan’s tribally and ethnically 
factionalised society, adherence to Islam remains one common feature shared by the 
majority. It is a powerful regulating aspect of Afghan life, providing a means of cultural 
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identity, a basis for social morality and a rubric of laws to regulate behaviour and guide 
concepts of justice.42  
 
3.2.2.1 Islamic approaches: substantive issues 
The Islamic faith is thought to have first emerged in Afghanistan in the early seventh 
century.43 Shari’a, the generic term for Islamic law and criminal justice, has its origins, it 
has been suggested, in the customary norms and practices of Bedouin tribal communities 
in the Arabian peninsular44 and some of Shari’a procedural practices such as collective 
responsibility for criminal behaviour 45  and punishments that allow for compensatory 
penalties are thought to have emanated from customary tribal approaches to justice, 
reflecting an inter-relationship between these two central Afghan legal traditions.46 
 
Alongside its customary roots Shari’a purports to derive from a divine source, namely the 
Qu’ran, which contains legal directions (Hadiths) claimed to have been made by Allah to 
the Prophet Mohammad between 610-632.47 As a primary source of Shari’a, the Qu’ran is 
supported by the sunnah, the recorded deeds and words of the Prophet Mohammad. Only 
a small proportion of the Qu’ran and the sunnah contain legislative material. It is thought 
that between 80 to 500 out of more than 6000 verses in the Qu’ran refer to legal issues 
and that of these, only 30 are linked to criminal law and 20 to criminal procedure.48  
 
Although the Qu’ran and the sunnah contain limited specific content on criminal issues, 
they nevertheless provide general reference points for interpretation and analysis. 
Following the death of Prophet Mohammad, caliphs (leaders of the Muslim community) 
and sohaba (the associates of Prophet Mohammad) appointed consultants to assist them 
in interpreting the Qu’ran and the sunnah to apply rules to new situations to which they did 
not specifically refer. 49  From this process there emerged the two central secondary 
sources of Shari’a, namely qiyas and ijima. Qiyas is a form of reasoning by which Islamic 
scholars deduce answers to legal questions by way of analogy from similar cases in the 
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Qu’ran or the sunnah. Ijima or ‘consensus’ refers to a process by which decisions reached 
by Islamic jurists on a new situation acquire a binding authority.50 The outcomes of qiyas 
and ijima became recorded statements of law comprising a valuable source of Islamic 
jurisprudence alongside interpretations of the Qu’ran and the sunnah.51  
 
Islamic legal scholars (ulama) are recognised in Afghanistan as legitimate authorities of 
Shari’a and as reference points for reaching decisions on disputes, including criminal 
matters in the context of Islamic law. Some also qualified as judges (qadi) in state 
Courts. 52  They have a recognised status as qualified interpreters of Shari’a acquired 
following instruction at religious schools (madrasa). Their primary legal resource are fiqh, 
which are textually-based rules of an Islamic school of law gathered from the most 
venerated Islamic scholars up until the late medieval period. The Sunni Hanafi school has 
emerged in Afghanistan as the more dominant of the religious interpretations for 
demographic reasons, as the Sunnis comprise an estimated 80%-85% of the Muslim 
population. The remaining 15% to 20% Shiite community are largely followers of the Jafari 
jurisprudential school.53 Because of the majority status of the Sunnis, Hanafi fiqh provide 
the basis for Afghan Islamic criminal justice. 
 
3.2.2.2 Islamic approaches: procedural issues 
In Islamic criminal justice, the nature of the offence is central to the determination of 
procedure, evidence and punishment. Offences are categorised as hudud, quesas or tazir, 
depending on their nature and attract punishments of varying degrees of severity 
depending on whether they are considered forbidden (haram) or reprehensible (makruh).54 
Hudud offences derive from the Qu’ran and include adultery, false allegations of unlawful 
intercourse, apostasy, highway robbery, alcohol consumption, theft and rebellion.55 They 
generally require evidential proof in the form of confessions or the oral testimony of a set 
number of witnesses, usually numbering two and rising to four in the case of adultery.56 
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They attract mandatory sentences, leaving no room for discretion by judges. Penalties 
include public flogging,57 stoning,58 the amputation of limbs59 and death by decapitation.60   
 
Quesas offences are assault-related crimes and include murder and intentional or 
unintentional bodily harm. They attract retributive penalties including corporal punishment 
for intentional murder, although there are optional alternative sentences of compensation 
by transferring money or property (diat and irsy) which allow some element of judicial 
discretion. However, in these cases it is the wishes of the victims or their families that 
determine sentencing outcome.61 
 
Tazir offences are undefined by religious legal sources and include offences such as 
fraud, forgery and sodomy for which discretionary punishments are exacted depending on 
the will of the qadi and the community.62 
 
Criminal proceedings under Shari’a are usually commenced by a claim made by the 
injured party against another person. Pre-trial procedure and investigation is modest and 
normally limited to enquiries by the qadi as to the character of the accused. 63  The 
proceedings at the trial hearing are led by the qadi. In normal circumstances both the 
complainant and the defendant represent themselves. There is no provision in the Qu’ran 
for defence representatives.64 The complainant is responsible for producing evidence and 
witnesses to support their accusations against the accused whose presence at the hearing 
is obligatory. The evidence required to establish culpability normally involves either a 
confession by the defendant or the oral testimony of a sufficient number of witnesses. The 
cross-examination of witnesses and prosecution evidence is confined to the qadi who 
ultimately reaches a decision based upon his understanding of the evidence and 
interpretation of the sources of Shari’a. With no prescriptive system of stare decisis Islamic 
judges are not confined to adhering to precedential rulings when reaching judgements on 
cases.65 Instead, they rely on their interpretation of the authoritative sources of Islamic law 
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and fiqh to reach decisions and formulate rules (ijtihad) that have application to the case in 
question. Therefore, according to Weiss, ‘the Muslim jurist never invents rules; he 
formulates, or attempts to formulate, rules which God has already decreed and which are 
concealed in the sources.’66 Once the qadi has reached a decision it is considered final as 
there is no system of appeal within Islamic criminal procedure.67 
 
Sharia criminal justice procedure is essentially inquisitorial. The juryless proceedings are 
led and controlled by the qadi whose role is to ascertain the truth and pass judgement. The 
procedure is highly dependent not only on witness evidence but also on confessions 
extracted from the accused, who remains a largely submissive presence in the 
proceedings, lacking the authority to cross-examine witnesses or the complainant. It is 
these qualities, coupled with a retributive punishment system that embraces physical 
penalties that combine to result in it being frequently regarded as excessively authoritarian 
and lacking in the international human rights and due process standards rights that afford 
some measure of protection for defendants in most western adversarial criminal justice 
systems. Farrar derides Islamic justice as ‘authoritarian, medievalist and completely 
unsuited to the demands of the modern nation state.’68 Such a view, however, runs the risk 
of representing a depreciatory and caricaturist exaggeration of Islamic jurisprudence that 
overlooks the centrality of many tenets of international human rights law to Shari’a.69 
Indeed, Islamic justice has been vigorously defended as having in-built human rights 
protections which prevent, for example, pre-trial detention and torture to extract evidence 
and which also endorse the defendant’s right of silence and the presumption of 
innocence.70  
 
The Islamic model of criminal jurisprudence is, nevertheless, clearly at odds with western 
adversarial models. It also contrasts with criminal justice systems that depend on 
formulistic and codified legislative rules. The Islamic system of justice centres on the 
endeavour of an individual to reach a decision based upon the subjective interpretation of 
religious sources as opposed to western concepts of justice that allow for objective 
analysis of prescriptive written laws. According to Vogel, the ‘western concept of law is that 
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it is a system of formal, objective, publicly known, generally applicable, compulsory rules, 
whether determined from general, published legislation, from the decisions of courts 
interpreting legal materials and applying them, or from authoritative scholarly analyses of 
legislation, court decision, and other sources of law. So far we have seen little in Islamic 
law that resembles this concept.’71 Afghanistan’s various rulers have had to confront the 
problem of how to align the country’s firmly established Islamic legal tradition with the need 
to create a centralised state criminal justice system. This has been a difficult process for 
Afghanistan, undertaken adopting the tools of codification and transplantation and 
producing mixed results.  
 
 
Section 3.3 The Development of the Afghan State Criminal Justice System  
Islamic law has remained a pervasive presence that has underpinned both the creation 
and development of the Afghan state and its criminal law system. Afghanistan’s various 
rulers since the inception of the state, from its monarchs to its republican presidents, have 
all recognised its importance not only as a regulating and unifying tool that might ensure 
stability in a highly factionalised society, but also as a means of attaining legitimacy in an 
overwhelmingly Muslim state. Consequently, Shari’a has been absorbed into formal 
criminal jurisprudence since the first attempt to establish a centralised legal system in the 
19th century. The processes that enabled this were Constitutional reform and the 
codification of positive law.  
 
These two processes have often worked in tandem, activated by renewed political 
upheaval and reform, which has been considerable in Afghanistan. The country has 
witnessed 11 changes of regime between 1923 and 2004, 8 of which occurred in the 28 
year period from 1973 to 2001.72 During the same period nine different constitutions have 
been promulgated, five of which have been accompanied by new criminal legislation.73  
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The nature of the various administrations has varied dramatically across the political 
spectrum from authoritarian74 and constitutional monarchist75  in the early and mid-20th 
Century, to socialist republic and fundamentalist Islamic regime in the late 20th Century 
and the current liberal democracy model under President Karzai. The ideologies of each of 
these political administrations, reflected in the Constitutions and the manner and extent to 
which they have sought to absorb Shari’a into the state system, have been key defining 
points in the development of Afghanistan’s criminal legal system.76  
 
Aside from the pervasive influence of customary procedures, Shari’a courts retained 
unopposed jurisdiction over criminal matters in Afghanistan until the early 19th century 
when Dost Mohammad Khan (1826-1863) declared that serious crimes should be referred 
to him for deliberation.77 Prior to then the ulama enjoyed unchecked authority over the 
provision of Shari’a education and the application of Islamic criminal law in the religious 
courts. Mohammad Khan’s decree represented the first attempt by an Afghan ruling 
administration to impose a measure of centralised regulatory control over the application of 
Shari’a in criminal matters.   
 
This process was furthered during the reign of Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901) often 
acknowledged as the founder of the Afghan state78 who first created a formal state court 
system which included criminal courts, administered by chiefs of police (kowtals) and 
judges.79 This process was augmented by the codification of positive law including the 
Penal Code 1896 that was essentially a codification of Islamic law and therefore 
represented a formal assimilation of the Shari’a into state criminal bureaucracy. The Code, 
however, was not an unadulterated reproduction of Shari’a norms. It was a modified 
version of Shari’a, accompanied by state imposed checks and balances to ensure 
regulatory control by the ruler.  The more severe Islamic hudud punishments such as the 
amputation of a hand for theft and stoning for adultery were moderated by the Code, a 
legacy which persisted until the Taliban period. 80  Furthermore, the Amir assumed 
exclusive authority over offences against the state and criminal cases punishable by 
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death.81 In addition, the scope of traditional Islamic retributive punishments were extended 
from the offender and their immediate family to whole communities by the imposition of 
compulsory fines on villages within a 10-mile radius of a crime.82  
 
Abdur Rahman’s reforms led to the creation of the first formal criminal justice system in 
Afghanistan, which was augmented by designated courts and codified law. The 
establishment of an authoritarian state justice system, legitimised by reliance on Shari’a, 
was used as a vehicle to suppress any threats of insurgency among tribal factions, thereby 
sustaining his authority. To that extent Abdur Rahman recognised the importance of Islam 
and Shari’a as a unifying tool to control tribal insurgency. The result was the absorption of 
Shari’a into the state system but in an adapted form which differed from its traditional 
application in the religious Courts and which sought to enhance the authority of the ruler 
and the state. A more problematic consequence of the reforms was that the drive towards 
reliance on state law infringed the interpretative powers of the ulama.83  The previous 
understanding between Afghan rulers and the ulama had been that rulers could issue 
decrees and make laws for the good of the state and the ulama would interpret them 
through jirgas or shuras. Abdur Rahman upset the balance of power between rulers and 
ulama by attempting to establish a centralised system based on Shari’a which challenged 
the authority of informal institutions and the ulama.84 Although he ultimately allowed the 
informal system to continue to function alongside the state system in recognition of its 
continued legitimacy amongst the population, his attempts at centralising the legal system 
set in motion a collision course between the state, religious and tribal justice systems that 
has continued to characterise Afghanistan’s criminal justice system to this day, each 
having different procedures, rules and adherents as well as varying levels of legitimacy.85 
 
The moderation of the influence of the ulama continued under King Ammanullah who 
reigned between 1919 and 1929. Encouraged by the successful reconstruction 
programme conducted by Kamal Ataturk in Turkey aimed at the creation of a secular state, 
Ammanullah embarked on an ambitious agenda of modernisation facilitated by legal 
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reform in an effort to promote the establishment of a democratic parliamentary monarchy.86 
Afghanistan’s first Constitution promulgated in 1923 gave official recognition to two 
sources of law, Islamic and statutory, thus marginalizing customary practices. A campaign 
of codification undertaken with the assistance of French and Turkish advisers led to new 
secular codes for commercial, civil and criminal law and the establishment of 
corresponding courts.87 A Penal Code enacted in 1924-25 was derived from a systematic 
collection of Hanafi fiqh and represented a codification of Hanafi interpretations of Islamic 
law.88  Comprising 308 articles it categorised offences according to the penalties they 
attracted along traditional hudud, tazir and quisas lines and fixed prescribed penalties for 
each class of criminal offence. 89  A statutory age of criminal responsibility of 15 was 
introduced and the use of force to extract confession evidence was prohibited. In addition, 
provision was made for rehabilitative penalties and the commutation of sentences.90 While 
it was based on Islamic law, it was influenced by the French Penal Code91 resulting in a 
less authoritarian approach to criminal justice and punishment than that exacted by 
traditional Islamic justice but one nevertheless with inquisitorial characteristics.  
 
Ammanullah’s aim was to effect state control over criminal jurisprudence. The preamble to 
the Penal Code confirmed that all crimes fell within the jurisdiction of the state.92 The state 
would also assume control for legal education, an area previously under the exclusive 
management of the ulama. The consequent undermining of the authority of the ulama 
alienated influential religious leaders to the extent that they regarded the centralising 
reform agenda and codification process as un-Islamic. This resulted in a critical loss of 
religious and ethnic-tribal legitimacy leading to the mobilisation of anti-governmental 
factions who orchestrated Ammanullah’s abdication in 1929.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Ammanullah’s successor, Nadir Khan, repealed all of his 
predecessor’s secular legislation, including the Penal Code in 1929 and ordained that 
Shari’a should form the basis of criminal law.93  The overriding authority of Shari’a was 
embedded in Nadir Khan’s 1931 Constitution which decreed that ‘the court of Shariat 
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decides cases according to the Holy Hanafite creed.’ 94  Islamic law was once again 
reinstated as the primary source of criminal jurisprudence by the Afghan state and Hanafi 
fiqh was applied by judges in all criminal cases until a period of renewed constitutional and 
judicial reform the 1960’s and 1970’s which resulted in an increased secularisation of the 
criminal justice system.95  
 
The 1964 Constitution, Afghanistan’s third, sought to actively integrate secular and 
religious principles into the state justice system. It defined ‘law’ as ‘those rules that are 
approved and passed by the government and the King,’96 thereby confirming statutory law 
as the primary source of the justice system. However, it also allowed for the residual 
application of Shari’a in the absence of any statutory law and prohibited the enactment of 
any law ‘repugnant to the basic principles of Islam.’97 This repugnancy principle provided 
the ulama with ultimate legislative authority. No law could be passed without their 
approval, with the net result, according to Bassiouni, that ‘the government defines the 
qanun [statute]’ but the ulama ‘interpret and control the fiqh [jurisprudence].’98  
 
The 1964 Constitution also provided that the judiciary would, for the first time, be an 
independent state body and new positive law re-organised the formal court system and 
criminal procedure. 99  The office of the Attorney General was created to investigate 
crimes100  and the Supreme Court established to administer the organisation of lower 
courts and the supervision of the judiciary. 101  Defendants were afforded the right to 
defence counsel 102  and a Bar Association was founded. 103  A comprehensive criminal 
procedure code was passed in 1965, its provisions largely remaining in place until 2003. In 
addition, a Law on the Judicial Authority and Organisation of the Courts, enacted in 
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1967, 104  created a bipartite national court system comprised of general and special 
courts.105  
 
The modernisation of Afghanistan’s state criminal justice system continued apace in the 
1970’s. The Guiding Rules on Criminal Affairs issued in 1971 provided statutory guidelines 
for sentencing and a new Penal Code, still in force today, was passed in 1976 under 
President Daoud.106 Both closely followed legal principles of Hanafi fiqh so that Islamic 
principles of criminal jurisprudence were absorbed into state law.107 As had been the case 
with Ammanullah, however, Daoud’s modernising agenda provoked resistance from 
conservative power-holders. According to Saikal, Daoud ‘failed to codify his programme in 
a way acceptable to the predominantly traditional and Islamic society,’ 108  resulting 
eventually in a coup d’etat in 1978 which ousted him from power. 
 
The removal of Daoud resulted in a further period of criminal justice reform. The Marxist 
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) established a justice system designed 
to support an authoritarian socialist state capable to performing purges against suspected 
dissidents. Amnesty International reported widespread violations of human rights in 
1978109 and by autumn 1979 it is thought that at least 10,000 people had been executed 
and between 30,000 and 50,000 imprisoned.110 Although the pre-existing criminal justice 
system was preserved it was supported by a newly established military tribunal created to 
‘try persons who have committed offences against the Revolution.’ 111  Later socialist 
regimes in power during Soviet rule from 1979 to 1988 retained this legal model in order to 
suppress opposition, supporting it with a brutal secret police force, the Khedamat-e-
Etelea’at-e Dawlati (KHAD).112  
 
As part of the process of trying to create a centralised socialist state this period also 
witnessed an intensification of secularisation policies at the cost of Islamic jurisprudential 
                                                          
104
 Law on the Judicial Authority and Organisation of the Courts, 7 October 1967 
105
 Lau, note 72, p.29 
106
 The Penal Code is reviewed in Section 3.4.2 of this chapter 
107
 Etling, note 42, p.11 
108
 Saikal, A. Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival, London: IB Tauris (2005), p.80 
109
 Amnesty International, ‘Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in the Democratic Republic 
of Afghanistan’ (1979) 
110
 Lau, note 72, p.31 
111
 The Revolutionary Council’s Decree No. 3 (May 1978) 
112
 Mohammad, F. And Conway, P. ‘Justice and law enforcement in Afghanistan under the Taliban,’ Policing-
Bradford (2003) 26(1),162-167, p.163 
84 
 
influences. The 1980 Interim Constitution of Afghanistan declined to recognise Shari’a as a 
source of law and Islam as the official religion of the state. Article 5 provided only for the 
‘respect, observance and preservation’ of Islam. The imposition of socialist ideology and 
the consequent attempt to disenfranchise religious leaders and undermine the influence of 
Islamic legal traditions provoked widespread discontent and fuelled support for the 
mujahedeen who, following the subsequent collapse of the last Marxist government in 
1992, embarked on a policy of ‘re-Islamization’ of the country’s legal system which 
reflected a reaction to the process of secularisation that had been imposed during the 
socialist and Soviet eras. This resulted in a reversion to orthodox interpretations of Shari’a. 
The reform process, however, was piecemeal and lacked comprehensive Constitutional or 
legislative guidance, making for confusion over the precise nature of applicable law. 
Adding to the confusion, a Constitution was drafted but never promulgated and previous 
Constitutions were not officially repealed. There was, nevertheless, uniform agreement 
amongst the various mujahedeen factions that the new legal order should be based on 
Islamic principles alone.113  
 
The Islamization of Afghanistan’s justice system took on a more radical progression during 
the theocratic rule of the Taliban from 1996 to 2001 who adopted a fundamentalist 
approach towards Islamic justice ruthlessly enforced by a religious police force under the 
aegis of a ‘Ministry of Virtue.’ 114  The Taliban repealed all laws passed during the 
communist regimes and adopted the pre-1978 criminal justice administration system, 
adapting it to promote their radical interpretation of Islamic justice. The judiciary was 
composed of Shari’a courts established at district, provincial and central levels, to which 
prosecutor’s offices were attached. Complainants in criminal cases could opt for the matter 
to be resolved by either the jirga or the court system which administered Shari’a law. If the 
jirga system was chosen, an executive officer would appoint members to the jirga of 
appropriate ability to facilitate a resolution of the dispute. According to Mohammad ‘most of 
the criminal disputes were solved by the legal system.’115 The investigative phase would 
be conducted by representatives from the police and the prosecutor’s office and by a state 
official who would submit their concluding report to the chief executive. The matter would 
then be referred to a judge would examine the evidence obtained during the preliminary 
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investigation and decide whether the matter would proceed to trial. If he established that it 
should, it would be referred to the High Court where the case would be decided. The 
accused was entitled to representation. If found guilty the matter would be referred to the 
Supreme Court for consideration and on a further finding of guilt to the Head of the State 
under the Taliban for final consideration. Verdicts were made public and punishments 
were carried out in adherence to Shari’a tradition.116 
 
The Taliban’s orthodox interpretation of Islam was generally viewed by the western world 
as archaic and oppressive. For some observers, however, the criminal justice approach of 
the Taliban had value and merit in a country that had been destabilised by foreign intrusion 
and years of civil war. Misdaq has argued that some of the Taliban’s justice achievements 
were ‘salutary,’117 on the basis that although the punishments exacted under the system 
were harsh and relied on more fundamentalist interpretations of Shari’a, at least the 
system that existed was largely devoid of the delays, nepotism and corruption that 
historically characterised the formal state justice system under previous regimes. Perhaps 
also the Taliban can be credited with replacing the chaos and inconsistency of the justice 
system in the mujahedeen era with the establishment of a uniform and centralised state 
criminal justice system alongside the jirga, a goal that has so often eluded those in power 
in the Afghan state.  
 
By 2001, then, Afghanistan’s criminal justice system had undergone several 
transformations in line with political upheavals of the 20th and 21st centuries that had seen 
it lurch from authoritarian and constitutional monarchy to communist state and from 
fundamentalist Islamic theocracy to democratic republic.  Since the creation of the state 
justice system in 1924, Afghanistan’s diverse administrations had remodelled the state 
criminal justice system in efforts to supplement their ideologies and impose some form of 
centralised and regulatory control. This system was created and developed by the 
processes of Constitutional reform and the codification of positive law. Both procedures led 
to the assimilation of Shari’a into the formal criminal justice system. Islamic jurisprudence 
was secularised through its translation into statutory law by way of the codification of 
Hanafi fiqh in both the Penal Codes of 1924-25 and 1976.118 The Constitutional absorption 
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of Shari’a fluctuated with regime change. The 1923 Constitution officially recognised 
Shari’a as a source of law. The ‘repugnance clauses’ in the 1964 and 1977 Constitutions 
allowed only for residual use of Islamic jurisprudence after consideration of state law. 
Later, the 1980 Constitution reduced the role of Shari’a by allowing merely for the ‘respect, 
observance and preservation of Islam’. The mujahedeen and Taliban regimes 
subsequently changed the jurisdictional picture by reinstating Shari’a as the primary 
source of criminal law. 
 
By and large the attempts at secularisation acknowledged Islamic law in order to appeal to 
Afghanistan’s predominantly Muslim population. However, with the exception of the 
mujahedeen and Taliban phases, Islamic jurisprudence was given secondary status to 
state law in an effort to enhance centralised control. According to Jones-Pauly this 
hierarchization of these two legal traditions served to put them on a confrontational 
‘collision course’ contributing to the instability that has characterised Afghanistan’s justice 
system.119 As Weinbaum noted in 1980, ‘the two legal traditions [Islam and state law] and 
the elites they foster are frequently competitive and incongruent.’120  
 
The shifting hierarchization of state and Islamic legal traditions during the historical 
development of the state justice system reflects their uncomfortable co-existence and the 
difficulties that the various architects of the system have had in integrating them. There are 
conflicting differences in the approaches of Shari’a and statutory interpretations of criminal 
jurisprudence which have undermined attempts to absorb Islamic jurisprudence into 
secular law at the heart of which is the contrast between the interpretative quality of the 
application of Hanafi fiqh and the prescriptive nature of codified law.  
 
Because of the difficulties of harmonising these two approaches, what emerged was a 
bifurcated state system where both Islamic and secular law were applied in most courts.121 
In 1980 Weinbaum observed that ‘there are two court systems, one handling criminal and 
civil cases arising under Shari’a and the other largely restricted to statutory law.’122 This 
dichotomy was reflected in and perpetuated by the educational training of the legal 
professionals who worked in the justice system. Secular and religious law faculties were 
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established at Kabul University in the early 1940’s. Until then the sole educational 
prerequisite for entry to the administration of justice was a qualification in Shari’a.123 The 
two faculties that were created became independent bodies teaching their own distinctive 
courses.  Students studying Islamic jurisprudence would have previously undergone 
twelve years of training in a madrasa.  Those undergoing tertiary secular legal training 
were instructed using mainly French teaching models. 124  The legal educators taught 
separate secular and religious courses and there was very little inter-departmental 
communication between staff and students, fostering the formation of two separate legal 
communities.  
 
These divisions continued once students completed their education and began working in 
the professional sector, with Shari’a-trained graduates applying Islamic law, and secularly 
trained graduates applying statutory law. According to Weinbaum the Shari’a-educated 
judges remained mostly ignorant of applicable statutory law and were ‘resentful of the 
appearance of an alien system of laws and an alternate judiciary.’125 Secularly-trained 
judges, on the other hand, sought to apply codified law, yet this still required them to be 
appreciative of Islamic jurisprudence because of the allowance for its residual application 
and in this regard they felt inadequately trained.126 The competition between state and 
Islamic law ultimately weakened the application of secular codified law and educational 
divisions reduced the number of secularly-trained legal professionals, limiting the capacity 
of the state criminal justice system. In 1980 the legal community in its entirety comprised 
no more than 1,200 individuals, including 715 judges, 170 public prosecutors, 100 lawyers 
serving departments at the Ministry of Justice and 50 legal educators. Only one-fifth of 
Afghanistan’s jurists were applying state laws although many were lacking appropriate 
training and resources to comprehend and apply them.127 In addition, there were just 162 
defence lawyers, most of whom were based in Kabul,128 8 provinces had no practising 
defence lawyers at all and a lack of qualified personnel and insufficient resources resulted 
in approximately 100 of the country’s 220 district courts lacking a prosecutor.129  
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The state system lacked the resources to have any reach beyond Kabul and urban areas 
to the provinces and was regarded as a less meaningful process for resolving criminal 
justice issues than those provided by customary approaches and Shari’a. Aside from the 
practice of baad, which violated Shari’a, there was little cause for competition between 
these two legal traditions and in reality customary practices operated in tribal areas without 
any opposition from either Shari’a or the state system. In remote tribal areas the state 
would rarely intervene.130 When it did, rather than insisting on the application of state-
created procedures, it would often acknowledge the significance of localised legal norms. 
A survey of 104 criminal cases in Pashtun tribal regions in the early 1980’s revealed that 
84 were resolved by customary processes. Of the remaining 20, in which state agencies 
and mechanisms were involved, the majority were decided in accordance with pashtunwali 
legal norms.131 While this might suggest that the three traditions could co-exist in harmony, 
it also demonstrates the historical inadequacies of the state system and its deference to 
customary and Islamic processes beyond urban centres. 
 
By 1993 the situation was unchanged. Amin observed that ‘in most areas the State law of 
Afghanistan still remains unenforceable. What is in force is either the religious law in the 
form of traditional Islamic law or the customary and tribal practices.’132 Amin also noted 
that ‘for most ordinary villagers and tribesmen, who form the majority of the population, 
Islamic law and tribal law remain more significant than State legislation.’133 By this stage 
Afghanistan was locked in a period of civil war which, along with later Taliban rule, brought 
education and the development of the state secular system largely to a standstill. The 
result was that at the time the Bonn Agreement was brokered in 2001 criminal justice was 
dispensed in different ways in Afghanistan in accordance with plural customary, Islamic 
and state legal traditions and the state criminal justice system itself remained bifurcated, 
with both secular and Islamic law applied in the courts, and less meaningful to the majority 
of the population than Afghanistan’s other two legal traditions.  
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Section 3.4 Criminal Justice Reform 2001-2011 
 
3.4.1 Establishing the criminal law framework 
 
In addition to clarifying the manner in which the reform of the criminal justice system should proceed, 
the Bonn Agreement also provided essential guidance on the composition of Afghanistan’s 
immediate criminal law framework. In this respect the Bonn delegates took a similar approach to 
that adopted by the UN in East Timor and Kosovo and chose to rely on existing legislation. 
Consequently, Bonn established that until the adoption of a new Constitution the interim legal 
system should be that established by the 1964 Constitution together with the domestic laws and 
regulations enacted since then provided they did not conflict with the old Constitution or the terms of 
the Agreement.
134
 It was necessary, therefore, to identify all domestic laws and regulations in 
existence since 1964. 
 
Finding these laws proved problematic as no ready compilation of existing laws and 
regulations existed, or had ever been compiled. Some Codes had been published in the 
monthly Official Gazette (Rasmi Jareda) but there was no complete set of copies of the 
Gazette upon which to rely.135 The previous 23 years of civil war and the dependence by 
the Taliban exclusively on Shari’a had left legislative record-keeping in disarray. The 
Taliban had burned legal texts at the Kabul Law Faculty136 and the Gazettes at the Ministry 
of Justice had largely been destroyed.  In the early stages of reform post-Bonn, therefore, 
there was significant confusion over the nature of the country’s applicable criminal law.  
 
To assist matters, the Interim Authority issued a decree on 5 February 2002 repealing ‘all 
decrees, laws, edicts, regulations and mandates, which are inconsistent with the 1964 
Constitution and the Bonn Agreement’137 with the intent of purging the justice system of 
legislative material contrary to Afghanistan’s political future envisaged to be a liberal, 
constitutional democracy supported by an effective justice system which would foster rule 
of law, social justice and international standards of human rights.138 It also handed the task 
of ascertaining the nature of existing legislative instruments to the Ministry of Justice and 
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on its authority IDLO began collating all relevant legal materials. This established that a 
confusing assortment of over 2,400 separate legal texts in Dari and Pashto and 100 in 
English has been passed between 1921 and 2001.139 Such was the enormity of the task of 
accessing these laws that IDLO did not complete a digital compilation of them until 
October 2003 and by March 2004 had still not been able to index or indeed distribute them 
to legal actors.140 USIP, ABA and International Resources Group had, however, collected 
authentic versions of some key legal codes in force.141 By examining these, a clearer 
picture of relevant applicable law began to emerge. 
  
3.4.2 Applicable state substantive criminal law 
Separate reports prepared by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ)142  and the 
Consortium for Response to the Afghanistan Transition (CRAFT)143 in 2002 both confirmed 
that substantive criminal law was governed by the Penal Code 1976.144 Consisting of 523 
articles, it incorporates both Islamic and European approaches to criminal justice and still 
remains the primary source of formal substantive criminal law today.145  While it confirms 
that state law is the primary source of law, it also acknowledges Islamic law as an 
additional legal source.146  It allows for statutory regulation of tazir offences attracting 
discretionary punishments, but stipulates that persons committing hudud, quesas or diat 
offences, which carry fixed penalties, should ‘be punished according to the principles of 
the Hanafi School of Islam.’147 In this way Shari’a law of Hanafi jurisprudence is built in to 
positive state law as one of the key sources for defining crime and punishment. The result 
is the creation of a mixed penal system with some offences attracting non-discretionary 
Islamic punishments and others attracting discretionary penalties based on western 
approaches to criminal justice. 148 
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The sentencing guidelines for the hudud offences of adultery,149 defamation,150 robbery151 
and extortion152 all call for primary consideration as to whether the right conditions exist for 
the matter to be tried as a ‘had’ offence, determined by the availability of confession 
evidence or the testimony of an appropriate number of witnesses prescribed for each 
offence. If the right conditions do not exist, sentencing guidelines prescribed by the Code 
can be applied in the alternative. 
 
Quesas offences attract retributive penalties including corporal punishment for intentional 
murder, although there are optional alternative sentences of compensation by transferring 
money or property (diat and irsy) which allow some element of judicial discretion. In 
implementing quesas penalties, matters including equality between individuals, similarity 
and proportionality between the crime and the offence are considered under the Code.153  
 
The remaining discretionary tazir offences are defined in the Code which also details the 
punishments they attract. These are similar to those found in western jurisdictions.154 
Felonies are punishable by life sentence, long-term imprisonment of 5-15 years or 
execution,155 ‘misdemeanours’ carry penalties of 3 months to 5 years imprisonment or a 
fine of more than 3,000 Afghanis156 and a minor offence, defined as an ‘obscenity’, entails 
a punishment of imprisonment for any period from 24 hours to 3 months or a fine not 
exceeding 3,000 Afghanis.157 The various punishments provided for in the Code range 
from cash penalties to periods of imprisonment, varying from a minimum of 24 hours158 to 
a maximum of 20 years, 159  and execution by hanging. 160  There are allowances for 
mitigation,161 the suspension of sentences for up to 3 years162 and differentiation between 
actual and attempted commission of offences.163  
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The Code presents as essentially a codification of Hanafi fiqh.164 There are, however, also 
elements within it that are similar to European substantive criminal law, such as its 
requirements for establishing criminal responsibility and its inclusion of the principles of 
non-retroactivity and the legality of crimes. For a crime to be committed, therefore, it must 
be defined as an offence by law.165 Convictions depend on the prosecution proving both 
the ‘material’ elements of an act or omission of an act leading to the offence166 and the 
‘moral’ element of intent.167 In addition, a defendant can only be punished in accordance 
with the provisions of the law in force prior to the commitment of the crime,168 although 
allowance is made for the application of new laws that might benefit the accused.169 This is 
important for the establishment of sustainable rule of law as it ensures against state 
intrusion in criminal justice processes by the imposition of retroactive laws. It is recognised 
in the Qu’ran170 and enshrined in the ICCPR,171 to which Afghanistan is a signatory. It also 
compliments similar provisions in the 1964 and the later 2004 Constitutions.172  
3.4.3 Applicable state criminal procedural law  
 
Criminal procedure in 2001 was being applied by public prosecutors with reference to the 
Criminal Procedure Law 1965.173 This comprised 500 articles and largely replicated the 
content of the French Procedural Code.174 The police and the public prosecutor (Saranwal) 
were responsible for the detection of crimes, the apprehension of offenders and the 
gathering of evidence for investigation.175 They were empowered to issue arrest warrants 
for felonies and misdemeanours on the basis that ‘there are sufficient grounds to believe’ 
the suspect is the offender.176 Suspects could be detained for 24 hours by the police177 
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although this could be extended by the public prosecutor for up to 7 days178 and could be 
increased further on application to the judge and following a hearing for up to three 
months. 179  On completion of investigations the Saranwal would decide whether to 
prosecute. Prescribed timescales were provided for the conclusion of investigations180 and 
the prosecution of cases following the completion of investigations.181 If the decision was 
taken to prosecute the Saranwal would file a criminal suit.182 Trials were juryless and 
would begin with the charges being read out to the accused. The victim, prosecutor and 
any plaintiff in a corresponding civil action would then forward their cases against the 
defendant who then plead. On pleading his or her innocence the prosecution would call 
witnesses who may be examined and cross-examined by the prosecutor, the victim, 
plaintiff and the accused.183 The same process would then follow with the witnesses for the 
defence.184 The defendant was not compelled to give evidence at trial.185 Once all the 
evidence in the case had been presented the parties, including the prosecutor, witnesses, 
victim and the accused were entitled to ‘enter into a conversation with one another,’ 
whereupon if no admission was made by the accused the judge passed judgement.186  
 
The 1965 Criminal Procedure Law was amended by legislation passed in 1967, 1974, 
1979, 1981 and 1991.187 These amendments reflected the upheavals that Afghanistan 
underwent from the 1960’s to the 1990’s that resulted in far-reaching political changes 
from constitutional monarchism to experimentation with communism and later Soviet 
occupation. In spite of the identification of relevant legislation, the multitude of amended 
law added to a sense of confusion in 2001 as to the exact nature of applicable law and the 
precise manner in which it should be applied and enforced. While the Bonn Agreement 
stipulated that only laws consistent with it and with international legal obligations could be 
recognised, some laws, particularly those from the Taliban era, were incompatible with 
these requirements and other laws, while meeting them, were inconsistent with each other.  
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A deficiency in resources and record-keeping of judicial decisions and a lack of guidelines 
in relation to the interpretation of some areas of legislation added to uncertainties. The 
imposition of hudud penalties in article 1 of the 1976 Penal Code, for example, appeared 
to contradict article 4 of the Code which prohibited ‘any punishment which is discordant 
with human dignity,’ although neither the Code nor the 1964 Constitution188 provided any 
definition for this concept.189 They were also arguably incompatible with both the 1964 
Constitution190 and Afghanistan’s commitment to human rights conventions.  
 
There was also confusion regarding the powers of the prosecutor to detain suspects. The 
1965 Law empowered prosecutors to extend periods of detention for seven days following 
initial detention by the police for 72 hours, which the CRAFT report confirmed was the 
prevailing practice in 2002.191 However, neither the 1974 amended Law nor that of 1981 
provided for a detention period of this duration.192  
 
 
3.4.4 Development, Reform, Training and Capacity Building  
 
I have proposed earlier that local contextual issues that influence criminal justice in the 
country adopting a legal transplant will affect its reception. It is vital, therefore, to consider 
reform programmes and capacity building enterprises undertaken to reconstruct the justice 
sector in Afghanistan post-2001 as the progress of these efforts are likely to impact on the 
potential reception of the ICPC and the CNL.  
 
While the 1965 Criminal Procedure Law and the 1976 Penal Code were established as the 
principle statutes clarifying immediate applicable criminal law and the state criminal justice 
system was functioning in 2001 and 2002, it was nevertheless not functioning in the 
manner contemplated by the 1964 Constitution. The offices of the Kabul public prosecutor 
reportedly employed 184 staff and in the six months between October 2001 and March 
2002 42 of 75 criminal cases were submitted to Court. 193  The majority remained 
outstanding (310) and, according to one report, statutory criminal law was ‘not widely 
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applied or enforced’194 and judges did not ‘seem to know much about the procedural 
laws.’195 Soon after the intervention in 2001 it was clear, then, to international experts that 
urgent measures would be required to construct a sustainable state criminal justice system 
in Afghanistan.196  
 
An international donor conference was convened in Tokyo in January 2002 during which a 
number of countries formally volunteered responsibility for leading reform in several 
fundamental state sectors. Germany assumed leadership of training and equipping the 
Afghan police and Japan for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration; the United 
States opted to lead reform of the Afghan armed forces; the United Kingdom was assigned 
‘lead nation’ status in the field of counter-narcotics and Italy assumed responsibility for the 
justice sector. These roles would entail the co-ordination of external professional 
assistance, providing and generating donor financial assistance and liaising with Afghan 
officials on major reform efforts, which would include the drafting of new relevant 
legislation.197 
 
On assuming its role as lead nation for the justice sector Italy was aware of the urgent 
need for criminal law reform. This was evident from the conclusions of the ICJ report in 
2002 and, later, an Amnesty International report, which had observed that ‘many judges do 
not have a basic knowledge of the criminal code and the criminal procedure code that are 
in force.’198  In response to the evident requirement for new legislation to construct a 
modern and sustainable state criminal justice system considerable progress was made 
with regard to improving and revising Afghanistan’s criminal law framework between 2004 
and 2006. On 4 January 2004 a new Constitution was ratified, confirming the structure of 
the state criminal court system and establishing a number of cornerstone principles and 
guidelines for the application of state criminal justice.199 The Interim Criminal Procedure 
Code was passed in February 2004, a Juvenile Justice Code was introduced in March 
2005, a Law on Prisons and Detention Centres was adopted in May 2005, a Police Law in 
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September 2005 and the Counter Narcotics Law in December 2005.200 All were essentially 
‘externally-driven’ and drafted with extensive input from international actors, principally 
from Italy, the UK and the UN.201 In October 2005 a new Law Reform Working Group was 
established under the auspices of the Justice Sector Consultative Group (JSCG) to 
manage national and international efforts to initiate legislative reform. 202  Legislative 
progress in the area of criminal law reflected a period of extensive reform in which on 
average the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) passed more than 37 new laws a year.203  
 
With regard to the development of government strategy on enhancing the justice 
framework, a 10-year reform programme was outlined in a paper entitled ‘Justice for All’ 
approved by the government in October 2005 and developed with substantial international 
donor assistance.204 This comprehensive needs assessment for the justice sector post-
dated the ICPC, but pre-dated the CNL by 2 months and contained important guidance for 
the content of new legislation. New law, it stipulated, to include counter narcotics 
measures,205 should conform with both international standards of human rights and Islamic 
principles. In addition, it urged that means of engaging with the traditional justice system 
should be explored.206  It did, then, advocate some negotiation between Afghanistan’s 
legal traditions. However, it fell short of insisting on any specific reference to customary 
justice procedures and mechanisms. Furthermore, it was fundamentally underpinned by a 
modernising agenda, evidenced by its assertion that future criminal justice legislation 
should be cognisant of ‘legal frameworks of modern, market-based democracies.’207  
 
The momentum of reform was continued at a conference in London in January 2006, a 
month after the CNL was passed by Presidential Decree. International donors pledged a 
further US$10.5 billion towards Afghan reconstruction, and the Interim Afghanistan 
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National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) with the Afghanistan Compact were unveiled.208 
These built on the Justice for All recommendations and provided for agreement between 
the Afghan government and the international community over a number of time-framed 
benchmarks to be achieved. Amongst the Compact’s rule of law component, which was 
made up of 4 benchmarks and mirrored those in I-ANDS, it stipulated that the country’s 
criminal law framework should be ‘put in place, distributed to all judicial and legislative 
institutions and made available to the public’ by 2010.209 With regard to criminal justice 
reform the Compact affirmed a target of ensuring ‘equal, fair and transparent access to 
justice for all based upon written codes with fair trials and enforceable verdicts.’210 The 
codification of law was clearly regarded by state-building strategists as the appropriate 
means of continuing the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s justice system. 
 
The Compact also led to the establishment of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board 
(JCMB) designed to monitor progress in the efforts towards meeting the benchmark 
targets by 2010.211 A consultative group within the JCMB replaced the JSCG and took 
responsibility for coordinating reform programmes to meet the Afghan National 
Development Strategy (ANDS) benchmarks including those connected with governance, 
rule of law and human rights.212 Within this consultative group, a Rule of Law Working 
Group was formed consisting of a number of technical working groups, which include a 
Criminal Law Reform Committee to counsel on continued criminal law reform and an 
advisory committee for counter narcotics.213  
 
Between 2002 and 2007 some progress was made with regard to improving criminal 
justice infrastructure. With assistance mainly from USAID, UNDP and the United Nations 
Office for Project Services (UNOPS) 45 justice buildings had been rebuilt, including 23 
provincial courthouses, 8 prosecutor’s offices and 14 district court buildings.214 Significant 
justice training programmes were also undertaken during this period, conducted and 
financed by international donors (mainly financed by Italy and contracted out training work 
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to bodies such as IDLO, the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences 
(ISISC), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and UNDP). Between 
2003 and 2005 the UNDP carried out training programmes involving 120 Judges and 130 
law graduates due to be employed within justice institutions.215 Between July 2003 and 
December 2004 the IDLO delivered a skills-orientated training programme to 500 Afghan 
judges, MOJ officials and prosecutors;216 and between 2005 and 2006 it provided training 
to a further 361 judges and 330 prosecutors.217 It also assisted in the training of Afghan 
lawyers undertaken by the Legal Aid Organisation of Afghanistan (LAOA).218 The ISISC, in 
addition, provided in-depth training on criminal law to 450 Judges and prosecutors in 2003 
and 2004.219 Furthermore, following the introduction of the ICPC, it provided training on the 
new procedures to 100 Judges, lawyers and judicial police officers, with the intention that 
they would later disseminate their knowledge and train their colleagues. 220  It also 
implemented a Provincial Justice Initiative in 2004 and 2005 aimed at improving criminal 
justice administration and capacity in each of Afghanistan’s provinces, 11 of which had 
received training on criminal procedure under the scheme by 2007.221  
 
Police reform started from a very low base in 2002. When Germany assumed lead nation 
responsibility for the police sector, Afghanistan’s police force had been, according to one 
report ‘virtually non-existent.’222 According to another report, it was ‘an untrained force 
manned primarily by factional commanders and their militias, who had little or no 
equipment or infrastructure, [and] who were unpaid or under-paid.’223 The Afghan National 
Police force (ANP) was created by Presidential decree in April 2003 and while the initial 
German-led reform programme provided good quality training for a limited number of 
middle and senior-ranking officers, it was later criticised for failing to ‘either reform the 
institutional context into which they were being inserted or to improve the quality of the 
mass of ordinary police.’224 The US increased its involvement in police reform from 2004 
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and the European Union (EU) later from 2007. 225  At the 2010 London Conference 
agreement was reached to increase ANP numbers to 134,000 by the end of 2011. By 
February 2011 there were 118,000 personnel, nearly double the number 4 years 
previously. 226   In spite of the considerable international investment in developing the 
force,227 however, attrition rates are high, the quality of its personnel has remained poor 
and corruption within it is reported to be widespread. In addition, the US approach to 
reform of the sector has been criticised for its emphasis on security as opposed to rule of 
law.228 Contemporary prognosis of police reform remains poor, a potentially critical factor 
for the application of procedures under the ICPC. According to a report in 2010 the ANP 
performs largely ‘para-military tasks and is plagued by high rates of illiteracy (80%), 
attrition (20% per annum) and drug-use (20-50%) [to the extent that]…the prospect of 
having a force which can deliver justice or basic security – let alone effective counter-
insurgency – seems as far away as ever.’229  
 
In general terms the progress and effectiveness of justice sector reform between 2002 and 
2007 was questionable. A review of the justice system by Amnesty International in 2005 
suggested that the condition of the justice system had hardly moved forward from that of 
2003. By 2005 it found it to be ‘ineffective’ and barely functioning in rural areas. 230 
Although restoration work faced considerable challenges arguably ineffective Italian 
leadership was culpable for the slow progress of reform during this period. A senior ROL 
official interviewed for this research in 2007 and then employed by the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) described the Italian performance in its lead 
nation role as ‘inept’.231 Dobbins claims that ‘Italy simply lacked the expertise, resources, 
interest and influence to succeed’232 in its role as lead nation for justice reform. This was 
exemplified by its failure to co-ordinate legal personnel training programmes. The majority 
of these were divided amongst different international organisations and delivered in an ad 
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hoc fashion, devoid of any monitoring or external evaluation. This reflected a wider trend 
with regard to general justice sector reform during the period between 2001 and 2007. 
While Justice for All, the I-ANDS and the Compact had provided a foundation for the 
development of Afghanistan’s justice system, multiple reform programmes were being 
devised and implemented by an array of international donors in the absence of any 
integrated policy. 233  Insufficient co-ordination between the Attorneys-General Office 
(AGO), the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the ANP was also frustrating criminal 
investigations and the development of the state criminal system.234 This resulted in a call 
at a Rule of Law Conference in Rome on 2-3 July 2007 for a greater degree of synergy 
between the justice institutions and the international organisations engaged in justice 
sector work, development and reform. 235  As a consequence of this the International 
Coordination for Legal Training (ICLT) was established in May 2007 with a mandate of co-
ordinating the various legal training programmes that were being undertaken by 
international organisations.236  
 
By this stage state-building strategy in Afghanistan appeared to be moving away from the 
lead nation approach that had been instigated at the Tokyo conference towards one that 
encouraged more local control and direction. Indeed, the concept of ‘lead nation’ was 
replaced by ‘key partners’ to reflect the number of donors and organisations, international 
financial institutions engaged in reconstruction work in the various state sectors.237 The 
Afghanistan National Development Strategy 2008-2013 (ANDS), approved in April 2008 
and presented at the Paris Conference in June of that year, appeared to underline the 
importance of Afghan involvement in the future reform of the justice sector by warning that 
international donors ‘should not attempt to impose an external judicial system that may not 
be accepted throughout the country.’238  In response to the ANDS process a National 
Justice Sector Strategy (NJSS) was drawn up in May 2008 providing a five-year strategy 
for the reform of the justice system designed to improve institutional capacity, coordination 
within the justice system and other state institutions and justice services.239 Alongside this 
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a National Justice Programme (NJP) was prepared to implement the designated reform 
targets and within this a greater emphasis was placed on the involvement of local actors at 
both operational and policy-making levels. In addition, funding for future reform 
programmes would be orchestrated by the WB and the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust 
Fund (ARTF) according to needs established by the Afghan government, thereby installing 
an Afghan demand-led programme for development to replace one driven primarily by 
bilateral aid assistance.240  
 
Legal training also reflected the drive towards increased Afghan involvement. In 2006 
courses conducted by the IDLO were taught only by international actors. In 2007 50% of 
the courses were taught by Afghan personnel and by 2008 the training course for MOJ 
officials was run entirely by Afghan staff. 241  
 
While official reconstruction efforts in the justice sector have been geared towards 
increased Afghan participation, particularly following deliberations at the 2007 Rome 
Conference, a review of justice sector reform concluded in 2010 that ‘the Afghan 
ownership in justice reform is yet to be met and …we are probably experimenting with a 
mixed regime, in which external players still influence de facto the decision-making 
process.’ 242  International actors, organisations and donors continue to influence 
fundamental justice sector reconstruction activities including government policy-making, 
legal education and training and legislative reform. Key policy documents such as the NJP 
and the NJSS were largely conceived and drafted by international personnel.243 Forums 
such as the Criminal Law Committee continue to be chaired by officials from international 
bodies.244 Training programmes are predominantly led by US organisations. The Justice 
Sector Support Programme (JSSP), funded by the US Bureau of International Narcotics 
and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) has provided training to the AGO since 2006. It also 
offers police-prosecutor training and mentoring to the AGO and the MOJ.  USAID, through 
the Afghan Rule of Law Project (ARoLP) provides training assistance to the MOJ and the 
Supreme Court. By June 2008 it was purported to have had trained to more than 70% of 
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all Afghan Judges.245 The US lead in legal training and education reflects its position as 
the largest financial contributor to justice sector reform since 2002, representing more than 
60% of total donor contributions or pledges to 2008. Its hegemony in the justice arena is 
likely to continue into the future.246 In 2008 it was estimated that approximately 83% of 
future bilateral projects to be conducted under the NJP would be carried out by the US.247 
According to Tondini, continued US and international dominance in the field of justice 
sector reform in Afghanistan perpetuates a mixed-ownership model of reconstruction and 
impedes the expansion of the important ingredient of local ownership in the area. And for 
Tondini, ‘the lack of local ownership has jeopardised the success of reforms,’248 which 
would include the ICPC and the CNL. It is also indicative of a continued top-down 
approach to the development of the overall justice system.249  
 
Recent developments which impact on justice development in Afghanistan include a 
commitment made by the Afghan government and the international community at a 
conference in Kabul in July 2010 to accelerate Afghanistan’s ability to govern itself and 
provide rule of law protections for its citizens through improved policing, justice and anti-
corruption.250 This was followed by a summit in Lisbon in November 2010 when NATO 
powers committed to the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
troops and the transition of security control to the Afghan government by the end of 
2014.251 This transition will undoubtedly affect the application of the ICPC and the CNL. 
Significant doubts remain over the ability of the Afghan state to provide justice and 
implement state legislation such as the ICPC and the CNL following the transition stage. 
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The international community and the Afghan government have invested considerable effort 
and expense in attempting to reconstruct Afghanistan’s criminal law framework since 
2002, which has involved significant legislative reform in addition to the ICPC and the 
CNL, and numerous programmes to provide legal education and training and improve 
infrastructure.  The strategy for reconstruction evolved from one driven by a lead nation 
approach between 2002 and 2007 to one which emphasised greater co-ordination 
between the justice institutions and the huge number of donor organisations involved as 
well as enhanced Afghan ownership. In reality, however, international actors and 
organisations, particularly those that are US-led, continue to influence decision-making 
and programmes of reform. The majority of technical assistance is currently imposed 
externally rather than co-ordinated by the Afghan government.252 While reform appears to 
continue to be dependent on foreign aid, the over-riding external influence on the state 
justice sector, including that concerned with criminal law, may impact on the local 
acceptance of new laws such as the ICPC and the CNL and contribute to constraining the 
development of rule of law.253 The overall prognosis after more than nine years of reform in 
this respect is not good. Indeed, the Afghan government acknowledged in its ANDS report 
that by 2008 efforts to establish rule of law in the country continued to be undermined by 
amongst other matters ‘weak legislative development and enforcement [and an] ineffective 
and poorly defined justice system.’254 The same report observed that the system was still 
constrained by ‘weak infrastructure…[a] lack of trained staff [and] poor education and 
training.’255 International Crisis Group’s more damning assessment of the justice system in 
November 2010 found it to be ‘in a catastrophic state of disrepair.’256 This suggests that in 
spite of all the effort and expense involved in reconstructing the justice sector little genuine 
progress had been made since 2002.  
 
 
Section 3.5 Challenges to the State Criminal Justice System and Constraints on  
  Transplant Reception 
 
There are a number of contemporary challenges to the operation of the state criminal 
justice system in Afghanistan that may condition the application and reception of 
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transplanted law currently in force, such as the ICPC and the CNL, and which therefore 
require examination. 
 
3.5.1 Cultural dynamics and the legitimacy of the state criminal justice system 
It has been noted that although state codified law has existed since it was first introduced 
in the late 19th century it has not always been applied in the state criminal courts. Legal 
practitioners have often resorted instead to Islamic and customary approaches to justice. 
Moreover, the application of state justice mechanisms has historically been confined 
mainly to urban areas. The majority of the population, largely illiterate and living in rural 
and provincial areas, have preferred to rely on customary approaches to justice and 
Shari’a.  
 
The aversion of large sections of the Afghan population to state criminal justice 
mechanisms is to some extent the result of general antipathy towards central 
administrations and distrust of centralisation efforts, often regarded as alien and the 
product of foreign intrusion. In contrast to other countries in the region such as India, Iran 
and China, Afghanistan has rarely enjoyed a strong central state exerting directive control 
over the totality of its population. Rather, the Afghanistan state has a history of being ‘soft 
centred’, with the writ of the central state struggling to extend beyond urban centres and its 
fragile existence dependent upon tribal and ethnic support. Tribal and ethnic affiliations are 
considered to be more relevant and permanent to the largely rural population than 
allegiances the state, whose directives and influences can seem comparatively unrelated 
to the hardships of daily existence.257  
 
The geographical makeup of the country is a contributing factor to the peripheral influence 
that the state enjoys over the population.  Its high mountainous areas, difficult terrain and 
consequent insubstantial transport system means that many rural areas have little 
interaction with urban centres and centrally directed policies. Instead, many communities 
have had to be self-sufficient, relying on regional as opposed to national market 
economies and managing their own administrative affairs and criminal justice disputes with 
reference to Shari’a and customary law rather than state mechanisms.258 Such factors 
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have made for introspective, conservative communities not easily accepting of the state’s 
various attempts at social, economic and political integration or indeed its attempts at 
imposing criminal justice mechanisms.  
 
It is noteworthy also that historical analysis of attempts to promote rule of law in 
Afghanistan demonstrate that when the state has attempted to impose a justice system on 
the population that challenges the authority of Islamic law and the interpretative power of 
the ulama it has struggled for legitimacy and has occasionally met with strong resistance. 
Barfield noted in 2001 that ‘for the past 150 years, there’s been a major struggle between 
urban elites in the capital attempting to push the rule of law onto the countryside, and the 
countryside looking at it less as the rule of law and more as the imposition of state central 
authority, which they reject.’ 259  Ammanullah’s 1923 Constitution, introduced under a 
modernising agenda, incited rebellion leading to his dethronement because it challenged 
the authority of tribal leaders and the ulama and sought to reduce reliance on informal 
justice mechanisms which had so much relevance to existence in rural areas. 260 
Ammanullah’s demise has served as a stark warning to subsequent leaders of the Afghan 
state of the problems they are likely to encounter in attempting to extend their rule and 
centralised justice mechanisms beyond urban areas. Lau warned in 2001 that ‘past 
experience would suggest that any attempt to implement and enforce secular statutory 
laws which depart from customary and/or particular interpretations of Islamic law is liable 
to be met with protests and perhaps even civil unrest.’261 Moreover, it is notable that when 
Afghan rulers have embarked on programmes of modernisation facilitated by legal reform 
to extend the power and reach of the central state, there is a propensity for it to be met 
with resistance from local power-holders, particularly tribal and religious leaders, when the 
laws are construed as intent on undermining or circumventing their authority. Such was the 
case with legal reforms instituted not only by Ammanullah but also later by Daoud. As 
Suhrke points out ‘all the modernising regimes [in Afghanistan] were defeated.’262  
 
The reach of the central state and its ability to impose its criminal justice system on the 
rural population has also been undermined by a history of local reservations over its 
legitimacy brought about by persistent reliance by Afghan rulers on foreign assistance. 
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Rather than gaining authority based on support from within Afghanistan, those in control of 
the state – and state justice mechanisms – have long been dependent on financial 
assistance from external powers. Abdul Rahman Khan, under British sovereignty, relied on 
the British arms to strengthen his state system. Between 1955 and 1978 the Soviet Union 
provided US$2.52 billion and the US $533 million in aid to support state rulers263 and the 
mujahedeen were later supported by the US and Saudi Arabia during Soviet occupation. 
The current regime, under President Karzai, has received unprecedented levels of foreign 
financial assistance. It is estimated that 90-95% of all state development costs and 69% of 
all government expenditure is financed by external aid, more than any other previous 
regime.264 The dependence by a succession of state rulers on foreign financial assistance 
to maintain power and control has resulted in a series of rentier states, particularly since 
1978, propped up by external aid rather than by an internal base of support. This 
dependence increases doubt over whether measures introduced by the Afghan state are 
for the best interests of the Afghan people or the result of manipulation by its foreign 
sponsors. There is considerable mistrust over the intentions of the foreign backers of the 
state. The collective experience of Soviet invasion, the US abandonment of the country 
following Soviet withdrawal, the support by neighbouring countries provided to factions 
involved in the civil war and the current intervention by international forces, which provides 
strategic access in the region, has created a deep suspicion that foreign powers support 
the Afghan state only to serve their own interests.265  
 
These suspicions increase antipathy towards the state regime and its justice system, and 
reduce their legitimacy and reach, which continue to remain largely confined to urban 
areas. The formal system of justice is relevant for only 10% of the population.266 It is, as 
the EU has acknowledged, ‘far removed from ordinary people’s everyday life’. 267  The 
legitimacy of the state justice system, limited by a devastated infrastructure, the corrupt 
practices of some of its officials whose capacity is questionable and fluctuating regime 
change has contrasted unfavourably to the permanency and relevance of Shari’a and 
customary practices whose authority derives from the more meaningful sources of religion 
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and the collective requirements of the local community. The Afghan state, Misdaq reminds 
us, has always been ‘in the shadow of the tribe.’268 And so, state law has always lived in 
the shadow of Shari’a and customary law. Tribal, ethnic and religious affiliations and 
consequent customary and Islamic practices have more resonance and greater appeal to 
the majority of the local population. As a result the norms and rituals provided for in any 
state law in Afghanistan, are traditionally rarely ‘widely shared’ by the local population.  
 
These issues are likely to impact on the potential reception of state laws such as the ICPC 
and the CNL which have been developed by way of legal transplantation. If state laws 
have traditionally had less appeal to Afghans, new transplanted state laws are less likely to 
be considered meaningful and appropriate to them with the result that the laws are 
consequently less likely to be accepted and to achieve their objectives.  
 
Moreover, local resistance to foreign conquest and intrusion and to foreign promoted 
attempts at state modernisation might imply a cultural resistance in Afghanistan to any 
new transplanted law such as the ICPC and the CNL, dependent on foreign sources, 
which would impact on their application and acceptance. Cultural resistance to a transplant 
may adversely affect its potential reception.269   What, however, is meant by ‘culture’ and 
indeed ‘Afghan culture’ by which it is possible to determine if there might be any cultural 
resistance to these transplanted laws? The concept of ‘culture’ is complex and difficult to 
define. According to Williams it is ‘one of the two or three most complicated words in the 
English Language.’270 A traditional ‘natural history’ anthropological approach to defining 
culture implies that it is handed down, preserved, fixed and perhaps an obstacle to 
change.271 This perspective might suggest that any legal transplant that fails to be attuned 
to the culture of its host country is likely to meet resistance. It is an outlook, however, that 
has recently been challenged. Current anthropological approaches towards culture tend to 
regard it not as an essential, inherited fixed tradition, but rather as something that is 
flexible and capable of change. Tapper’s 2008 review of Afghan culture supports this 
stance.272 While Tapper maintains that it is not possible to say with any authority what 
culture or indeed Afghan culture actually is, it is nevertheless more likely to be  ‘a dynamic, 
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changing, flexible collection of values and practices.’273 In contrast to the natural history 
perspective, Tapper’s view of Afghan culture would auger well for the potential receptivity 
of legal transplants such as the ICPC and the CNL that are intent on bringing about 
change.  Rather than being fixed and inflexible Afghan culture may be capable of 
negotiation and alteration and therefore of absorbing new, transplanted legal concepts and 
procedures.   
 
3.5.2 Narcotics and Organised crime 
In a similar manner to other post-intervention countries seeking to emerge from conflict, 
Afghanistan has experienced an increase in criminal activity.274 In Afghanistan’s case this 
has to a large extent been centred around the opium industry which represents a huge 
threat to rule of law, security and economic development efforts. 
 
The narcotics industry had expanded during the Soviet occupation in the 1980’s and the 
civil war in the 1990’s and the consequent inability of central government to enforce 
prohibitions on cultivation and trafficking. The collapse of the licit economy and agricultural 
trade forced farmers to undertake poppy cultivation as a means of livelihood, a practice 
encouraged by ethnic warlords who were able to engage in trafficking enterprises by 
establishing ethnic trade links across Afghanistan’s borders.275  
 
The Taliban imposed a total ban on opium poppy cultivation in July 2000 on the basis of its 
contravention of Islamic principles, resulting in a dramatic fall in production in 2001.276  On 
the whole, however, during the Taliban period the opium trade continued largely 
unchecked by central authorities as a de-facto legal enterprise and, until the demise of the 
regime, it was its primary source of foreign exchange.277 The removal of the Taliban, 
however, brought about dramatic changes to the opium economy, resulting in a rapid 
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resurgence in poppy cultivation, epitomised by a leap in production from 200 to 3,400 
metric tons between 2001 and 2002.278 The rise in poppy prices following the Taliban 
period of prohibition encouraged poor farmers to plant poppy to clear their debts and 
wealthier farmers to turn land into profit. Furthermore, as a result of the US policy of giving 
money to local commanders in return for their support in the ‘war on terror’ the money 
market was flooded with millions of US dollars which were used to create loans to farmers 
to finance future poppy crops.279 Between 2002 and 2004 opium cultivation increased from 
3400 to 4200 metric tonnes.280 At the time the ICPC and the CNL were introduced the 
industry was still expanding. By 2004 opium cultivation had increased to an unprecedented 
131,000 hectares, a rise of 64% from levels in 2003.281 Afghanistan was producing 4,200 
metric tonnes of opium, accounting for 87% of global poppy cultivation.282 A smaller crop in 
2005 produced a similar amount due to more favourable weather and environmental 
conditions.283 
 
There are correlations between the opium trade and the financing of terrorism and 
independent armed factions as well as the promotion of corruption which all present de-
stabilising challenges for the Afghan government and adversely impact on reconstruction 
and reform efforts, including those related to criminal justice and counter narcotics in the 
form of the application of the ICPC and the CNL.  
 
According to a 2009 UNODC report criminal syndicates ‘are the main organisers and 
beneficiaries of the opium trade in Afghanistan’ and organised crime financed by the drug 
trade represents ‘a tremendous security threat’ in Afghanistan.284 Criminal groups profiting 
from narcotics trafficking range from ethnically-based small gangs to large organisations 
engaged in transnational operations. It is estimated that there are between 25 and 30 high-
level networks which largely dominate the local opium economy, a further 500 to 600 mid-
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level trafficking networks and that drug related funds accruing to warlords approximates 
US$200 to US$400 million a year.285  
 
The opium economy provides substantial financial leverage for factional commanders and 
warlords to maintain their independence from central rule and resist attempts to impose 
the rule of law upon them, often through violence. In September 2008 the Head of the 
Counter Narcotics Tribunal Appeals Court, Judge Alim Hanif, was shot dead by the Afghan 
‘mafia’ according to the Ministry of Counter Narcotics. 286  Furthermore, in 2010 Judge 
Mehro Ahmed, the country’s most senior counter narcotics Judge confirmed that she had 
been offered bribes and received death threats from criminal gangs involved in the drug 
trade.287  In addition, profits from the opium trade have enabled warlords to integrate 
themselves into the state apparatus and gain influential and representational power on and 
within national, executive and judicial institutions, including the army, police, intelligence 
services and the judiciary.288  The entry of warlords into national politics has impeded 
coherent government of the country. From these positions of power commanders and 
former warlords have been able to corrupt government and judicial institutions from within 
and exert political influence in ways that undermine the state criminal justice system. This 
political influence can provide protection against prosecution and imprisonment and 
extends to the top echelons of the justice system. 289   
 
3.5.3 Corruption 
Drug-related corruption is recognised as the dominant source of corruption in Afghanistan, 
compromising provincial and local government agencies and undermining legitimate 
efforts towards state-building and political reform.290 There are strong links between the 
narcotics trade and public service corruption in Afghanistan, which is reportedly significant 
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among the police and the judiciary.291 Corrupt officials, often appointed as a result of a 
combination of patronage and the payment of a bribe, are empowered from their state 
positions to exact bribes from other officials and the public. 292  State justice and law 
enforcement personnel, facing the harsh realities of economic life typified by poor salaries 
and rising costs, use their positions of authority to profit from the proceeds of the drug 
trade. The result, according to a 2010 report is that ‘drugs and bribes are the two largest 
income generators in Afghanistan.’293  
 
Corruption has become a normal feature of daily existence for the majority of the 
population. Between 2009 and 2010 52% of adult Afghans paid bribes to public officials.294 
Moreover, the huge sums of monies involved in the drug industry have transformed the 
level of corruption in the country to the extent that revenue exacted from bribes in 2010 
alone amounted to $2.8 billion. 295  As a result between 2005 and 2010 Afghanistan 
dropped from 117th to 176th out of 178 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, making it the third worst country in the world for corruption.296  
 
What is particularly troubling as far as the formal criminal justice system is concerned is 
that the police and the courts are consistently perceived by Afghans to be the most corrupt 
of the state institutions. 297  Asia Foundation reported in 2008 that 51% of people 
interviewed who had contact with the judiciary and the courts between 2007-2008 had 
experienced instances of corruption. 298  Although attempts have been made by the 
Supreme Court to tackle corruption within the judiciary, most notably with he arrest of 92 
judges in 2009 following investigation by the Judicial Inspectorate, 299  a 2010 survey 
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confirmed that the courts and the police remain the most corrupt of the state institutions.300 
Corruption among the judiciary, police and state justice personnel erodes the credibility 
and legitimacy of the state. More specifically, it inhibits public confidence in the state 
criminal justice system, which is likely to undermine the application of state criminal justice 
laws and their potential for achieving their objectives. Disillusioned by the state system the 
public are more likely to resort to non-state justice mechanisms to seek justice. 301 
Moreover the abuse of justice by those in power, including the police and judiciary, is 
capable of fuelling insurgency. If ordinary people without power are unable to obtain justice 
under the state system, this not only increases their dissatisfaction with the state and its 
foreign backers but also the appeal of justice under the Taliban, which although 
acknowledged as punitive, is trusted. Ledwidge noted of Taliban courts in Helmand that 
they were ‘the only effective and trusted tribunals of justice. Above all, unlike the state 
courts, their decisions are not dependent on the ability to pay bribes and will be 
enforced.’302 The inability to obtain justice under the state system has been exploited by 
the Taliban, furthered their appeal and perpetuated the insurgency which continues to 
represent a huge problem for security in Afghanistan, in turn impeding the application of 
state criminal justice mechanisms.303  
 
 
3.5.4 Insurgency and Insecurity  
The ANDS report noted that ‘security constraints in certain parts of the country make 
service delivery [of state justice] difficult or impossible.’304 Insecurity remains one of the 
greatest impediments to state-building efforts in Afghanistan, undermining the 
implementation of state development policies and damaging confidence in the government 
and its ability, through new criminal justice measures such as the ICPC and the CNL, to 
promote rule of law.305 Afghanistan’s history of conflict has continued beyond the removal 
of the Taliban from power in 2001, and the current government faces a range of security 
threats from the Taliban and al Qaeda, factional militias and drug-traffickers, which 
threaten to de-stabilise the country.  
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The armed conflict involving the Taliban has escalated since 2005. In 2006 more than 
4,400 Afghans, which included 1,000 civilians, died as a result of anti-government 
violence.306 Terrorist attacks on UK and coalition forces have increased since 2007 and 
include indiscriminate and regular attacks on government and justice targets including the 
Prisons Directorate and Ministry of Justice.307 International military intervention has grown 
rapidly since 2006 to the extent that there are now 130,000 NATO forces, divided amongst 
37 troop contributing countries.308 
 
The ANDS strategy committed the government to expand the Afghan National Army to 
80,000 personnel by the end of 2010 and the Afghan National Police and Afghan Border 
Police to 82,180 in an effort to increase the power of the government to inhibit future 
security threats.309 While these threats continue, and terrorist acts are committed with 
impunity and the power of armed groups remains unchecked, it is probable that public 
confidence in the ability of the central state and its legal authorities to ensure justice will be 
further eroded. This in turn is likely to adversely affect the application and relevance of 
criminal justice mechanisms such as those provided for in the ICPC and the CNL.310  
 
Conclusion 
I have argued in Chapter 2 that the reception of a criminal law legal transplant will be 
conditioned by local contextual issues. The legal history and traditions of a country will 
inform the extent to which a transplanted law may be regarded as meaningful and 
appropriate. Constitutional reform, criminal justice infrastructure development and capacity 
building and the challenges that the justice sector face will impact on the application of a 
transplanted criminal law and the potential of it achieving its objectives. Considering these 
issues is therefore vital to evaluations of the ICPC and the CNL.  
 
                                                          
306
 UNDP, note 15, p. 7 
307
 Attacked on 11.02.2009; see http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-
country/asia-oceania/afghanistan  
308
 The total number of soldiers trebled between 2006-2009; Suhrke, note 264 
309
 ANDS, note 238, p.55-57 
310
 Thier, note 126, p. 4 
114 
 
In 2005 the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) noted that Afghans 
demonstrated ‘a rich understanding of and strong desire for justice.’311 According to the 
report ‘Afghans believe justice to be a general medium through which to improve specific 
aspects of their life. Justice for many also meant the upholding of basic human rights.’312 
The ICPC and the CNL were introduced in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005 to improve 
accessibility to these ideals, to contribute to the process of reconstructing the country’s 
state criminal law framework and enhance the development of rule of law. These were 
hugely challenging tasks facing the new administration and its international donors 
following more than 25 years of conflict. By 2001 the state system barely functioning, with 
limited capacity and infrastructure and uncertain knowledge of relevant applicable laws. 
Moreover, positive state laws had a historical legacy of being regarded as less relevant 
than Islamic and customary law, their legitimacy sustained by the authority of Islam, the 
dominant religious faith amongst Afghan people, and the regard to which justice that is tied 
to the collective consciousness of the community is held. Furthermore, when modernising 
state legislation has been introduced which has been perceived as undermining the 
authority of practitioners of customary and Islamic law, it has met with resistance. The 
legal traditions and the historical features that shape criminal justice in Afghanistan have 
conditioned the reception of new state laws in the past and are likely to do so now and in 
the future.  
 
The ICPC and the CNL were introduced during a period of justice reconstruction in 
Afghanistan characterised by a ‘lead-nation’ strategy resulting from the UN’s ‘light footprint’ 
stance on involvement, whereby Italy assumed responsibility for the justice sector and the 
UK took the lead in the field of counter narcotics. This period was typified by a top-down 
approach to justice reform led largely by international donors and which witnessed 
extensive law reform. They were two of a number of laws that were introduced between 
2002 and 2006 in the field of criminal law which were externally-led and drafted with 
significant international input. Legal training and capacity building programmes were 
initiated by a large number of international donors, but there was a lack any real co-
ordination between them and insufficient Afghan involvement. While the reconstruction 
strategy changed following the 2007 Rome Conference to allow for greater local 
engagement in the reconstruction process, it remains largely controlled by international 
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donors, and particularly by the US. While the continued international presence in the 
reconstruction of the state criminal law system may be inevitable to ensure financial 
assistance for future training and capacity building to support and augment the proper 
application of new laws such as the ICPC and the CNL their association with international 
assistance may alienate the Afghan public from them, given that there is a history of local 
mistrust of the foreign backers of the Afghan state.  
 
In spite of all the effort and expense that has been put into reconstructing Afghanistan’s 
state justice system since 2001 it still faces considerable challenges, not least those 
presented by the narcotics industry, insecurity and corruption which damage its legitimacy 
and inhibit its potential to appeal to Afghans. The international emphasis on security over 
justice and rule of law and pervasive corruption and abuse of power within justice 
institutions increase local disillusionment in the state criminal justice system and drive 
insurgency, which in turn undermines state justice mechanisms and reform. These 
contemporary challenges to the state justice system are likely to constrain the application 
and reception of new transplanted laws such as the CNL and the ICPC. 
 
These contextual considerations appear perhaps to provide a bleak prognosis for the 
potential reception of these two laws. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the 
development of that state justice system as a whole has been informed by the 
transplantation of law, namely codified Islamic law and western positive law of a civil 
tradition. Afghanistan has a history of transplant reception. Furthermore, if modern 
anthropological approaches are applied, the flexibility and dynamism of Afghan culture 
might auger well for the potential successful reception of the new procedures for criminal 
procedure and counter narcotics introduced by the ICPC and the CNL. A clearer picture of 
the real progress of these laws, however, should emerge from their evaluation.  
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4  An Evaluation of The Interim Criminal 
Procedure Code 2004 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the Interim Criminal Procedure Code, promulgated into law in by 
Presidential decree in February 2004 1  and evaluates it, applying the evaluative test 
proposed in chapter 2. It relies on original qualitative material derived from interviews with 
and evidence obtained from a range of senior Afghan legal representatives and 
international personnel based in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2011 who have 
experience of the law’s application. It is organised into four sections. Section 4.1 outlines 
the central provisions of the law. Section 4.2 examines the reasons for its development 
and Section 4.3 clarifies why it can be considered to be a legal transplant. In Section 4.4 
the various components of the proposed evaluative test for legal transplants are applied to 
the lCPC. Drawing on quantitative data and qualitative evidence this section of the chapter 
considers the manner in which the law is being applied, its compatibility with other sources 
of state criminal law, the extent of its correlation with Islamic principles of criminal justice 
and of its prospects of being considered meaningful and appropriate both amongst Afghan 
legal practitioners and the general public. It also examines the motivations behind the 
introduction of the law and the possible justifications for relying on legal transplantation as 
a means of developing it and their impact on its reception. In addition, it assesses the 
extent to which the ICPC has achieved its objectives before reaching a conclusion on the 
issues of whether or not it has been successfully received and whether it was reasonable 
to have relied on legal transplantation to develop this law.   
 
 
 
Section 4.1 The ICPC: Provisions and Procedures 
 
The ICPC’s 98 articles, divided amongst 15 chapters, collectively prescribe procedural 
rules to govern all the stages of criminal procedure from the arrest and detention of 
individuals, the investigation and prosecution of criminal offences, 2  trials and the 
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implementation of decisions 3  as well as the appeal stage, including appeals to the 
Supreme Court.4  
 
The first 41 articles and 7 chapters are concerned with the provisional arrest and 
preliminary investigation stages of proceedings. The Code provides that following the 
arrest of a suspect, the police are entitled to search the individual and any relevant 
premises and seize evidence which they consider to be essential to prosecute a criminal 
offence.5 At the time of arrest, suspects are to be informed of their right to remain silent 
and their right to defence counsel.6 The police are able to interrogate arrested individuals 
within 24 hours of their arrest7 and they must report to the primary prosecutor within this 
preliminary period following arrest detailing the nature of any criminal offences and the 
outcome of their interrogations.8 In terms of the formalities of interviews, if the police 
decide to take the suspect to the police station for questioning, they should inform him or 
her of the reasons for their arrest,9  their right to remain silent10  and their right to be 
represented by defence counsel.11 Interviews are to be recorded in writing.12 
 
The primary prosecutor is required to commence the preliminary investigation within 48 
hours of receiving the case from the police.13 This investigative stage is stated to be 
concerned with ‘the establishment of the truth,’ an important indicator of inquisitoriality.14 
The primary prosecutor is entitled to question the suspect and is empowered to ‘collect all 
relevant evidence’ in whatever way they deem fit 15  and the suspect is entitled to 
representation by a defence counsel,16 which may be free if they do not have the financial 
means to appoint one.17  
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Primary prosecutors can conduct investigations both on their own and in conjunction with 
the police, who they will instruct.18 Key investigative ‘tools’ include inspections, searches, 
seizures, expert examinations or interrogations19 but these are offered as suggestions 
rather than limitations and the law omits to provide any guidelines on procedure for 
collating evidence using these techniques.20  
 
The Code provides that the primary prosecutor must decide within 15 days of the original 
arrest whether to release the suspect, indict them or apply to the Court to continue to 
detain them for a further 15 days.21 If the prosecutor determines that there is insufficient 
evidence to support a conviction at the conclusion of the investigation, they must dismiss 
the case and release the suspect.22  Alternatively, if the prosecutor decides to proceed 
with a prosecution, they must submit an act of indictment to the Court, requesting a trial to 
assess the liability of the suspect.23  The indictment should include an identification of the 
suspect and a description of the criminal offence alleged to have been committed.24 In 
addition to the act of indictment, the primary prosecutor is required to forward his or her file 
containing all documents gathered during the investigation to the Court,25 which should be 
made available to the accused26 and their defence counsel.27  
 
After receiving the indictment the Court must immediately order ‘notification of the deed’ 
indicating the time and date set for the trial.28 This deed should name the accused, define 
the crime they are alleged to have committed and refer to any factual circumstances in 
support of the prosecution’s case.29  It should be served on the accused, any defence 
counsel and the primary prosecutor at least 5 days before the trial date,30 which should be 
listed to take place no later than 2 months from the filing of the indictment.31 
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Before the trial, both the prosecutor and the accused must file at Court a list of any 
witnesses and experts they wish to call to give evidence, explaining the relevance of their 
testimony.32 The Court examines the lists and may exclude any requested witnesses and 
order the appearance of any other witnesses or experts whose evidence it considers to be 
potentially relevant,33 following which the selected witnesses and experts are notified by 
the Court of their requirement to attend the trial.34  
 
At the subsequent trial before a single Judge the indictment is read out and the legality of 
the accused’s arrest is assessed.35 The prosecutor then presents the case against the 
accused and explains the findings of the preliminary investigation.36 Police officers who 
conducted the investigations may give evidence, as well as witnesses and experts, 
including any victim and they may be cross-examined by the accused or their defence 
counsel. The accused may also give evidence.  At any stage, the Court can question the 
accused or any witnesses and experts,37 although the accused can refuse to testify and 
answer the Court’s questions.38  
 
At the end of the proceedings the prosecutor may give an indication to the Court of the 
kind and amount of punishment that he considers the accused should receive for the 
offence if found guilty, 39  and the accused or their representative may make final 
submissions to rebut the accusations made by the prosecutor.40 The Judges presiding 
over the case then retire to chambers to consider the verdict and, in reaching a decision, 
they must not rely on any witness or expert evidence contained in the file of the preliminary 
investigation unless it was repeated during the trial or the accused or his legal 
representative were present and able to ask questions when the evidence was obtained.41  
 
Decisions should be declared in Court and should identify the accused, detail the relevant 
facts of the case, and provide a verdict, citing reasons with reference to the facts of the 
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case and the law.42 Decisions reached in the primary Court are capable of appeal to the 
Provincial Court on application within 20 days.43 The grounds for appeal include erroneous 
application of the law by the judge at first instance, or incorrect definition of the crime, 
evaluation of the evidence or the imposition of an inappropriate penalty. 44  There is a 
further route of appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Court of Appeal 
on the basis that the law has been wrongly applied or interpreted or the evidence against 
the defendant was invalid.45   
 
The Code also provides criminal justice due process protections and rights for defendants 
that conform with international expectations and standards and the 2004 Constitution. It 
establishes a presumption of innocence,46 and a right for the accused to remain silent.47 It 
also provides protection for the accused against intimidation and coercion to secure 
confessions,48 and entitles him or her to representation by a defence counsel,49 who may 
review the prosecution file submitted in support of the indictment50  and represent the 
accused during preliminary investigations by the judicial police,51 at any later interrogations 
by the prosecutor52 and at the trial,53 which the Code stipulates must be heard without 
undue delay.54 The Code also permits defendants to call their own witnesses and experts 
to give evidence at the trial in order to defeat or discredit prosecution evidence.55  
Section 4.2 Reasons for the Development of the ICPC 
Reviews of Afghanistan’s criminal justice system undertaken by the ICJ in 2002 and 
Amnesty International in 2003 provide some indication of the potential motivating factors 
behind the passing of the ICPC in 2004.56 Both complied with internationally-recognised 
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best practice guidelines for promoting rule of law in states seeking to emerge from conflict, 
inclined to recommend the prioritisation of determining the nature of existing applicable law 
and assessing it through the lens of international human rights standards.57  
 
The Bonn Agreement had installed a legal system similar to that established by the 1964 
Constitution that resulted in applicable substantive and procedural criminal law being 
governed by the 1976 Penal Code and the 1965 Criminal Procedure Law. Both the ICJ 
and AI reports, however, revealed significant weaknesses in this formal criminal law 
framework, some of which related specifically to applicable criminal procedure. ICJ’s report 
concluded that Judges knew little about the procedural laws that were in force58 and that 
‘the laws establishing the framework of criminal procedure [were] marked by uncertainty.’59 
AI’s report noted a lack of sufficient procedures within the 1965 law enabling any challenge 
to the legality of a detention before a judge, contrary to Afghanistan’s international 
obligations ensuring the provision of fair trial guarantees. There was uncertainty amongst 
practitioners as to whether detention periods should be determined in accordance with the 
1965, 1974 or 1981 laws. Both reports recommended urgent reform of procedural law.60  
 
By 2003 there were then, according to these reports, justifiable reasons for introducing a 
new criminal procedural code. It could provide much needed clarity as to exactly what 
procedures should be applied in criminal cases thereby replacing the evident uncertainty 
surrounding applicable law which was perhaps not surprising given the vast number of 
legal texts still in force and applicable at this time. It could also provide the essential 
requirements for international standards of fair trial, due process and human rights. At the 
same time a new law would fulfil the recommendations of international organisations such 
as the UN that advocated the necessity of adequate criminal law frameworks consisting of 
modern laws for building effective justice systems in post-intervention states.61  
Section 4.3 The ICPC as a Legal Transplant 
By the time Amnesty International’s report was published Italy had assumed lead nation 
responsibility for justice reform as a consequence of its Tokyo-assigned role of leading 
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international assistance for the reform of Afghanistan’s justice sector. The assumption of 
this role led to the drafting of the ICPC being controlled by Italian experts, a contributing 
factor in the law becoming a legal transplant, as it resulted in the adoption of provisions 
from Italy’s own 1988 Code of Criminal Procedure.  
 
It is noteworthy that the allocation of Italy’s lead-nation role was arguably the result of 
chance and circumstance rather than the consequence of deliberate intent. By the time the 
justice sector was considered at the Tokyo Conference international responsibility for other 
assistance sectors had already been resolved. Consequently Enrico Gerardo De Maio, the 
Special Envoy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Afghanistan at the time, took it upon 
himself to nominate Italy as the justice lead nation without prior consultation or 
authorisation by the Italian Parliament, and arguably without proper consideration of its 
capacity to fulfil this role.62 While it seems extraordinary that such a key area for reform 
should be led by a country without it having first assessed its own ability and capacity to 
manage it there was, nevertheless, a lengthy history of association between Italy and 
Afghanistan to lend justification to De Maio’s decision. Italy was one of the founders of the 
‘Geneva Group’ of countries concerned with the political development of Afghanistan.63 
Moreover, King Zahir Shah and many high level Afghan luminaries had been living in Italy 
since 1973 following Daoud’s coup and using it as a base from which to generate support, 
particularly during the Taliban era. Largely as a consequence of this, anti-Taliban Afghan 
authorities had met in Rome in November 2001 before travelling to Bonn to deliberate on 
Afghanistan’s political and legal future and sign the Bonn Agreement.  
 
In February 2003, Guiseppe Di Gennaro, the Executive Director of UNODC, at the time in 
his 80’s, was appointed ‘special advisor’ to the Italian government to counsel it in its 
responsibilities towards justice reform.64 The Italian government also established the Italian 
Justice Project Office (IJPO) with Di Gennaro at its helm and tasked it with overseeing 
Italian justice reform policies and projects in Afghanistan.65 By this stage the ICJ and AI 
reports had reviewed the criminal justice system and recommended reform of the 
applicable criminal laws, the latter calling on the MOJ and the Judicial Reform Commission 
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(JRC) to ‘facilitate a process of codification of the law’ with assistance from the 
international community.66 The JRC convened working groups to review the existing 1965 
criminal code. However, there were concerns among international experts that neither it 
nor the MOJ had sufficiently experienced personnel to be able to conduct any amendment 
to the law adopting the required internationally acceptable human rights standards.67  
 
The IJPO was at this time providing assistance to both the JRC and the justice ministries 
and it was well placed to assist in the process of reforming Afghanistan’s criminal 
legislation. As the head of the IJPO Di Gennaro assumed control of the process of drafting 
the ICPC. He was assisted in this respect by a small team of lawyers from the IJPO and by 
some US military lawyers,68 but nevertheless emerged as the principle architect of the 
law, 69  which was completed within in a very short period time. 70  According to an 
international expert, Di Gennaro claims to have consulted Afghan officials over the content 
of the law.71 It is likely however, that there was only a very limited degree of consultation 
between international personnel and Afghan officials during the drafting process.72 Indeed, 
the lack of consultation created resentment at local level in the Afghan justice institutions 
and the Afghan National Assembly initially rejected the Code and urged President Karzai 
to refuse to ratify it.73 It was only after the Italian government exerted political pressure by 
threatening to withdraw funding for other justice projects that President Karzai invoked his 
Presidential powers and issued the Code as an interim decree pending parliamentary 
approval.74 
 
Di Gennaro’s knowledge of Afghan criminal law and its legal traditions is thought to have 
been limited in comparison to that of his home country. 75  A former Italian anti-mafia 
magistrate, he was a high-profile legal figure in Italy and considered to be an expert in 
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Italian criminal law and international standards of human rights. This may account for his 
decision to base the new ICPC on the Italian Criminal Procedure Code 1988, on which he 
had specialist knowledge and expertise. 76  Although the ICPC did not emerge as a 
complete reproduction of the Italian Code, which contains more than 300 provisions, its 98 
articles are largely sourced from it.77  
 
As a consequence of the processes that led to the drafting of the ICPC and the foreign 
reference point for its content, it can be construed as a legal transplant. It satisfies the 
definition of a legal transplant proposed in this paper. It was the product of the act of 
borrowing selected legal provisions that had been successfully established in another 
country, in this case those from the Italian Code, so that they would be incorporated 
directly into Afghanistan’s domestic criminal justice system. 
 
 
 
Section 4.4 Evaluating the ICPC 
 
4.4.1 The Application of the ICPC 
A number of international organisations and NGO’s have reported on various areas of the 
justice system in Afghanistan since 2004, some of which provide useful information 
regarding the application of the Code.78 The Afghan ministries, however, have published 
very little statistical material providing any valuable insight into the manner in which 
criminal procedure laid down in the ICPC is being applied. Commenting on this issue, a 
report by UNODC in May 2008, which reviewed existing criminal justice legislation in 
connection with a programme of penitentiary reform, lamented that ‘essential information, 
such as crime and sentence statistics nationwide…[were] not available.’79  
 
Some statistics have been published by the Afghan ministries and the Central Statistics 
Organisation (CSO). Information provided by CSO’s Statistical Yearbooks indicate that 
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between 2004 and 2010 ‘total crimes’ on an annual basis varied between 6,786 and 
10,870 (Figure 1). Between 2007 and 2010 the most common offences were consistently 
‘injury,’ theft and murder 80  (Table 3). However, the CSO unhelpfully fails to confirm 
whether the statistics it provides refer to total number of arrests or convictions; nor does it 
provide any information regarding sentencing.  
 
The AGO has published only one National Crime Statistics Report since 2001 which 
covers the period between March 2006 and March 2007 (Table 4).81 While some caution 
should be noted as to the accuracy of the figures provided, the report does provide some 
useful information about the working capacity of the courts, and the number and type of 
cases that they were processing when applying the ICPC.82 It reveals that the Appeal 
Prosecutors’ Office prosecuted 12,365 cases in the courts in the central departments, 
Kabul and in the provincial courts.83  The most common types of offences prosecuted were 
theft (19%), murder (12%), assault–related ‘beating-up’ (10%) and ‘injury’ offences (7.5%), 
demonstrating a degree of similarity with the statistics provided by the CSO.84  
 
The Supreme Court has also made available some statistics on the judicial decisions 
reached in criminal cases in central and provincial courts for the period between August 
2008 and April 2009 (Table 5). Excluding offences involving narcotics, the Courts 
considered 416 individual criminal cases. Of these only 2 resulted in the release of 
suspects. In the remaining cases, 31 defendants were sentenced to be executed and the 
rest received a total of 4,455 years imprisonment. These figures suggest that if an 
individual is arrested and charged with an offence there is a high probability that they will 
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be convicted (99%).85  Moreover, if a defendant is not released or executed following 
criminal proceedings in which the ICPC is applied, on average they are likely to be 
sentenced to at least 10 years in prison. 
 
The Supreme Court statistics also demonstrate significant regional variations in sentencing 
decisions. In Saamangan and Takhar provinces individuals convicted of murder were on 
average sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, whereas in Panjshir province defendants 
convicted for the same offence were sentenced to an average of only 2 years in prison. 
Moreover, the percentage of cases in which the Courts sentenced convicted murderers to 
be executed varied depending in which province the case was heard. In Takhar province 
50% of suspects convicted of murder were sentenced to be executed. By comparison, in 
Jawzjan and Ghanzi provinces 33% of similar offenders received this type of sentence and 
in Saripul only 14% were to be subjected to a similar fate. More than a quarter of all cases 
in which defendants were sentenced to death took place in Herat province (8 out of 31). In 
the remaining 7 provinces which provided sentencing statistics, none of the defendants 
convicted of murder were sentenced to be executed. The potential for being executed if 
found guilty of an offence is, it would seem, a provincial lottery and likely to be a 
consequence of the inconsistent application by justice officials of the ICPC and the Penal 
Code in the Courts across the country. 
 
The lengthy prison sentences and high conviction rates evident from the Supreme Court 
statistics correlates with statistics relating to the prison population in Afghanistan which 
indicate a  significant increase in prison numbers during the period that the ICPC has been 
applied. In 2001 Afghanistan’s prisons held only 600 inmates.86 In March 2005, a year 
after the ICPC had been enacted, there were estimated to be 5,500 incarcerated in the 
country’s prisons.87 By January 2006 prison numbers had increased to 6,085.88 Only nine 
months later there were reported to be 10,604 prisoners,89 almost double the number the 
previous year and far exceeding the prison capacity at the time of 7,421 inmates.90 It is 
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estimated that the total number of people being detained in prison now is 17,000 which 
continues to represent more than the country’s total prison capacity amongst its 24 
provincial prisons and 200 detention centres.91 Although the government plans to increase 
prison capacity to 27,000 with assistance from UNODC and international partners, 92 
current prison facilities remain poor and overcrowding has been reported to be as much as 
1000% in some detention centres.93   
 
Since the ICPC has come into force, detention and conviction rates have consistently 
outstripped prison capacity. While this on the one hand reflects insufficient prison 
infrastructure it is also indicative of an increase in the number of police arrests leading to a 
greater number of cases being referred for investigation and prosecution adopting ICPC 
procedures at a time when the justice ministries are not sufficiently capable of processing 
them. The expansion of the ANP since 2004 has resulted in increased numbers of arrests. 
In 2006 42% of all cases referred to the Afghan courts involved criminal law matters.94 By 
2007 ‘the number of arrests ha[d] increased,’ according to UNAMA, 95 and 6,156 people 
were detained under provisional arrest. 96  By 2009 annual arrests were estimated to 
number between 8,000 and 10,000.97 While more arrests are being made by the police, 
more criminal cases are being referred to the Courts. According to Amnesty International, 
the Courts dealt with 5,310 criminal cases between 2002 and 2003, before the ICPC was 
passed.98 AGO reports for 2006 to 2007, however, refer to the AGO prosecutor’s office 
handling 34,288 existing files.99 Moreover, the Supreme Court reported a five-fold increase 
in pending criminal cases in the two-year period between 2005 and 2007.100  
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The capacity of the justice system to handle the increasing flow of cases referred for 
investigation and prosecution has, however, been questionable.101  At the time that the 
ICPC came into force in 2004 a lack of available judicial personnel meant that 9% of the 
courts and 12% of prosecutor’s offices were operated only by administrative staff. 102 
Moreover, the administration of the courts was seriously handicapped by a shortage of 
support staff. The number of administrative personnel working for the judiciary equated to 
only 60% of the total number of judges and those in prosecutors’ offices represented only 
23% of the total number of prosecutors.103 By the time of the last in-depth analysis of the 
justice system in 2007 the AGO was reported to have 4,900 employees, 2,500 of whom 
were prosecutors. However, prosecutors’ offices in the provinces were reported to be 
either ‘non-existent or placed in inadequate structures’104 and an estimated 80 districts had 
no prosecutors’ office at all. These problems have been compounded further by a weak 
court infrastructure inherited by the Afghan state in the post-Taliban era and by a limited 
judiciary. In 2007 there were 442 courts across the country, comprised of 34 provincial 
courts and 408 primary courts.105 Of these, however, 97.8% required urgent reconstruction 
or rehabilitation work and 19% were not functioning at all. These limitations adversely 
affect the reach of the state justice system and the application of state criminal law such as 
the ICPC.106  
 
The weak capacity of the judiciary has had similar consequences. In 2007 there were 
1,415 judges employed by the Supreme Court to preside in the courts, although CHECCHI 
reported that in reality only 1,107 were actually working in them, 12% of whom had been 
appointed before 1978.107 Adopting these figures there were 21,317 people per judge in 
Afghanistan and too few to consider the amount of cases awaiting trial. Many of those 
detained in Afghanistan’s prisons were incarcerated simply because there was no judge 
available to consider their case. 108  In 2007 58% of the inmates were being held in 
Afghanistan’s prisons were being held in pre-trial detention waiting for their case to be 
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adjudicated, a direct consequence of the lack of capacity in the formal justice system to 
process an increasing number of cases referred for prosecution.109  
 
The proper application of the ICPC has also been hampered by the poor capacity of the 
country’s defence service. By 2005 there were only 170 lawyers registered with the Bar at 
the MOJ of whom only 50 were practicing.110 By 2007 their numbers had increased to 
250.111 There are now reported to be 850 defence lawyers, equating to 30,000 people per 
defence counsel, only 50 of whom are members of the Afghan Independent Bar 
Association (AIBA).112 The result is that although the ICPC provides that defendants can 
be assisted by defence counsel of their choice, in practice there are insufficient numbers 
available to comply with this provision of the Code.113 
 
There are, according to UNODC ‘huge gaps in the provision of legal defence’ in 
Afghanistan.114 A survey in 2008 reported that 81% of adult male prisoners interviewed did 
not have legal representation.115 UNAMA reported the following year that 82.5% of 931 
detainees had not had a defence lawyer to represent them at any stage of their 
proceedings.116 In the majority of cases detainees had not been represented due to the 
unavailability of defence counsel.117 Monitoring conducted by the Women and Children 
Legal Research Foundation (WCLRF) in 2008 found that 57% of 900 women respondents 
facing criminal charges presented their cases without representation and that the potential 
for obtaining representation varied considerably between provinces.118  In some provinces 
insecurity has contributed to the poor provision of defence representation. Helmand, for 
example, had no defence lawyers at all until September 2008 when security was 
considered sufficiently stable for the International Legal Foundation (ILF) to establish an 
office there. 119  By 2010, however, there were only 4 defence lawyers for the whole 
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province but they refused to act in cases outside the capital of Lashkar Gah due to security 
concerns.120  
 
In some instances defendants are reportedly denied access to legal representation 
because they have not been informed of their rights to receive it by legal authorities 
contrary to the provisions of the Code.121 A 2007 report observed that ‘many judges and 
prosecutors do not fully recognise or respect the role of defence attorneys’122 resulting in 
ILF defence lawyers being denied access to appear at trial or given little or no notice of 
trial hearing dates. The same report also referred to incidences where defence lawyers 
were deliberately obstructed in their ability to defend clients by other professionals 
involved in the justice system and subjected to criticism and intimidation, included threats 
to withdraw their licences.123 UNAMA has reported further incidences of defence counsel 
dropping cases under pressure from other justice officials.124 The effective implementation 
of the sections of the Code that relate to representation by defence counsel is therefore 
being hampered by inadequacies in the capacity of the defence service and also by the 
failure of police, prosecutors and Judges to properly apply them. The problems relating to 
professional application appear to be the result of a deficient culture of criminal defence in 
the state system manifested by a lack of awareness amongst judges, police and 
prosecutors of the role of defence lawyers and an inclination for obstructing access to 
representation.   
 
The apparent lack of regard by some legal professionals for both the role of defence 
counsel and the provisions of the Code relating to defendant’s rights of access to them 
were highlighted during the prosecution of the case concerning Assadullah Sarwari 
between 2005 and 2007. One of the grounds cited by the prosecution in the indictment as 
evidence of Sarwari’s guilt in relation to the offence of the ‘killing of countless Afghans’ 
was the fact that he had ‘interrupted the investigation by asking for a lawyer.’125 This was 
only one of a number of procedural irregularities during the trial which, according to 
                                                          
120
 Interview, UK Justice Advisor, 24.02.2010; Walker, E.L. Culturally-Attuned Governance and Justice in 
Helmand Province, Afghanistan, International Media Ventures (April 2010) available at 
http://www.Governance%20and%20Justice%20in%20Hlemand%20-%20WALKER1.pdf 
121
 ICPC, article 5(7); UNAMA, Arbitrary Detention, note 78. This was the case with 15.6% of the interviewees, 
p.13 
122
 UNAMA, Overview, note 78, p. 18  
123
 ibid  
124
 UNAMA, Arbitrary Detention, note 78, p.13  
125
 UNAMA, Overview, note 78, p. 18  
131 
 
UNAMA, included a ‘failure to appoint defence counsel.’126 In spite of this Sarwari was 
eventually found guilty at the National Security Primary Court and sentenced to death.  
 
The potential for defendants to obtain legal representation in accordance with the 
provisions of the ICPC has been restrained not only by the improper application of the 
Code by legal professionals but also by the inadequate provision across the country of a 
legal aid scheme to provide legal advice and assistance to individuals facing criminal 
charges. Article 31 of the 2004 Constitution commits the Afghan government to provide 
legal aid services. In compliance with this the ICPC entitles defendants to free legal 
assistance, which should be available under a legal aid scheme.127 The legal aid service in 
Afghanistan is largely dependent on the resources of a number of NGO’s, some of which 
have made considerable contributions towards supporting it.128 Defence lawyers from ILF 
handled 3,275 cases between 2003 and 2007 in which 66% of defendants were released 
before or shortly after trial and only 12% received prison sentences of more than 1 year.129 
Moreover, between 2006 and December 2008 the Da Qaanoon Ghushtonky organisation 
secured the release of 50% of 4,000 detainees to whom it provided legal assistance and in 
80% of the remaining cases defendants received reduced sentences because they were 
represented with the assistance of legal aid.130   
 
These statistics demonstrate a significant correlation between the provision of legal aid 
and defence representation on the one hand and a reduction in sentencing and conviction 
rates on the other, illustrating the potential benefit of having a legal aid system accessible 
to the public that can deliver access to justice. Unfortunately, however, the legal aid 
service in Afghanistan remains largely inadequate. It is poorly monitored by the Supreme 
Court and latterly the MOJ and it remains largely misunderstood by the public and legal 
community.131  While this remains the case it is likely that defence representation will 
discriminate against the poor. Of 1350 respondents interviewed by WCLRF in 2008 96% 
who did not have a defence counsel during criminal proceedings had no income at all.132 
Until a sustainable legal aid scheme is developed that can ensure access to legal defence 
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for all those requiring legal aid the ICPC is likely to be implemented in a discriminatory 
manner, exacerbating its potential for creating injustices.  
 
The inadequate provision of legal aid together with the poor capacity of the defence 
service and the insufficient referral of defendants to defence lawyers by legal authorities 
for representation are likely to be contributing factors to the propensity of judges to convict 
and hand out lengthy prison sentences when applying the proivisions of the ICPC. As 
Afghanistan’s prison population consequently increases, a worrying concern is that many 
prisoners are detained arbitrarily. Indeed, since the introduction of the ICPC, arbitrary 
detention has remained a pervasive feature of criminal justice in Afghanistan.  
 
Monitoring of MoI and MoJ detention facilities in 2009 revealed that a range of judicial and 
legal authorities including the police, prosecutors, the Courts and detention centre officials 
arbitrarily detained people across Afghanistan ‘with disturbing regularity at the district, 
provincial and central levels.’ 133  A Foreign Office prosecution caseworker based in 
Helmand province and interviewed in December 2008 confirmed for this research that 
many arrested individuals were arbitrarily detained under the ICPC. Approximately 90% of 
300 defendants imprisoned were waiting for a trial date and some had been waiting for 
more than three years.134 Amnesty International reported ‘widespread’ arbitrary arrest and 
detention of individuals by the police in 2009135 and a report by UNAMA the same year 
concluded that ‘detention centres are overcrowded with a significant number of persons 
whose detentions do not appear to be justifiable as lawful, reasonable or necessary, 
particularly in the pre-trial phase.’136 
 
It is possible to lay some of the blame for this worrying trend at the feet of the transplanted 
content of the Code itself. Omissions and its lack of clarity and prescription, particularly at 
the pre-trial stage of proceedings, have increased the risk of defendants being arbitrarily 
detained following arrest. The Code stipulates that a prosecutor may release a detained 
individual before trial whenever they determine that the deprivation of the individual’s 
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liberty is no longer necessary.137 Nevertheless, it fails to specify with any clarity when an 
individual must be released.138 Moreover, while the Code states that the prosecutor should 
conduct interrogations within 48 hours of arrest139 there are no guidelines addressing what 
happens if this does not occur or whether a detainee should be released from custody at 
this point if no interrogation has taken place. In addition, following the 48-hour interrogation 
period the ICPC stipulates that the prosecutor should release an individual within 15 days 
of arrest, unless a further 15-day extension has been granted on application to the Court 
or an indictment has been filed.140 However, after the filing of an indictment, there is no 
provision in the Code setting out a precise time frame within which a trial should begin.141  
 
The Code also omits any requirement for review by the Court of the legality of any arrest 
and detention at the pre-trial stage until the first hearing,142 scheduled to take place within 
15 days of arrest.143 Furthermore, it lacks any prescriptive guidelines on how the legality of 
detention should be determined at the first hearing. It also fails to stipulate the nature of 
any legal test that the Court should apply to assess legality and it omits to provide any 
explicit right to the detainee to be present during the determination of the legality of their 
detention either when the prosecutor confirms the actions of the police within 72 hours of 
arrest or when the matter is first considered by the Court. Similarly, it declines to formally 
permit the presence of defence lawyers at these times to enable them to challenge the 
decisions of the prosecutor and the Court.144 All of these omissions increase the potential 
for arrested individuals to be detained arbitrarily for long periods at the pre-trial stage.  
 
In addition to these concerns, the ICPC has attracted criticism for failing to provide 
sufficient pre-trial alternatives to imprisonment.145 It contains no provisions at all specifying 
when an individual can be released on bail.146 Judges are instead expected to refer to the 
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1965 Criminal Procedure Code for guidance on this issue.147 The Code also fails to assign 
authority to the police to divert suspects from the criminal justice system. Moreover, 
although it entitles prosecutors to discharge cases, it does not enable them to refer 
defendants to diversion facilities such as restorative justice or treatment programmes.148  
 
It is likely that insufficient procedural guidelines in the Code relating to detention increase 
the potential for defendant’s to be arbitrarily detained during the course of criminal 
proceedings.  In practice, however, the prevalence of arbitrary detention as a feature of 
formal criminal justice in Afghanistan post-2004 is compounded not only by the 
inadequacies of the Code but also by a failure by legal authorities to properly apply its 
provisions. The poor and limited application of the procedures relating to the right to 
defence counsel by prosecutors and judges has already been noted. Evidence suggests 
that legal authorities also rarely adhere to the detention timeframes that the Code does 
provide.149 A report by UNAMA in 2009 noted a ‘frequent failure of police and prosecutors 
to respect existing time limits and procedures to control the legality of detention.’150 It also 
commented that ‘a significant number of detainees were in detention awaiting court 
verdicts well beyond legal timeframes laid out in the ICPC.’151 The two-month timeframe at 
the Primary Court level for verdicts to be reached was breached in all of the detention 
cases monitored by UNAMA in six of Afghanistan’s provinces, including Kabul. Delays at 
the Supreme Court level, where verdicts should, according to the Code,152 be reached 
within 5 months, ‘often stretched into years.’153 Some detainees had waited for more than 
6 years for the Supreme Court to reach a verdict.154 A number remained incarcerated in 
spite of being acquitted of the charges against them and even after they had served their 
sentences. 155  The study observed that ‘throughout Afghanistan, MoJ detention centre 
authorities did not necessarily release prisoners who had completed their legally mandated 
sentence.’156 The same UNAMA report also found that provisions in the Code allowing for 
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the suspension of sentences were not being properly applied.157 UNODC has speculated 
that in reality suspensions are only granted in cases involving corruption.158  
  
The improper or incomplete application of the ICPC by legal authorities is not confined to 
procedures relating to detention timeframes. Nor is it limited to any particular section of the 
legal community who should be applying it. Instead, it is evident in relation to all of the 
procedures detailed in the Code from investigation to imprisonment and it is ubiquitous 
among the whole spectrum of state criminal justice actors including the police, 
prosecutors, judges and defence lawyers. This has been the case since the Code was 
introduced and continues to be the case. AI reported in 2005 that judges and prosecutors 
were often ignorant of applicable state law, such as the ICPC.159 A senior UNAMA rule of 
law officer interviewed in 2007 as part of this research who observed criminal trials in 
Herat province noted the very limited ability of Judges to conduct even simple cases 
involving basic theft and that trial procedures prescribed by the Code were not applied.160 
UNAMA reported in April 2007 that the ‘procedures relating to the investigation, arrest and 
detention, charging, trial and imprisonment of individuals are rarely adhered to.’ 161  A 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Justice Adviser interviewed in December 2008 
remarked that ‘most of the Judges and prosecutors know the basics [of the ICPC] but 
choose to ignore it.’162  
 
The question remains, however, that if legal professionals are not necessarily properly 
applying the provisions of the Code when deciding on procedural matters in connection 
with criminal cases, what are they applying?  To some extent they are relying on nothing 
more than their own personal intuition. After spending more than a year observing criminal 
trials in Kabul, a Prosecutions Caseworker Adviser confirmed in 2009 that Judges were 
conducting trials not in accordance with the provisions of the Code but ‘the way that they 
think it should be done.’163 These practices still continue. Tondini noted in 2010 that in the 
criminal courts ‘rulings were (and still are) largely based on the Judge’s personal 
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opinion.’ 164  In addition, aside from relying on intuition, legal officials also adhere to 
customary and Islamic approaches to justice over and above the prescriptive procedures 
of the ICPC. UNAMA has reported that ‘in adjudicating criminal cases, judges are 
discretionally applying a mixture of shari’a law, Afghan customary law and statutory law.’165 
By way of example, according to one report, the former Chief Judge of Helmand province, 
Judge Afghani, issued four orders for quisas executions over a five year period to 2008 
‘based upon his interpretation of Shari’a and evidence principles.’166  
 
The incursion of Shari’a law into the application of criminal procedure is particularly evident 
in cases concerning ‘moral crimes.’ Prosecutors and judges are reportedly detaining 
individuals under the provisions of the ICPC for offences that are established under 
customary or Islamic law but not recognised under any Afghan state law. In December 
2008 UNODC found that approximately 50% of detained women were facing criminal 
proceedings for breaching ‘moral crimes’, customary law or Shari’a.167 WCLRF reported 
the same year that ‘a significant number of detained women have been accused of running 
away from home’168 and the ILF assisted in 212 ‘escape from home’ cases between 2003-
2010 in spite of the fact that it is not a criminal offence.169 
 
A number of well-publicised criminal cases which attracted international attention illustrate 
the pervasive influence of Shari’a on criminal justice and a tendency by legal actors, and 
particularly the judiciary, towards casting aside procedures laid down in the ICPC in order 
to comply with Islamic interpretations of justice. In 2005 Ali Mohaqiq Nasab was arrested 
at the request of the Supreme Court and charged with blasphemy having published 
articles in which he questioned the severity of corporal punishments under Shari’a and 
argued that Islamic law discriminated against women. Even though Nasab’s arrest was 
conducted in a manner contrary to the provisions of the ICPC and his trial was 
procedurally flawed he was sentenced to two years imprisonment.170  
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With reference again to the case involving Assadullah Sarwari, by the time of his trial he 
had already spent more than 13 years in detention. Although found not guilty of any of the 
counts detailed on his indictment, the Court invoked Hanafi jurisprudence to find Sarwari 
guilty of an alternative offence in spite of the fact that the prosecution failed, according to 
international observers, to adduce sufficiently cogent evidence to prove that he was guilty 
of the charge he faced. 171  International monitoring of his trial noted significant non-
compliance with the provisions of the Code, particularly those guaranteeing due process 
and fair trial standards. In addition to the denial of defence counsel, previously noted, 
procedural rules in relation to the admission of evidence and the cross-examining and 
calling of witnesses were ignored.172   
 
In 2008 Sayed Pervez Kambaksh was found guilty of blasphemy and sentenced to death 
for circulating an essay on women’s rights which questioned verses in the Qu’ran. His trial, 
however, was held in secret without access to a defence lawyer.173 At an appeal hearing 
the key prosecution witness withdrew his testimony, claiming that he had been forced to lie 
on pain of death. Nevertheless, rather than being acquitted of the charges against him, 
Kambaksh’s sentence was only commuted to 20 years imprisonment.  When the matter 
was referred for further appeal in March 2009, in spite of assurances that the hearing 
would be held in ‘a very open court’, the Supreme Court upheld the sentence, issuing their 
decision in secret without permitting any representations by Kambaksh’s defence 
lawyer.174 
 
These cases raise concerns that Judges are inclined to apply procedural rules that 
conform with Islamic interpretations of criminal justice at the expense of ignoring 
procedures laid down in the ICPC. This seems to particularly be the case with regard to 
crimes involving alleged violations of Shari’a. They also underline the limited regard that 
criminal justice actors appear to have for the procedures outlined in the Code.  It does not 
appear to be critically important to justice officials whether or not they should adhere to it. 
Indeed, according to a CJTF Judge the ICPC ‘is not considered that important’ inspite of 
the fact that it is one of the main procedural codes for prosecuting offences involving 
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narcotics.175 The same Judge verified and that he had ‘not had to read the ICPC for the 
past three years’ and that in his view ‘it has little use or relevance.’ 176  Another 
Prosecutions Caseworker Adviser interviewed in 2009 observed that he could not ‘find any 
particular evidence that [the ICPC] is conciously used’ in the Courts.177 
 
These findings would appear to confirm that improper application or lack of application of 
the ICPC by justice officials is symptomatic of their having received insufficient training. 
The CJTF Judge confirmed that the police ‘are still very ignorant’ and do not follow the 
provisions of the Code, indicating a lack of knowledge of and training in the application of 
the ICPC’s procedures. The same Judge stated that in his experience ‘many of the 
lawyers do not have proper training to use any laws’178 and that ‘there is not enough 
training anywhere in the legal system.’179 He further explained that practitioners did not 
always adhere to the provisions of the ICPC when applicable ‘because they are unaware 
of them,’180 a further indication of insufficient legal training. 
 
A lack of background education in state law amongst justice officials in Afghanistan is 
likely to be contributing to the leaning towards criminal justice procedure and decision-
making based on both Shari’a and intuition. In 2007 only 11.6% of Judges had obtained a 
University degree in law.181 A further 7.7% had no legal educational experience at all182 
and 15% were estimated to be illiterate.183 The composition of the judiciary reflected a 
range of ability and competence resulting from diverse appointment practices during 
different regimes. Some 12% had been appointed before the civil war, 24% were 
appointed during the communist and mujahedeen periods and 12% during Taliban rule.184 
At the same time, the majority of the country’s 2,500 prosecutors had neither a University 
degree in state law or Islamic law. Only 37% of the 282 prosecutors in the AGO’s 
provincial office in Kabul and 20% of those in other AGO provincial offices had graduated 
with University degrees.185  
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Inadequate resources are also likely to be contributing to the poor application of the ICPC. 
In 2007 more than a third of Judges were assessed as having insufficient access to 
applicable laws and regulations and more than half of them had no access at all to any 
legal sources, including the ICPC.186 An additional report in 2007 confirmed a deficiency in 
legal resources, observing a ‘lack of statutory compilations and other legal materials in the 
courts. No courts hold a full collection of the law and most primary instance courts have 
only copies of the criminal code (Penal Code) and the traffic law.’187 A 2009 report noted 
that ‘the judiciary is in dire need of access to legal research materials, updated laws, and 
important judicial opinions. Without access to up-to-date written materials, judges are 
forced to rely on old laws (if available) or simply on their own good judgement.’188  
 
Corruption is also undoubtedly a factor which impacts negatively on the proper and 
appropriate application of the ICPC, affecting the impartiality of the police, prosecutors and 
the judiciary. Corruption has been a persistent feature of the application of state criminal 
justice since the ICPC was introduced. In 2007 considerable numbers of judges were 
reported to be appointed as a result of patronage rather than ability and the judiciary was 
‘perceived as the most corrupt institution within Afghanistan.’189 According to a UK senior 
prosecutions advisor interviewed in June 2008 ‘corruption is a huge variable in the 
application of criminal procedure’ and one which hamstrings the whole justice system.190  
A 2008 report by UNODC found that the prevalence of corruption presented ‘a very 
serious obstacle to fair trials, legal detention and imprisonment.’ 191  In 2009 Amnesty 
International warned of continued widespread corruption amongst judges, prosecutors and 
other justice sector officials.192 Poor working conditions and a lack of personal security 
adversely affect judicial impartiality and the low wages they receive encourage reliance on 
bribes to supplement their income.193  
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Since its inception it would appear that the application of the ICPC has been 
problematic.194 While the number of arrests and criminal cases referred to the Courts has 
increased significantly between 2004 and 2010, available statistics reveal a propensity to 
convict and hand down lengthy prison sentences, resulting in an increasing prison 
population, consistently outstripped the prison capacity. Many defendants are detained 
arbitrarily. To some extent this is the result of the transplanted content of the ICPC and its 
omissions and inadequacies. It fails to provide clarity over the timeframes for pre-trial 
detention, or to allow for pre-trial review of the legality of detentions. It also contains 
insufficient pre-trial alternatives to imprisonment. However, it is also the result of a failure 
by legal authorities to properly implement its provisions. Many of the Code’s procedures 
are not adhered to and its application is compromised by various ‘environmental’ factors, 
including the weak capacity of the judiciary, the unavailability of defence representation, an 
inadequate legal aid service, poor resources and the prevalence of corruption. It is 
possible, however, that it is also being compromised by a critical failure by both the local 
population and legal practitioners to find it sufficiently meaningful and appropriate for 
application in relation to domestic criminal justice disputes. 
 
 
4.4.2 The extent to which the ICPC is considered meaningful and appropriate  
It has been previously noted in chapter 3 that the established legal order as regards 
criminal procedure in Afghanistan is conditioned not only by codified state law but also by 
customary and Islamic approaches to justice. These latter two approaches have always 
held a greater appeal to the majority of the population, resonating strongly with their tribal 
allegiances and religious convictions. Those introduced by the centralised state appeal to 
and affect a minority of the population, a legacy of reservations over the legitimacy of state 
mechanisms and institutions and the inability of the state to extend the reach of its rule and 
justice system beyond urban areas. Historically, secular criminal law has always struggled 
to be regarded as meaningful and appropriate amongst Afghanistan’s Islamic and tribal 
population and this is likely to remain the case until the reach, legitimacy and appeal of the 
state justice system is improved. The extent to which any new state criminal law, such as 
the ICPC, is capable of being regarded as meaningful and appropriate in Afghanistan and 
of being successfully received will be conditioned by these historical and contemporary 
criminal justice realities.  
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What, however, of the potential at first instance of the ICPC being regarded as meaningful 
and appropriate by that section of the Afghan population affected by state criminal justice 
and by the legal officials responsible for applying it? If, after all, it resonates with this 
section of the population it is more likely to be accepted, to extend its influence to a larger 
percentage of the population and to result in a successfully received legal transplant. Its 
potential in this respect is tied to the degree of its compatibility with established state 
criminal justice procedures that pre-dated it. If there is some correlation between the 
procedures and rules in the ICPC and those in previous state procedural law it should 
render the new provisions more meaningful and appropriate to legal practitioners who are 
applying it. The greater the compatibility with previous norms, the greater the prospects of 
their being regarded as meaningful and appropriate. 
 
In defence of law reformers drafting new laws to reconstruct the criminal law framework, 
the real problem in this respect is the historically transformative nature of Afghanistan’s 
state justice system. It has been noted in chapter 3 that since the early 20th century, state 
criminal procedure has not been a static entity but has been subjected to continuous 
modification and change, varying in tune with the philosophies of the various political 
regimes in power. Royal rulers sought to balance western ideals with Islamic principles, 
Soviet-inspired criminal procedure led to the adoption of a civil law approach, while the 
Taliban regime chose to align criminal procedure with their radical interpretations of 
Islamic justice. With which one of these variations should a new criminal code seek to be 
compatible to improve its prospects of being meaningful and appropriate at least to the 
legal practitioners who would be applying it? Di Gennaro’s ICPC provides a system of 
criminal procedure that combines both common law and civil law approaches to criminal 
justice in a manner similar to the ‘mixed’ system of criminal procedure established in Italy 
by its 1988 Code. Were the provisions of this new Italian-inspired ICPC, however, 
sufficiently compatible with any of the past variations of Afghan state criminal law 
procedure to the extent that they could hope to be in any way meaningful and appropriate 
to legal practitioners at first instance?  
 
The preliminary investigation stage contains some features of criminal procedure closely 
associated with systems based on civil law traditions. Charges are issued in private and 
confirmed in writing and are immune from appeal. Trials, on the other hand, while juryless, 
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are conducted publicly before a judge and retain rules of evidence similar to trial procedure 
practiced in common law jurisdictions.195 This collaboration of civil law and common law 
procedures, borrowed from Italy, is not too far removed from previous experience with 
regard to State criminal procedure legislation in that the ICPC’s predecessor, the 1965 
CPC, had installed a similarly mixed system of criminal procedure.196 At the time of its 
introduction the ICPC therefore conformed with an established state law legal tradition that 
had been in existence for nearly 40 years. 
 
The ICPC is also compatible with other fundamental sources of state criminal law at the 
time of its introduction, namely the 1976 Penal Code and the 2004 Constitution. It was, 
according to Tondini, aimed at ‘integrating the new procedural norms with the substantive 
provisions of the 1976 Penal Code, still in force.’197 Furthermore, it complies with the 
expectations and requirements for criminal procedure and justice set down in articles 22 to 
31 of the 2004 Constitution which guarantee internationally recognised principles of fair 
trial standards and access to justice.198 Fundamentally, it is consistent with the overall 
vision of the 2004 Constitution to establish rule of law in Afghanistan and ensure the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of its citizens. Its compatibility with the Constitution and 
the Penal Code should enhance its potential for being regarded as meaningful and 
appropriate to the legal professionals who would be applying it. 199 
 
There is evidence, however, that, on the contrary, some of the transplanted content of the 
ICPC has been regarded by justice officials as confusing and inappropriate, adversely 
affecting its successful application and reception. Its provisions relating to responsibility for 
criminal investigations represent an example. The 2004 Constitution confirmed that the 
police would be responsible for the detection of crimes and that investigations and 
prosecutions would be conducted by prosecutors at the AGO. The ICPC confirmed that 
the police’s role would be confined to detecting crimes but went further than the 
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Constitution 200  and insisted that they should be placed under the ‘direction and 
supervision’ of prosecutors and it provided authority for prosecutors to direct the police 
during investigations.201  
 
The strengthening of the role of the prosecutor by the ICPC at the expense of the police 
marked a departure from established state criminal justice practices in Afghanistan. 
Historically, the police had always assumed responsibility for both the discovery and the 
investigation of criminal offences.202 The new procedural roles prescribed by the Code 
were out of tune with the normal cultural interpretations of the responsibilities of the police 
and prosecutors. This created confusion as to the general ambit of their duties and a level 
of mistrust between them. 203  According to an Italian legal consultant ‘one of the key 
reasons why the ICPC is not effectively and equally applied and enforced by judicial actors 
and enforcement agencies is because ‘the division of powers between the police and the 
prosecutor is still open to doubt.’204 While the provisions were undoubtedly designed to 
engender a relationship of collaboration and co-operation between police and prosecutors, 
evidence suggests that in fact they increased tension between them as the police resented 
the intrusion of prosecutors into their normal investigative role. A UK senior prosecution 
adviser interviewed in 2008 confirmed that there was ‘immense distrust’ between the 
police and prosecutors underscoring the application of the ICPC and intensified by its 
provisions that enhance prosecutor’s roles at the expense of the police.205  
 
The failure of the Code to explicitly replace previous criminal legislation has also caused 
confusion for legal practitioners trying to apply it. By virtue of article 98(3) it revokes only 
those laws and decrees which are deemed to be incompatible with it. It is therefore left as 
a matter for judicial interpretation as to what these might be so that in practical terms, 
judges are required to subjectively evaluate the validity and applicability of the Code’s 
provisions, judged against former procedural criminal law. As a consequence Afghan 
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Judges have continued to refer to and apply provisions from the 1965 Criminal Procedure 
Code. Indeed, because the ICPC omits to address all procedural issues, such as the 
possibility of granting bail, Judges are required to refer to earlier codes.  
 
The ICPC’s failure to emphatically replace previous procedural law has resulted in 
unsatisfactory confusion for practitioners over the precise nature of applicable law. The 
consequent uncertainty over what rules to apply increases the risk of varied and 
inconsistent application of the ICPC’s procedural rules. At the same time it compromises 
the prospects of the law being regarded as meaningful and appropriate among the legal 
actors who should be applying it. If the meaning of certain provisions and procedures of 
the law are lost to practitioners due to confusion over their relevance, they are less likely to 
be regarded as appropriate for the circumstances they face and therefore to be applied. As 
a result they are more likely to refer to other, less confusing laws instead. There is 
evidence that this is what is happening in practice. The CJTF Judge interviewed for this 
research confirmed that legal actors continue to refer to previous procedural laws as 
opposed to the ICPC. He noted that ‘arrests are carried out using the old Penal Code’ and 
that generally in his experience, ‘far more attention is paid to the Code that we learnt when 
we became judges,’ referring to the 1965 Code, which was, in his view, ‘perfectly good.’206 
It is notable also that UNAMA reported in 2007 that ‘a significant number of Afghan 
prosecutors and judges, as well as Afghan NGO defence lawyers have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the ICPC,’ adding that ‘the lack of a harmonised and more 
comprehensive criminal procedure code has created conflict and confusion.’ 207  This 
confusion is translating into dissatisfaction about the Code amongst the practitioners who 
should be applying it, with the result that they are not applying it either properly or at all. 
 
In addition to these problems, the extent to which legal actors regard the ICPC as 
inappropriate for Afghan criminal justice is reflected in their continuing discretional 
application of customary law and Shari’a in criminal cases as opposed to the procedures 
that the Code prescribes.208 This deference to customary law principles and Shari’a at the 
expense of the provisions of the ICPC is in all probability compounded by the educational 
background of the Judges who are applying the law. State law in the form of the codified 
ICPC is generally averse to the legal educational background of most practicing Judges. 
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The majority of Judges in 2007 were educated in Islamic law; 44% had obtained degrees 
in Islamic law and 16.1% had been educated in madrassas.209 Continuing professional 
development and education should improve judicial understanding of the application of the 
ICPC. However, this may take longer to achieve than might have been the case if all 
Judges were required to be educated to at least tertiary level in state law, including 
criminal procedural law. As it is, it remains the case that there is no requirement for Judges 
to have obtained University qualifications from the law faculty at Kabul University. 210 
Moreover, in spite of the training that has so far been provided to Afghanistan’s criminal 
judges they still appear to struggle to find the law meaningful and appropriate for 
application. ARoLP claimed to have provided training to 70% of all Judges by June 
2008,211 yet the cases involving Nasab, Sarwari and Kambaksh demonstrate that Judges 
continue to ignore procedural rules set down in the Code in order to mete out justice more 
aligned to Islamic law. 
 
As such the ICPC does not contain any provisions which specifically draw on procedural 
rules from either of Afghanistan’s customary or Islamic legal traditions. Some of its 
provisions are, nevertheless, certainly consistent with Shari’a. The principle of presumption 
of innocence, provided for in article 4 of the ICPC, is confirmed in the Qur’an, which states 
‘remove punishment as often as you can; and set the accused free if he has a chance, 
because it is better for the judge to be wrong in acquittal that to be wrong in 
punishment.’212 There are no principles in Islamic law in opposition to the ICPC’s provision 
in article 52 for the public conduct of a trial and the jury-less trial system prescribed by the 
Code is consistent with the Islamic legal system.213 Furthermore, the right of the suspect 
and an accused individual to remain silent under article 5 of the ICPC is consistent with 
Islamic law which affords the accused a right to refuse questioning and remain silent 
during the investigation of hudud crimes. In addition, there is no prohibition in the Shari’a 
of the right to legal representation, which is guaranteed in articles 5, 18, 19, 38 and 41 of 
the ICPC. Islamic law also acknowledges a right to a fair trial without undue delay and 
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although this is not explicitly provided for in either the ICPC or the Constitution, the ICPC 
specifies detention periods for compliance by the police and prosecutors in article 36.214 It 
is also subject to the repugnancy principle in article 3 of the Constitution which affirms that 
no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of Islamic religion. As Shari’a is 
constitutionally confirmed as the basis of all law, essentially the ICPC cannot contravene it. 
To that extent the ICPC is not completely divorced from the influences of Islamic law.  
 
In spite of this, the procedures prescribed by the Code are in many respects at odds with 
the Islamic model of criminal justice. It provides processes for obtaining evidence 
borrowed from Italy which are distinct from Islamic rules of evidence which are traditionally 
based on oral testimony and confessions.215 More generally, the westernised procedural 
system encapsulated in the ICPC that favours objective judicial analysis of prescriptive 
legislative rules contrasts with the Islamic model of criminal jurisprudence which centres 
on the endeavour of a judge to reach decisions based upon their subjective interpretation 
of religious sources.  
 
With regard to customary law the ICPC had to conform with constitutional principles and 
the Constitution does not provide for any referral to customary law and procedure in 
criminal cases.216 It affirms instead that no one can be convicted of a criminal offence 
unless the act is defined in law as a crime.217 As a result, as Deladda points out, the role of 
jirgas in criminal cases ‘is definitely contra Constitution.’218 Furthermore, the absence of 
any provision in either in the Constitution or the ICPC that would result in the legitimisation 
of local justice mechanisms with respect to criminal law has been supported by a number 
of organisations, notably the AIHRC, which have been strongly opposed to any such move 
due to the patriarchal nature of the jirga/shura institutions and the continued practice of 
dispensing justice that allows for baad decisions. 219  Therefore, arguably, there were 
justifiable reasons for the exclusion of local justice procedures from the Code. 
                                                          
214
 Max Planck, note 212 
215
 Tondini, note 64, p.64 
216
 The only reference to Afghanistan’s ‘traditions’ in the ICPC is in article 54 which is concerned with family 
welfare 
217
 article 27 ICPC. This principle is also recognised in the Penal Code (article 2) which states that ‘no act is 
defined as a crime, except according to law.’ 
218
 Deladda, A. Afghanistan: The Justice System From A people’s Perspective (Sept 2008) available at 
www.argoriente.it; p.17 
219
 Sima Samar of the AIHRC at the Rome Conference 2007 cautioned the international community to stop 
funding traditional justice systems in the country, author’s notes from the Rome Conference. See also Drumbl, 
note 91, chapter 1, p.352 
147 
 
 
While this may be the case, the lack of customary and Islamic processes in the ICPC may 
well have impacted negatively on its legitimacy and reception. According to Ahmed, the 
ICPC’s circumvention of Shari’a ‘reflects a disdainful approach to Islamic law, similar to the 
Weberian derogatory view of Islamic law as the rule of a simpleton qadi dispensing raw 
and irrational justice under a tree.’220 He insists that ‘if judicial reform initiatives are to take 
firm root in Afghanistan, they must spring from an authentic base of Afghan history and 
sociological cultures, of which both Afghan customary law and Islamic jurisprudence play 
integral roles.’ 221  Ahmed’s premise on the ICPC accords with the views of those 
theoreticians who regard legal development as a reflection of local context and his 
criticisms of the law have been shared by other academics and international experts.222 
Bassiouni observed in 2007 that ‘internationally supported rule of law programmes tend to 
ignore or avoid issues of Islamic law. This negatively impacts the acceptance of these 
programmes by Afghan society.’223 Furthermore, following a review of justice sector reform 
in Afghanistan in 2008 Suhrke advocated that ‘‘to be legitimate and effective legal reform 
needs to seriously engage with the foundations of justice in Afghanistan, i.e Islamic law, as 
well as Afghan traditions.’224  
 
Interestingly, since the ICPC was passed in 2004 there have been a number of 
developments intent on generating greater co-ordination between the legal traditions that 
define justice in Afghanistan, which may have wider implications for the use and 
application of this law while it remains in force. As previously noted, the ‘Justice for All,’ 
government paper set out a 10-year plan in 2005 for justice sector reform and  
recommended exploring ways of engaging the state system with the traditional justice 
system.225 Although it failed to prescribe how this should be done or what ideal should be 
achieved, it represented the first recognition at the government level after the ICPC had 
been passed that some negotiation between these two systems might be beneficial for 
improving access to justice in Afghanistan.  
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UNDP’s 2007 report ‘Bridging Modernity and Tradition’ provided a possible solution. 
Adopting a model of justice first proposed by one of its authors, Ali Wardak, in 2004, the 
report proposed a hybrid model for criminal justice in Afghanistan which allows for 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms represented by jirgas/shuras but placed under 
state supervision, and particularly by a Human Rights Unit, to counter concerns regarding 
the potential for human rights abuses.226  
 
Under this model serious criminal offences would be dealt with only by the state system, 
whereas parties involved in minor criminal offences should be referred at first instance to 
the jirga/shura for resolution. Any decision reached by the jirga/shura, consisting of at least 
6 elected local elders, would be notified to the local district court and a Human Rights Unit 
to ensure compliance with ‘national legal norms’ and human rights principles.227 If the 
jirga/shura is unable to deal with the matter satisfactorily it should be referred to the formal 
local district courts. Under this system the ICPC would have no application in relation to 
any cases dealt with by the jirga/shura, but would remain relevant in any cases dealt with 
by the state courts. This collaborative relationship between the formal and informal justice 
procedures and processes would, it was anticipated, encourage local participation and 
ownership and improve the legitimacy of the state system.228  
 
UNDP maintained that without any official endorsement, some areas of the country were 
already gravitating towards the system of justice it proposed. Judges in Nangarhar 
province were reportedly referring criminal cases to tribal jirgas/shuras for deliberation and 
resolution and the decisions they reached were reported to the local courts for official state 
ratification. 229  Support for this model of justice, however, remains divided amongst 
international donors engaged in justice reform and legal experts in the formal justice 
institutions. It has been received with caution and mistrust in some justice departments, 
concerned that it might lead to increased donor support for informal mechanisms and loss 
of funding for their own departments. 230  The Supreme Court reportedly issued a warning 
against distributing or citing the report in June 2008. 231  There are concerns also 
surrounding the adoption by the state of the arbitrary decision-making and discriminatory 
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practices that are known to characterise the informal jirga/shura justice system and about 
the reality of being able to ensure sufficient oversight by human rights support institutions 
such as, perhaps, AIHRC, the Women and Children Justice Group and the Huquq 
Department.232  
 
In spite of these concerns current government justice development strategy appears to be 
geared towards improving the level of co-ordination between the formal and informal 
justice systems.  One of the priority goals identified by the 2008 ANDS was the 
investigation of ‘policies for improved links between formal and informal justice sectors and 
oversight of the informal by the formal.’ 233  In addition, the NJSS provided for the 
incorporation of informal justice mechanisms into the formal criminal justice system. In a 
similar manner to the Justice for All paper, however, neither the ANDS nor the NJSS, 
specified how this should be done, resulting in the ad hoc development of criminal justice 
practices that meets these targets, which may or may not be conducted in the manner 
envisaged by Wardak and the 2007 Human Development Report.  
 
Initiatives have, however, been undertaken in Helmand province since 2008 with UK 
support to establish a criminal justice system which combines informal and formal law and 
procedure in a similar manner to that proposed by the 2007 report.234  Here, informal 
mechanisms have been set up as part of the Afghan Social Outreach Programme 
(‘ASOP’), a government initiative supported by Provincial Reconstruction Teams tasked 
with improving justice administration and capacity in Afghanistan’s provinces. ASOP has 
established community councils in Helmand which are similar to jirga/shuras but consist of 
elected members. Each community council is divided into three sub-committees, namely 
an economic and social, a security, and justice sub-committee.235 When an individual is 
arrested for a criminal offence in one of the provinces the matter is referred to a Prisoner 
Review Shura (PRS) within 72 hours of the arrest. The PRS is essentially a local-level 
Afghan led detainee review and processing mechanism. It consists of the local chief of 
police (ANP), the local heads of the national army (ANA) and the National Directorate of 
Security (NDS), the District Governor and a member of the justice sub-committee. Details 
of the background of the case and the evidence against the accused are provided and the 
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PRS collectively decide whether there is any evidence pointing towards the guilt of the 
accused.236  It is not required to weigh any evidence at this stage or deliberate upon 
establishing innocence or guilt. If it determines that there is evidence against an individual, 
it must then decide if the offence constitutes a serious crime or minor misdemeanour. If the 
matter is deemed to constitute a serious offence, it is passed on to the investigative 
prosecutor within 72 hours of the initial arrest period and the case and the suspect will be 
transferred to Lashkar Gah to be dealt with under the formal justice system.237 The matter 
then proceeds under the provisions of the ICPC. If, however, the offence is considered to 
be minor, the matter is referred to the justice sub-committee for consideration. In these 
types of cases, the accused will remain out in the community before their case is 
considered rather than imprisoned. Justice is dispensed by the justice sub-committee in a 
shura/jirga style presided over by community elders. There is no formal procedural 
framework prescribing what the committee must do or when it should dispose of a case.238  
 
The PRS system has been criticised for potentially undermining the role of the 
prosecutor239 and for institutionalising the involvement of the police, the army, community 
elders and the District Governor to make decisions regarding criminal cases when they 
have no statutory authority to do so.240 Yet it provides a transparent and open procedure 
for the processing of detainees to reduce cases of possible arbitrary detention and 
constitutes a valuable intersection between the formal and informal justice sector. 
According to an international expert, the establishment of this new criminal justice system 
in Helmand has been ‘extremely positive,’ 241  and PRS’s ‘have proved reasonably 
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successful…and appear to have the acceptance and support of the communities.’ 242 
Perhaps the ICPC will be considered more appropriate and meaningful for general 
application in this system of justice where it is adopted as a procedural code only in 
relation to more serious criminal offences and where minor criminal matters are dealt with 
by religious elders at the community level, thereby achieving solutions which are 
acceptable within the communities and which promote positive community relations. This 
allows more local-led dispute resolution attuned to Afghanistan’s informal legal traditions 
but built into the formal system and could help to strengthen the relevance and outreach of 
the formal system. It could also reduce incidences of pre-trial detention at a time when the 
capacity of the justice sector remains insufficient to deal with all criminal cases, minor and 
serious, in accordance with the ICPC.  
 
 
4.4.3 ICPC: The Motivations for legal transplantation and their impact on its 
reception  
The reasons for the development of the ICPC have been noted earlier in this chapter. If 
there were sufficient reasons for reforming the existing law were there, however, 
reasonable motivations for choosing to do this by way of legal transplantation? An 
alternative solution might have been to amend the 1965 Procedural Law by removing and 
introducing provisions to ensure compliance with international fair trial and human rights 
standards. As noted in chapter 1, re-cycling pre-existing legislation can be a cost-efficient 
and expedient solution to developing new law. Not only this, in post-intervention situations 
reliance on an acceptable legal framework may also increase the legitimacy of a new 
transitional government among the local population and improve the application of the law 
by legal practitioners familiar with old provisions at a time of limited professional 
capacity.243  
 
There are, however, difficulties with this approach to legislative reform. Applicable laws 
proved to be inadequate for modern criminal law requirements in Cambodia in 1992244 and 
reliance on old criminal laws by the UN was problematic in both Kosovo and East Timor.245 
So perhaps post-intervention reform by legal transplantation might have offered a better 
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solution. UNTAET and UNTAC had both facilitated criminal law reform by legal 
transplantation. In the context of the ICPC, at the time that it was being drafted 
international assistance for promoting rule of law in conflict states was still informed by the 
2000 UN Brahimi report which had advocated the development of interim criminal codes 
for transplantation in post-intervention countries. There were, then, perhaps reasonable 
justifications for Di Gennaro’s decision to develop a new criminal law in Afghanistan by 
way of transplantation. 
 
And what of his decision to borrow from the Italian Code? Miller’s ‘legitimacy-generating’ 
motivation for transplanting law might offer an explanation.246 This would suggest that Di 
Gennaro contemplated that the ICPC’s Italian connection would afford it a level of prestige, 
providing it with a degree of legitimacy at local and, at the very least, government level. It 
may well have been the case that the law’s Italian connection gave it an authority which 
led to it being accepted into Afghan law by President Karzai, who was ultimately 
responsible for making it law. It is unlikely, however, that it led to the ICPC acquiring any 
real legitimacy either amongst the majority of the Afghan population, who have rarely been 
affected by its provisions, or among Afghan justice officials, some of whom at the time that 
the law was prepared resented the Italian control of the drafting process, exemplified by 
their exclusion of Afghan personnel and the political pressure that the Italians exerted to 
ensure that the law was ratified.247 Arguably the only potential benefiters of any prestige 
that may have been attached to the ICPC from its Italian origin were the Italians who 
drafted it and the Italian government. There was, after all, a certain cachet to be acquired 
in drafting a new law for use and application in Afghanistan which, at the time, was centre-
stage in international interest in rule of law assistance programmes. Moreover, the efficient 
introduction of this new criminal code would help to justify Italy’s selection as the country 
responsible for justice reform.  
  
It is perhaps more likely that speed rather than prestige was a factor in Di Gennaro’s 
decision to transplant law. By 2004 the need for reform of Afghanistan’s criminal law 
framework was urgent. It is well documented that criminal activity can increase sharply 
when countries are in the process of transition from conflict, undermining the restoration of 
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peace and stability. This had been the case in East Timor, 248  El Salvador 249  and 
Guatemala. 250  In Afghanistan there was evidence of a similar trend in crime rates. 
Between 2002 and 2003 Afghan drug traffickers had earned $2.3 billion, their profits 
perpetuating organised criminal activity. 251  By 2004 more than 40% of Afghanistan’s 
economy was adjudged to be illicit, largely funded by the rapid expansion of the drug 
trade. 252  USIP reported in March 2004 that rule of law had been ‘displaced almost 
completely by the ‘rule of the gun.’253 Furthermore, Taliban insurgency was increasing, 
resulting in attacks on foreign aid workers and Afghan police.254 Afghanistan would not be 
able to establish rule of law on a criminalised base. 255  This background would have 
generated an understandable sense of urgency to law reformers such as Di Gennaro in 
early 2004 and the expediency with which law could be developed by transplantation 
would have been an attractive motivation for drafting the ICPC in this way, providing a 
quick legislative solution for what was, after all, intended to be an interim law until the later 
introduction of a more comprehensive procedural code. 
 
There was also undoubtedly a rationale of modernisation behind Di Gennaro’s 
transplantation of the Italian Code into the ICPC. The applicable criminal law was nearly 
40 years old. As noted, the ICJ and the AI reports had highlighted weaknesses in it that 
were unacceptable in terms of Afghanistan’s international obligation to guarantee fair trials 
to defendants. Adopting provisions from a modern law already applied in a western 
democracy would ensure that the new ICPC would comply satisfactorily with international 
expectations not only of fair trial, due process and human rights standards. Transplanting 
law in this way demonstrates a motivation of modernisation underscored by the ideals of 
western liberalism and the consequent imperative of ensuring compliance with 
international human rights norms.  
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Di Gennaro’s commentary on some of the provisions of the ICPC highlights a rationale of 
modernisation to ensure conformity with international criminal procedural expectations. 
The omission of a confession from a list of ‘key tools’ that the prosecutor may use to 
collect evidence, he asserted, ‘demonstrates that Afghanistan wants to align its criminal 
procedure system with those of advanced democratic countries.’ 256  In addition, for 
prosecutors to determine whether or not to arrest a suspect in accordance with article 35, 
he instructed that ‘prevailing international standards’ should be applied.257 The apparent 
centrality of human rights protections to the content of the ICPC was also underlined by 
Aldo Mantovani, the Italian ambassador to the UN, soon after its introduction when he 
urged that it was ‘fully in line with human rights provisions and international standards.’258  
 
As indicated in chapter 2, modern criminal law reform instigated by western democracies 
is subject to the imperative demand of including human rights and fair trial protections that 
meet international standards. 259  The requirement for legal reform compliant with 
international human rights norms was regarded as essential by the international partners 
supporting the new Afghan state and would, in any event, be necessary to ensure 
conformity with Afghanistan’s obligations under international treaties to which it was a 
signatory.260 It is therefore unsurprising that this imperative would inform the content of 
Afghanistan’s criminal procedure code and be a key motivating factor behind the reliance 
on legal transplantation to develop this law. Di Gennaro clearly considered that the Italian 
Code provided a suitable template from which appropriate procedures and rules could be 
duplicated to ensure that Afghanistan’s new criminal procedure would contain adequate 
due process rights and fair trial standards. 261 
 
While there were, then, strong motivational reasons for developing the ICPC by way of 
legal transplantation, some of which were rooted in the reality of the nature of the existing 
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justice system in Afghanistan in 2004, the resultant process of this transplantation and the 
transplanted content of the law have, nevertheless, had implications in terms of its 
reception. Ahmed has argued that the dominant international influence in the development 
of the ICPC translates into an imposition of law which has adversely affected its reception 
among both the Afghan judiciary and the general public.262 It is certainly the case that the 
processes which led to the development of the law by way of transplantation were driven 
almost entirely by the international community. The recognition of the demand for a new 
procedural code and its fulfilment in the form of the ICPC was the product of work 
undertaken and political measures initiated mostly by international actors and 
organisations. Research conducted into the existing procedural and substantive criminal 
law, which demonstrated the need for new legislation, was carried out by international 
organisations. Italy’s involvement in Afghan justice sector reform in 2002 was the result of 
the United Nation’s ‘light footprint’ approach towards its reconstruction and its assumption 
of the lead nation role for international assistance to the sector led to Di Gennaro’s 
appointment as special advisor to the Italian government. Di Gennaro, associated with 
UNODC, would emerge as the principal architect of the new Code. The dominant 
international influences behind the creation of the Code were reflected in the lack of any 
Afghan involvement in the drafting process. Poor levels of domestic consultation in the 
drafting of a law are more likely to engender local perceptions of imposition. This 
perception, with respect to the ICPC, was potentially heightened by Italy’s threat to 
withdraw funding for justice projects in the event that the law would not be passed.  
 
Any local interpretation of the law as an imposition may indeed have tainted it as a foreign 
intrusion on Afghan culture and traditional approaches to criminal justice. At the very least 
this is likely to affect the application of the law and its potential for achieving its objectives. 
Ahmed, however, has warned of more serious consequences, suggesting that the ICPC 
may assume political significance as a foreign westernised transplant designed to 
undermine the authority of legal adjudicators in the country’s customary and Islamic 
criminal justice legal traditions. In this respect it is capable of generating de-stabilising 
resentment towards the Afghan state.263 If this is the case, the motivations for relying on 
legal transplantation to create the ICPC have had damaging consequences, resulting in 
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the creation of what could be termed a ‘lethal transplant,’ capable of triggering dangerous 
anti-governmental sentiments. 
 
 
4.4.4 The extent to which the ICPC has achieved its objectives 
The ICPC fails to detail its specific objectives. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the noted 
motivations behind its introduction and the comments of Di Gennaro and Mantovani, it is 
reasonable to suggest that it aimed to establish a set of codified procedural rules 
incorporating internationally acceptable fair trial, due process and human rights standards 
available for application on an interim basis until the introduction of a new and more 
comprehensive criminal code. These rules, it was intended, would change the way in 
which criminal justice would be dispensed in Afghanistan, providing clarity over applicable 
criminal procedure; encouraging uniform application of criminal law by police, prosecutors 
and judges; and assisting the promotion of a centralised state criminal justice system 
which would replace the arbitrary decision-making procedures and practices that can typify 
customary and Islamic criminal justice processes. These objectives were alluded to by the 
Italian Undersecretary of State, Margerita Boniver in May 2004 when she explained at a 
donor conference in Doha, Qatar that the ICPC was ‘a simplified text designed to make the 
work of the criminal police and judges easier and compliant with international human 
rights.’264 In achieiving these goals it was anticipated that Afghanistan’s criminal procedure 
would mirror that applied in western democracies, a requirement of the international 
community providing significant financial aid to Afghanistan’s rule of law reconstruction, 
and that it would meet the recommendations of the UN for enhancing rule of law 
development in countries seeking to emerge from conflict. 
 
As a codified law the ICPC certainly provides a procedural framework available for uniform 
application by legal practitioners processing criminal cases. By being consistent the other 
key elements of the state criminal law framework, namely the 1976 Penal Code and the 
2004 Constitution and by providing a reference point for procedural application by police, 
prosecutors, defence lawyers and Judges involved in criminal cases it complements efforts 
to centralise Afghanistan’s criminal justice system and strengthen the central state. At the 
same time, by its application, it can marginalise customary and Islamic approaches to 
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justice. Moreover, its provisions succeed in incorporating rules and procedures that are 
aligned with international expectations of fair trial, due process and human rights.  
 
Whilst this is the case, the ICPC has encountered significant difficulties in achieving the 
objectives identified above. Although it was designed to be a trimmed down criminal law 
only for interim application it has not proved to be a sufficiently comprehensive interim 
code containing the necessary requisite provisions to cover all procedural eventualities. Its 
failure to emphatically replace previous criminal procedural legislation and its revocation of 
only those laws which are incompatible with it means that rather than being able to refer to 
one all-inclusive criminal code Judges are required to navigate through various pieces of 
legislation to determine which procedural rules should be applied. For example, while the 
ICPC reduced the maximum period of pre-trial detention from 10 days to 24 hours,265 this 
period was extended by the Police Law in 2005 to 72 hours 266  and the CNL 2005 
introduced new search, surveillance and seizure provisions and increased the 30-day 
period from arrest to indictment.  
 
The requirement for amendments to its procedure in legislation such as the Police Law 
and the CNL, both passed only one year later, suggests that the ICPC was not a 
sufficiently comprehensive interim criminal procedure code, a criticism confirmed by 
experts interviewed for this research. A PRT advisor suggested in 2010 that the ICPC 
failed to provide sufficient ‘clarity over rules of evidence, particuarly those relating to the 
use of scientific and hearsay evidence.’ 267  Furthermore, a UK Home Office expert 
observed of the ICPC in 2008 that ‘there is a great need for consolidation...and full 
coverage of the law.’268  
 
Moreover, the ICPC’s allowance for judicial discretion over which procedural rules in pre-
dating, post-dating and occasionally contradictory legislation should be applied, without 
providing any guidance as to which law should take precedent, only increases the scope 
for confusion and inconsistent application of state criminal procedure.269 To that extent the 
ICPC has not succeeded in replacing the uncertainty surrounding applicable criminal law 
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referred to in AI’s 2003 report with the clarity that was required and has not in all respects 
helped to make the work of judges and criminal police easier in the way that Boniver 
predicted.  
 
Nor can it be concluded that the ICPC has succeeded in promoting the uniform application 
of state criminal law. It is not being applied consistently by all legal practitioners and it has 
yet to succeed in ensuring that the arbitrary decision-making practices associated with 
Islamic and customary criminal justice have been replaced by reference to and the 
application of its own predictable and prescriptive procedural rules. This is the case both 
within the state justice system and outside it. The vast majority of the population still refer 
criminal matters to customary and Islamic justice procedures that exist outside the state 
system. Within the state system many judges do not adhere to the procedural rules that 
the law prescribes and continue to be influenced by Islamic interpretations of criminal 
justice. It is interesting to note that the findings of various recent reports that confirm that 
Judges are applying customary law and Shari’a in relation to criminal cases mirrors the 
observations of the 2003 AI report compiled before the ICPC came into force. This 
suggests that the ICPC has had little impact in successfully changing the way in which 
criminal law is applied in Afghanistan and in promoting a centralised state justice system.  
 
Furthermore the ICPC has arguably failed to achieve Boniver’s stated objective for the law 
of ensuring that the work of criminal police and judges is compliant with international 
human rights. A Judge based in Kabul has suggested that it had no influence at all on 
judicial consideration of defendant’s human rights in criminal cases. This Judge confirms 
that ‘we always consider human rights and fairness but that is because we are Judges, not 
because of some law. The ICPC has made no difference to how it was before the Taliban 
and the Soviets.’270 In fact, although the ICPC provides protections for defendants facing 
criminal charges that are consistent with international expectations of due process and fair 
trial in practice they are not always applied. An international expert formerly employed by 
UNAMA confirmed in 2008 that ‘based on the monitoring we have done…the application of 
fair trial standards and adherence to international human rights standards is very poor.’271 
Contrary to its provisions defendants are denied access to or not informed of their right to 
legal representation and defence lawyers are obstructed from representing their clients 
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and attending trials. Similarly, the procedures regarding detention timeframes allowing for 
the suspension of sentences are routinely ignored by Judges.272 Furthermore, suspects 
arrested or detained on criminal charges are not brought promptly before judges or 
prosecutors or entitled to a trial within a reasonable period, in contravention of article 9(3) 
of the ICCPR. In 2007 approximately 6,000 detention matters were awaiting 
adjudication.273  
 
Arguably is it also the case that the ICPC fails to provide sufficiently comprehensive 
human rights and due process protections. It omits to specify whether a defendant should 
be released if they are not questioned within 48 hours. It also fails to insist on a review of 
detention before the first hearing and to prescribe what test should be applied to determine 
the legality of an arrest. Moreover, the ICPC provides insufficient alternatives to 
imprisonment. Police are not afforded any powers under the law to divert cases away from 
prosecution and to discharge a suspect or issue warnings if the offences fall within the 
ambit of state criminal law.274 Under the ICPC pre-trial detention is not a means of last 
resort in criminal proceedings in Afghanistan, contrary to the UN’s Standard Minimum 
Rules for Non-Custodial Measures.275 Its inadequate fair trial and human rights guarantees 
as well as the poor application of the protections that it does provide are contributing to the 
high conviction and arbitrary detention rates that have characterised the state criminal 
justice system since its introduction into law.  Rather than promoting human rights, it is 
often a wrongly applied state mechanism responsible for human rights abuses. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This evaluation of the ICPC examines the extent to which it has been accepted and 
achieved its objectives and seeks to establish if it has been successfully received in 
Afghanistan to determine if it was reasonable for legislators to rely on legal transplantation 
to develop it.  
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It is possible to suggest that there was every justification in resorting to the legal transplant 
mechanism to develop this law. Di Gennaro, who was largely responsible for the final draft, 
was an expert in Italian criminal law and the Italian procedural code provided a useful 
template from which procedures could be borrowed for dissemination into this new Afghan 
Code. These procedures, furthermore, would offer a collaboration of civil and common law 
rules not dissimilar to those that existed under the 1965 CPC, affording some consistency 
with previous Afghan state criminal procedure law. Moreover, developing law by means of 
legal transplantation was not new to the Afghan state criminal justice system. The 1965 
Procedural Code and the 1976 Penal Code were both developed in this way. According to 
an Italian expert the ICPC, as a legal transplant, ‘has been appropriate because it has not 
inserted issues unknown to the Afghan legal history into the domestic legal order. On the 
contrary it has relied on the Afghan legal tradition which has been influenced by the 
French/Italian civil law system since the [nineteen] twenties.’276 In 2004 the transplant 
mechanism would offer Di Gennaro a quick and efficient process for responding to 
recommendations for urgent reform, modernizing Afghanistan’s criminal procedures and 
ensuring that they would be equipped with internationally appropriate due process, fair trial 
and human rights norms, fundamental objectives of international donors providing valuable 
financial assistance to rule of law reconstruction.277 In addition, developing the criminal law 
framework by legal transplantation would accord with contemporary UN recommendations 
for reconstructing rule of law in countries seeking to emerge from conflict.278 
 
These justifications for employing the legal transplantation mechanism coupled with the 
fact that the ICPC has succeeded in providing a procedural criminal law framework for 
application by criminal practitioners might suggest that it was reasonable to develop the 
law in this way.279 Indeed, it is possible to argue that it may have a valuable place in an 
evolving criminal justice system along the lines being of that being developed in Helmand 
province that accords with the proposals of Wardak in 2004 and the HDR in 2007 and the 
ANDS goals identified by the government in 2008. 
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However, the application of the evaluative test proposed in Chapter 2 reveals that the 
ICPC has not been a successful legal transplant. Police, prosecutors, judges and defence 
lawyers are failing to apply its provisions properly or failing to apply them at all. Judges 
reach decisions based on their own intuition or on Islamic interpretations of justice rather 
than with reference to the procedures prescribed in the Code. The persistent application 
by state judges of Shari’a in the courts as well as the continued referral of the 
overwhelming majority of criminal matters to customary and Islamic justice authorities 
suggests that the ICPC is not considered meaningful and appropriate for use either by 
legal practitioners or the general Afghan public. Overall, it has struggled to be accepted 
and has failed to achieve many of its objectives.  
 
The views of a PRT Justice Advisor based in Helmand are insightful in relation to 
identifying problems with the ICPC. In her view ‘the problem is not that they don’t want it 
[the ICPC] or even that it is Italian – but that they do not have it, because of security 
issues. They are not reacting in a negative way to the law itself. They are not failing to 
apply the ICPC because it is foreign. It is the law and they recognise that. They are not 
actively dis-applying it – just apathetically not applying it.’280 The apathetic failure by justice 
authorities to apply the provisions of the Code is to a large extent the result of the many 
challenges facing the Afghan state justice system - and in the case of Helmand, primarily 
security issues. The poor capacity and competency of personnel in the justice institutions, 
insufficient resources and the insidious influence of pervasive corruption amongst justice 
officials compromise its application. There are insufficient numbers of defence lawyers to 
provide representation to every defendant who requests it and insufficient numbers of 
Judges to preside over cases. The legal aid scheme is also not sufficiently well developed 
to enable defendants to receive free legal advice and assistance in contravention of the 
provisions of the Code. These constraints have adversely affected the application and 
reception of the law.  
 
There have, however, also been problems with the reception of the law which are directly 
associated with its transplanted content. It is not a comprehensive interim criminal code. 
According to a principal UNAMA rule of law advisor ‘it is not good that this criminal 
procedure code did not sufficiently provide for bail.’281 In defence of the law according to 
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this expert, it ‘was written specifically post-conflict when Afghans needed something 
relatively straightforward that they could implement.’282 Nevertheless, the transplantation of 
rules from an Italian source resulted in procedural inadequacies and omissions which have 
engendered avoidable confusion amongst practitioners and increased the potential for the 
arbitrary detention of detainees. The ICPC has also failed to provide total clarity over state 
criminal procedure, or to ensure that the work of police and judges is compliant with 
international human rights standards. All of these factors suggest that it was 
unreasonableto develop this law by borrowing foreign procedural rules. 
 
There is some concern, furthermore, that the process by which the ICPC was developed – 
with minimal Afghan involvement – and the transplanted nature of its content may result in 
it being construed as a foreign imposition and as a political act designed to promote 
centralisation based on a western model at the expense of local Afghan culture and justice 
mechanisms. The very fact of its legal transplantation has compromised its legitimacy. 
More worrrying than this, commentators such as Ahmed have warned of the ICPC’s 
capacity for provoking resistance among ulama if it is perceived as a threat to their 
religious authority which could contribute to the destablisation of the central state in a 
manner similar the regimes of Ammanullah and Daoud.283  If this is to be believed, it 
certainly supports a conclusion that it was unreasonable to develop this law by means of 
legal transplantation as it was the allure of the transplant mechanism that profoundly 
affected its content and the manner in which it was drafted.  
 
Ahmed’s views about the potential of foreign legal transplants such as the ICPC to trigger 
conflict in Afghanistan rest on a wider picture of historic resistance to attempts by the state 
to establish a unified legal system in the country, of which a law such as the ICPC is 
representative, and also on the conviction that the ulama uniformly oppose such secular 
and transplanted laws.284 A study conducted in Saidabad district in Wardak province in 
2007 seems at first instance to support Ahmed’s fears.285 It confirmed that in criminal 
cases where there was a conflict between Shari’a and state law, religious legal authorities 
viewed any failure to apply Shari’a as evidence of western designs to undermine Islamic 
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jurisprudence.286  However, the same authorities also viewed the relationship between 
secular law and Islamic law as essentially non-conflictual, which suggests that they 
acknowledge that there is a legitimate place for statutory codified law in Afghanistan’s 
criminal justice system. State law therefore has the potential to exist without provoking the 
opposition that Ahmed seems to regard as inevitable because of its transplanted nature. 
The real concern, however, in relation to the ICPC is that the process of its transplantation, 
driven largely by modernisation and expediency, as well as its transplanted content have 
not in any way resolved the discrepancies that have existed between secular, Islamic and 
customary conceptions of criminal justice and which remain divisive and political issues.287 
Its failure to offer some negotiation between these legal traditions means that, as Roder 
suggests, it has in fact ‘worsened this situation.’ 288  As a legal transplant it provides 
procedures which are abused, misunderstood and misapplied by the actors who are 
supposed to be implementing them, leading to injustices which can undermine rule of law, 
defeating the key objective for which it was introduced, and transforming it into a driving 
force for the insurgency which continues to plague Afghanistan.  In that context it has 
every potential of being a ‘lethal’ rather than an effective legal transplant, suggesting that it 
was unreasonable for those responsible for it to have developed it by legal transplantation.  
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5  An Evaluation of The Counter Narcotics Law 
2005 
 
 
Introduction 
This chapter considers the Counter Narcotics Law, passed by Presidential Decree on 18 
December 2005, and evaluates it as a legal transplant. It draws on quantitative data as 
well as original qualitative material obtained from a number of interviews conducted with 
Afghan and international legal personnel based in Afghanistan, including senior 
representatives from the judiciary, prosecution and defence services with experience of 
the law. Organised in a similar manner to the evaluation of the ICPC in Chapter 4, Section 
5.1 reviews the main provisions of the law; Section 5.2 reflects on the reasons for its 
development; Section 5.3 examines why it can be interpreted as a legal transplant; and 
Section 5.4 applies the evaluative test proposed in chapter 2, leading to conclusions 
regarding the extent of its successful reception in Afghanistan and whether it was 
reasonable for it to have been developed by means of legal transplantation.  
 
  
 
Section 5.1 The Counter Narcotics Law 2005 
Consisting of 58 articles divided into 8 chapters, the CNL contains a number of objectives, 
broadly divided between prohibited and authorised activities, considered in detail in section 
5.4.4.  It also provides for the establishment of the Special Narcotics Force1 within the MOI 
to detain and arrest suspects and hand them over to the Counter Narcotics Police of 
Afghanistan (CNPA).2 In addition, it formally provides for the establishment of the Central 
Narcotics Tribunal within the Primary Provincial Court and the Appellate Provincial Court 
both based in Kabul3 and it grants the Tribunal exclusive jurisdiction to consider any drug 
trafficking case in which the amount of heroin, morphine or cocaine seized exceeds 2kgs, 
the amount of opium is more than 10kg or the total weight of hashish or other specified 
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illegal substances is greater than 50kg.4 Drug trafficking cases involving lesser quantities 
of prohibited drugs are declared as falling under the jurisdiction of Public Security 
Tribunals in the Provincial Courts.5  
 
The offence of ‘drug trafficking’ is widely defined under article 15 as including activities 
such as the production, manufacture, distribution, possession, sale and transportation of 
specific illicit drugs.6 The investigation, prosecution and trial of these offences is to be 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the ICPC ‘and other relevant laws,’ which 
the CNL fails to detail. Moreover, in the event that the CNL lacks the required provisions to 
decide on a penalty for an offence, the provisions of the Penal Code are stated to apply 
and to avoid confusion over which law should apply for imposing penalties for offences, it 
stipulates under article 56 that ‘where existing laws and regulations conflict with this law, 
this law shall prevail.’7 
 
The CNL prescribes penalties for offences relating to the cultivation,8 use,9 possession10 
and trafficking11 of illicit drugs and for the operation of facilities for storing them and drug 
laboratories. 12  In addition, it provides penalties for importing or using equipment and 
materials for producing and processing illicit drugs,13 for corruption and bribery perpetrated 
in connection with trafficking operations14, the prescription of illegal drugs15 and the use or 
possession of weapons in connection with drug trafficking.16  
 
There are key sentencing provisions in article 16 for drug trafficking offences. Trafficking 
offences involving heroin, morphine or cocaine involve sentences ranging from 
imprisonment for 6 months to a year and a fine not exceeding 50,000 Afghanis for 
quantities under 10 grams to mandatory life imprisonment for amounts over 5 kilograms 
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and fines of up to 10 million Afghanis.17 Offences involving opium or its derivatives attract 
sentences varying from 3 months imprisonment and a fine up to 25,000 Afghanis for 
amounts less than 10 grams to life imprisonment and a fine of 5 million Afghanis for 
quantities in excess of 50 kilograms. 18  Furthermore, anyone convicted of organising, 
financing or controlling trafficking activities involving 3 or more people is liable to receive a 
sentence three times more severe than those apprehended with the drugs, subject to a 
maximum sentence of 20 years.19 
 
Penalties for use and possession for personal consumption include provision for 
imprisonment for periods ranging between three months to a year depending on the 
substance and for the imposition of fines in addition.20 Any possession of more than 1 
gram of heroin and cocaine and 10 grams of opium or hashish results in a referral for 
sentencing under the provisions in article 16.21 
 
In addition, the 2005 law introduced procedures for the stop and search of suspects22 and 
vehicles and for the seizure of assets.23  It also provided new investigative provisions 
enabling for covert electronic surveillance, undercover operations and the use of 
informants, aimed at helping to secure the conviction of medium and high-level drug 
traffickers.24  
 
Section 5.2 Reasons for the Development of the CNL 
The passing of the CNL was to a large extent a reaction to the failure of counter-narcotics 
reform initiatives undertaken by the Afghan government and its international supporters 
between 2001 and 2005. In May 2003 a 5-year National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS) 
was adopted following extensive consultation with international experts from the US, the 
UK and UNODC25 which contained the ambitious objective of reducing opium cultivation by 
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70% by 2008 and eliminating it by 201326 and identified judicial reform as one of five key 
areas on which to concentrate efforts to facilitate this.27 In this respect it recognised ‘the 
need for [the] establishment of an efficient and modern criminal justice system to address 
drug trafficking’ and promised that ‘proper laws will be enacted’28 which would include a 
‘national law on drug trafficking and related offences’ in the drive towards establishing an 
‘anti-drugs legislative system that meets international standards.’29 
 
The result was a new Counter Narcotics Law was passed in October 2003, drafted quickly 
with very little input from or consultation with local representatives30 and transplanted from 
a UN ‘model’ law with deliberate omissions in order, apparently, to make it more 
comprehensible to Afghan practitioners.31 This represented a diversion from the previous 
1991 law which, according to one international expert, was ‘basic and just imposed 
imprisonment for trafficking and cultivation,’32 and provided for the regulation of illicit drug-
related offences and the classification of drugs and precursors in accordance with 
internationally approved standards. However, by late 2004, according to UNAMA, ‘there 
was a consensus that the [CNL 2003] needed revision.’33 It failed to provide the police and 
prosecutors with the necessary modern mechanisms required to successfully apprehend 
and convict drug traffickers, particularly those at the top end of the trade with international 
connections who were adopting increasingly sophisticated trafficking strategies. A new law 
could provide police and prosecutors with more modern tools to deal with counter-narcotic 
crime.34 New initiatives were required. 
 
By this stage it was clear that counter-narcotic strategies were failing. There were at least 
15,000 opium traders and approximately 10% of the total population were involved in 
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poppy cultivation.35. Opium production was estimated at 4,200 tons, 23 times more than 
that produced 20 years earlier.36 Profits from the narcotics trade were worth $US2.2 billion 
a year and the industry had become deeply interwoven with not only the economic, but 
also the political and social fabric of the country.37 Opium was being cultivated in all of 
Afghanistan’s provinces38 and profiteering from its production was financing insurgency, 
encouraging corruption and increasing warlord power, which combined to represent a 
huge threat to domestic state building and rule of law reform efforts.39 UNODC warned that 
‘unless the drug problem is solved, there will be no sustainable development for 
Afghanistan.’40  
 
The CNL was introduced as a legislative solution to Afghanistan’s ‘drug problem.’ In 
recognition of the spiralling narcotics problems the Afghan government published a 
Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan in February 2005, following a period of 
consultation with international experts, which set out eight pillar activities designed to 
tackle the cultivation, production and trafficking of drugs in Afghanistan. That concerned 
with ‘criminal justice’ identified a number of key targets, amongst which were the 
development of ‘a more effective criminal justice system,’ (a tacit admission that the 
prevailing system was inadequate), the establishment of a new Court and prison in Kabul 
dedicated to major drug trafficking cases and the introduction of ‘an effective counter 
narcotics legal framework’.41 
 
In alignment with these requirements a centralised counter-narcotics Criminal Justice Task 
Force (CJTF) was established by the Afghan government in co-operation with the UK and 
with support from the US and UNODC, becoming fully operational in July 2005.42 UK 
representatives noted that ‘in a climate where counter narcotic law was largely 
unimplemented, it was decided a dedicated, highly-mentored unit was essential to deal 
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effectively with serious counter narcotic related crime, and demonstrate to traffickers they 
were at real risk of prosecution.’43 The CJTF was composed of specialist investigators, 
prosecutors and judges trained to expedite significant counter narcotics cases.44 The result 
of this revised counter-narcotics programme was the creation of an integrated system of 
criminal justice that would exist parallel to the poorly functioning existing justice system 
and which would be specifically dedicated to drug-related criminal cases capable of being 
fast-tracked through new centralised courts, namely the Central Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) 
Primary and Appeal Courts, devoted solely to narcotic-related crime. A new counter-
narcotics law was required that would be the centre-point of these new initiatives and 
which would also have the pragmatic significance of establishing the jurisdiction of the 
CNT by law and formalising the statutory powers of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics 
(MCN), founded in December 2004 to co-ordinate counter-narcotics activities.45  
 
 
Section 5.3 The CNL as a Legal Transplant 
While the CNL was a product of collaboration between the UK, the US and the Afghans it 
is regarded locally as an internationally-led law,46 a perception heightened by the fact that 
it was drafted in English as opposed to Dari or Pashto.47 In reality, it was largely designed 
by the UK and the US. The UK had a larger input with the operational sections of the law 
such as the provisions dealing with electronic interception and surveillance, which were 
new counter-narcotic legal concepts in Afghanistan.48 The US were intent on imposing 
mandatory sentences for drug offences and providing for the extradition of suspects for 
trial abroad, both of which were included in the final draft.49 The first draft was prepared by 
members of the Drugs Team from the UK Home Office stationed at the UK Embassy in 
Kabul in 2005.50 They were not, however, trained lawyers51 and the UK acknowledged that 
it lacked the necessary personnel to competently complete the drafting process, at which 
                                                          
43
 The Criminal Justice Task Force – Lessons Learned, Conference on the Rule of Law in Afghanistan, Rome 
(02.07.2007), held on file, p.1 
44
 Its jurisdiction, defined in the CNL 2005, extends to any case where the amount of heroin, morphine or 
cocaine seized exceeds 2kgs, opium exceeds 10kg or hashish or other specified illegal substances exceeds 
50kg (article 34(4)(a)-(c) 
45
 interview, International Drugs and Development Adviser 18.06.2009. Although the MCN was formed in early 
2005 and had two Deputy Ministers it had not yet been accorded any formal statutory powers 
46
 interview, senior member of the UK Rule of Law team, 29.02.2008 
47
 UNAMA, note 33, p.7 
48
 interview, international Drugs and Development Adviser, 09.12.2008 
49
 Possibly because US personnel were more involved than UK Home Office actors at the end point of the 
drafting process; interview, note 46 
50
 ibid 
51
 interview, senior prosecutions adviser, 25.06.2008 
170 
 
point it sought the assistance of two US Department of Justice Deputy District Attorney-
Generals,52 who had been working alongside various retired military policemen, US Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, Norwegian judges and lawyers employed as 
mentors within the CJTF.53  
 
There were opportunities for Afghan involvement in the drafting process. The UK was 
assisted by Dr Adbul Jabar Sabet, later to be appointed Attorney-General, but who in 2005 
was acting as both a legal adviser for the MOI and the UK Drugs Team, with which he had 
a very close working relationship.54 The UK provided Sabet with a framework for the law 
and asked him to review it, applying his experience of domestic criminal and counter-
narcotics law. 55  Some additional personnel in the AGO followed the legislation in its 
drafting stages through to its enactment. To that extent Sabet and the AGO had every 
reasonable opportunity to approve or amend the CNL before it was passed by Presidential 
Decree in December 2005.  
 
As it turned out, however, the contribution of the AGO and also the Supreme Court to the 
drafting stages proved to be relatively minor, confined principally to ensuring that it 
included a rigorous sentencing structure, which emerged as the primary concern of Afghan 
contributors to the process.56  The comparatively inconsiderable role played by Afghan 
actors to the drafting stages of the CNL may have been due to a lack of professional 
capacity within the AG and Supreme Court departments. It was apparent to the 
international actors at the time that there was not a great wealth of legislative reform 
experience amongst Afghan officials who might have been in a position to contribute to the 
process.57  Additionally, there may have been a lack of willingness amongst domestic 
actors to contribute meaningfully to the drafting task. It would have distracted them from 
their other administrative responsibilities and exposed them to criticism if the law was later 
construed as being flawed.58  It is likely also that the ‘lead nation’ policy installed following 
the Tokyo Conference generated a culture of dependence by domestic officials on the 
experience of international actors to complete technical and demanding tasks of this 
nature. 
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It is equally possible that the potential for greater Afghan contribution was compromised by 
the speed with which the CNL was drafted and passed. It was, a senior prosecution 
advisor with the British Embassy Drugs Team later reflected, ‘too rushed’.59 There was a 
sense of urgency about the drafting process given the recognised demand amongst the 
UK and international donors in particular for a new counter-narcotics law that would 
complement the revised strategy that envisaged a new justice system dedicated to drug 
crime, augmented by the CJTF, the CNPA and new courts. But the speed with which it 
was prepared was, in all likelihood, also the result of political ramifications. Once 
Parliament returned, it would have to be considered by the Taqnin, entailing a lengthy 
consultation process and inevitable postponement of the potential impact of the new 
counter-narcotics policy. Ultimately it was passed by Presidential decree just one day 
before Parliament was due to convene.60 In fact, then, the drafting process of the CNL 
2005 was similar to that of its predecessor. It was drafted quickly, based on international 
models and contained provisions conforming to international conventions.  
 
Given the combination of all of these factors, the CNL 2005 contains many of the 
hallmarks of a legal transplant. It established centralised institutions, the operation of 
which were internationally funded. The new judges, police and prosecutors employed by 
these institutions would be internationally trained and placed under foreign scrutiny and 
invigilation. There was only marginal input by or consultation with local actors during the 
drafting stages. It may be a piece of Afghan legislation but it is regarded as an 
international law which fundamentally includes borrowed foreign principles of acceptable 
counter-narcotics law, drafted in a foreign language mainly by foreign actors.  
 
 
Section 5.4: Evaluating the Counter Narcotics Law 2005 
5.4.1 The Application of the CNL 
The CJTF, which applies the CNL with respect to more significant drug cases under article 
34, is situated within a $US 12 million compound in central Kabul and comprises over 150 
staff. These include 40 CNPA investigators from the MOI and 35 prosecutors seconded 
from the AGO, all of whom are selected on the basis of ability and integrity. There are also 
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13 Judges provided by the Supreme Court, seven of whom preside at the Primary Court 
and 6 at the Appeal Court.61 Situated in the compound is a Detention Centre containing 50 
beds for detaining suspects and is staffed by personnel from the Central Prison Division 
under the aegis of the MOJ. There are also barracks for the prison staff and a Judicial 
Security Unit responsible for maintaining the security of the compound, ensuring the 
protection of Judges and staff and the safe transfer of prisoners on site. All of the units in 
the compound have been built as separate entities. Therefore, police investigators work in 
one building and Judges in another in an effort to preserve the integrity and independence 
of the departments engaged in applying the law.62  
 
There are four different types of Prosecutors based at the CJTF who are applying the 
CNL. Investigative prosecutors conduct all the necessary investigations in relation to a 
drugs case which comes within the jurisdiction of the CNL. This may involve working 
closely with the police during the questioning and interrogation of a suspect and attending 
crime sites and viewing drug hauls. Investigations should be concluded within 15 days of 
receiving a case, although prosecutors are able to apply for an extension of time for up to 
15 days on application to the Court.63 At the end of the prescribed investigative periods, 
which cannot exceed 30 days, the investigative prosecutor must either release the suspect 
or serve them with an indictment. This consists of 6 to 7 pages of script detailing the case 
against the accused, which is served on them and filed at Court. Cases will be timetabled 
with lists published and made available to the accused and defence lawyers and trial dates 
should be set down within 2 months of the service and filing of an indictment.64 The CJTF 
try to ensure that defence lawyers to whom drug cases are referred are members of the 
AIBA as it imposes a code of conduct and ethical standards.65 In practice, there tends to 
be a select group of defence lawyers affiliated with the Bar Association to whom cases are 
referred on a regular basis.66  
 
UK mentors have been working with the prosecutors to try to change a predisposition for 
automatic referral of cases to trial having noted that some prosecutors, and particularly 
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those who were trained in Moscow or in Afghanistan under the Soviet court system, had a 
propensity to refer cases without proper assessment of the evidence and prospects of 
securing a conviction.67 Procedural changes have been introduced to ensure that cases 
are properly reviewed before a decision is taken to set a matter down for trial and it is 
currently estimated that approximately 85% of the cases received by the CJTF proceed to 
trial.68  
 
If an indictment is served the case is transferred to a Primary Prosecutor who will present 
the case for the prosecution at the trial. At the end of the trial Judges retire to chambers to 
deliberate and agree a finding. If they find the defendant guilty they will also determine the 
sentence at that stage. The judgement and sentence will usually be confirmed in writing.69  
 
If the matter is appealed, which according to a senior CJTF prosecutor tends to be 
‘inevitable,’70 it will be referred to the CNT Appeal Court.  The prosecution file will be 
transferred to the Appellate Prosecutor who assumes responsibility for preparing and 
presenting the case for the prosecution at the appeal hearing which should be conducted 
within 2 months.71 At the end of the appeal process the accumulated prosecution case file 
will be passed to trial prosecutors. They scrutinise the paperwork and the procedures that 
have been followed and prepare cases for trial at the Supreme Court if it is referred for 
further appeal, which in practice is relatively rare (Figure 2).72  
 
The CNL contains penalties for imprisonment which relate in practice not only to cases 
involving the possession and trafficking of large quantities of narcotic drugs, which are 
referred to the CNT, but also to low-level drug offences dealt with in Provincial Courts 
which might involve the use or possession of small quantities of drugs. There are concerns 
that the sentencing provisions are excessively harsh and fail to enable an appropriate 
degree of judicial discretion.73 Imprisonment appears unavoidable under the law, even for 
possession of small quantities of illicit drugs. Article 27, for example, fails to define any 
lower limit for possession entailing imprisonment. The result is that the possession of small 
amounts of cannabis amounting to less than 10 grams attracts a term of imprisonment of 
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between 3 to 6 months in addition to a fine.74   Article 29 demands that the Courts impose 
maximum penalties in relation to offences committed by repeat offenders.75 Furthermore, 
detainees sentenced to more than 5 years imprisonment are denied any right to apply for 
home leave76 and drug trafficking offenders are prohibited from applying for probation or 
the suspension of their sentences, irrespective of the type of drug and the quantities 
involved or the circumstances of their offence.77 According to UNODC, ‘the principle that 
underlies the CNL is punishment.’78 The punishment that is meted out is often in the form 
of lengthy prison sentences. Statistics published by the Supreme Court on selected 
decisions for the 8 month period between August 2008 and March 2009 reveal that 166 
defendants were convicted of ‘drugs narcotic crime’ and convicted to a total of 1,756 years 
in prison, representing an average sentence of ten and a half years imprisonment per 
defendant (Table 6).79  
 
Drug trafficking offences result in mandatory prison sentences. Yet the majority of drug 
trafficking offenders that the law applies to in practice are couriers, paid small sums of 
money to transport drugs. It would not be unreasonable, for instance, for a courier to 
receive approximately $500 for transporting more than 10 kilos of heroin, which carries a 
mandatory life sentence. 80  The draconian sentencing provisions in article 16, largely 
reduced to a simple consideration of the weight of the drugs that have been seized, allow 
little room for prudent judicial consideration relative to degree of criminal responsibility. 
There is no hope for leniency for a courier, irrespective of the extent of their involvement in 
the crime. 
 
A number of interviewed experts have expressed concern over the CNL’s sentencing 
structure. A CNT judge observed that the most serious problem with the law is ‘the very 
harsh sentences that allows the judges no discretion.’81  A senior prosecution adviser 
reached the same conclusion, commenting that ‘sentencing is robust and there is no real 
discretion.’82 According to a senior prosecutions caseworker at the CJTF the ‘massive 
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minimum sentences’ provided for in article 16 represented ‘hard law [and] bad law’, the 
practical effect of which is that couriers receive lengthy prison sentences ‘for effectively 
trying to get small amounts of money.’83 There is no allowance for any balance between an 
offence and the suffering that should be imposed on an offender in order to secure justice. 
Ultimately, the CNL fails to provide an adequate level of proportionality between the nature 
of any drug trafficking offence and the degree of punishment that should be meted out, 
contrary to the recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee.84 
 
In addition to concerns surrounding the tough sentencing provisions of the law, problems 
have arisen with the implementation of some of the ‘new’ procedures the CNL introduced. 
Article 41 provides incentives for apprehended and convicted drug offenders to co-operate 
with law enforcement agents, in return for which their sentences can be reduced by up to 
50% on recommendation of the prosecutor in circumstances where an offender has 
provided ‘substantial assistance’ regarding the criminal activities of other suspects. This 
represented a new innovation for counter-narcotic law in Afghanistan, its rationale being 
that it should encourage offenders lower down the criminal chain, such as drugs couriers, 
to provide evidence against higher ranked drug offenders. No similar provision existed in 
the ICPC upon which the law enforcement authorities could rely.  
 
Officials have, however, experienced difficulty in applying section 41, some of which stems 
from its lack of prescription. It fails to set out any clear process for dealing with any new 
information provided by co-operating defendants. The reasoning of the law was 
undoubtedly that there should be a referral to the CNPA or international authorities so that 
they can make enquiries as to the authenticity of the information provided and that, if it 
proves to be helpful, this would be noted in the trial bundle with a recommendation for 
sentence reduction if the defendant is convicted. The article, however, does not prevent 
the information being made available to the Judge before reaching a judgement, a matter 
for concern as it may influence their decision-making regarding a defendant’s innocence or 
guilt and increase the potential for prejudicing judicial impartiality.   
 
Section 41 also fails to provide any definition of ‘substantial assistance’ so this is rather 
unhelpfully left open to the subjective interpretation of Primary Prosecutors. Furthermore, 
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the English version of the law provides that the Primary Prosecutor has a discretion to 
recommend a sentence reduction of up to 50% so that the discount would be relative to 
the amount and value of assistance provided. The Dari translation, however, stated that 
any sentence reduction should be 50% in all cases, removing any room for judicial 
discretion.85 The intended application of the article was initially, therefore, lost in translation, 
making it susceptible to inconsistent application by the judiciary, until a ruling by the 
Supreme Court clarified that sentence reductions are discretionary and up to 50%.86  
 
Aside from these problems, article 41 is open to abuse by offenders who, in the quest for 
sentence reductions, make false accusations against entirely innocent people, leading to 
their arrest. A CNT Judge commented that he did ‘not like the Section 41 provision on 
informing on others as it provides an incentive to lie about people that you do not like and 
to get them in trouble with the authorities.’87 An international expert also described the 
consequences of article 41 as ‘a problem, a massive issue. The Sentencing Commission 
should be looking at it but do not have the personnel.’88 
  
Not only has article 41 led to the arrest of innocent people, the vital evidence against 
medium and higher-value drug traffickers that the drafters of the CNL might have 
anticipated would be forthcoming because of the incentives of sentence reduction has not 
materialised to the extent that was perhaps hoped. In practice, applications for section 41 
sentence reductions are invoked infrequently by defendants. A prosecution adviser 
attributed the ‘uncommunicative’ behaviour of defendants to a ‘cultural’ predisposition 
towards inscrutability rather than any reaction to the presence of international actors in the 
investigative and prosecution process.89 It is more likely, however, to be a direct response 
to threats to their safety and that of their families by personnel higher up the trafficking 
hierarchy. Higher-end drug traffickers are well aware of the potential dangers that article 
41 might present to them and counter them by adopting ‘scare and favour’ strategies 
which include issuing threats of harm and offering financial rewards. The latter often 
involve ensuring that the courier’s family are looked after and provided for during their 
detention. Threats of harm, on the other hand, can be far reaching, and can include killing 
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not only a courier’s partner and children but also all of their blood ancestors.90 These 
carrot and stick incentives have been successful in frustrating law enforcement agents 
from benefiting from the sentence reduction incentives provided for in article 41 and on the 
whole it has not proved greatly persuasive to couriers and lower-end targets, who remain 
the most likely to be arrested and convicted, to provide vital evidence against key target 
large-scale drug traffickers.   
  
Article 37 of the CNL also introduced new procedures to counter-narcotic practices in 
Afghanistan and is one of the key centralising provisions of the legislation. It provides that 
upon the arrest of an individual with a quantity of drugs which ensures that the case falls 
within the jurisdiction of the CNL, the arresting officer must prepare a report and hand the 
accused over to the primary prosecutor of the district where the arrest took place within 72 
hours. The accused must then be transported by the CNPA to its headquarters in Kabul 
within 15 days of the arrest where the suspect can be held for questioning for up to 72 
hours. Within 15 days of the arrest the case should be handed over to a Special Counter 
Narcotics prosecutor who must present an indictment to the primary CNT or in the 
alternative seek a further extension of time of 15 days within which to do so.91 The effect is 
that suspects arrested under the CNL must be transferred to Kabul as soon as possible 
and no later than 15 days from their arrest.  
 
Article 37 was designed to ensure that the administration of counter-narcotic justice would 
be funnelled to special Courts in Kabul staffed with specially trained judges and 
prosecutors cognisant with the law. The rationale behind this centralisation process was 
that it would enhance the potential for successfully prosecuting major drug cases and also 
help to ensure uniform application of the law.  Suspects could be transported quickly from 
provincial areas to Kabul where their cases would be placed under the scrutiny of the 
Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF). Prosecution cases would be managed by a small 
and select group of trained individuals. Hearings would take place in the same courts and 
the judges presiding over them would be conversant with the law and procedure and 
would quickly build experience, ensuring consistency in application of the law.  
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In reality, however, the article 37 provisions have proved very difficult to implement. 
Transporting suspects from provincial areas within the timescales the article prescribes 
presents major logistical problems. Transport infrastructure in Afghanistan is extremely 
poor. It has no functioning rail system, a limited and unregulated air transport industry and 
possesses one of the worst and least developed road systems in the world.92 The potential 
for complying with the provisions of article 37 and securing a transfer of drugs suspects 
within the prescribed time limits varies depending on where in the country an arrest is 
made. Different areas offer better or worse prospects for compliance, depending on 
available transport facilities. Rather than promoting the uniform application of the law in the 
manner that was anticipated by the drafters of the CNL, the difficult transfer requirements 
of article 37 decrease the potential for consistency. Afghanistan’s poor transport 
infrastructure and the consequent problems the authorities have in transporting prisoners 
results in inevitable delays beyond the targets specified by article 37 of the CNL. A CNT 
Judge has admitted that ‘many times people are kept for longer than their time limits,’93 
representing worrying violations of defendant’s rights to freedom from arbitrary detention 
provided for in the Afghan Constitution and under international conventions to which 
Afghanistan is a signatory. 
 
The CJTF, with UK mentor assistance, has sought to solve the problem by airlifting 
prisoners from provincial areas to Kabul, often relying on assistance from the RAF.94 This, 
however, has proved problematic because of the infrequency of available flights and the 
potential limited comparative priority airlifting prisoners may represent to the air force 
relative to ongoing military commitments. Whilst the UK and the Afghan government are 
understood to have been considering employing a private contractor to airlift prisoners, the 
sticking point has been the consequent costs that this would involve and agreeing on who 
should be required to meet them. The UK has so far been paying the costs of transporting 
suspects and the Afghan government is reluctant to contribute on the grounds that as the 
UK was responsible for the law it should be liable for consequent expenses.95  
 
Difficulties in organizing safe transport are not the only problems facing officials in their 
efforts to comply with article 37 requirements. Other variables affecting compliance include 
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the degree of security in the area of arrest, the capacity of the police in the locality and 
their propensity to corruption. Most commonly, arrests take place when drugs are 
discovered during police or army checkpoints. Arrested individuals should be handed to 
the CNPA as soon as possible and the matter referred to the primary prosecutor within 72 
hours, whereupon arrangements should be made for the transfer of the suspect to Kabul. 
Many cases, however, fail to be transferred either to the CNPA or Kabul due to police 
corruption.96 There is provincial variation in compliance with the law. In Helmand ‘the 
likelihood of anything happening [in Helmand] is not great. What is more realistic…is that a 
bribe is paid to the policeman or [the case] is simply not progressed because I suspect that 
the police don’t know what they should do next and the security situation being what it is 
you are not going to worry about taking a guy who has got some [drugs] all the way back 
to see the prosecutor.’97 On the other hand, there is perhaps an improved prospect of 
compliance in cases involving higher profile suspects, irrespective of the area of their 
arrest. On or about February 2010, for example,  a policeman arrested by the CNPA in 
Helmand in connection with a trafficking operation was successfully transferred to the 
CJTF in Kabul.98  
 
In fact, 85% of cases received by the CJTF relate to offences committed in provincial 
areas,99 so there is evidence to suggest that the authorities are overcoming logistical and 
security problems to comply with article 37. However, it is estimated that in approximately 
30% of all cases presented to the CNT no defendants are produced.100 In these instances 
drugs have been found by the police but they have made no arrests or, alternatively, the 
police have made legitimate seizures but allege that the suspects have escaped. These 
alarming statistics raise concerns about the prevalence of systematic police corruption. 
According to a UK prosecutions casework adviser the police are known to be complicit in 
profiting from the seizure of drugs in the course of their duties. 101  In 2009 the CNT 
convicted a head of the Highway Police for assisting a drugs trafficker when he was found 
to have ordered his men to escort a drugs dealer.102 In some instances police officers will 
stop and search vehicles, locate and seize drugs in the course of their duties and then 
divide the drugs haul amongst themselves and the drug traffickers before allowing the 
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traffickers to move on. Alternatively, they may accept a bribe to release a suspect. 
According to a CNT judge ‘far too often, only the small fish are arrested and the big fish 
escape…often the police will let people go if they are paid enough money.’103 In other 
instances police officers are known to have simply disappeared following a seizure of 
drugs, taking the drugs with them or the cash equivalent value having sold them back to 
the drug dealers from whom they were originally seized.104 
 
To some degree the potential for police corruption is increased as a result of omissions 
from the transplanted content of the CNL. Article 28(3), for example, states that vehicles 
seized in connection with trafficking offences can be confiscated and sold and that the sale 
proceeds should be deposited at the government treasury department. Yet the article fails 
to clarify who should be responsible for the seizure of assets and their sale or how they 
should account for the sale proceeds or indeed conduct a sale. This lack of prescription 
and clarity has led to ad hoc practices being employed by law enforcement officials and 
has enhanced their ability to profit without detection from corruption by disposing of seized 
assets and retaining the proceeds.105  
 
In addition to predatory corruption by the police and law enforcement personnel, the 
application of the CNL has also been compromised by the poor capacity of these officials 
and their lack of understanding of the law, particularly at the investigative phases of drug 
cases. Article 38 stipulates that officials who conduct drugs seizures should prepare 
reports that include details of the type and quantity of the drug and a factual account of the 
seizure. Any seized drugs should be handed over to the CNPA who gather physical 
evidence of the amount and weight of the drugs and take samples which are referred for 
testing, following which the remaining drugs are to be destroyed.106 The scene report on 
drug seizures is a vital part of prosecution evidence and collected samples should 
represent a key feature of police investigative work.  
 
Cases that originate in Kabul have an improved success rate because the police in Kabul 
handling the initial stages of the case are more likely to have received proper training in 
the conduct of the investigation of drug cases than those in provincial areas. A 2008 
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UNODC report recorded that the CNPA in Kabul, which it described as a ‘competent, albeit 
small, organisation,’ was then conducting police investigations ‘at a level capable of 
assisting legal proceedings.’107 Cases originating from the provinces, however, often have 
to be dropped because the evidential chain has been broken due to poor police practices. 
No witness statements will have been taken; the police will have compiled incorrectly 
completed or inaccurate reports of drug seizures; samples taken from a small percentage 
of the haul may be mislaid without any other physical evidence of the seizure having been 
obtained, resulting in the case being removed from CNT jurisdiction to the Provincial 
Courts because the amount of drugs taken from the samples is less than that required for 
the CNT to have jurisdiction for prosecuting the case.108  A CNT judge has confirmed that 
‘sometimes we have to send cases back to the provincial courts because the drug amount 
is too small.’109 It is the experience of the same judge that ‘the prosecutors are good at 
applying the law but still need to try to investigate the case further. Sometimes pressure is 
put upon prosecutors to continue with bad cases because a senior person does not like 
the accused. The police do not send proper scene reports or information on the 
destruction of the drugs as according to the law. The police are very ignorant and lazy and 
do not care for obeying the provisions of the law.’110 In some instances also the CNPA fail 
to destroy seized drugs are not after samples have been taken, in contravention of article 
39. This may be simply because there are insufficient funds to organise a drugs burn but is 
often suspected to be the result of corruption and profiteering on the part of the police.111 
 
It is clear that problems with the capacity of the police, including the CNPA, are hampering 
the successful application of the CNL, an issue highlighted by  UNODC in 2008 report 
when it described the CNPA in general as ‘not yet a competent and independent police 
agency.’112  While the poor capacity of the police is affecting the application of the CNL, 
the same can also be said of the defence service. The CJTF in Kabul is reasonably well 
supported by capable defence lawyers approved by the Supreme Court who receive 
mentoring assistance.113 Judges presiding over cases in the CNT in Kabul are known to be 
very thorough in checking whether someone is represented and they will stop a case to 
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allow representation to be obtained if it has been requested.114 In an effort to ensure 
availability of defence representation some NGO’s based in Kabul provide defence 
lawyers, operating a system similar to a duty solicitor referral scheme, so that there is a 
defence counsel on duty each night who can dispense advice and offer to represent a 
defendant charged with a CNL offence. The CJTF also endeavours to make a telephone 
available to suspects when they are brought into custody in Kabul in order that they can 
call a defence lawyer.115 However, this extent to which this service is available, particularly 
during the night, is questionable.116  
 
Because of these practices it is likely to be the case that there are more defence lawyers 
available to represent defendants involved in drugs cases under the jurisdiction of the CNT 
than there are available to suspects in other criminal offences outside CNT jurisdiction. 
According to a senior prosecution adviser, ‘you would probably see more defence lawyers 
in the drugs cases than you would elsewhere.’117 Nevertheless, in spite of these efforts, 
approximately 30% of cases listed for hearing at the CNT are adjourned because defence 
lawyers have failed to attend to represent their clients, contributing to a chronic backlog of 
cases and lengthening the period of time that defendants have to remain in prison awaiting 
trial.118 This backlog is often exacerbated by the prison department in Kabul neglecting to 
produce defendants for hearing, the net result of which is that only about one third of listed 
cases at the Tribunals in Kabul proceed to hearing.  
 
The delays to proceedings caused by the unavailability of defence practitioners, or indeed 
by the failure of the prison service to produce parties for trial, may result in worrying 
breaches of fundamental rights to persons deprived of their liberty which are enshrined in 
international law to which Afghanistan is a signatory which provide that an accused should 
be entitled to a trial within a reasonable period of time119 and that criminal trials should be 
held without undue delay.120 Such delays to the trial process also run contrary to Islamic 
law which acknowledges the right of an accused to a trial without undue delay.121 
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5.4.2. The extent to which the CNL is considered meaningful and appropriate 
The established legal order in terms of counter-narcotics criminal justice in Afghanistan 
has been influenced by an eclectic mix of customary practices, religious and positive state 
law. As a consequence of the historically tenuous reach of the Afghan state religious and 
customary practices are more influential than state legislation in shaping the established 
legal order and local attitudes towards drugs. Therefore, the extent to which the provisions 
of the CNL are compatible with customary and religious approaches towards narcotics is 
significant in determining its potential for being welcomed as meaningful and appropriate 
by the local or indeed the legal population.  
 
Customary and religious practices appear to be characterised by an ambivalent mixture of 
prohibition and toleration. According to MacDonald ‘both opium and hashish are generally 
tolerated by Afghans but the attitudes towards them are not written down in any way. 
There is quite a liberal attitude towards it.’122 In some northern provinces opium use is 
considered to be an integral aspect of social existence and an acceptable form of 
medication and, indeed, child-care.123 According to Lau at the customary level ‘the use of 
drugs is strongly condemned but no one has the right to take steps against, or even 
question, a person accused of using drugs.’124 Under Islamic principles opium cultivation 
has been haram (forbidden) while also subject to an agricultural tax (ushur) imposed by 
mullahs, allowing for interpretation by farmers as religious toleration.125  
 
It is noticeable that the limitations that the CNL places on judicial decision-making as 
regards sentencing are similar to the simplified rules for sentencing for Shari’a hudud 
offences which are prescriptive and allow no discretion concerning punishment for an 
offence provided strict evidential requirements have been fulfilled. To that extent there is 
some degree of compatibility between the CNL and Shari’a. Nevertheless, the CNL’s lack 
of tolerance towards drug cultivation, use, production and trafficking together with its 
strong emphasis on punishment as opposed to rehabilitation are generally incompatible 
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with customary and religious attitudes towards narcotics which continues to influence 
approximately 80% of the population. Therefore, the CNL is unlikely to be considered 
meaningful and appropriate by the vast majority of the population who continue to refer to 
Islamic and customary practices rather than those imposed by the state.  
 
According to a CNTF Judge, however, the procedures and practices laid down by the state 
and embodied in the CNL are much more appropriate for combating drug crime in 
Afghanistan than those prescribed by the country’s other legal traditions. This Judge 
asserts that ‘there is little dispute amongst the law enforcers that the only way to deal with 
the evil of drugs is through the laws. We need laws that people can understand to fight 
against the scourge of drugs.  If rule of law means everything, then the laws must be 
written down and [be] able to be understood by anyone who looks them up.’126  This 
suggests that there is a clear understanding amongst those concerned with enforcing state 
law that positive laws such as the 2005 CNL are the most appropriate and meaningful 
method by which the State can seek to combat the drugs industry. Indeed, they are more 
appropriate than reliance on customary and religious rituals and norms. According to the 
same Judge, ‘If there is a use for traditional justice, it should not be in narcotics because 
many think of drugs as a problem for foreigners. They would also be subject to pressure 
and bribery and make decisions based on what they know of the family.’127 Furthermore, 
this Judge was clear that in his view drug crime ‘should not be left in the hands of ignorant 
shurahs who make up their minds based on how they like the family of the people on 
trial.’128 He also regarded the ability to punish offenders that the law provides as a much 
more meaningful and appropriate means of combating drug crime in Afghanistan than the 
toleration and reconciliation allowed for in customary practices, commenting that ‘the 
Pashtunwali concentrates on reconciliation more than punishment which would not be 
appropriate for drugs.’129  
 
While it is probable that there is a consensus amongst law enforcement personnel that 
state law is more appropriate and meaningful for combating Afghanistan’s drug economy 
than the rules and norms provided by the country’s other legal traditions, the question 
remains whether the transplanted content of the CNL is compatible with the established 
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legal order as regards state law. This will impact on the extent to which it is likely, as a 
transplanted law, to be meaningful and appropriate to the practitioners applying it.  
 
Some of the new measures the CNL transplant instigates certainly represent diversions 
from counter-narcotics legislative norms.  Its provisions for search, seizure and covert 
surveillance and its referral of more serious drug trafficking offences to the CNT’s in Kabul, 
for example, are new to Afghan state criminal justice.130 Nevertheless, its stipulation that 
investigations, prosecutions and trials are to be conducted in accordance with the ICPC 
renders it compatible with Afghanistan’s formal civil law legal tradition.131 Furthermore, its 
objectives are broadly similar to those contained in the 2003 law, also a legal transplant, 
and it continues a tradition performed by Afghan state rulers, evident since the early 20th 
century, of reforming state criminal justice by transplanting foreign-designed law. In 
addition, the CNL’s fairly unforgiving sentencing structure is aligned with the 2003 law’s 
imposition of severe sentences to punish narcotic crime. Fundamentally, however, it is 
consistent with the 2004 Afghan Constitution which confirms that ‘the state prevents the 
production and consumption of intoxicants…[and] the production and smuggling of 
narcotics.’ 132 To a large extent then, the CNL is compatible with the established legal 
order as regards state law and while its modernising features may be inconsistent with 
previous state approaches to counter-narcotics they met a justifiable requirement for new 
investigative procedures to tackle increasingly sophisticated drug crime.  
  
This compatibility should enhance the extent to which it is considered meaningful and 
appropriate by state law enforcers. However, there is evidence that this is not the case and 
that this is impacting on the manner in which it is being applied. The robust article 16 
sentencing guidelines are regarded as problematic and inappropriate by legal personnel. 
According to a CJTF Judge the unfortunate result of article 16 is that ‘too many people 
who are arrested are at the bottom of the gangs while the big traffickers get away leaving 
poor people to spend 16 years in Pol-e-Charki prison.’133 The mandatory imposition of 
fines under the same article also appears to be regarded as inappropriate by the judiciary. 
It is rare for them to be imposed, which is perhaps not surprising, given that they are 
                                                          
130
 article 34 
131
 article 35 
132
 article 7(2)  
133
 CJTF Judge, note 81 
186 
 
largely disproportionate to the ability of offenders to pay them. 134  The minimum fine that 
can be imposed for possession for personal use and drug trafficking under the CNL, for 
example, is 5,000 Afghanis,135 representing more than 30% of average annual earnings.136  
 
The draconian sentencing guidelines of article 16 are not the only provisions of the CNL 
that practitioners struggle to find meaningful and appropriate for counter-narcotic crime. A 
former prosecutions caseworker adviser for the CJTF has observed that Judges at the 
CNT often rely on their own intuition instead.137  At one trial 5 suspects were defending 
charges of possession under article 16. They had been stopped with a lorry containing 50 
kilos of heroin and were facing life imprisonment if found guilty. Whereas a similar case in 
the UK might be expected to take a number weeks or months to complete, this trial was 
concluded within only 40 minutes. Three of the defendant’s lawyers did not bother to 
attend court and sent their client’s defences to the Court in writing. The Judge’s were 
prepared to accept this and reach a decision on the evidence available to them.138 This 
case is not unique. At another trial in November 2009 a panel of three Judges sentenced 
five people to a total of 55 years in prison following an investigation lasting more than six 
months which included telephone intercepts and forensic reports and a hearing lasting 
merely two hours in which they accepted only the opening statements from lawyers 
present and failed to allow for the cross examination of witnesses. The verdict was 
recorded the day after the trial without calling the Court into session.139 Ruhullah Qarizada, 
President of AIBA, has also reported unsuccessfully defending a client at the CNT who 
was wrongly sentenced to 16 years in prison due to mistaken identity. Qarizada ‘brought 
50 people from [the accused’s] village, the mullah, the district governor and five members 
of parliament who all said he was Mahmood, not Ahmad. One policeman who arrested him 
said he’d heard his mother call him Ahmad, so the Judge gave him 16 years in prison.’140  
 
An Afghan defence expert based in Kabul has confirmed that the Judges at both the CNT 
and the provincial courts presiding over drugs cases ‘do not follow the law. They do not 
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use the CN law. They do what they want.’141 He claimed that ‘the judges just ignore the 
evidence, they don’t care…for example, when they arrest a person and find 2 kilos of 
drugs at the time of the search of his home, they sentence him on the basis that they 
found 10 kilos of drugs at his home. They do not consider the evidence.’142 In a further 
interview he stated that ‘there was a case involving 50 kilos of sugar found at a house. A 
man was arrested and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment on the basis that it was 50 
kilos of heroin.’143 This suggests that Judges are deliberately ignoring the provisions set 
down in the CNL 2005. According to one international expert the problem with the law is 
that it is ‘counter cultural’ for practitioners and that in relation to its application by judges 
and prosecutors ‘you are trying to introduce [the 2005 CNL] but they just don’t understand 
it as it goes against everything that they are used to.’144  
 
Judges, it would appear, are not properly applying the law because they do not consider it 
to be culturally meaningful and appropriate. This is also the case with respect to police and 
prosecutors. Part of the rationale behind establishing the CJTF was that it would enhance 
the prosecution of drug cases by bringing the police and prosecution together so that they 
could work as an effective team to investigate and prosecute cases properly. In practice, 
however, it has been very difficult trying to foster a working relationship between the 
prosecutors and the police.145 The police may conduct initial investigations and refer cases 
to prosecutors within the time limits set down by the law, but they will often do this 
irrespective of the state of the evidence that has been gathered and whether or not it was 
obtained in compliance with the provisions of the CNL. According to a prosecution 
casework adviser interviewed in 2008, the ‘police do not understand that they need to give 
a caution,’ which he surmised was due to a ‘cultural’ lack of an acceptance that it should 
be required.146 Moreover, a 2008 UNODC report noted that ‘many CNPA officers do not 
fully understand the concept of intelligence gathering, accurate recording and analysis and 
referral to other units and agencies.’ 147  It concludes that the proper recording and 
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gathering of intelligence by law enforcement personnel is often frustrated ‘due to cultural 
reasons.’148  
 
An international prosecution mentor interviewed in 2008 confirmed that if the prosecution 
discover a break in the evidential chain which may be fatal to the prospects of a successful 
prosecution they are often reluctant to refer the matter back to the police for further 
investigation. 149  At the same time, the police are unenthusiastic about receiving 
instructions from prosecutors about how to conduct their investigations. According to a 
former member of the UK Drugs Team ‘it is very hard to break down the barrier between 
the two. There is a constant… cultural conflict…where the police and prosecutors work 
together.’ 150  Another international expert notes that at the CJTF ‘the police and 
prosecutors just do not get on at all and the prosecutors, once they get [a case] don’t 
actually refer it back to the police.’ 151  He concludes that ‘so few cases are actually 
investigated properly [because] it is going against all sorts of cultural norms for the 
Afghans.’152 The same expert notes that ‘from the judges down, they just don’t understand 
what the law is there for and how to use it. It is contrary to everything they have done in 
the past.’153 
 
What can be concluded from these findings? It is probably fair to say that the extent to 
which the CNL is likely to be considered meaningful and appropriate to Afghans is directly 
associated with the reach of the formal system of justice.  While the reach of the formal 
system remains limited to 10-15% of the population, only the same percentage of the 
population are likely to potentially regard the CNL as meaningful and appropriate for 
dealing with drug use, cultivation, production and trafficking in Afghanistan. For the 
majority of the population for whom Islamic and customary approaches continue to have 
more resonance than legislative rules imposed by the state, the CNL has, therefore, 
limited meaning. Indeed, an international expert confirmed that ‘nationally, it is not known 
by many people.’154 The punitive nature of the CNL, furthermore, may also be regarded as 
incompatible with customary and religious tolerance towards narcotics, and their emphasis 
on reconciliation and rehabilitation. This may adversely influence the potential for the CNL 
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to be considered meaningful and appropriate to the sections of the population who refer to 
Islamic and customary practices.  
 
Whilst acknowledging these problems, the CNL is largely consistent with the established 
legal order represented by formal state law. While this augers well for its potential for being 
considered meaningful and appropriate by Afghan legal practitioners and law enforcement 
agents, evidence suggests that on the contrary some police officers, prosecutors, defence 
lawyers and Judges struggle to apply the transplanted content of the law because they are 
‘counter cultural’, removed from their experience of the established legal order and the 
norms and rituals which they might associate with counter-narcotic justice.155  While this 
continues to be the case, it is likely to impair the application of the CNL and the potential 
for its acceptance as a legal transplant. According to an international Drugs and 
Development Adviser the CNL ‘goes against their [legal actors] understanding of what is 
important and meaningful.’156  
 
 
5.4.3 CNL: The motivations for legal transplantation and their impact on its 
reception 
There were significant international as well as domestic motivations for a new CNL in 2005. 
At the international level, the vast majority of opium being produced in Afghanistan was for 
consumption abroad at various American, European and Asian destinations for which the 
return of an opium-driven economy in the aftermath of the international intervention in 
2001 had serious negative ramifications. Afghan poppy fields became the fastest-growing 
source of heroin in the United States. 157  Heroin-related death rates in Los Angeles 
increased by 75% between 2002 and 2005 and the overall US market for Afghan heroin 
doubled between 2001 and 2004.158 Beyond the US, in Europe and Asia, according to the 
2005 World Drug Report, opiates ‘continued to be the main problem drug, accounting for 
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62% of all treatment demand.’159 In addition, the UK was under pressure to produce and 
implement a cohesive counter-narcotics strategy to honour its lead nation role and to add 
justification to its continued military involvement in Afghanistan since 2001, the result of 
national self-interest in disrupting at source the importation of heroin into Britain.160  The 
UK and her international partners were keen to prompt the Afghan government to adopt a 
more proactive counter-narcotic strategy, now embodied in the Implementation Plan, the 
creation of the CJTF and the new centralised courts and which would be complemented by 
a new CNL. According to the former Head of the Rule of Law team at the British Embassy 
in Kabul in 2005: 
 ‘the decision that was made in consultation with the Afghan government was   
 that we would have a Central Tribunal and a Task Force to look at the drugs   
 issue because in great parts of the country the government [did] not have   
 reach. It did not have a formal justice system that was working. There were   
 some areas where there were no judges and no prosecutors and because of   
 the scale of the drugs problem it was felt necessary to have some sort of   
 centralised control over the Afghan side with international mentors.’161 
 
On the domestic front, there was a political awareness at government level that new 
initiatives and procedures would be required to combat drug crime and opium 
production.162 Without these measures opium cultivation, production and trafficking would 
remain a threat to the security of the country, represented by warlords, extremist terrorist 
groups and the emerging Taliban, all of whom were continuing to profit from the industry. 
At the government level also, there would certainly have been an awareness of the need 
to co-operate with international requirements for imposing new counter-narcotics 
measures in order to ensure continued financial support and the prospect of new funding 
pledges. According to an international expert interviewed for this research ‘for central 
institutions, what it is more relevant is that this [the CNL] has granted new pledges and 
other financial commitments…this is what does really matter.’163  
 
President Karzai, who passed the CNL by decree without parliamentary approval, may 
well have been motivated to introduce a new CNL primarily to appease and maintain 
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working relations with important international sponsors of the new administration, and 
particularly the US and the UK. The dependence on international assistance is a common 
occurrence for new governments installed in states seeking to emerge from conflict intent 
on enhancing rule of law. However, this dependence can create an unequal working 
relationship between local officials and international actors which can translate into 
international control of legislative reform, conducted by legal transplantation. This appears 
to have been the case with regard to the CNL. It was drafted principally by officials from 
the UK and the US who, in a similar vein to criminal justice reform programmes in East 
Timor and Kosovo, chose to rely on legal transplantation as a means for promoting legal 
change.  
 
Developing the CNL by legal transplantation would mean that it could be drafted quickly, 
which was considered by the international donors assisting the Afghan government in 
counter narcotic policy-making to be a priority. The former Head of the UK Rule of Law 
team confirmed that ‘in order to deal with the drugs problem, which was an immediate 
threat to security and stability in the country, something needed to be fast-tracked in order 
to allow that to happen. So essentially a small criminal justice system was set up to deal 
with counter-narcotics.’164 
 
In addition to these considerations it seems clear that a key motivation behind the decision 
by international actors to transplant new law to reform Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics 
legislative framework was that of modernisation. There was a consensus amongst 
international agencies by 2004 that the 2003 law required revision.165 According to one 
report although the 2003 law had been ‘a major step forward compared to previous 
legislation…it did not address the ‘working needs’ of drug law enforcement officials.’166 It 
was intended that these needs would be met by modern investigative and counter 
surveillance techniques provided for in the 2005 law and designed to complement the new 
counter-narcotics strategy, enabling end-to-end centralised control of more serious drug 
trafficking cases. According to the former head of the UK Rule of Law team: 
  
‘Life had moved on and Afghan law had not. Under the formal system what 
they were doing was going back to their Criminal Procedure Code of the 
mid-to-early 1970’s. The world had obviously moved on tremendously since 
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then. So there were some elements of drug law enforcement and criminal 
justice that we know about in the outside world that (a) [the Afghans] had 
not experienced and (b) that had not been around when those laws were 
passed. If you go back to the Afghan law it simply did not have the tools in it 
to deal with the sophistication of the crime that now existed.’167  
 
By modernising the counter-narcotics law, Afghanistan’s international partners sought to 
improve the country’s criminal law framework and enhance the potential for establishing 
rule of law. They were also, however, motivated by the concerns of their own domestic and 
foreign policies, which were intent on key issues such as promoting stabilisation in central 
Asia, developing counter–terrorism strategies and reducing the domestic importation of 
Afghan opiates. In seeking to meet both Afghan criminal justice and their own domestic 
needs the international drafters of the CNL engaged in a policy of modernisation by 
transplantation. However, in transplanting foreign legal concepts it resulted in a means of 
reform perhaps more concerned with conformity to international standards than with 
Afghanistan’s dominant legal traditions. According to an International Drugs and 
Development advisor, ‘the big thing from the international[s] is that…they want something 
sophisticated that mirrors their own and covers all aspects and…meets international 
conventions requirements. However, [the CNL] does not really show appreciation of 
Afghan society and tribal norms.’168 As noted earlier, this was a form of modernisation 
which although compatible with Afghan state law was largely incompatible with customary 
and religious approaches to counter-narcotics and therefore unlikely to appeal to the 
majority of the nation. This has implications for the potential acceptance of the CNL and its 
potential for achieving its objectives. It is difficult to assess whether the CNL is promoting 
local antipathy towards the Afghan government but there is evidence that it is disliked and 
that its objectives are viewed by certain sections of the Afghan population as disconnected 
from the national consciousness. An international expert confirms that the Afghan 
‘parliament does not like the 2005 law because it was brought in by Presidential decree’169 
and a CNT Judge has commented that ‘many think of drugs as a problem for foreigners’170 
rather than for Afghans. The former head of the UK Rule of Law team who was based in 
Kabul between 2005 and 2007 claims that the ‘impression from the Afghan side is that it is 
foreign-imposed and they would probably say that it is more US-imposed perhaps because 
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the US were more involved at the end point [of the drafting]. They feel that it is more 
international than Afghan.’171 
Reforms such as the CNL, motivated by modernisation and instigated by means of 
transplantation do not come with a guarantee of success. With the armies of the countries 
who helped to draft the law still present in the country and engaged in supervising the 
enforcement of the law it may also be regarded with scepticism as an externally-designed 
law intent on serving foreign interests, which may undermine its potential for being 
properly applied and accepted. It has been noted previously that modernising legal reform 
lacking the endorsement of nationalism is likely to lack legitimacy and struggle to be 
accepted by the local population. Furthermore, historical analysis of criminal justice reform 
in Afghanistan reveals that attempts by previous Afghan rulers to impose modernised state 
justice mechanisms on the rural population have not only failed but have also provoked 
considerable resentment towards the Afghan state.  
 
 
5.4.4 The extent to which the CNL has achieved its objectives 
The CNL 2005 has 7 stated objectives. It was designed to prevent the cultivation of 
specified illicit narcotic drugs172 and prescribe penalties for, amongst other activities, their 
illegal cultivation, production and trafficking.173 It also seeks to regulate and control the 
production and processing of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substance and chemical 
precursors174 and to coordinate and monitor the government’s counter-narcotics activities, 
policies and programmes.175 In addition the CNL aims to encourage the cultivation of licit 
crops, 176  establish treatment, rehabilitation and harm reduction services 177  and attract 
national and international assistance programmes in the fight against illicit narcotic 
cultivation, production and trafficking.178 
 
The basis of the law, affirmed in article 1, and arguably its main objective, is to provide the 
Afghan state with a legal framework for preventing the cultivation and trafficking of illicit 
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narcotic drugs, particularly opium poppy. During the period since it has been in force, 
however, drug production, cultivation and trafficking have continued to be conducted on an 
enormous scale and those profiting from the trade have been able to operate with 
apparent impunity. The annual levels of cultivation and production of opium poppy in each 
of the years since the law was passed in 2005 up to 2008 exceeded those of any of the 
previous years to 1994.179 Indeed, the area cultivated and the amount of opium produced 
in the three years from 2006 to 2008 was more than that produced and cultivated during 
the preceding 6-year period from 2000 to 2006.180 In 2007 193,000 hectares of opium 
poppy were cultivated, more than at any other time in the recorded history of poppy 
cultivation and production in Afghanistan. 181  At the time of the law’s introduction 
Afghanistan accounted for 89% of global opium production. By 2008 it had increased to 
96%182 and it has remained at more than 90% since 2006.183 
 
There has, nevertheless, been some recent success in reducing opium cultivation. 
Nangarhar, the second highest opium-producing province in 2007, was declared to be 
poppy free by 2008. A 2010 report notes a 33% drop in cultivation over the previous 2 
years.184 Furthermore, the number of opium-free provinces in Afghanistan increased from 
6 in 2006 to 25 by 2010.185  
 
It is difficult to fully assess the effect of the CNL on opium cultivation and whether 
production might not have increased more without it or, indeed, whether any of the recent 
inroads into poppy cultivation owe anything to its application and enforcement. A 2008 
UNODC report suggested that recent poppy reduction was the result of ‘good local 
leadership and bad weather,’186 asserting that the impact of law enforcement and criminal 
justice initiatives on the reduction of poppy cultivation in 2008 had been negligible 
compared to that of religious and customary influences. It concluded that ‘religious 
leaders, elders and shura deserve credit for becoming increasingly effective in convincing 
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farmers not to grow opium, not least because it is against Islam’ and that counter-narcotic 
measures to build integrity and justice and ensure ‘good governance, efficient 
administration and honest judiciary…have yet to gain momentum.’ 187  A 2010 report 
maintained that market forces played the principal role in deterring farmers from opium 
cultivation and that in the south-western regions, where most of the country’s opium is 
grown, low prices and low yields were the main reasons for farmers refraining from 
growing opium.188 On the other hand, the same report notes that in the north-western 
provinces 61% of farmers refrained from growing opium in 2010 ‘because it is illegal,’189 so 
there is some indication that the legal framework established by the 2005 CNL is 
becoming increasingly recognised among the rural population in more stable provinces.190 
There is, then, some evidence of the law achieving its objective of preventing poppy 
cultivation, although this is largely influenced by varying degrees of regional security.  
 
There is also evidence that the legal framework set up as a result of the 2005 CNL has 
achieved some creditable success in preventing drug trafficking. Drug traffickers have 
been successfully arrested, prosecuted by the CJTF and convicted at the central courts. 
Initially the CNT got off to a slow start when it was established. By April 2007 the Primary 
Court had received 42 cases but had only reached verdicts in 2 of them and the Appeal 
Court had received 60 cases but had failed to reach any decisions at all.191 However, there 
has been a rapid increase in case turnover and conviction since then and for the 3-year 
period between May 2005 and June 2008 the CJTF prosecuted 1,486 cases, resulting in 
the conviction of 587 defendants, 181 acquittals and the referral of 46 people to treatment 
centres. In the same period the CJTF reviewed 890 cases from other courts in Afghanistan 
resulting in the conviction of a further 968 individuals. By June 2008 a total of 1555 people 
had been convicted at the CNT for drug-related offences. 192  As a result of these 
encouraging statistics the Afghan Attorney-General announced in December 2008 that the 
‘CJTF has had an excellent and successful performance towards disrupting the narcotics 
trade and bringing drug traffickers to justice.’193 The successful arrest and conviction of 
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drug traffickers continue. In 2009 278 cases were heard at the Primary Court and 299 
defendants were convicted, representing an 89% conviction rate.194 Between March 2009 
and March 2010, the CJTF convicted a further 599 drug-traffickers. 195  A further 155 
convictions were secured in the first quarter of the Islamic year 1389 (March 2010-March 
2011).196 The current conviction rate is 96%.197  
 
Undoubtedly, then, some progress has been made with regard to the CNL meeting its 
objective of preventing drug trafficking. Nevertheless, the positive achievements of the 
CJTF are tempered by the fact that the vast majority of the cases that it processes concern 
couriers at the bottom end of the trafficking industry rather than the controllers of the drug 
trafficking networks who are the priority targets.198 The first key priority of the government’s 
2006 NDCS was to disrupt ‘the trafficking networks’ by ‘targeting traffickers and their 
backers.’199 There have been some occasional successes. According to the CJTF in 2009 
‘the number of cases involving middle or high-value targets ha[d] increased by over 300 
percent in the last year to reach 10 percent of the total number of cases.’200 Between 
March 2008 and February 2009 the CJTF successfully convicted 26 medium-value targets, 
classified as those people directly above the couriers in drug networks.201 This compares 
with 13 convictions of similar offenders in the previous 12 months.202 Furthermore, Haji 
Abdullah, thought to be in charge of the country’s third biggest drugs network, was 
convicted in 2009 following the submission of telephone intercept evidence, permitted 
under the CNL.203 Another leading figure in the drugs trade in Afghanistan, Haji Rashid, 
was recently convicted in the Appeal Court following an appeal for which he received a 20-
year sentence and a US$10 million fine. 204  Another case involving a high-level drug 
trafficker was before the Courts in February 2010.205 According to the CJTF these cases 
                                                          
194
 CJTF statistics available at http://www.cjtf.gov.af/  
195
 Motawekel, K.R., Year 1388 ended with the convictions of 599 drug traffickers, CJTF (05 April 2010) 
available at  http://www.cjtf.gov.af/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50%3Ayear-1389--
599&catid=13%Atopics&lang=en  
196
 CJTF statistics, note 194 
197
 interview, senior member of Rule of Law team, ADIDU, London 31.03.2011  
198
 interview, note 45. According to his expert the CJTF is concerned ‘largely with low level cases and there is 
not much movement up the chain from that.’ 
199
 NDCS, note 34, p. 18 
200
 UNODC, note 284, chapter 3, p.140 
201
 interview, note 67 
202
 ibid 
203
 Boone, J. in ‘Afghan Opium Baron Gets 20 Years as UK Anti-Narcotics Strategy Pays Off,’ Guardian 
(11.08.2009) available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/11/afghan-opium-baron-convicted 
204
 interview, senior Rule of Law officer, ADIDU 09.02.2010. She could not comment on the nature of the case 
on the basis that it was sub judice. 
205
 ibid 
197 
 
demonstrate that equipped with the legal tools provided by the CNL ‘the Afghan 
government can now disrupt major networks.’206 Progress has been made, but it is slow. 
Abdullah and Rashid represent the first ‘high value’ targets successfully prosecuted under 
the CNL since its enactment 6 years ago.207  
 
In spite of these successes, the percentage of cases successfully prosecuted concerning 
medium to high-level targets is, in reality, minimal, given that there are estimated to be 
between 800-900 mid and high-level traffickers in Afghanistan.208 Furthermore, there is 
also some concern amongst international observers that the number of cases that the 
CJTF receives has plateaued. It currently processes and prosecutes on average 
approximately 30 cases a month.209 In the 10-month period from March 2008 to January 
2009, the CJTF dealt with 334 cases and a total of 370 defendants.210 Between March 
2009 and March 2010 the CJTF received 395 cases.211  Given the size of the opium 
economy in Afghanistan – estimated to be worth $2.4 billion a year212 - it would not be 
unreasonable to expect the CJTF to receive and prosecute substantially more drug cases 
falling under the jurisdiction of the CNL and indeed, more cases involving higher-end drug 
traffickers. In fact, according to UNODC ‘the impact [of the CNL] on major drug traffickers 
and organised criminal groups has been limited and the seizures have been small 
compared with the vast amount of drugs produced.’213  
 
The CNL also included an objective to establish detoxification, treatment, rehabilitation and 
harm reduction services for drug dependent individuals.214 In conjunction with this, article 
27 provides that addicts may be referred to detoxification or drug treatment centres 
following medical examination. While the intent of the CNL was to treat drug addiction and 
encourage the reintegration of drug users back into society the prospect of successful 
rehabilitation following treatment is unlikely given a lack of social reintegration, aftercare 
measures and education programmes, which are not required to be provided by the law.215  
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There are estimated to be more than a million drug users in Afghanistan and drug 
dependency is predicted to continue to increase. 216  Afghans are more vulnerable to 
becoming addicts because of the continuing conflict following 25 years of war, social and 
economic disruption and resulting chronic mental health problems of its population.217 It is 
arguable, ironically, that the CNL actually contributes to Afghanistan’s drug addiction crisis 
as the majority of the country’s addicts start their drug habits in prison and the law’s tough 
sentencing guidelines result in most drug offenders being punished by imprisonment. And 
so, according to UNODC, ‘the CNL represents a prescription to ensure an ever increasing 
prison population and an ever increasing number of drug addicts.’218  
 
Some progress has been made in establishing drug treatment facilities. In 2002 there were 
only 2 drug treatment, rehabilitation and harm reduction services in the country.219 By 2009 
this had increased to 39, offering 495 residential places.220 The net result, however, is that 
less than 0.25% of Afghanistan’s drug users can be treated each year with the current 
treatment amenities available. 221  There remains, then, a huge gap between treatment 
demand and provision and the objectives of the CNL to ensure the provision of appropriate 
treatment services, the reintegration of drug users back into society and the reduction of 
drug dependency are not being met. 
 
The CNL also aims to prevent the trafficking of chemical precursors used in the refinement 
of morphine to heroin222 and to attract international cooperation and assistance to combat 
precursors and narcotic trafficking.223 These objectives build on commitments expressed 
by the international community at a conference in Paris in 2003 to share responsibility for 
combating opiates trafficking from Afghanistan, 224   later reiterated at a follow-up 
conference in Moscow in June 2006. The resulting ‘Moscow Declaration’ led to the 
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establishment of cross-border consultative groups designed to share counter-narcotic data 
and coordinate technical assistance relating to the trafficking of opiates from Afghanistan 
in order to enhance trafficking prevention. As part of this process a consensus was 
reached that more attention should be paid to preventing the flow of chemical precursors 
into Afghanistan, 225  as a result of which a Targeted Anti-Trafficking Regional 
Communication, Expertise, Training (TARCET) initiative was launched under UNODC 
guidance aimed at targeting precursors used in the manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan. 
In addition, a UN Security Council resolution passed on 11 June 2008 called on Member 
States to step up their efforts to stop precursors being smuggled into the country.226  
 
Following increased cooperation between member states and as a result of joint 
operations by countries within the framework of the Paris Pact and the Moscow 
Declaration successful seizures of precursors have been reported. Operation TARCET 
was responsible for the seizure of 47 metric tons of precursors in Afghanistan and its 
neighbouring countries.227 It is doubtful whether these seizures would have taken place 
without the international assistance resulting from the Paris and Moscow conferences. Nor 
is it likely that the international community would be so forthcoming in lending assistance 
of this nature unless Afghanistan had a law such as the CNL 2005 criminalizing drug and 
chemical precursor trafficking, providing internationally approved classification and 
regulation of precursors and narcotic drugs and equipping enforcement agents with more 
modern counter-surveillance measures. To that extent it has had some success in meeting 
its objective of preventing the trafficking of precursors.228 The same might also be said in 
relation to its objective of attracting international cooperation and assistance. The UK 
alone spent £290 million between 2005 and 2008 supporting a number of counter-
narcotics measures229  and committed $US20 million between 2004 and 2011 specifically 
for the CJTF.230 
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These advances have not been shared in relation to the CNL’s objective to coordinate, 
monitor and evaluate the counter-narcotics activities of the Afghan government which is 
the provenance of the MCN. The Ministry consists of a number of departments set up in 
thematic lines to compliment the 8 pillars of activity under the NDCS 2006 and 6 working 
groups have been established to analyse the effect of counter-narcotic measures in 
relation to each pillar activity. It has, however, been described by an international expert as 
‘a huge mess.’231 Its predecessor, the Counter Narcotics Directorate, had been reviewed in 
2003-2004 and it had been recommended at that stage that it would be more effective in 
carrying out its remit of monitoring counter narcotics policy and strategy if it was made 
smaller and staffed with better quality people with higher salaries. Rather than following 
this recommendation, however, the Afghan government and the UK were culpable of 
creating a new Ministry that employed too many people, most of whom were on small 
salaries and incapable of doing their jobs.232 
 
It is also the case that there is very little communication between the various departments 
who tend to focus only on their own areas of responsibility. UNODC found counter-
narcotics law enforcement in 2008 to be hindered by a ‘lack of trust between the various 
ministries [that] hinders the sharing of information.’233 In June 2009 an international expert 
maintained that ‘the problem was and still is that the various departments are too territorial 
and just concerned with protecting their own empires and areas of responsibility.’234 In an 
effort to improve the capacity of the Ministry the UK has funded a £12.5 million project 
deploying task forces comprised of experts from the different areas with which the Ministry 
is supposed to be concerned which provide technical assistance to staff involved in the 
various pillar activity departments. In spite of these efforts, while the Ministry remains 
functional, it is inefficient and viewed with some distrust by the international community.235 
It is not effectively co-ordinating the government’s counter narcotic activities. Nor is it 
properly evaluating the implementation of the NDCS. In short, the Ministry is failing to carry 
out its mandate as set out in article 52 CNL 2005. It is worrying indeed that there is no 
competent state institution capable of evaluating national counter-narcotics strategies, 
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including those for legislative reform, in a  country that continues to dominate world illicit 
opium exportation.  
 
Conclusion  
There are certainly some positive points to note in relation to the CNL. Its transplanted 
provisions have been complimented by a CNT Judge who has described it as a ‘good law 
in that it is straight-forward and easy to understand.’236 Blanchard argues that it ‘clarifies 
administrative authorities for counter narcotics policy and establishes clear procedures for 
investigating and prosecuting major drug offences.’237  Some of its provisions are well 
drafted and it provides a comprehensive classification of narcotics in line with international 
conventions. There were also entirely understandable reasons for updating the 2003 law 
and introducing new investigative techniques to tackle increasingly sophisticated trans-
national drug trafficking crime. Furthermore, the CNL succeeded in establishing a new 
legal framework which has helped to secure the conviction of medium and high-level 
traffickers.  
 
Nevertheless, applying the evaluative test proposed in this thesis, the CNL has not been a 
successful legal transplant. The application of the law has proved to be problematic. Its 
tough sentencing regime emphasises the punishment of offenders rather than 
rehabilitation and fails to allow sufficient judicial sentencing discretion to enable 
appropriate proportionality between offences committed and the penalties that should be 
imposed. The result is that in many cases low-level couriers and drug users receive long-
term prison sentences, with no prospect of parole, home leave or social rehabilitation and 
are incarcerated in prisons where drugs are readily available, increasing the risk of drug 
addiction. The drafters of the law failed to differentiate between low-level and medium to 
high-level drug offenders and prescribe appropriate penalties for each. On this note, 
UNODC has recommended an urgent need to reassess the drugs policy in Afghanistan 
and suggested that ‘an approach which emphasises treatment and social reintegration of 
[low level drug traffickers and users], with hard penalties for [medium and high-level 
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traffickers] would appear to be a much more effective long-term strategy than the punitive 
policies which have recently been introduced.’238  
 
There are also concerns that the provisions of article 41 can lead to the arrest and trial of 
innocent people, wrongly accused by drug offenders motivated by the possibility of 
reducing their sentences. In addition, the exclusive competence conferred by the CNL 
2005 on a single central narcotics tribunal for serious drug trafficking offences has created 
a number of problems. The concentration of power to institutions in Kabul increases the 
perception of a centre-instigated divide between Kabul and the provinces which can be 
counter-productive to the impact of new state law such as the CNL. Furthermore, logistical 
problems caused by the necessity of having to transfer suspects to Kabul have resulted in 
the law failing to be effectively and equally applied across the country. The feasibility of 
properly enforcing the CNL without infringing defendants’ rights of freedom from arbitrary 
detention was not considered with any degree of adequacy by the drafters of the CNL or 
the authorities involved with it before it was passed by Presidential Decree and represents 
a crass disregard for fundamental human rights. While many defendants may not actually 
be aware of the jurisprudential safeguards against arbitrary detention, lengthy and 
unauthorized pre-trial detention can be regarded as fundamentally un-Islamic and a 
violation of protections on individual’s freedom of movement provided by the Shari’a,239 
fostering antipathy towards and the central government and its perceived foreign-
influenced state laws. 
 
The acceptance of the CNL is likely also to be affected by the extent to which it is 
considered to be meaningful and appropriate by those applying it. The government’s 
October 2005 Justice for All strategy had called for new legislation to include counter-
narcotic measures that should comply with international standards and Islamic principles 
but which should also seek ways of engaging with traditional justice systems.240 Yet the 
CNL, passed 2 months later, provided no such negotiation between Afghanistan’s legal 
traditions and conformed primarily with international expectations.   
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Contrasting views on whether state legislation in the form of the CNL is the most 
appropriate means of dealing with drug production, use and cultivation in Afghanistan 
largely mirror the divisions between the legal traditions that make up Afghanistan’s 
established legal order as regards counter-narcotics criminal justice. Afghan state actors 
interviewed for this research maintained that introducing and enforcing state law in 
Afghanistan is the most appropriate means of combating the drug trade.241 However, for 
the large majority of the country who refer to religious and customary practices rather than 
those prescribed the state, the CNL has limited application or meaning. Moreover, the 
prospect of the CNL being considered meaningful and appropriate by this majority is 
reduced as a result of the incompatibility of its emphasis on punishment with customary 
and religious traditional approaches of reconciliation and tolerance. 
 
While legislation in the form of the CNL might be considered the most realistic means of 
tackling drug crime in Afghanistan amongst adherents of its formal established legal order, 
and although the CNL is mostly compatible with Afghanistan’s formal legal traditions, there 
is evidence that legal practitioners and law enforcement agents are failing to properly 
apply it precisely because they fail to find its provisions either meaningful or appropriate. 
The CJTF has experienced antipathy towards its attempts to change the established roles 
of the police and prosecutors to improve their implementation of the law because it goes 
against their cultural norms in terms of what they consider their roles should be. This can 
lead to poor investigative and prosecution practices compromising the successful 
prosecution of drugs cases.  
 
In addition, defence lawyers regularly fail to attend hearings and some Judges ignore the 
provisions of the law when reaching judgments and apply Shari’a instead.  It would appear 
that some of the transplanted provisions of the CNL are contrary to the understanding of 
many local legal practitioners of what is important and meaningful for counter narcotic 
criminal justice in Afghanistan, which impacts on their investment in the law and ultimately 
its application and potential acceptance. According to an international expert interviewed 
for this research the international actors responsible for drafting the law were aware of the 
these potential problems: 
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‘These were sort of things that we talked about at the time and what we very much 
felt at that time was [that] they won’t be able to comply with this but we shouldn’t do 
something that is the dumbed down because this is as high as they will ever go. If 
you keep the bar high then at least you give them something to move towards but 
what there hasn’t been is the sort of support to actually get it acted upon, get it 
done by everybody, understood by everybody.  It is across the board. It is from the 
judges down. They just don’t understand what the law is there for and how to use 
it…You have also got huge tribal and religious influences in there [and] they really 
don’t want to get involved in these sort of things.  They just don’t understand it.  It is 
contrary to everything they have done in the past.’242   
 
The 2005 CNL has also failed to meet its objectives of preventing poppy cultivation and 
the trafficking of narcotic drugs and chemical precursors. Some progress has certainly 
been made. With assistance from international partners, precursors bound for heroin 
producing laboratories in Afghanistan have been seized. Furthermore, the CJTF has 
prosecuted cases leading to the conviction of more than 1500 drug traffickers since it was 
established in May 2005. Medium and high-level drug traffickers have been convicted, 
their convictions made possible because of the new counter surveillance and intelligence 
gathering provisions the CNL introduced. However, the impact of these successes on the 
drug economy in Afghanistan has been minimal and the CNL 2005 has not achieved its 
goal of preventing the cultivation and trafficking of opium poppy. Cultivation and production 
levels of opium poppy in the first 4 years following the passing of the law exceeded those 
of any previous equivalent period in Afghanistan’s history. Furthermore, it has failed to 
encourage the establishment of treatment, rehabilitation and harm reduction programmes 
and by and large the MCN has failed to effectively carry out its mandate under the CNL 
2005 to monitor, coordinate and evaluate the Afghan government’s counter narcotic 
policies.  
 
Many of the problems surrounding the law relate to issues which are part of wider social 
and political dilemmas affecting general rule of law reform in Afghanistan. A CNT Judge 
confirms that ‘the problem is not with the law but with the willingness to enforce the laws 
as they are written.’243 The deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan since 2005 
affects the delivery of the counter narcotics projects.244  There are also problems with 
regard to the capacity of the police, to the extent that a 2008 UNODC report concluded 
that ‘Afghanistan has inadequate and insufficient counter narcotics law enforcement 
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capabilities to respond to the impact of the illicit drug trade.’245 Police corruption is endemic 
and is thought to be the main reason that more cases are not being received by the 
CJTF.246 A CJTF Judge who convicted a head of highway police in 2009 has commented 
that in his experience ‘often the police will let people go if they are paid enough money.’’247 
It is not only the police who are corrupt, although corruption is considered to be more 
prevalent amongst the police than in other justice departments. 248   According to the 
defence expert based in Kabul ‘there is a lot of corruption in the Counter Narcotics Courts 
amongst the Judges and the prosecutors. They do not always follow the law. They do what 
they want. There is corruption in both the provincial and the Counter Narcotics Courts.’249 
In a further interview this expert claimed that in the context of counter narcotics cases: 
 
‘The biggest people to get bribes are the police, then the Judges. Judges take 
bribes. There are two groups of Judges – one group does take bribes and the other 
does not. The police take the most bribes and let people go. Police, prosecution 
and Judges collude and get together and find a way to acquit. They will work out a 
solution for the defendant so that a case collapses or Judges are left with no 
alternative other than to acquit. The Judges who accept bribes will back each other 
up if there is any questioning about their decisions.’  
 
The Ministry of Interior has been a notable source of corruption. In 2007 it was unable to 
account for up to 30% of foreign-donated funds and was staffed by personnel, 
approximately 80% of whom were thought to be benefiting directly from the drug trade.250 
In 2008 it was estimated that between 25%-40% of all the civil servants working in the 
Afghan government were profiting from the illicit narcotic industry.251 Indeed, the CJTF has 
confirmed that between 2008 and 2009 those prosecuted under the CNL ‘have included a 
provincial deputy head of the CNPA, senior civil servants, former Russian commanders 
and officers in the ANA, ANP, NDS and the Border Police,’252 which dramatically illustrates 
the link between state corruption and the narcotics trade. This level of corruption continues 
to compromise the enforcement of the CNL, the application of which is further impeded by 
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Afghanistan’s poor travel infrastructure, insecurity and the limited reach of the state 
criminal justice system to provincial areas.  
 
While recognising this, arguably some of the problems associated with the CNL are 
attributable to the fact that it is a legal transplant. This was a legal transplant motivated by 
a modernising agenda largely devised and implemented by international actors. The 
increased involvement of international actors in drafting the law undoubtedly led to the law 
becoming a legal transplant. But it also increases the potential for it to be perceived 
negatively as a ‘foreign law.’ The international countries responsible for drafting it were not 
only motivated by a requirement to fulfil their responsibilities to assist in the development 
of rule of law in Afghanistan. They were also concerned with protecting their own domestic 
interests best served by disrupting the Afghan opium economy. To do this they controlled 
the drafting process and the content of the law, which introduced more modern 
investigative techniques that conformed with westernised ideals for counter-narcotics 
legislation. Although it was compatible with the Afghan civil law tradition and the Afghan 
Constitution, it was inconsistent with Afghanistan’s more dominant customary and religious 
legal traditions and approaches to narcotics. It is likely that this has adversely affected the 
extent to which legal practitioners find the law meaningful and appropriate, impairing the 
acceptance of the law. A more tolerant approach to drug offending advocating 
rehabilitation, allowing for non-custodial sentencing and distinguishing between low-level 
and medium to high-level offenders may have had a better prospect of acceptance. A 
defence expert interviewed in 2010 complained that the CNL ‘is very strict. It is not 
benefitting the general public. It is bad for them and the country…for couriers it is not 
right.’253  
 
It is likely also that the transplanted nature of the law, as well as continuing international 
support for enforcing it and supervising its application may well increase local suspicion 
that the CNL is nothing more than a foreign imposition. According to an international 
expert ‘the external support given to the centre (CNT) may be counterproductive in that 
these legal practices may be discredited as Western impositions.’254 While it appears that 
in fact most of the population are unaware of the law, a legacy of the lack of reach of the 
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state justice system, if it is regarded as a foreign imposition by those who are aware of it, 
this will undoubtedly have damaging repercussions in terms of its legitimacy and 
acceptance. The defence expert interviewed for this research in 2010 claimed that ‘it is a 
foreign law, paid for by the US. Local people who have a little bit of knowledge about the 
law see it as a foreign law and as very strict and not appropriate for Afghanistan.’255 
Ultimately, the CNL 2005 appears to emerge in Afghanistan as an unsuccessful foreign 
legal transplant, suggesting that it was unreasonable to develop this counter-narcotics law 
by means of legal transplantation.  
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 interview, note 143 
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6  Conclusion 
 
This study has set out to evaluate the ICPC and the CNL to determine whether it was 
reasonable for the legislators who drafted them to rely on legal transplantation in order to 
develop these laws when seeking to reform Afghanistan’s criminal law framework and 
promote rule of law. In addressing this issue it seeks to contribute to debates on both 
theoretical perspectives of legal transplants as mechanisms for legal development and 
their practical limitations in post-intervention states.  
 
As I have noted in Chapter 1, reform programmes undertaken following international 
peacekeeping operations and military interventions have reflected a consensus that 
promoting transitions from conflict to peace in post-interventionist countries is dependent 
on the establishment of the rule of law and that its development in turn requires functioning 
criminal justice systems and criminal law frameworks that comply with international 
standards of due process, fair trial and human rights.  
 
According to the UN it is during the critical periods in the aftermath of conflict that 
international legal advisors have the greatest opportunities to ‘set virtuous cycles in 
motion’1 and develop effective criminal law frameworks conducive to establishing the 
panacea of rule of law. When seeking to fulfil these opportunities they have engaged in 
extensive programmes of legislative reform and, in the process, have often resorted to 
transplanting foreign solutions.  Yet in the vital area of criminal law reform, identified by 
O’Connor, as ‘the first necessary step for post conflict states on the road towards rule of 
law and human rights,’2 what can the phenomenon of legal transplantation appropriately 
contribute? A critical issue of concern is whether legal transplants actually represent 
reasonable, effective and legitimate tools for legislative reform in these environments. 
Contrasting theoretical views on their value, feasibility and evaluation, conflicting UN 
recommendations during the last decade over their legitimacy, and a ‘rudimentary’ 
                                                 
1 UN, Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict, U.N. Doc. 
A/63/881-S/2009/304 (11.06.2009) available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNODC/GEN/NO9/367/70/PDF/N0936770.pdf?Open Element,  p.1 
2 O’Connor, note 5, chapter 1, p.527 
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understanding amongst international advisors as to their viability have not provided any 
definitive reassurance on their potential as mechanisms for affecting post-intervention 
criminal law reform.   
 
What of their potential with regard to the ICPC and the CNL, two contemporary criminal 
laws developed by legal transplantation in post-intervention Afghanistan? Was it 
reasonable for these laws to have been developed in this way and what useful theoretical 
and practical lessons can be learned from this study? An examination in Chapter 2 of the 
historical use of legal transplants as mechanisms for promoting criminal justice reform and 
the range of motivational rationales for adopting them reveals that they have practical 
significance as tools for legal development to the extent that it could be considered natural 
for legislators to rely on them and, indeed, poor practice to ignore them. It would appear, 
then, that there is every justification in post-intervention law reformers, such as those 
responsible for the ICPC and the CNL, contemplating employing the legal transplant 
mechanism to bring about legal change.  
 
Yet this ‘transplant justification’ does not translate to an easy conclusion that it must 
always be reasonable to adopt legal transplants, as evidenced by the ‘disappointing’ 
results of legal transplant projects during the law and development movement of the 
1970’s3 and other reported transplant ‘failures’ such as those that introduced plea-
bargaining in Georgia and Moldova in the early 2000’s.4 The reasonableness of developing 
a law by legal transplantation is tied to the determination of its success or failure and this 
requires the application of an evaluative test. The new and original test that I propose, 
elucidated in chapter 2, draws on both positive and socio-legal perspectives of legal 
development and suggests that the reception of legal transplants, such as the ICPC and 
the CNL, will be related to the extent to which they achieve their objectives and are 
accepted, affected in turn by the manner in which they are applied and the degree to which 
they are considered meaningful and appropriate. This test also insists that the motivations 
for relying on borrowed law as well as the identity of the motivators can affect both the 
process of making law by transplantation and its reception and it acknowledges that 
transplant reception will be conditioned by local contextual concerns. In recognition of this I 
have examined in Chapter 3 the legal traditions that shape criminal justice in Afghanistan 
                                                 
3
 Brooks, note 92, chapter 1, p.2285 
4
 Reichelt, note 119, chapter 2; Alkon, note 15, chapter 2, p.44-45 
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and the progress of and unique challenges to capacity building and reform of the state 
justice sector, which undoubtedly have resonance for the reception of the ICPC and the 
CNL. 
 
It has to be accepted that many of the problems surrounding the ICPC and the CNL are 
symptomatic of the huge challenges that the state criminal justice sector has faced since 
their inception. The poor capacity of legal personnel, the historically limited reach of the 
state system, corruption and continuing insecurity, all discussed in chapter 3, impact 
negatively on the potential success of these two laws. Perhaps when international reform 
and reconstruction efforts have had more time to ‘bed-in’ these negative effects can be 
reduced allowing for better prospects of successful transplantation. Turkey’s 
transplantation of the Swiss Civil Code was assessed as being successful, after all, some 
25 years after new legislation was enacted.5 Moreover, at the time of its introduction, 
Turkey possessed a generation of well-trained jurists. Typical of post-intervention states, 
this was far from being the case in Afghanistan when either the ICPC or the CNL was 
passed. As a UNAMA rule of law officer noted in 2007 ‘we are starting at a low point. 40% 
of judges have no legal training at all. So it will take time for the new generation to come 
through. In many respects the foundations have been laid in terms of education and it will 
take time for the newly trained generation of lawyers to come through and make a 
difference. It will take at least a decade.’6 It is likely therefore, that there will be a slower 
rate of progress in terms of legislative reform taking root in post-interventionist as opposed 
to non-conflict states, delaying the reception of any transplanted laws. According to 
Samuels: 
 
‘It is increasingly clear that a realistic timeframe for re-creating a working criminal 
justice system following serious armed conflict with formal courts, trained judges 
and a retrained police force is close to twenty-years. This is all the more true where 
the criminal justice system was never particularly strong or effective before the 
conflict, and it is even worse where new legal norms are sought to be introduced, 
or if there is little political will or weak local constituency support for the reforms.’7  
 
On this basis it is arguable that it might be more realistic to evaluate whether the ICPC and 
the CNL have been successful legal transplants in 15 years time. 
 
                                                 
5
 Beckstrom, note 83, chapter 1, p.582 
6
 interview, senior UNAMA Rule of Law officer, 17.10.2007  
7
 Samuels, note 16, chapter 1, p.18  
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While acknowledging that post-intervention environments may delay legal transplant 
reception what does this study reveal in the contemporary context of the ICPC and the 
CNL? In my view, it is clear, that on the issue of transplant justification there were 
compelling reasons for the introduction of both laws as part of the process of reforming 
Afghanistan’s criminal law framework. A new criminal procedure code was required to 
replace a 40-year old law to and remove uncertainly surrounding applicable procedures 
and a counter-narcotics law was assessed as necessary to provide more appropriate 
techniques for investigating increasingly sophisticated drug trafficking operations and 
complement the government’s 2005 Counter Narcotics Implementation Plan and the 
establishment of the CJTF and the CNT. Moreover, insomuch as new laws were deemed 
to be essential, those responsible for drafting them conformed to historical tradition when 
they decided to rely on legal transplantation as a development tool. As I have explained in 
chapter 3, since the beginning of the 20th century Afghanistan’s various rulers and regimes 
have attempted to create a functioning state criminal justice system to augment and 
uphold the philosophies upon which their rule was based, and to do this they undertook 
programmes of constitutional and legislative reform which involving extensive legal 
transplantation. Hanafi fiqh was codified and transplanted into penal law and western 
substantive and procedural laws with a civil law tradition were also borrowed and 
transplanted into new penal and procedural codes.8 Transplanted legal solutions have 
certainly, therefore, been historically instrumental to the development of Afghanistan’s 
state legal system.  
 
In addition to this, at the time that the ICPC was drafted the UN Brahimi Report was 
encouraging dependence on transplanted foreign models. Although the Rule of Law 
report, which pre-dated the CNL, offered contrasting advice, it still advocated the necessity 
of ensuring that post-intervention countries should be equipped with effective legal 
frameworks in the form of modern laws9 consistent with international human rights 
norms,10 an objective with which the use of legal transplants could assist. In the context of 
transplant justification, therefore, when the ICPC and the CNL were drafted both historical 
domestic law-making guidelines and contemporary international recommendations for 
                                                 
8
 For example Ammanullah’s 1924 Penal Code borrowed provisions from the French Penal Code, as was the 
case with the 1965 Criminal Procedure Law and the 1976 Penal Code; Vafai, note 77, chapter 3 
9
 UN, Rule of Law, note 30, chapter 1, para. 30 
10
 ibid, para 6 
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post-intervention reform would have indicated that it would be understandable to rely on 
legal transplantation to prepare these laws. 
 
What, however, of the reasonableness of developing these laws in this way, taking into 
consideration the proposed evaluative test? It must be acknowledged that there are indeed 
some successful aspects of the ICPC and the CNL which might suggest that it was 
reasonable for them to have been developed by transplantation. The ICPC provided the 
Afghanistan state justice system with a much-needed modern procedural framework for 
readily-available universal application by legal practitioners and law enforcement actors. 
Furthermore, its Italian-sourced provisions offered both a collaboration of civil and 
common law procedures not far removed from the mixed system of criminal procedure 
previously practiced under the 1965 Code and compatibility with the 2004 Constitution. 
Meanwhile, the CNL provided new techniques for investigating increasingly sophisticated 
drug trafficking operations, and it has been instrumental in securing the conviction of more 
than 1500 traffickers. In addition to this, legal transplantation has helped to ensure that the 
provisions of both laws met the imperative demand of compliance with international 
standards of human rights and due process, without which the ideal of establishing rule of 
law through law enforcement in Afghanistan would be unrealisable. 
 
In spite of these accomplishments my evaluations of the ICPC and the CNL in chapters 4 
and 5 reveal that neither can yet be considered a successful legal transplant. There have 
been significant problems with both pieces of legislation as regards their application, 
meaningfulness and objectives, many of which derive from their transplanted content. It is 
also apparent that the motivations for developing both laws by transplantation and the 
consequent process of their development have also moderated their reception.  
 
The transplanted content of the laws have certainly had implications in terms of their 
application. I have noted in chapter 4 that the ICPC fails to allow for the review of the 
legality of any arrest and detention at the pre-trial stage until the first hearing and to 
provide sufficient pre-trial alternatives to imprisonment. It also omits any reference to bail 
applications. I have argued that these omissions and procedural inadequacies in its 
transplanted content increase the potential for inconsistent application of the law and for 
the arbitrary detention of defendants. 
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The transplanted content of the CNL, discussed in Chapter 5, has also impacted on its 
application. It contains an inappropriately draconian sentencing regime with limited 
allowance for judicial discretion relative to degrees of criminal responsibility. In addition, its 
insistence on the referral of cases to Kabul has created logistical problems that increase 
the potential for inconsistent application of its provisions and the arbitrary detention of 
defendants. Moreover, its concentration of power to institutions and foreign-trained 
professionals in Kabul may exacerbate the centre-periphery divide and the antipathy 
towards the central administration and its reform efforts which have historically adversely 
affected the reach, legitimacy and reception of state laws.  
 
The transplanted content of both laws has also struggled to be considered meaningful and 
appropriate by those responsible for applying them and the Afghan public. The ICPC’s 
strengthening of the role of the prosecutor at the expense of the police in a similar vein to 
the Italian Code creates confusion and mistrust between police and prosecutors, reducing 
the effective application of the law. Furthermore, its failure to definitively replace previous 
legislation affecting criminal procedure creates uncertainty and inconsistency in 
application. With regard to the CNL, its potential for being regarded as appropriate by the 
local population has been reduced by the incompatibility of its punitive sentencing 
provisions with the tolerance and reconciliation of customary and religious approaches to 
counter narcotic crime. Moreover, the referral of criminal matters to customary and Islamic 
justice authorities and the continued application by Judges of Shari’a in both the criminal 
courts and the CNT’s since both the CNL and the ICPC were passed is indicative of their 
lack of resonance and meaning amongst local legal practitioners. Even if Tapper is correct 
in suggesting that Afghan culture is capable of absorbing new transplanted legal 
procedures, it appears that those offered by the ICPC and the CNL have failed to 
sufficiently connect to Afghan perceptions of ‘justice’ to foster the absorption that their 
draughtsmen might have hoped for. 
 
With regard to the motivations for employing legal transplants to develop these laws, it is 
apparent from this study that they were largely the result of international as opposed to 
local demand and that the actors responsible for drafting them were motivated primarily for 
reasons of expediency and modernisation to adopt legal transplants. However, these 
motivations affected the law making process in the context of these two laws, resulting in 
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transplanted law that largely ignored the vital ingredients of local participation, local 
context and the plurality of Afghanistan’s legal traditions.  
 
The necessity of quickly producing suitably ‘modern’ law resulted in transplanted laws 
prepared by international actors following minimal local participation, with damaging 
consequences. The lack of consultation with Afghan officials during the drafting of the 
ICPC created resentment in the justice institutions and rejection by the Afghan National 
Assembly.  President Karzai was nevertheless persuaded by his international partners to 
invoke his Presidential powers to issue both it and, later, the CNL to avoid delay and 
scrutiny by the Taqnin. In the case of the ICPC this was in the face of threats by the Italian 
government to withdraw funding for a number of justice projects. Such law-making 
processes can increase legitimacy-damaging local perceptions of international imposition. 
 
The requirement for expedient, modern law also encouraged the adoption of legal 
transplants in the case of the ICPC and the CNL without sufficient reference to the social, 
political and historical context of Afghanistan’s criminal justice system to test whether they 
would become or how they could be changed to become effective solutions. Indeed, the 
knowledge that the architects of the ICPC and the CNL had of Afghanistan criminal justice 
and legislative heritage is questionable,11 a point to which the MOJ’s 2005 Justice for All 
report was possibly alluding when it objected to the fact that ‘very few foreign experts 
appreciate the uniqueness of Afghan law.’12 Some historical research would have revealed 
that although positive codified state law was traditionally less significant to Afghanistan’s 
rural communities than customary and Shari’a approaches to justice,13 there have been 
periods when the centralised state criminal justice system has been accepted even by the 
rural population and that this has been the case when the state legal system has absorbed 
all the country’s legal traditions. The last legal system developed solely by the Afghans 
between 1964 to 1979, which witnessed the passing of the 1965 Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the 1976 Penal Code, was generally accepted by everyone from rural 
population to urban elite. The Court system was split between courts that applied religious 
                                                 
11
 interview, former senior Italian official 17.07.2008 who noted that Di Gennaro’s knowledge of Afghan law 
‘was very limited.’ 
12
 Ministry of Justice, Justice for All, note 204, chapter 3, p.7 
13 This was certainly recognised by international academics before the passing of the ICPC and the CNL. 
Barfield, note196, chapter 3, p.437-443; Etling, note 38, chapter 2,  p.14 
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law and those applying state law.14 Judges in primary courts would often refer matters to 
tribal village elders for resolution in accordance with customary law and incorporate their 
findings in their own formal decisions. According to Etling this period demonstrated that ‘it 
is possible to mix Islamic and secular laws within one legal system, and …such a system 
in Afghanistan increased the legal system’s legitimacy and led to wide acceptance by the 
local population.’15 This semi-secular system of justice was accepted because it allowed 
for the inclusion of all of Afghanistan’s legal traditions and for interpretation of rules and 
procedures by the legal authorities responsible in each legal tradition. Neither the 
transplanted ICPC nor the CNL, however, allowed for similar negotiations between these 
legal traditions, resulting in negative repercussions in terms of their reception.  
 
In conclusion it would appear that it was not reasonable to develop these laws by legal 
transplantation. Their creation by foreign actors, their transplanted foreign content and the 
continuing international support for enforcing them and supervising their application has 
increased their potential for being regarded as foreign impositions intent on promoting 
centralisation based on western models at the expense of local requirements. This 
perception of the laws may damage not only their potential reception but also the 
legitimacy of the central government that has introduced them.16 They may even have the 
capacity to be lethally destructive to the welfare of the central state, particularly if they are 
regarded as representing a sufficiently serous threat to the religious authority of the 
ulama.17 The real concern for the Afghan government and its international supporters is 
that if the procedures that the transplanted content of the ICPC and the CNL provide are 
abused and wrongly applied by the actors responsible for implementing them, the 
consequential injustices that are perpetrated risk increasing local dissatisfaction with the 
state justice system and the appeal of alternative justice mechanisms, including those 
offered by the Taliban. The transplanted, international design of the CNL and the ICPC 
contributes to the injustices that they can cause. According to an Afghan defence lawyer, 
with respect to the CNL ‘the judges and prosecutors get their salaries from the UK 
embassy so they just convict people [under the law] to keep them happy.’18 While these 
two laws were introduced to reform Afghanistan’s criminal law framework and promote rule 
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 ibid, p.11 
15
 ibid, p.12 
16
 Suhrke, note 42, Chapter 2,  p.1293  
17
 Ahmed, note 263, chapter 4,  p. 291 
18
 interview senior Afghan defence lawyer, 25.05.2010 
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of law, by becoming unsuccessful legal transplants applied inappropriately as vehicles for 
arbitrary arrest and detention, bribes and corruption, they create frustration and discontent 
with state criminal justice, capable of exploitation by the Taliban. To that extent, rather 
than driving justice, they can develop into catalysts for insurgency.  
 
It is inevitable that the international community will engage in further military and 
humanitarian interventions followed by post-intervention efforts to promote the rule of law 
which, given the centrality of criminal justice to rule of law development, are likely to 
require both international and domestic advisors to consider what the most effective and 
reasonable means of developing new criminal law might be. This will remain a vital issue 
as the legitimacy of future interventions and consequent legislative reform programmes 
aimed at developing criminal law frameworks will be measured against the effectiveness of 
the laws that are subsequently introduced. What practical and theoretical lessons can be 
learned from this study that may have pragmatic resonance for future post-interventionist 
legislators?  
 
On a theoretical level both laws refute Legrand’s premise that legal transplants are 
impossible as well as perspectives such as Montesquieu’s which advocate that it would 
only be un grand hazard for law to develop by legal transplantation. The CNL and the 
ICPC confirm that law can be developed in this way. In fact the development of both laws 
seems to support Watsonian optimism over the significance of the legal transplantation 
medium for promoting legal change. These legal transplants have practical utility. There is, 
however, a caveat to be applied to this assertion and that is that local contextual issues 
will impact on the success or failure of a transplanted law. As the evaluations of the ICPC 
and the CNL demonstrate, the reception of the ICPC and the CNL has been affected by 
the limited success of justice reform programmes implemented since 2001, by an 
insufficient commitment by the Afghan authorities to reform, and a failure to create a 
suitable environment in which rule of law can operate. In spite of significant international 
effort, good will and expense centred on reconstructing the state justice system genuine 
progress has been slow and difficult. Afghanistan’s state criminal justice system continues 
to be constrained by a lack of sufficiently trained or appropriately educated staff, 
insufficient numbers of Judges and defence lawyers, a poorly developed legal aid scheme, 
inadequate investigation and prosecution practices, insecurity and corruption amongst the 
police, law enforcement personnel and the judiciary. These concerns as well as a lack of 
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real commitment amongst the current administration to ensure that rule of law prevails 
have challenged the reception of these legal transplants.19  
 
The observation that local environmental issues have been vital conditioning factors for the 
reception of the ICPC and the CNL accords the views of theorists on transplant feasibility 
such as Kahn-Freund, Berkowitz and De Lisle all of whom have underlined the centrality of 
local context to the successful adoption of transplanted law. While none of their theories 
resulted from assessments of transplanted criminal law in post-intervention states they do 
in fact have resonance for legislation of this nature in these environments. The findings of 
this study accord with De Lisle’s recommendation that transplanted law has a better 
prospect of successful reception if there is a close collaborative relationship between local 
and foreign legal experts and dependence on local expertise in the drafting process.20 This 
was not the case with either the ICPC or the CNL, to their detriment. The experience of 
both laws also confirms Berkowitz’s proposition that ‘legal transplants may work if they are 
adapted or if the population is already familiar with the basic principles of these laws.’21 In 
spite of their consistency with the Constitution and with that state law civil tradition both 
laws contained procedures unfamiliar to the legal practitioners responsible for applying 
them. Familiarity can be enhanced through education and training but this is likely, 
particularly in the context of a post-intervention country such as Afghanistan, to take time. 
Without immediate familiarisation, there is always the possibility of success through 
adaptation. However, adaptation also requires time. Berkowitz’s theory was based on the 
assessment of legal transplants, the majority of which were introduced in the 19th Century, 
allowing for more than 100 years of potential adaptation. There has been some evidence 
of adaptation of the ICPC through the work of PRT’s and referral of minor criminal cases to 
jirgas/shuras in accordance with the recommendations of Wardak and the 2007 HDR. Any 
potential future adaptation of these laws will take more time and will be dependent on local 
commitment to the overall development of rule of law.22 
                                                 
19
 See Mertus, note 2, chapter 1, p. 1382; Deladda, note 218, chapter 4. Deladda comments that in 2008 ‘the 
Afghan leadership’s lack of interest in justice issues’ was affecting international reform efforts and that ‘if they 
were not sidelined altogether, the already limited number of qualified professionals within the justice institutions 
was not motivated to pursue serious reform;’ p.10. In addition, a CJTF senior prosecutions adviser interviewed 
in 2009 stated that with regards to counter narcotics and corruption he did ‘not get the feeling that there is 
much will on behalf of Afghan authorities.’  
20 DeLisle, note 26, chapter 2, p.179-308 
21
 Berkowitz et al, note 51, chapter 2, p.189; Tondini has also argued that ‘in order to generate a relatively 
strong popular demand for legal and judicial services, justice system reform has to adapt to the local conditions 
or contain principles already familiar to the local population;’ note 201, chapter 3, p.92 
22
 Carothers, note 1, chapter 1, p.96-105 
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The findings from these current evaluations of the ICPC and the CNL demonstrate that 
there is a significant inter-relationship between law and the society it serves and caution 
against Watsonian bias in favour of transplant feasibility. They should serve as a warning 
for post-interventionist law reformers facing the critical dilemma of how to appropriately 
create new criminal law to look beyond the comfort zone that Watson’s theory might offer 
them on the value of legal transplants as tools for affecting legal change and its implication 
that they need always look no further than to tried and tested models from other 
jurisdictions. In fact, Watson’s bias promotes a uniformity of decision-making for law 
reformers without due consideration of contextual issues which might detract from the 
legislation’s success.  More than this, it encourages a pre-disposition towards legal 
transplants as tools for legal change without proper recourse to relevant extraneous 
concerns. In this respect it is difficult not to agree with some of Watson’s critics who have 
suggested that his premise on legal development is too one-dimensional.23 His favouritism 
towards the transplant mechanism endorses a myopic strategy of law reform that ignores 
crucial factors such as evaluation, the impact of transplanting law on receiving jurisdictions 
and the prospects of reception.  Legal reform policy based on Watsonian perspectives on 
legal transplantation runs the risk not only of introducing law regarded by receiving 
populations as inappropriate and therefore predestined to fail, but also of provoking local 
resentment and anti-governmental sentiments,24 which are prospects of increased concern 
in more extreme reform situations, such as those related to criminal law reform and rule of 
law promotion in post-intervention states.  
 
On a practical level the following lessons emerge from the evaluations in this study of the 
ICPC and the CNL that should have relevance to law reformers engaged in criminal law 
reform in future transitional states. Firstly, there is every justification in considering that 
legal transplants can be engineers for developing criminal law frameworks in post-
intervention states. Secondly, sources for readily-available transplantation, such as the 
Model Codes for Criminal Procedure, can be useful reference points for ensuring the 
introduction of modern law that will comply with international human rights norms. 
According to a UK senior prosecutions adviser formerly based in Kabul ‘It is fantastic to be 
able to use something as a quasi-template, talk to Afghans about it and see how it 
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 Legrand, note 71, chapter 2, p. 60 
24
 Ahmed, note 17, p.291 
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interacts with the principles that they think should underpin [it].’25 However, the Model 
Codes, as their authors now acknowledge, should only be used for inspiration for 
legislative material that can then be assessed for ‘sensitivity’ rather than as tools for 
producing ‘bolt-on’ laws which ignore these issues.  
 
Thirdly, it should not be assumed that it is always reasonable to rely on legal 
transplantation to prepare post-intervention criminal law. The reasonableness of 
developing legislation in this way demands prior assessment. Legal transplants are more 
likely to be considered effective and, indeed, reasonable mechanisms for reform if they are 
employed in ways that are sensitive to the environment of the adopting country. ‘Sensitive 
transplanting’ should improve the legitimacy and reach of the resulting laws and requires 
full and proper consideration of a number of constituent issues, namely: 
 
a) an in-depth knowledge of theoretical perspectives of legal transplants, as elucidated in 
Chapter 2, which should provide a valuable insight on the legitimacy and constraints of 
legal transplants as tools for legal change and on the conditioning factors for their 
success; 
 
b) a full appreciation of the history and legal traditions of the criminal justice system of the 
adopting post-intervention country in order to determine what kind of legal changes – 
including those brought by transplantation – might be achievable and sustainable and 
how they might be supported; 
 
c) suitable reflection on the potential successful reception of the transplanted law before 
its implementation. In this respect I recommend adopting the evaluative test outlined in 
Chapter 2 to ensure advance assessment of the way in which it will be applied, 
whether it will be considered meaningful and appropriate and the potential for it 
achieving its objectives so that vital judgements can be made not only on whether the 
proposed transplanted content is appropriate but also on the critical issue of how 
institutional reform can be synergised with legal reform to facilitate the reception of the 
law. This approach sits comfortably with Stromseth’s ‘synergistic’ framework for rule of 
law development, allowing for suitable contemplation of appropriate levels of 
articulation between codified and traditional law;  
                                                 
25
 interview, UK senior prosecutions advisor, 25.06.2008 
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d) an awareness that the motivations for adopting transplants can have consequences for 
the process of their development and success. The requirement for expedient and 
modern laws calls for cautious law-making that does not ignore vital local expertise and 
consultation and that acknowledges that foreign-inspired provisions are more likely to 
have valuable local legitimacy if they resonate with local legal traditions. In this respect 
countries with plural legal traditions, such as Afghanistan, demand particular 
sensitivity;  
 
e) finally, an acknowledgement that legal transplantation lacking appropriate sensitivity in 
such countries may, as the ICPC and the CNL demonstrate, result in unsuccessful and 
potentially ‘lethal’ legal transplants that, rather than promoting justice, create injustices 
and undermine the establishment rule of law, the fundamental concern upon which 
transitions from conflict to peace and stability depend.   
 
Sensitive transplanting requires all the elements referred to in items (a) to (e) to be 
satisfied. It is proposed that post-intervention criminal law reformers should always be 
equipped with a full appreciation of the issues outlined in items (a), (d) and (e) and that 
before they embark on post-intervention law reform involving legal transplants in any 
particular country they should undertake the tasks referred to in items (b) and (c). 
Compliance with these processes will ensure a sensitive transplanting outcome.   
 
Legal transplantation is, as Twining has pointed out, ‘a pervasive aspect of legal 
experience,’26 a practical mechanism capable of providing solutions for legal change; 
capable, as exemplified by the ICPC and the CNL, of facilitating the incorporation of 
international human rights and due process ideals and internationally-recognised 
procedures into new post-intervention criminal legislation. Yet while legal transplantation is 
pervasive as a reform tool it may not always be the most reasonable means of promoting 
legal change. The pervasiveness of legal transplantation should not lead reformers to easy 
presumptions of its universal suitability when searching for law-making solutions. In the 
vitally important area of post-intervention criminal law reform, legislators should be 
cognisant of its limitations and ‘lethal’ potential and recognise that the reasonableness of 
relying on legal transplantation will depend on the sensitivity with which it is applied, 
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 Twining, note 78, chapter 2, p.51 
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requiring a full appreciation of legal transplant feasibility, local legal traditions and the prior 
application of the proposed evaluative test to assess potential effectiveness. While legal 
transplantation is likely to remain a pervasive aspect of post-intervention criminal law 
development it is more likely to be a reasonable and successful aspect of future legal 
experience in this field if it is employed sensitively as a mechanism for reform. 
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Appendix 1:  Afghanistan: society, conflict and context to 2001 and 
constitutional and legal institutional reform under the Bonn 
Agreement 
 
Afghanistan is a land-locked country bordered to the west by Iran, to the north by 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and to the east and south by China and 
Pakistan. Its current population of 25.5 million, 1  divided among its 34 provinces, 
consists of Pashtuns, representing approximately 44% of the total population, Tajiks 
25%, Hazarah 10%, Uzbek 8% with the remaining 13% composed of a variety of 
Aimak, Turkmen, Baluch, Brahui, Nuristani, Pashaie, Pamiri, Mongols, Arabs, Gujars, 
Kohistanis, Wakhis, Jats, Kirghiz and Qizilbash.2 While ethnically diverse, the Afghan 
population is united in its devotion to Islam. Approximately 99% of the population are 
Muslim,3 the remaining 1% non-Muslim communities being comprised of Hindus and 
Sikhs. 4  Of those adhering to the Muslim faith, 80 to 85% are Sunnis while the 
remaining 15 to 20% are Shi’a Muslims.5 
 
Its geographical positioning has acted as a magnet for empire builders and colonial 
expansionists intent on variously promoting trade links to its neighbouring countries, 
creating a buffer state to protect colonial concerns or aligning its political ideologies to 
conform with their own to establish a central Asian ally. In this way it has attracted 
military intervention most recently from the British in the 19th and 20th centuries, the 
Soviet Union in the 1980’s and the United States in 2001.6 Since 2001 it has become a 
focal point for the US and the UK in their ‘war on terror.’ 
 
                                                 
1
 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Central Statistics Organisation Statistical Yearbook 2009/10 available at 
http://www.cso.gov.af, p.5 
2
 Situated at the ‘crossroads’ of central Asia, it was an important staging post on the ‘Silk Road’, attracting 
trade and the interest of people from different civilisations, helping to define the composition of its multi-
ethnic population. See Wardak, A. ‘Building a post-war justice system in Afghanistan,’ (2004) 41, Crime, 
Law & Social Change, p.319-341, p.321. There are thought to be approximately 30 different languages 
spoken amongst the population, although Dari and Pashto are recognised as the two most widely used 
and also as the country’s official languages. See Rahimi, R. Afghanistan: Exploring the Dynamics of 
Sociopolitical Strife and the Persistence of the Insurgency, (2008) Pearson Peacekeeping Centre 
Occasional Paper 2 available at 
http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/PEARSON_Afghanistan_DynamicsSociopoliticalStrife_
PersistenceInsurgency.pdf, p.6 
3
 Rubin, B.R. (1995) The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, Yale University Press; p.38  
4
 Mendoza, K (2004) Islam and Islamism in Afghanistan, Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law 
School, available at http:// www. law. harvard. edu/ programs/ ilsp/ research/ mendoza.pdf, p.5 
5
 Wardak, note 2, p.325 
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th
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th
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The Soviet invasion in December 1979, the subsequent civil war following the Soviet 
withdrawal and the period of Taliban rule have had far reaching consequences for the 
social and economic fabric of Afghan society and for Afghanistan’s capacity for 
advancing human development, the effects of which are still relevant to the application 
of criminal justice in contemporary Afghanistan. The period of Soviet intervention lasted 
for ten years. In the local arena Afghanistan became embroiled in a guerrilla war 
between Soviet forces and Afghan mujahedeen resistance fighters, comprised of an 
amalgamation of previously fractious ethnic tribes moulded together to fight a holy war 
against a secular occupying state. In the wider political arena Afghanistan became part 
of the Cold War struggle between East and West and more particularly between the 
United States and the Soviet Union.7 
 
A maturation of the resistance movement from local organisation to national planning 
and implementation in the mid-1980’s coincided with significant financial assistance 
from the US, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia to the mujahedeen cause and led to the 
withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan in February 1989.8  
  
At this critical stage, the country’s diverse, tribal population had an opportunity for the 
first time in a generation to create a lasting peace. Instead the country quickly spiralled 
into a civil war fought along old ethnic, linguistic and religious grounds and financed by 
foreign sponsors. The primary intent of some of the armed groups was ethnic 
nationalism and joining forces with their ethnic cousins in newly formed neighbouring 
independent republics, rather than creating a unified Afghanistan. As a result, the 
former mujahedeen alliance quickly fragmented, fracturing along ethnic and tribal lines. 
Different factions led by warlords with networks of support built on language, ethnicity, 
kinship and political ideology scrabbled for power and internecine fighting broke out, 
reducing Afghanistan to a fractured collection of territories.  
 
Out of this chaos the Taliban emerged as a serious political force in the mid-1990’s, 
seizing power in 1998. Their meteoric rise to power owed much to their appeal as a 
uniting force with a divinely directed mandate to rid the country of corruption and 
warlord power. Taliban Afghanistan became a theocratic state under which Islam was 
the state religion, dictating the government of the country.  
 
                                                 
7
 Wardak, note 2, p.321-323 
8
 Misdaq, N. Afghanistan. Political Frailty and Foreign Interference, Routledge (2006); p.168 
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In the international arena Taliban Afghanistan was largely isolated. Only Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates officially recognised the Taliban as 
Afghanistan's legitimate government. It faced criticism for its undiluted Islamic 
radicalism that breached international standards of human rights. The United Nations 
refused to accept the legitimacy of the Taliban regime due to its failure to hold 
democratic elections and it was ostracised on the world stage as a result of its defiance 
of two United Nations Security Council resolutions in 1999 and 2000 relating to its 
association with Al Qaida.9   
 
Following the tragic events in New York and Washington in September 2001, 
Afghanistan became a fundamental strategic priority for the US and it intensified 
pressure on the Taliban to locate and hand over Osama Bin Laden. When these 
overtures were rejected the US commenced a military campaign on 7 October 2001, 
given the title of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, which resulted in the removal of the 
Taliban from power in early December.10 
 
The Afghan government later observed that ‘after nearly three decades of continuous 
conflict the country emerged [in 2001] … as a truly devastated state with its human, 
physical and institutional infrastructure destroyed or severely damaged.’ 11  It is 
estimated that between 1978 and 2001 1 million of Afghanistan’s population were 
killed, 2 million left disabled and 7 million displaced.12 Serious human rights abuses 
were perpetrated during this period, including massacres, revenge killings, torture, 
murder and assassinations.13   
 
The economy collapsed in the period following the Soviet invasion in 1979 and a new 
war economy emerged centred on the production and trafficking of illicit drugs, 
perpetrated firstly by the mujahedeen to finance arms requirements in the war against 
                                                 
9
 S/RES/1267 (15.10.1999) which established a sanctions regime to cover individuals and entities 
associated with Al Qaida and S/RES1333 (19.12.2000) which established a ban on arms and flight 
restrictions. The link between Taliban Afghanistan and Al Qaida resulted in the country being regarded as 
a ‘rogue state,’ capable of threatening international peace and security. See Kuovo, S. State-building and 
rule of law: lessons from Afghanistan? NDC Forum Paper Series (Rome: NATO Defence College, 2009); 
available at http://www.ndc.nato.int, p.9 
10
 The military campaign was initially named Operation Infinite Justice, but this was replaced with 
Operation Enduring Freedom on the grounds that Operation Infinite Justice might imply that the US military 
as opposed to only God could dispense final justice and its potential insinuation of vengeance and global 
gendarmerie. See Woodward, B. Bush at War, Simon & Schuster, New York (2004),  p.209 
11
 Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 2008 available at 
www.undp.org.af/publications/KeyDocuments/ANDS_Full_Eng.pdf,  p.3 
12
 Nadery, A. ‘Peace or Justice? Transitional Justice in Afghanistan’ (2007) Vol. 1, International Journal of 
Transitional Justice, 173-179, p 174 
13
 Wardak, note 2, p.329  
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the Soviets and later, following the Soviet withdrawal, by local warlords to finance their 
struggle for power during the civil war. 14  The growth in the opium economy was 
augmented by a breakdown in the power of the central state during the Soviet war in 
the 1980’s and the civil war in the 1990’s weakening legal constraints on opium 
cultivation, production and trafficking. 15  As a result, opium production increased 
dramatically. Whereas in 1980, Afghanistan had produced 19% of world opium, by 
1999 it was producing 79% of global output and it remained the world’s leading 
producer of opium in 2002 following the removal of the Taliban from power.16  
 
Health services, education facilities and employment opportunities were also badly 
affected during the Soviet occupation and civil war and continue to be poor. It is 
estimated that 72% of the adult population in Afghanistan is illiterate, representing one 
of world’s lowest literacy rates.17 In 2007 Afghanistan was ranked 174th out of 178 
countries for human development.18 Approximately 80% of the population continue to 
live in rural areas, mostly at subsistence level,19 and average earnings are estimated to 
be less than $2 a day.20  
 
Against this background the international community has been engaged in an 
extensive programme of reform which commenced in November 2001 with the 
adoption by the United Nations Security Council of Resolution 137821 that called on 
Member States to assist with the reconstruction of Afghanistan and provide support for 
the implementation of an interim ‘broad-based, multi-ethnic’ administration. 22  In 
                                                 
14
 UNODC, The Opium Economy in Afghanistan. An International Problem (2003) available at 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/unodc-afg-31jan.pdf, p. 90. Before the Soviet war 85% of 
the population lived in rural areas and agriculture accounted for 68% of employment in the country. 
However, between 1979 and 1989, approximately two thirds of the country’s villages were bombed and 
one third of all farms were abandoned. More than 30% of the population fled the country and the 
depopulation of rural areas resulted in severe disruption to agricultural trade and food production, which 
declined by as much as 45% 
15
 ibid, p. 89 
16
 ibid 
17
 US Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook available at www.cia.gov/library/publication/the-world-
factbook/geos/af.html. Adult literacy is 28.1% of the population. 
18
 UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report, Security With a Human Face: Challenges and 
Responsibilities (2004) available at 
http://planipolis.iiep/unesco.org/upload/Afghanistan/Afghanistan%20HDR%20202004.pdf, p.18-19. 
Average life expectancy was only 43 years and 26% children were dying before reaching age of 5 
19
 Thier, J. A. The Future of Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC (2009), p.39 
20
 Integrity Watch Afghanistan, Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption. A National Survey 
(2010) available at www.iwaweb.org,  p 4. In 2008 it was estimated that 6.5 million Afghans were 
dependent on food aid, 42% of the population were living below the poverty line and 40% were 
unemployed. See ANDS 2008, note 11, p.187 
21
 S/RES1378, U.N. SCOR, 56
th
 Session, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378 (2001). In addition to expressing a need 
to support the Afghan people in their establishment of a new administration it urged member states to 
provide humanitarian assistance and funding for reconstructions and rehabilitation projects. 
22
 ibid  
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response to this mandate convened the Bonn Conference, attended by a number of 
representative Afghan groups,23 which led to the Bonn Agreement.24  
Under the Agreement the 1964 Constitution was adopted until a new Constitution was 
prepared. It represented a compromise between Islamic tradition and modern reform 
and conveniently provided a structure for the organisation of the Courts and for 
acceptable human rights protections. According to Chesterman, the reliance on the 
1964 Constitution post-Bonn was ‘an attempt to connect the peace process with 
memories of a more stable Afghanistan’ during the 1960’s and 1970’s under 
Mohammad Zahir. 25  Unlike many of its predecessors it had been drafted following a 
process of consultation and participation from a large cross section of Afghan society 
represented in the Loya Jirga 1964 constitutional assembly. Until the country slipped 
into turmoil, chaos and occupation following Mohammad Daoud’s coup in 1973, it 
advanced the concept of popular political participation and ushered in a period of 
relative peace and national stability.26  
 
It was regarded as the one Afghan Constitution of recent history which had 
successfully affected a compromise between traditionalists favouring Islamic 
jurisprudence and modernist reformers seeking enactment of and adherence to new 
statutory legislation. According to Arjomand it ‘was the product of the meeting of liberal 
constitutionalism and Islamic modernism that proposed to interpret the principles of 
Islam without undue restriction from the rigidities of medieval Islamic jurisprudence and 
succeeded in finding the finest formula for the reconciliation of Islam and 
constitutionalism in the Middle East to that date or since.’27 
                                                 
23
 The period from the defeat of the Taliban to the installation of a new administration took only 76 days. 
See Johnson, T.H. ‘Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war,’ (March-June 
2006), 25(1-2), Central Asian Survey, 1-26, ; p.3 and 4. According to Johnson the key factions were the 
Peshawar group (mostly Pashtun), the Cyprus groups (Iranian backed), the Rome group (on behalf of the 
former King, Mohammed Zahir Shah) and the Northern Alliance (primarily Tajik); p.23.  
24
 The Agreement was given official UN endorsement in Security Council Resolution 1383 on 6 December 
2001. The resolution noted the desire of the Afghan people to ‘end the tragic conflict in Afghanistan and 
promote national reconciliation, lasting peace, stability and respect for human rights.’ Security Council 
Resolution 1383, U.N. SCOR 56
th
 Session, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (2001). The official title of the 
agreement was the ‘Agreement on the Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions’ 5 December 2001 S/2001/1154 
 
25
 Chesterman, S. ‘Justice Under International Administration: Kosovo, East Timor and Afghanistan’, 
(September 2002) International Peace Academy Report, p.1-14, p.9 
26
 Lau, M. (2002) ‘Afghanistan’s Legal System and its Compatibility with International Human Rights 
Standards,’ International Commission of Jurists. Lau refer to the period 1964 to 1973 as ‘the Constitutional 
Period’ p.29. See also Arjomand, S.A. ‘Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan: A Comparative and 
Historical Perspective’ (2005) Drake Law Review, vol 53, 4, p943-962. Arjomand notes that the 
Constitution of 1964 brought about ‘a decade of democratic politics with a flourishing free press, student 
demonstrations and political mobilization’ p.953 
27
 Arjomand, note 26, p.952 
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This formula included the stipulation that the legislature must observe that statutory law 
is the primary source of law but that statutory law must nevertheless adhere to Islamic 
principles.28 This harmonisation of Islamic and statutory jurisprudence in a manner that 
could preserve Islamic tenets while reacting to social and democratic development was 
regarded as an appropriate platform upon which to start the process of legal reform, 
and indeed criminal justice reform, in post-Taliban Afghanistan.29 
 
The 1964 Constitution had created legal institutions, established a court structure and 
ensured critical human rights protections. It had insisted on fundamental human rights 
safeguards including equality before the law (article 25), the right to a fair trial, to liberty 
and human dignity (article 26) and the right to instruct defence counsel (article 26). It 
had also created for the first time an independent judiciary (article 97) to protect judges 
from political pressures and that was placed under the supervision of a newly 
established Supreme Court (article 105). In addition it has established the office of the 
Attorney General, which was tasked with the duty of investigating crime (article 103) 
and placed under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. These protections and 
institutions would now apply post-2001 for the purposes of the criminal justice system 
in Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the Bonn Agreement. The same 
was the case with regard to the organisation of the court system laid down in the 1964 
Constitution, and the later 1967 ‘Law of the Jurisdiction and Organisation of the Courts 
of Afghanistan.’ This was a bi-partite national court system, divided into general courts 
comprising the Supreme Court, the Court of Cassation, the High Court of Appeal, 
Provincial courts and Primary (district) courts, and specialised courts consisting of 
juvenile courts, labour courts and other dedicated courts established by the Supreme 
Court as and when required. The Supreme Court, established on 15 October 1967 
became the highest Court in the country, its authority extended to organising and 
administrating the lower courts and the judiciary. Within it, the Court of Cassation was 
placed in charge of reviewing the decisions of the provincial courts on issues of law 
and their conformity with Hanafi Shari’a jurisprudence. Below these courts was the 
High Court of Appeal, based in Kabul, to which appeals against the decisions of the 
Provincial Courts were referred. Each province in Afghanistan was assigned one 
Provincial Court which would have limited jurisdiction related to specific criminal 
offences, including drug smuggling, and the consideration of appeals of decisions 
made by lower Primary Courts. The Chief Justice would be responsible for deciding on 
                                                 
28
 article 64 
29
 Kamali, M.H. ‘Law in Afghanistan: A Study of the Constitutions, Matrimonial Law and the Judiciary’, 
Leiden 1985, p.21 
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the number of Primary Courts that should be allocated for each province. All criminal 
cases would be started in the Primary courts but the decisions reached would only be 
considered final if the sentence pronounced did not exceed imprisonment for a period 
of more than one month. In addition, decisions in the Primary court had binding 
authority if they were not appealed other than those involving quisas offences, or 
sentences of capital punishment and life imprisonment. This court structure and the 
criminal justice court system largely remained intact following the upheavals of the 
previous three decades. It was adopted by the interim administration as the applicable 
legal system in accordance with the Bonn Agreement and indeed, it remained in 
operation until the adoption of the 2004 Constitution.30 
                                                 
30
 Weinbaum M.G. (1980) ‘Legal Elites in Afghan Society’ International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 
39-57; p.52. See also Arjomand, note 26, p.952. and Lau, note 26, p.14-18 
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Appendix 2: Customary justice – nanawati, warlord interference and baad 
practices 
 
Seeking pardon (nanawati) 
A typical form of nanawati requires the guilty party to slaughter a sheep outside the 
victims house accompanied by a delegation including an elder, a female relative and a 
mullah. The group then enter the victim’s house and seek forgiveness which the 
pashtunwali code dictates must be granted, whereupon the parties are reconciled.1 
Serious offences demand greater acts of contrition to achieve pardon and may 
necessitate the presentation of blood-money (khunbaha) by way of compensation. The 
nanawati for intentional or accidental murder can require the perpetrator’s relatives to 
help carry the victim’s body to a gravesite, while that for the abduction and murder of a 
married woman ‘requires the giving of four copies of the Holy Koran, four women, and 
a fat sheep to the victim’s family, ’2  
 
Warlord interference 
The extent to which local strongmen and warlords actually intervene in customary 
justice mechanisms remains a matter for speculation. A report by the Feinstein 
International Famine Centre in 2004 concluded that ‘armed political groups, 
commanders and warlords have strategically targeted traditional customary justice 
systems (jirgas and shuras) throughout rural Afghanistan in their attempt to control 
local populations. In many instances, these predatory forces have successfully 
positioned their loyalists within these groups, thus undermining this avenue of justice 
for rural Afghans.’3  However, in a 2007 survey by the UNDP only 12% of respondents 
confirmed that local commanders were always represented at jirgas or shuras,4 which 
suggests that the vast majority of customary criminal proceedings are immune from 
undue influence by warlords.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Wardak, A. Jirga – A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan available at 
http://unpan1./un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/APCITY/UNPAN017434.pdf, p.32 
2
 International Legal Foundation, The Customary Laws of Afghanistan, New York/Kabul: ILF, (Sept. 2004) 
available at http://www.theilf.org/Customary%20Laws.pdf, p.10 
3
 Feinstein International Famine Centre, Human Security and Livelihoods of Rural Afghans, 2002-2003 
(2004) available at http://famine.tufts.edu/pdf/Mazurana2.pdf; p.1-264,  p.7 
4
 UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report Building Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the 
Search for Justice (2007) available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdfp.98    
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The frequency of baad practices 
Baad practices violate Islamic Shari’a5 and are criminalized by state law6 but remain 
relevant for customary approaches to criminal justice. There is, however, some debate 
as to the level of frequency with which decisions of this nature are reached. The UNDP 
reported in 2007 that decisions involving baad were ‘quite rare’7 and an exception 
rather than the norm.8 This may be the result of victim’s reluctance to issue complaints 
for fear of reprisal or rejection by their community rather than evidence that baad 
practice is in decline. Victims are unlikely to be aware of their legal rights to challenge 
it. According to the 2009 article ‘many women cannot read or write, and they have no 
information about the legal code or Shari’a law. The misery of baad will continue until 
women are made aware of their rights.’9  
 
The custom of baad has been practiced in Afghanistan since reconstruction work on 
the state justice system began in 2001 and continues to be considered a relevant form 
of justice in the country. A report in 2003 commissioned by the Women and Children 
Legal Research Foundation concluded that the practice of baad was ‘a critical problem 
in all parts of the country.’10 A more recent 2008 report by the same body found that 
traditional practices fundamentally limit women’s access to justice and that women ‘are 
more likely to face discrimination and violation of their rights’11 if legal matters, including 
criminal issues, are resolved by jirgas. In the light of this, the report recommended that 
‘jirgas should be prevented from dealing with women’s cases.’12  
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Women and Children Legal Research Foundation, Bad Painful Sedative (2003), available at 
http://www.wclrf.org.af/English/eng_pages/Researches/Badpainful/badpainful.htm Chapter 3. Verse 19 of 
the Nisa Chapter states ‘the pious Moslem, you are not permitted to receive women by force as a heritage. 
Do not treat them harshly and make life pleasant for them.’  
6
 it is criminalized by the Penal Code 1976, article 17, para. 2 and it is also in contravention of Chapter A, 
article 6 of the Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and Article 6 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women all of which Afghanistan is a party to. An Afghan state law, the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women was introduced in July 2010, which formally criminalises baad practices as well as polygamy and 
under age marriage. See UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘The Shia Family Law,’ available at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/conflict-prevention/afghanistan21/human-rights/shia-FAMILY-LAW 
7
 UNDP, note 4, p.97 
8
 ibid, p.94 
9
 Paykan, W. Afghan Girls Suffer For Sins of Male Relatives, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, arr.no. 
317 (26.03.2009), available at http://www.iwpr.net?p=351344&apc_state=heniarr200903 
10
 WCLRF report, note 5  
11
 WCLRF, Women’s Access to Justice (2008) available at 
http://www.wclrf.org.af/English/eng_pages/Researches/Women_a_t_Justice/WATJ.pdf, p.25 
12
 ibid, p.42 
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Appendix 3:  The Tokyo Conference 2002, Lead Nation Designation and  
  Constitutional Reform 
 
At the Tokyo Conference in January 20021 a number of countries made significant 
financial pledges towards reconstruction efforts 2  and were awarded ‘lead nation’ 
responsibility for the reform of various state sectors. In contrast to its high-profile 
participation in other post-conflict nations3 the UN, whose partnership with Afghanistan 
was formally ratified by the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) in March 2002,4 chose to adopt a minimalist, ‘light footprint’5 
approach to Afghanistan reconstruction. The expansive mandates that it had assumed 
in East Timor and Kosovo6 that had provided it with single-handed responsibility for 
justice reform were replaced in Afghanistan with an assistance role designed instead to 
support, foster and augment Afghan reform efforts.7 It would, it was hoped, encourage 
increased Afghan ownership.8 At the same time, it was anticipated that it would deter 
donor nations from relying upon and then under-funding the UN as had been its 
experience in previous post-conflict reconstruction operations and instead compel them 
to assume more proactive assistance roles.9  
                                                 
1
 The ‘International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan’ took place in Tokyo on 21 
and 22 January 2002, held at ministerial level and co-chaired by Japan, US, EU and Saudi Arabia. See 
Consulate General of Japan in New York, Japan Info: Tokyo Hosts International Conference on 
Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, available at www.cgj.org/en/c/vol_09-5/title_02.htm 
2
 According to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs the total cumulative financial commitment 
amounted to $4.5 billion, with $1.8 billion pledged for 2002; see ‘Co-Chairs Summary of Conclusion. The 
International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, January 21-22, 2002’ available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/afghanistan/min0201/summary.pdf 
3
 notably Kosovo and East Timor 
4
 UN Security Resolution 1401 2002. See Thier, J.A. ‘Re-establishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan’ 
CDDRL Working Papers, 19, 01.09.2004. Their notes that UNAMA had an advisory capacity only to the 
Afghan government rather than any implementation responsibility p.13 
5
 it was confirmed as a ‘light expatriate footprint’ strategy by the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General, Lakhdar Brahimi, at the Opening of 55th Annual DPI/NGO conference ‘Rebuilding Societies 
Emerging from Conflict: A Shared Responsibility’ 09.09.2002 available at www.unama-
afg.org/news/_statement/SRSG/2002/02sep09.htm 
6
 In Kosovo, the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) established the Kosovo War and Ethnic 
Crimes Court, an international court staffed predominately by international judges. Similarly, the justice 
system established in East Timor was run by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor 
(UNTAET), staffed by foreigners. See Dickinson, L.A. ‘Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: The Promise of 
Mixed Tribunals,’ ( 2002) 31 (3), Denver Journal of International Law & Policy, pp.23-37 
7
 In fact, this minimalist policy has been replicated elsewhere since 2001 and the UN has adopted advisory 
and assistance as opposed to lead roles in justice and rule of law areas in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (see U.N. SCOR, 58
th
 Sess., 4797
th
 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1493 at 11, (2003)); Liberia (see U.N. 
SCOR, 58
th
 Sess., 4830
th
 mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1509 at 13, (2003)); Haiti (see U.N. SCOR, 59
th
 Sess., 
4961
st 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 at 7(1)(d), (2004));  and Burundi (see U.N. SCOR, 59
th
 Sess., 4976
th
 
 
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/15425at 6, (2004)); see O’Connor, V ‘Traversing the Rocky Road of Law Reform in 
Conflict and Post Conflict States: Model Codes for Post Conflict Criminal Justice As a Tool of Assistance, ’ 
(2005) 16, Criminal Law Forum, .231-255, p.234 
8
 It was thought to be in tune with the message of the Bonn Agreement, that underlined the ‘right of the 
people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future.’ See UN Security Council, ‘Agreement 
on the Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government 
Institutions’ 5 December 2001 S/2001/1154; preamble to the Agreement p.2; available at 
http://www.afghan-web.com 
9
 see USIP, Establishing the Rule of Law in Afghanistan. Special Report 117 (March 2004) available at  
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In May 2002, a few months after the Tokyo conference10, the AIA established a Judicial 
Commission which was tasked with implementing a law reform programme 
incorporating the compilation, publishing and distribution of all laws and to recommend 
new legislation to assist the AIA in the administration of justice. It was also charged 
with legal training and the appointment of judges, prosecutors and law enforcement 
officials.11 The initial 16-member Commission was dissolved after only four months due 
to tensions amongst members aligned to the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court 
over control over the Attorney General’s Office of the power to appoint judges.12 A 
second 10-member commission was installed in November 2002 charged with similar 
tasks and given responsibility to coordinate the reconstruction of the justice system. 
This Judicial Reform Commission (JRC) comprised key personnel from the central 
institutions of the justice sector including a former Minister of Justice, two former 
Attorney’s General and three former Supreme Court justices in an effort to draw on a 
broad range of experience and skills and to foster a constructive working relationship 
between formerly competitive elements among the main justice sector institutions.13  
 
In December 2002 Italy convened a conference in Rome where international donors 
pledged a further US$30 million funds for the justice sector.14 In response to its new 
lead nation role it also established the ‘Italian Justice Project Office’ (IJPO) which was 
designed to provide assistance to the JRC and local justice institutions. 15  Gaining 
impetus from deliberations at the Rome conference, the JRC developed a Master Plan 
in which it identified 30 separate projects in areas including law reform, training and 
legal education to be conducted over an 18-month period.16 However, divisions within 
the JRC among representatives of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice soon 
stifled its ability to operate as a coordinating body.17 The schisms within it weakened its 
ability to persuade the Constitutional Commission and government bodies to deliberate 
                                                                                                                                               
http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr117.pdf , p. 5 
10
 The ‘International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan’ took place in Tokyo on 21 
and 22 January 2002, held at ministerial level and co-chaired by Japan, US, EU and Saudi Arabia. See 
Consulate General of Japan in New York, Japan Info: Tokyo Hosts International Conference on 
Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, available at www.cgj.org/en/c/vol_09-5/title_02.htm 
11
 see Bosi, T.D. Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The United Nations’ Involvement in Afghanistan (2003) 
19(3), New York Law School Journal, 819-831, p.824 
12
 Their, J.A. ‘Re-establishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan’ Centre on Democracy, Development and 
the Rule of Law, Stanford Institute for International Studies, Working Paper; no.19, 1 September 2004, p.8 
available at http://www.cddril,stanford.edu. Their suggest that the Judicial Commission was dissolved due 
to ‘political tension among members, the lack of a clear agenda and the impression of undue conservatism 
among some in the Afghan Transitional Authority’. 
13
 ibid  
14
 Press briefing, spokesman for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Afghanistan, 26 
January 2003 
15
 Tondini, M., (2010) ‘Statebuilding and Justice Reform: Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Afghanistan,’ 
Routledge; p.48 
16
 Their, note 12, p.12 
17
 Ibid, p.19 
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and act on reforms necessary for the reform of the justice system.18 Its failure to affect 
institutional changes led to its later dissolution in 2005, 19  by which time it had, 
according to the 2007 Human Development Report ‘achieved only a limited level of 
success’ in relation to implementing justice reform.20  
 
In January 2003, under Italian leadership, a Justice Sector Consultative Group (JSCG) 
was established and led by the Ministry of Justice. Italy was the lead donor participant, 
amongst donors including the US, Germany, Canada and the UK. The UN maintained 
a presence principally through UNAMA.21 The JSCG was designed to be a national 
level mechanism for the donor countries, Afghan government and international 
organisations to coordinate their policies and activities and agree on means of 
implementation. However, while it facilitated information-sharing, it was reported to 
have failed at establishing sufficient consultation and communication between the 
various justice agencies and donors, resulting in an uncoordinated and ad hoc 
implementation of justice reform from the time of its establishment to mid-2005, which 
may have influenced the application of the ICPC.22  
 
 
Constitutional Reform 
Ratified on 4 January 2004 the new Constitution proclaimed that the intention of the 
Afghan State was to create ‘a civil society free of oppression, atrocity, discrimination, 
and violence and based on the rule of law, social justice, protection of human rights, 
and dignity, and ensur[e] the fundamental rights and freedoms of the people.’23 It has 
been acknowledged as Afghanistan’s ‘legislative keystone’24 as it asserts that all new 
                                                 
18
 Rubin et al, (2005) ‘Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond. Prospects for Improved Stability Reference 
Document,’ Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ Conflict Research Unit April 2005;, 
p.42 
19
 Decree on Dissolution of the Judicial Commission, Official Gazette No.862 22.09.2005, available at 
USAID-ARoLP database. 
20
 UNDP, Afghanistan Human Development Report Building Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the 
Search for Justice (2007) available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/national/asiathepacific/afghanistan/nhdr2007.pdf, p. 81 
21
 UNAMA, Justice Sector Overview (April 2007),  p.2 
22
 Ibid, p.2. See also UNDP, note 20, p. 81 
23
 See Preamble of The Afghan Constitution 2004, para 8; available at 
http://www.servat.unibe.ch.law/icl/af00000_.html. The vision and content of this Constitution won it 
considerable praise amongst elite UN officials, academics and politicians at the time of its introduction, and 
it was variously described it as an ‘historic achievement,’ a ‘blueprint for Afghanistan’s emerging 
democracy’ and a ‘model for the Islamic world;’ See U.N Secretary General Kofi Annan ‘Afghan Charter 
Wins World Praise, BBC News available at http://www,news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia; United 
Nations Development Programme Report  ‘Afghanistan. A Country on the Move’ March 2005 p.3 and 
Feldman, N. ‘A New Democracy, Enshrined in Faith’ New York Times 13.11. 2003 
24
 UNODC (2008) ‘Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided To Afghanistan By The 
United Nations Office On Drugs And Crime,’ Vol 4, Rule of Law Programme, p.1-62, p.3 
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statutes, law and regulations must comply with its provisions. 25  To that extent it 
remains a significant source of criminal law and procedure in Afghanistan.26 
 
It provides for a presidential system with a centralised administration avoiding 
distribution of power between a president and a prime minister which had invoked 
power struggles in the past.27 It also retains a bicameral parliament with an elected 
lower house and an upper house, one-third of whose members are appointed by the 
President, while the remaining two-thirds are elected.28 Apart from the removal of the 
central Court of Appeal in Kabul and absorption of the Court of Cassation into the 
Supreme Court, 29  the structure of the court system – later supplemented by the 
provisions of the 2005 Law of the Organisation and Authority of the Courts – is little 
changed from that previously prescribed by the Law on the Jurisdiction and 
Organisation of the Courts in Afghanistan in 1968. As a result, the judicial system 
comprises the judiciary, represented by the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal and 
Primary Courts,30 the Attorney-General and Ministry of Justice.  
 
The Supreme Court is established as the central authority of the Afghan judiciary 
responsible for administering and overseeing the judicial system, appointing judges 
and ensuring the compatibility of new legislation with constitutional provisions. Its nine 
members, led by the Chief Justice, are appointed by the President for ten-year posts 
following referral by the Lower House (Wolesi Jirga)31 and in conjunction with their 
meeting stipulated age and educational requirements.32  
 
Provincial Appeal Courts are the second most authoritative judicial bodies whose 
mandate is to review the judicial decisions of the Primary Courts. There is one for each 
province, each having a designated section dealing with criminal offences. These 
                                                 
25
 Gholami, H. ‘Basics of Afghan Law and Criminal Justice’ (2007) available at 
http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/AfghanistanZentralasien/D
ownloads/Polizei-Legal-Manual.pdf, p.75 
26
 Ibid, p.154. The process which led to its enactment started not long after the assignment of donor nation 
reconstruction roles at the Tokyo Conference. In accordance with the Bonn Agreement (article 1(6)) 
President Karzai appointed a nine-member Constitutional Committee in October 2002 which prepared a 
draft Constitution. This was placed before 502 delegates representing the country’s assorted ethnic and 
tribal factions for consideration at a Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003 and approved following 
three weeks of negotiations, resulting in the promulgation of the final draft at the beginning of 2004.   
27
 Arjomand, S.A. ‘Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan: A Comparative and Historical Perspective,’ 
(2004-2005) 53 (4) Drake Law Review, p.943-962; p.956 
28
 article 84 
29
 articles 116-136 
30
 article 116 and see also the Law of the Organisation and Authority of the Courts 2005 
31
 article 117 Law of the Organisation and Authority of the Courts 2005 
32
 article 118 members must be at least 40 years old and have higher education qualifications in either 
formal state law or Islamic jurisprudence  
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courts have jurisdiction over ‘public’ crimes, crimes against public security and traffic 
related criminal cases and involve jury-less trials presided over by three judges.33  
 
A number of the Constitution’s provisions establish cornerstone principles and 
guidelines that are significant in the context of criminal justice. Articles 6 and 7 demand 
respect for international human rights and confirm that the Afghan state will observe 
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 34  and the international conventions and treaties to which it has agreed to 
adhere. These include the ICCPR,35 the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam 
1990, 36  the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women 1980,37 and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 199838 all of 
which consequentially are relevant in the context of Afghan criminal law and procedure. 
 
With regard to the Constitution’s links to the ICPC and the CNL, it stipulates in general 
terms the requirement for a system of criminal procedure and criminal justice that 
provides due process rights to defendants and which constrains representatives of the 
state, including the police and prosecutors, in the exercise of their duties in an effort to 
ensure against intimidation and coercion of defendants.39 In this manner it provides 
rights to individuals which cannot be marginalized or indeed infringed by other criminal 
legislation, but which should in fact be complimented by the provisions of new criminal 
law. These include internationally recognised principles of fair trial standards such as 
equality before the law,40 the right to legal representation,41 the right to silence,42 the 
                                                 
33
 Article 6 of the Law of the Organisation and Authority of the Courts of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan 2005. It was the intention of the 2005 Law that there should be a Primary Court, where three 
judges preside over cases in each of Afghanistan’s 364 separate districts and furthermore that Urban 
Primary Courts should be established in each provincial centre which would handle criminal cases at first 
instance; see Article 47(1) Law of the Organisation  and Authority of the Courts  of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, 2005 
34
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN General Assembly Resolution 217A(III), 10 December 1948 
35
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 was acceded to on 24 January 1983. It 
guarantees fundamental rights such as the right to life, liberty and human dignity (articles 6, 9 and 10), 
freedom from torture (article 7), due process rights (article 14) and the principle of innocence until proven 
guilty (article 15). 
36
 The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam provides for the right to life and security of the person 
(articles 2 and 18), the presumption of innocence (article 19), and freedom from arbitrary arrest and torture 
(article 20) 
37
 The Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1980 was acceded to on 5 March 2003. 
It requires Afghanistan to ‘pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating 
discrimination against women’ and calls for necessary criminal sanctions to uphold this ideal (article 2). 
More specifically it includes provisions requiring Afghanistan to eliminate the trafficking of women (article 6) 
and to ensure the equality of men and women before the law (article 15). 
38
 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 was acceded to on 10 February 2003. It 
establishes the International Criminal Court and defines criminal offences that fall within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. 
39
 Articles 22-31  
40
 Article 22 Afghan Constitution 2004 
41
 article 31 Afghan Constitution 2004 
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right to be tried without undue delay,43 the presumption of innocence44 and freedom 
from torture.45 
 
The Constitution also affirms that Islam is the religion of the state46 and is a source of 
law to the extent that it prohibits the enactment of legal provisions that ‘contravene the 
tenets and provisions of the Holy religion of Islam.’47 In addition, it authorises the state 
to promote religious instruction 48  and directs that the educational system must be 
founded on the tenets of the Islamic faith,49 a constitutional anomaly given that no 
previous Constitution has sought to impose constitutional management of religious 
instruction. The Constitution also provides that while statutory norms take precedence, 
judges have the right to apply Islamic jurisprudence in cases where no constitutional or 
statutory provision prevails to deal with the matter in question. 50  The hierarchy of 
domestic law is therefore such that the Courts are required to firstly apply the 
provisions of the Constitution and applicable statutory laws and where no provisions 
exist in either for the case in question they should follow Shari’a, adopting Hanafi 
jurisprudence. As a consequence, if an act is not defined as a crime in law but is 
regarded as a crime in Shari’a, Hanafi jurisprudence should be applied. However, if an 
act is defined as a crime in both Shari’a and state law, the provisions of the law must 
be implemented. Nevertheless, in this regard, the Penal Code, still in force, relates only 
to tazir offences, leaving huduud, quisas and diyat offences to be punished in 
accordance with Hanafi jurisprudence. 
 
The provisions of the Constitution seek to underline and confirm the centrality of the 
principles and values of the Islamic faith to the Afghan experience. They exist 
alongside protections for international standards of human rights. In this manner, it 
seeks to reach a workable and realistic compromise between Islam and western 
human rights norms. For some observers it successfully achieves the right balance. 
Noah Feldman regards it as both ‘pervasively Islamic’ and ‘thoroughly democratic’ to 
                                                                                                                                               
42
 article 30 
43
 article 31 
44
 article 25 
45
 article 29 
46
 article 2 
47
 article 3 
48
 article 17 
49
 article 45 
50
 article 130. This right, however, does not extend to police or prosecutors, whose roles are defined as the 
‘discovery of crimes’ and ‘investigation and prosecution conducted by the Attorney’s Office in accordance 
with the provisions of the law’ art 134(1). The 1991 AGO Law is unaffected and remains the legislative 
authority for the powers and organisation of the AGO under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice. The 
Saranwali Law 1991 governed the powers of prosecutors and the powers and authority of the police would 
later be set out in the 2005 Police Law. Official Gazette 862 
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the extent that it can be regarded as a model for Islamic democracy. 51  Yet the 
Constitution’s attempt to reconcile Islamic norms and human rights standards has at 
times created uncertainty over the primacy of constitutional and Islamic law.52  
 
The Supreme Court is given responsibility for reviewing legislation and its compliance 
with Islamic provisions under article 3.53 This enables more fundamentalist personnel in 
the Supreme Court – itself an un-elected body - unchecked authority to strike out any 
new legislation which they determine are contrary to the provisions of Islamic law, 
irrespective of the its compliance with other constitutional and human rights values54 or 
indeed to delay reform processes which they deem to be ‘un-Islamic.’55 Similarly, while 
the residual judicial validity of Islamic jurisprudence compliments the still applicable 
Penal Code56 and represents an attempt to strike a workable balance between Islamic 
and statutory legal influence, the recognition of the validity of potential Islamic 
punishments under article 130, including hudud offences resulting in capital 
punishment, contradicts other constitutional and indeed international commitments to 
human rights obligations.57 Ambiguities of this nature have created confusion amongst 
the judiciary and legal actors in relation to the application of criminal law that has on 
occasion resulted in well-publicised and internationally damaging judicial decision-
making based on Islamic interpretations of criminal justice. 58 
                                                 
51
 See Feldman, note, 23; Feldman describes the 2004 Constitution ‘pervasively Islamic’ and ‘thoroughly 
democratic.’ See also Suhrke who suggests that the intent in 2004 was to create a liberal, constitutional 
democracy supported by an effective justice system which would foster rule of law, social justice and 
international standards of human rights; Suhrke, A. ‘Reconstruction as Modernisation: the ‘post-conflict’ 
project in Afghanistan’, (2007), 28:7, Third World Quarterly, 1291-1308, p.1298 
52
 The Constitutions of many other Islamic states such as Pakistan (article 25), Lebanon (article 7) and 
Morocco (article 5) uphold the principles of basic human rights but at the same time confirm that that 
Islamic faith is the foundation of law suggesting that in Afghanistan Shari’a law should have primacy over 
constitutional law. See UNODC (2008) ‘Thematic Evaluation of the Technical Assistance Provided to 
Afghanistan by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,’ Vol. 4, Rule of Law Programme, May 2008, 
p. 4 
53
 article 121 
54
 Arjomand note 27, p.959 
55
 See Deladda, A. Afghanistan: The Justice System From A people’s Perspective (Sept 2008) available at 
www.argoriente.it. Deladda notes that the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Fazal Hadi Shinwari 
delayed justice reform ‘by refusing to cooperate with any foreign support that, in his view, risked to 
‘secularise’ the judiciary,’ p.7 
56
 article 1 
57
 For example those set out in article 7 ICCPR 
58
 Abdul Rahman was arrested in February 2006 following allegations that he had assaulted his daughters. 
His wife’s family alleged that he had converted to Christianity, whereupon he was charged with apostasy. 
This was not a criminalized activity under the 1976 Penal Code so Rahman was charged under section 
130 of the 2004 Constitution in accordance with Hanafi jurisprudence. Rahman faced the prospect of being 
sentenced to death in spite of the fact that article 7 of the Constitution obliges Afghanistan to observe 
article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 an article 18 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 1966 which both allow for freedom of religious choice. The case attracted 
worldwide publicity and Rahman was released and the case suspended on a technicality, whereupon he 
was transported to Italy where he requested political asylum. See UNAMA report p.37. The International 
Crisis Group has called for a review of the 2004 Constitution by 2014 to reduce the power of the President 
to influence the Supreme Court. According to a report in November 2010 ‘the strong presidential system 
adopted under the 2004 Constitution has only exacerbated the weakness of judicial institutions. The lack 
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of a clearly defined arbiter of the constitution has undercut the authority of the Supreme Court and 
transformed the court into a puppet of President Hamid Karzai;’ see International Crisis Group, Reforming 
Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary, Asia Report No. 195 (17.11.2010) available at 
http://www.crisigroup.org/en/regions/asai/south-asia/afghanistan/195-reforming-afghanistans-broken-
judiciary.aspx, p.1-2. By way of example the Constitution entitles the President to pardon criminals who 
have had their sentences confirmed by the Supreme Court and in 2009 Amnesty International reported 
that between 800 to 1,000 pardons were granted annually, with numbers increasing before elections. 
Some of those pardoned were well-connected individuals convicted of serious crimes. One example is 
Bilal, convicted for trafficking heroin when head of the Border Guards in Takhar Province who was granted 
a pardon in 2009 and whose uncle, Haji Din Mohammad was appointed Karzai’s election campaign 
manager soon afterwards. See Carter, S. and Clark, K. No Shortcut to Stability. Justice, Politics and 
Insurgency in Afghanistan, Chatham House, (2010) available at 
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/papers/view/-/id/985, p.33 
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Appendix 4: Confessions and the ICPC 
 
Confessions are not included in the list of suggested ‘key tools’ in article 37(3) of the 
ICPC but the Code does not prohibit their use as evidence in criminal proceedings. 
Nevertheless, suspects and accused individuals are protected against any form of 
coercion to extract a confession in article 5. The protections provided under article 5 
are wider than those in the earlier 1965 Code which provided that ‘a statement 
obtained from an accused or any other person by compulsion is invalid’ (article 78). 
 
According to a commentary on the ICPC by Di Gennaro the missed inclusion of 
confession in the list of the law’s ‘key tools’ was deliberate and ‘demonstrates that 
Afghanistan wants to align its criminal procedure system with those of advanced 
democratic countries. In this context confession is to be made in absolute 
psychological freedom and the self accusation of the offender takes the value of an 
important clue to be matched by other evidentiary elements for being corroborated as a 
full fledged proof.’1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 IDLO Criminal Law and Procedure in Afghanistan: Focus on Gender Issues (2007) available at 
www.idlo.int, p.46-47 
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Appendix 5: The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure 1988 
 
The Italian Code of Criminal Procedure was enacted on 24 October 1988. It introduced 
adversarial practices into Italian criminal procedure, which until then had been largely 
dominated by accusatorial features. Prior to the Code being passed into law, criminal 
procedure stipulated that a public prosecutor should assemble a dossier of evidence 
against the accused during the preliminary investigation stage. Trials would be jury-less 
and conducted before a Judge who controlled the proceedings and considered 
evidence presented in the form of the dossier to establish the truth.  
 
The 1988 Code limited the influence of the dossier and strengthened the impact of the 
trial. Different Judges would preside over hearings during the preliminary investigation 
and preliminary hearings and the trial to improve the impartiality of trial Judges. In 
addition, trials would be conducted along adversarial principles with the burden of proof 
falling on the prosecutor who would contest evidence produced at trial rather than that 
contained only in the dossier. On the other hand, some of the procedures set down in 
the Code are regarded as being more aligned with those of a civil law tradition. The trial, 
for example, will determine guilt and length of sentence, so mitigating evidence in 
relation to sentencing must be presented at trial. In addition, trials are largely juryless, 
except for those cases involving serious crimes, such as murder and treason.  
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Appendix 6:  Afghanistan’s Emerging Opium Economy: 1924-2005 
 
 
1924-1979 
Opium poppy has been cultivated in Afghanistan since at least the 18th century, 
although little was known of the nature and extent of poppy cultivation or indeed 
domestic attitudes towards the use and cultivation of narcotic drugs until the Afghan 
government began to participate with a newly emerging international drug control 
system in the beginning of the 20th century.1 As a result of Afghanistan’s involvement 
with the Second Opium Conference convened by the League of Nations in 1924 it was 
determined that the cultivation and use of opium in the country was officially tolerated2 
and that its exportation was subject to a 5% government levy.3 It is thought that up until 
this time opium consumption in the country was low, opium poppy was not considered 
to be a traditional crop, and it was only produced in a small number of provinces, in 
particular Badakshan. Indeed, opium cultivation in Afghanistan remained very modest 
until the late 20th century. In 1932 the area under cultivation was 4,000 hectares and it 
was producing 75 tons of opium; less than 2% of that produced in China at the time.4  
 
Throughout the 1930’s opium production did not increase beyond 100 tons per annum, 
in spite of the fact that it was not an illegal activity. It was not until 1945 that a law was 
introduced prohibiting its production, although smuggling continued through India.5 A 
further law was passed in 1957 prohibiting the cultivation, commerce, buying, selling, 
importation, exportation and use of opium but it was non-specific with regards to the 
penalties for the commission of offences. 6  By this stage Afghan traffickers were 
exploiting a gap in the market left by the collapse of the Iranian opium trade caused by 
a ban on poppy cultivation imposed by the Shah in 1955.7 Inadequate enforcement 
capacity and resources resulted in the government being unable to enforce the ban 
                                                 
1
 UNODCCP, Studies on Drugs and Crime ‘Global Illicit Drug Trends (2001) available at 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/report_2001-06-26_1/report_2001-06-26_1.pdf, p.30 
2
 League of Nations, Report of the Second Opium Conference, sub-committee ‘B’ 1924.  It was reported 
that ‘opium ceased to be a government monopoly and any person may deal in it’  
3
 UNODCCP, note 1, p.30 
4
 League of Nations, Permanent Central Opium Board, Pre-War Production and Distribution of Narcotic 
Drugs and Their Raw Materials, Geneva 1944. See UNODC (2003) The Opium Economy in Afghanistan. 
An International Problem available at http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/unodc-afg-31jan.pdf, 
p. 88 
5
 ‘Opium Production Throughout the World,’ United Nations, Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. 1, No.1, October 
1949, p.12 
6
 Law Prohibiting Opium Cultivation, Commerce, Buying, Selling, Importation, Exportation, and Use in 
Afghanistan. See Vafai, note 77, chapter 3, p.32 
7
 Felbab-Brown, V. ‘Kicking the opium habit?: Afghanistan’s drug economy and politics since the 1980’s,’ 
June 2006 6(2),  Journal of Conflict, Security & Development , p.128 
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and it was observed at an international conference in 1961 that Afghanistan had 
become one of the leading countries in the world ‘in which narcotics constitute a 
serious problem.’8 By 1972 the situation had little changed and although production 
was at comparatively low levels measured against that in later decades, the 
International Narcotics Control Board at this time officially recognised the potential for 
Afghanistan to present among the greatest challenges to international control of illicit 
production and traffic.9 At this stage traditional routes of supply in the Golden Triangle 
countries were disrupted by the collapse of the governments and war in Vietnam and 
Laos. A prolonged drought in the Golden Triangle area in the late 1970’s also 
contributed to reduce poppy production in that region, leaving a gap for Golden 
Crescent countries, including Afghanistan, to meet a rapidly increasing demand for 
opiates in Western Europe and North America. Within Afghanistan itself, resistance to 
Soviet occupation in 1979 resulted in the PDPA government losing control of opium 
producing rural areas, allowing cultivation to continue unchecked. 10 
 
 
 
 
Soviet invasion and civil war period: 1979-1996 
As a consequence of devastation wrought on the country by the communist coup in 
1978 and the Soviet invasion in 1979 ordinary agricultural production declined as 
irrigation systems were destroyed, livestock was depleted and large sections of the 
rural population fled the countryside.11 The nature of normal rural enterprises changed 
and poppy cultivation replaced arable crops in large sections of the country,12 not only 
because of the deterioration of regular agricultural trade but also of the increasing trend 
of factions involved in the war to rely on the narcotics trade to purchase arms. 
Mujahidin resistance leaders13 cultivated foreign patronage, particularly from the United 
States, and consequent financial support for their cause to consolidate their power 
bases and build small armies, funded in turn by investment in the production and 
                                                 
8
 Bulletin on Narcotics, Vol. XIV, No.1, Jan-March 1962, p. 41 
9
 UNODCCP, note 1, p.31  
10
 UNODC, note 4, p. 88 
11
 UNODCCP, note 1; the Soviet campaign led to the destruction of the infrastructure of the rural economy 
and a decline in food production of almost two-thirds over the period from 1979 to 1988, p.32 
12
 See Hyman, A. Afghanistan under Soviet Domination, 1964-1991 (1992) London: MacMillan. By the late 
1970’s opium poppy was cultivated in over half of Afghanistan’s 28 provinces, p. 36.  
13
 For example, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Ismat Muslim and Pir Sayad Ahmed Gaylani 
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trafficking of opium.14 Poppy cultivation increased at a time when competing Golden 
Crescent countries such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan were introducing prohibitive 
policies and enforcing severe counter narcotics laws. These internal and external 
influences coincided in the 1980’s to establish Afghanistan as one of the world’s 
leading countries in opium production and trade. By 1989 it was accounting for 35% of 
global opium production.15  
 
The collapse of the country into civil war following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 
1989 resulted in the breakdown of central power and irreparable damage to centralised 
counter narcotic enforcement strategies and agencies. Afghanistan became a non-
state ‘marketing corridor’16 in which opium production expanded as competing regional 
politico-military factions sought to profit from the narcotics trade to support their war 
economies. Former mujahidin leaders used profits from the drugs trade to make the 
transition from guerrilla resistance fighters to political power-holders, protecting their 
independent strongholds with well-equipped conventional armies and using the 
financial gains from the drug trade to engender political support by meeting the 
subsistence needs of their local populations and sponsoring regional institution-
building.17 The opium economy was decentralised and controlled by private actors who 
enjoyed unregulated and largely unfettered command over their geographical sections 
of the opium trade which they employed to support their own war economies.  
 
 
 
The Taliban era: 1996-2001 
The opium economy was the bedrock of warlord power between 1989 to 1994. 
However, its funding of civil war, and resulting promotion of lawlessness and corruption 
during this period contributed to increasing support for the Taliban and a weakening of 
warlord supremacy when the Taliban emerged as a political force in 1994. The 
Taliban’s designs for creating a centralised Islamic nation state enjoyed considerable 
appeal amongst a population tired of internecine warlord fighting and political 
uncertainty. With a large groundswell of support the Taliban were able to control 90% 
                                                 
14
 Felbab-Brown, note 7, p.129. See also Goodhand, note 279, chapter 3, p.408 
15
 UNODCCP, note 1, p.32 
16
 Goodhand, note 276, chapter 3, p.199 
17
 See Rubin, note 24, chapter 3; Rubin notes that in an interview in 1987 Mullah Nasim Akhundaza 
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of the country on assuming power in 1994.18 As a result they took centralised control 
over opium production and trafficking, which it augmented by the establishment of new 
coalitions with the merchant class of the Afghan-Pakistan border to facilitate smuggling 
and trafficking enterprises.19 Within a short period of time the Taliban were controlling 
96% of the areas under cultivation and generating approximately US$30 million per 
year through taxes on the narcotics trade alone.20 Cultivation remained unchecked and 
annual levels of production were relatively unchanged in the first four years of Taliban 
rule, averaging between 2,200 to 2,800 metric tonnes a year until 1999 witnessed a 
marked increase in production to 4,500 metric tonnes, equivalent to 79% of the total 
global opium output.21 At this stage, according to Goodhand, ‘opium was a de facto 
legal commodity, as indicated by its cultivation on prime agricultural land.’22 Just as 
production was reaching these peak levels, however, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar 
issued a decree in August 1999 authorising all poppy farmers to reduce cultivation by 
one third and this, coupled with the effects of a severe drought, led to cultivation levels 
falling by 28% in 2000. This was followed by the imposition of a total ban on opium 
poppy cultivation in July 2000 on the basis of its contravention of Islamic principles, 
resulting in a dramatic fall in production in 2001 to 74 metric tonnes,23 representing a 
mere 1.6% of the cultivation levels reached two years earlier in 1999. While it is 
estimated that the Taliban prohibition brought about a 90% reduction in cultivation of 
opium in 2001,24 the ban nevertheless did not extend to exportation and it continued to 
be the regime’s primary source of foreign exchange until its demise later that year.25  
 
The reasoning behind the Taliban’s sudden change of policy from the promotion of 
poppy cultivation to a position of intolerance in 1999 remains unclear. The intent may 
have been to facilitate international negotiations at a time of Security Council imposed 
sanctions. Alternatively, given the theocratic nature of the regime, it may have been the 
result of religious motivations. In a BBC interview in November 2008, the Taliban 
official spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid confirmed that the Taliban interpretation of the 
Qu’ran was that drug production should be prohibited and it was therefore ‘un-Islamic.’ 
Mujahid claimed that for that reason they ‘controlled it when in power’ and ‘never got 
                                                 
18
 Goodhand, note 16, p.199 
19
 Goodhand, note 14, p.408 
20
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any money from drugs.’ 26  A more cynical conclusion would be that the Taliban 
leadership was intent on reducing production to increase prices in an effort to create a 
more favourable market from which they could later profit. Opium production until then 
had doubled under the Taliban regime between 1996 and 1999, to a peak of 4,600 
tons.27 Following the production ban some areas of Afghanistan witnessed a dramatic 
increase in opium prices, reportedly as much as ten-fold, in the period between June 
2000 and February 2001.28  
 
 
Post-Taliban Opium Economy: 2001-2005 
It was really only in the last two decades of the 20th century that the opium industry 
expanded and became deeply entrenched in Afghanistan. In the 1930’s opium 
production was limited to 3 provinces. By 1994 it was conducted in 8 provinces but 
within 6 years this had increased to 22, representing 80% of all of the country’s 
provinces.29 This expansion had largely been the result of the collapse of the state 
during Soviet occupation in the 1980’s and the civil war in the 1990’s and the 
consequent inability of central government to enforce prohibitions on cultivation and 
trafficking. This coincided with the collapse of the economy and agricultural trade and a 
movement by rural households towards poppy cultivation as a means of livelihood, 
encouraged by ethnic warlords who were able to engage in trafficking enterprises by 
establishing ethnic trade links across borders.30 During the Taliban period the opium 
trade had continued largely unchecked by central authorities as a de-facto legal 
enterprise.31  
 
However, the removal of the Taliban in 2001 brought about further dramatic changes to 
Afghanistan’s opium economy. There was a rapid resurgence in poppy cultivation, 
epitomised by a leap in production from 200 to 3,400 metric tons in twelve months from 
2001 to 2002.32 The rise in poppy prices following the Taliban period of prohibition 
                                                 
26
 BBC interview with Zaiullah Mujahid, Taliban official spokesman 13.11.2008 available at 
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encouraged poor farmers to plant poppy to clear their debts and wealthier farmers to 
turn land into profit. Furthermore, as a result of the US policy of giving money to local 
commanders in return for their support in the ‘war on terror’ the money market was 
flooded with millions of US dollars which were used to create loans to farmers to 
finance future poppy crops.33 Between 2002 and 2004 opium cultivation increased from 
3400 to 4200 metric tonnes.34 By 2004 opium cultivation was taking place in all of 
Afghanistan’s 32 provinces and had increased to an unprecedented 131,000 hectares, 
a rise of 64% from levels in 2003.35 Afghanistan was producing 4,200 metric tonnes of 
opium, accounting for 87% of global poppy cultivation. 36  A smaller crop in 2005 
produced a similar amount due to more favourable weather and environmental 
conditions.37 
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INTERIM CRIMINAL CODE FOR COURTS 
 
 
Chapter 1 General Provisions 
 
Article 1 Applicable Rules 
  
1.  Three judges shall be assigned to every primary court. One of them as President of 
the Court.  In places where the said team cannot be deployed because of lack of 
availability or security reasons, one judge shall be assigned thereto, functioning as 
a monocratic court. The  decision to deploy one judge to a district as a monocratic 
court is made by the President of the Provincial Court.   
 
Article 2 Record of Procedural Activities 
 
1. All the activities accomplished in execution of the provisions of this code shall be 
recorded in written form by a public officer. 
a. The judicial police activities shall be recorded by a police officer taking 
part in the operations. 
b. The Saranwal activities shall be recorded by a secretary of the office. 
c. The activities of the judges shall be recorded by a clerk. 
2. The activities which are mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article include a full text   
or a terse compilation of the statements of the suspect, accused, victim, expert and 
witness as well as the description of the expert’s activities and the running of the 
hearings. 
3. The records of the statements of the suspect, accused, victim and witness shall be 
undersigned by them or when the person is unable to do so signed by finger 
prints. 
4. In case the latter refuse or are unable to sign, the public officer responsible for the 
recording shall mention the circumstances. 
5. The above mentioned records constitute official documents. 
6. The lack of recording, apart possible disciplinary actions against the responsible 
of the omission brings about the legal inexistence of the related activities. 
 
Article 3 Terms 
 
1. The procedural terms are indicated by hours or days. 
2. When a term established by days expires on a holiday it is extended to the 
following working day. 
3. In the calculation of the duration of the term the hour or the day of 
commencement shall not be included. 
4. The final day term for filing a document or accomplishing any procedural activity 
expires at the hour of closure of business of the related office as established by the 
home rules. 
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Article 4 Presumption of Innocence 
 
1. From the moment of the introduction of the penal action until when the criminal 
responsibility has been assessed by a final decision the person is presumed 
innocent.  Therefore decisions involving deprivations or limitations of human 
rights must be strictly confined to the need of collecting evidence and establishing 
the truth. 
 
Article 5 Suspect and Accused 
 
1. A person is considered a suspect when in any deed of the investigations the 
commission of a crime is attributed to him. 
2. A person is considered an accused when an act of indictment has been enacted 
by the Saranwal according to paragraph 4 of article 39. 
3. The quality of accused remains until when the person is discharged or sentenced 
by a final decision. 
4. The suspect and the accused shall not undergo intimidations or any form of 
physical or psychological pressure. 
5. Their statements shall be made in a condition of absolute moral freedom. 
6. The suspect and the accused have the right to abstain from making any 
statement even when they are questioned by the relevant police or judicial 
authorities. 
7. The police, the Saranwal and the Court are duty bound to clearly inform the 
suspect and the accused before interrogation and at the time of arrest about his 
or her right to remain silent, right to representation at all times by defense 
counsel, and right to be present during searches, line-ups, expert examinations 
and trial. 
8. The words or terms “suspect” and “accused” also include in their definition 
his/her defense counsel. 
 
Article 6 Duration of Provisional Arrest 
 
1. The terms for the duration of provisional detention following the arrest during the 
investigative phase are those established in article 36. 
2. During the trial at the Primary level, the Court can extend the detention for two 
additional months; during the trial at the appeal level the Court can extend the 
detention for another two months term; during the trial before the Supreme Court 
the detention can be further extended by the same Court for additional five 
months. 
3. Whether during the celebration of the above mentioned trials the related terms 
expire, the arrested person shall be released. 
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Article 7 Exclusionary Rule 
 
1. The evidence which has been collected without respect of the legal requirements 
indicated in the law is considered invalid and the Court cannot base its judgment 
on it. 
 
Article 8 Final Decision 
 
1. The decision of the Primary Court is final if a valid appeal has not been filed 
within the term prescribed by the law. 
2. The decision of the Court of Appeal is final if recourse to the Supreme Court has 
not been filed within the term prescribed by the law. 
3. The decision of the Supreme Court is final. 
4. The Saranwal at the Primary Court shall give execution to the final decisions. To 
this end the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court shall deliver to the Saranwal 
at the Primary Court that adopted the initial decision the file containing the 
procedural documents and the objects confiscated. 
 
Article 9 Denunciation of Forgery 
 
1. In every phase of the proceeding, the suspect, the accused and the victim can 
denounce the forgery of a document considered among the evidence material. 
2. The denunciation is submitted to the Primary Saranwal during the investigations 
and to the Court in the successive phases and degrees. 
3. The Saranwal is also entitled to make the denunciation of forgery to the Court. 
4. If the investigating Primary Saranwal or the Court deems the denunciation 
grounded the procedure is stayed. In this case the same Saranwal during the 
investigation phase or the competent Saranwal to whom the document shall be 
transmitted introduces the penal action for forgery. 
5. The proceedings are resumed when the issue has been settled by a final decision. 
6. Otherwise the proceedings are not discontinued and the document in question is 
delivered after the final decision to the Primary Saranwal for the adoption of the 
decisions belonging to his competence. 
7. In the decision that rejects the denunciation of forgery the suspect or accused that 
made the case can be sentenced according to provisions of law. 
 
Article 10 Abstention and disqualification of the Saranwal 
 
1. The primary Saranwal is entitled to request his superior to make him abstaining 
from the investigations when he believes that there are grounded reasons to do so. 
2. The suspect has the right to request the higher Saranwal to exonerate the primary 
Saranwal conducting the investigations against him, presenting the evidence of 
the occurrence of the grounded reasons indicated in pararagraph 1. 
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3. The superior Saranwal can decide to authorize the abstention of the Primary 
Saranwal or exonerate him accepting his request or responding to a complaint of 
the suspect when there are grounded reasons to do so. 
4. When the superior Saranwal has authorized the abstention of the Primary 
Saranwal or has exonerated him, shall substitute the same. 
 
Article 11 Abstention of the Judge 
 
1. A judge cannot handle the case if: 
a. the crime was committed against him or his relatives;  
b. he has performed the duties of the judicial police, of the Saranwal or has 
given witness or functioned as an expert in the same case;  
c. he has been defense counsel of the accused. 
2. When the cases indicated in paragraph 1 occur, the judge of a single member 
court shall request the President of the Provincial Court to authorize him to 
abstain. 
3. When the cases indicated in paragraph 1 occur to a judge member of a collegial 
court, then he or she shall request the President of the Court to authorize him or 
her to abstain.  
4. When the cases indicated in paragraph 1 occur to the President of a collegial 
court, he or she shall request the President of the next higher court to authorize 
him or her to abstain.   
5. The President of the appropriate level Court either accepts or rejects the request.  
This decision cannot be protested. 
6. When the President of the appropriate level Court authorizes the abstention, he or 
she shall substitute the requesting judge or President for the handling of the case. 
7. Pending the decision, the criminal procedures shall be stayed. 
 
Article 12 Disqualification of the Judge 
 
1.  The accused or the Saranwal can request the disqualification of a judge or a 
President when  he/she thinks that one of the cases indicated in paragraph 1 of art. 
11 occurs. 
The request shall be addressed according to the case to the appropriate President 
 indicated in paragraph 2, 3 and 4 of art. 11. 
The president either accepts or rejects the request.  
      2.   In case of acceptance, the President of the appropriate level Court shall substitute    
the disqualified judge or President.  This decision cannot be protested. 
5. Pending the decision, the criminal procedures shall be stayed. 
 
Article 13 Definition of Flagrante Delicto 
 
1.  A crime is considered flagrante delicto in the moment in which is committed.   
2.  The perpetrator who is caught during the commission of crime is in a state of 
“flagrante delicto.”   
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3.  It is considered also in state of flagrante delicto the prepetrator when, upon the 
commission of the crime, is immediately pursued by the police, or the victim or other 
persons.   
 
Article 14 Joinder and Severance of Cases 
 
1. The Primary Saranwal or the Court can join different cases when: 
a. a suspect or an accused is alleged of having committed more than one 
crime; 
b. different investigations or trials are conducted in relation to 
accomplishers in the same crime; 
c. the same evidence is relevant for different crimes. 
2. The primary Saranwal and the Court can sever joint cases when: 
a. this contributes to a more expeditious handling of them; 
b. adults and minors are accomplishers in the same crime. 
 
 Article   15  Procedural Nullity and Consequences 
 
1. The criminal procedure is considered null and so declared, even ex officio, when: 
a. The persons who have acted as judges or Saranwal did not posses the 
related legal status;  
b. The procedure has not been instituted by the Saranwal and when he has 
not been present in cases in which his presence is mandatory. 
 
Article 16 Procedural Invalidities and their Consequences 
 
1. All the violations of procedural provisions different from those indicated in the 
previous article bring about the invalidity of the procedure only if they are 
denounced by the interested party. 
2. When the denunciation is made during the investigations or the trials the 
responsible judicial authority shall make decisions to redress the procedure 
whenever possible. 
3. In any case the denunciation can be made in the appeal or in the recourse to the 
Supreme Court. 
4. The Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court declares the invalidity of the 
procedure whenever it appears that the violations of procedural provisions have 
provoked relevant distortions in the decision of the case. 
 
Article 17 General Rules for Notifications 
 
1. The notifications are served by the judicial police that shall give the requesting 
judicial organs a report on the service rendered. 
2. The notifications are served in the domicile of the concerned person in his hands 
or in the hands of an adult relative or cohabitant. Should this not be possible, a 
copy of the deed is left at his dwelling place. 
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3. When the person is under arrest the notification is served on him through the 
Director of the prison. 
4. When it has not been possible to locate the domicile of the concerned person, the 
judicial police shall conduct accurate investigations aimed at identifying the 
places where the person lives or works. In case the search for finding these places 
proves fruitless, the notification deed shall be delivered to the administrative 
organ of the place considered as the person’s last place of residence. 
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Chapter 2 Common Provisions for the Suspect and the Accused 
 
Article 18 Defense Counsel 
 
1. Legal assistance to the suspect and the accused requires the service of a qualified 
professional. 
2. To this end an official register is established in the Ministry of Justice where only 
persons with a university degree in law or sharia can be included. 
3. The suspect and the accused can be, in any case, assisted by a defense counsel of 
their choice. 
 
Article 19 Legal Aid 
 
1.  The suspect or the accused be financially unable to appoint a defense attorney are 
entitled to have a  free defense attorney appointed for him or her in the following 
manner: 
a. The investigating Saranwal or the Court adjudicating the case, on the petition of 
the person, appoints a defense attorney for the destitute person from amongst the 
lawyers officially permitted to work as defense attorney. 
b. The person for whom an attorney has been appointed reserves the right not to 
accept the appointed defense attorney and to defend himself in person. 
c. The fees of the aforesaid attorney shall be paid from the State budget and its 
extent shall be fixed by regulation. 
 
Article 20 Interpreter 
 
1. The suspect or the accused who does not know the language used during the 
investigations and the trials or who is deaf, dumb or deaf and dumb shall be given 
an interpreter for, at least, explaining to him the charge and the indictment and for 
assisting him during the interrogations and confrontations. 
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Chapter 3 Reporting of Crimes and Role of the Saranwal 
 
Article 21 Reporting of Crimes 
 
1. Police are duty bound to report within 24 hours to the Primary Saranwal all the 
crimes they happen to know. 
2. Public officers are duty bound to report crimes ascertained in the performance of 
their duties. 
3. Private citizens are duty bound to report to the judicial police or the Primary 
Saranwal only crimes against internal and external security. 
 
Article 22 Institution of Proceedings 
 
1. The Primary Saranwal has the obligation to introduce the penal action for 
prosecution of all crimes, known directly by him or reported to him, committed in 
the territory of the District, unless otherwise expressly provided by law. 
2. The Saranwal shall not dismiss or stay a case except as otherwise provided by the 
law. 
 
Article 23 Investigations 
 
1. The Primary Saranwal performs the investigation activities by his own or making 
recourse to the collaboration of the judicial police. 
2. The purpose of the criminal investigation is the establishment of the truth and in 
order to do so the Primary Saranwal shall extend his assessment to cover all facts 
and evidence relevant for establishing whether the crime has been committed and 
ascertaining who is responsible for it. 
3. In conducting the investigations the Primary Saranwal is duty bound to evaluate 
incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally and to respect the interest of 
the victims. 
 
Article 24  Transfer of the Investigation 
 
1. When in the course of the investigations it appears that the competence belongs to 
another District the Primary Saranwal shall transfer the case to the latter. 
2. The suspect who deems that the competence belongs to a different Primary 
Saranwal can submit to the investigating Primary Saranwal a request for transfer. 
3. Should the Primary Saranwal refuse to transfer, the suspect can file a complaint to 
the higher Saranwal, whose decision cannot be protested. 
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Chapter 4   Jurisdiction of the Courts 
 
Article 25  Jurisdiction on crimes 
 
1. The District Courts are competent for adjudicating petty, misdemeanors and 
felony crimes according to the provisions of the law.   
 
Article 26 Territorial Jurisdiction 
 
1. The territorial jurisdiction is determined by the place where the crime is 
committed. 
2. In case of attempt crime the competence belongs to the Court which has 
jurisdiction on the place where the last action for the commission of the crime has 
been accomplished. 
3. In case of continuing or permanent crime the competence belongs to the Court 
having jurisdiction on the place where the continuation or the permanence ceased. 
4. When an accused is to be adjudicated for more than one crime, the territorial 
competence belongs to the Court having jurisdiction in the venue where the most 
serious crime has been committed. 
5. When the Court realizes that in cases of multiple crimes committed by the 
accused the most serious crime has been committed in another venue, it shall 
transfer the procedure to the court having jurisdiction in that venue. 
 
Article 27 Conflict between Two Courts 
 
1. When between two District Courts located in the same Province raises a conflict 
on the attribution of territorial jurisdiction, the case is ruled by the President of the 
Provincial Court. 
2. When the said conflict raises between Courts in different Provinces, the case is 
ruled by the Supreme Court. 
3. The settlement of the territorial jurisdiction conflict is made at the request of one 
of the conflicting Courts or of the related Saranwal. 
4. The decision settling the conflict is notified to the competent Court. 
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Chapter 5 Duties and Jurisdiction of Judicial Police 
 
Article 28  Categories of Judicial Police Officers 
 
1. Judicial police are categorized as follows: 
a. the Judicial police’s commissioned officers are the superior ranks of the 
State  police;  
b. the ordinary officers of the judicial police are the low ranks of the State 
police. 
2. Special laws can attribute the functions of judicial police to other public officers. 
 
Article 29 Role of Judicial Police 
 
1. The judicial police perform their duties under the direction and supervision of the 
Saranwal. 
2. The judicial police have the role of detecting crimes, collecting evidence, and 
seeking suspects in the pursuit of justice. 
 
Article 30 Judicial Police’s Arrest 
 
1. The judicial police shall arrest on their own initiative: a) the offender who is 
caught in state of flagrante delicto of misdemeanors, punished by medium term 
imprisonment, or felony; b) the person who is allegedly the author of a felony and 
there is risk of his disappearance. 
2. In all other circumstances, the judicial police perform arrests only in execution of 
orders of the judicial authorities. 
 
Article 31 Judicial Police’s Interrogation 
 
1. The judicial police, after having identified the person arrested on their own 
initiative, inform him of the reasons of the arrest and interrogate the same about 
the crime and its circumstances within a maximum of twenty-four hours. 
2. Immediately after a report shall be sent to the Primary Saranwal and the person 
shall be put at his disposal. 
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Article 32 Judicial Police’s Urgent Activities 
 
1. In case of flagrante delicto and whenever there are grounded reasons to believe 
that urgent action is needed to preserve the evidence the judicial police can, on 
their own initiative, conduct preliminary investigations which include: 
a. personal frisks or searches of premises and other places; 
b. seizure of objects and documents; 
c. inspection of persons and places, taking photos; 
d. requesting the assistance of experts for performing activities which require 
special professional qualification. 
2. Immediately after having performed the above listed activities, the judicial police 
shall send a report to the Primary Saranwal. 
3. Defense Counsel of suspect and accused has the right to be present in 
investigation and interrogation phases according to art. 38 of this code. 
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Chapter 6 Investigation Performed by the Saranwal 
 
Article 33 Ratification of the Police’s Decisions 
 
1. The Primary Saranwal immediately after having been informed about the judicial 
police’s activities indicated in articles 30, 31 and 32 either sanctions the deeds of 
the judicial police’s activities or adopts decisions to revoke or modify them. 
2. Before taking the actions mentioned in the previous paragraph the Saranwal can 
ask the police to provide explanations. 
 
Article 34 Interrogation of the Person Arrested 
 
1. The Primary Saranwal shall interrogate the person arrested within forty-eight 
hours from the moment when the person has been put at his disposal. 
2. The Primary Saranwal can release the arrested suspect whenever he deems no 
more necessary the deprivation of liberty. 
 
Article 35 Arrest and Seizures by the Primary Saranwal 
 
1. In the course of the investigations activities the Primary Saranwal can order the 
arrest of the alleged author of a misdemeanor punishable by medium term 
imprisonment or felony and seizure of items and goods connected with the crime. 
2. The person arrested shall be interrogated within forty-eight hours. 
 
Article 36 Terms for Indictment in Case of Arrest 
 
1. When the arrest performed by the Judicial Police is sanctioned or when the arrest 
has been ordered by the Saranwal and it remains in force, the arrested person shall 
be released if the Saranwal has not presented the indictment to the Court within 
fifteen days from the moment of the arrest except when the Court, at the timely 
request of the Saranwal, has authorized the extension of the term for not more 
than fifteen additional days. 
 
Article 37 Collection of Evidence 
 
1. During the investigations phase the Primary Saranwal shall collect all relevant 
evidence which can substantiate a decision pros or cons the suspect. 
2. The collection of evidence is not restricted to particular forms or matters.  The 
Primary Saranwal is free in selecting tools and modalities of proof. 
3. The following shall be considered as key tools: 
a. Witnesses 
b. Confrontations 
c. Line up procedures 
d. Inspections 
e. Searches 
f. Seizure 
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g. Expert exams and evaluations 
h. Interrogations  
 
Article 38 Defense Counsel Presence 
 
1. The defense counsel has the right to be present at all times during the 
interrogation of the suspect. 
2. The suspect and the defense counsel have the right to be present during searches, 
confrontations, line-up procedures and expert examinations as well as during the 
trial. 
3. In the investigation phase the Saranwal and the judicial police shall notify the 
suspect and his defense counsel of searches, confrontations, line-up procedures 
and expert examinations in order to allow them to be present.  This duty can be 
waived only when there is an urgent need to conduct the said operations, which is 
defined as when it is a flagrante delicto crime or there is a fear of the loss of 
evidential facts.  
 
Article 39 Conclusion of the Investigation 
 
1. At the conclusion of the investigations phase, if the Primary Saranwal deems that 
there is not grounded evidence dismisses the case. 
2. The victim or higher Saranwal can file a complaint to the Court against this 
decision within ten days. 
3. The Court, after having examined the case, can confirm the decision of the 
Saranwal or vice versa request him to lodge the indictment. 
4. In any other case the Saranwal shall submit to the Court the act of indictment 
requesting the assessment by trial of the criminal responsibility of the indicted 
person. 
5. The act of indictment is comprised of the following: 
a. Complete identification of the suspect; 
b. Complete description of the crime. 
6. Together with the act of indictment the Primary Saranwal shall transmit to the 
Court the file containing all the deeds formed during the investigations, putting at 
the Court’s disposal the seized items and goods. 
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Chapter 7   Notification of the Deeds and Representation During the Investigations 
 
Article 40 Notification on the suspect 
 
1. During the investigations the judicial police and the Saranwal shall give 
notifications of the deeds to the suspect, to his defense counsel and the victim of 
the activities to be accomplished, to which they have the right to be present. 
2. If there are no particular grounded reasons of urgency, the notification should be 
served at least three days before the performance of the activity.  
3. Reasons of urgency imposing a shorter period or absence of notifications shall be 
clearly mentioned in the record of the activities.  
 
Article 41 Notification on the Not Found Suspect and his Representation 
 
1. When it has not been possible to identify any of the places indicated in article 17, 
the notifications shall be served on a defense counsel appointed by the police 
during their autonomous investigations, or by the Saranwal during his 
investigations. 
2. The appointment of the defense counsel is made by the police and the Saranwal in 
a written form. 
3. In this case the defense counsel represents the suspect. 
4. The above indicated decision ceases to take effect at the end of the investigations.   
 
 
 19
 
Chapter 8  The Trial 
 
 
Article 42 Preparation of the Trial 
 
1. The Court immediately after having received the act of indictment, orders the 
notification of the deed indicating the day and hour fixed for the commencement 
of the trial. 
2. The deed shall contain the name of the accused and the indication of the alleged 
crime with its factual circumstances in reference to the related law provisions and 
shall be served on the accused and his defense counsel, the victim and the 
Saranwal at least five days in advance. 
 
Article 43 Access of the Accused to the Findings of the Investigation   
 
1. The accused and his defense counsel are entitled to examine the documents 
contained in the file mentioned in the last paragraph of article 39 and the objects 
under seizure. 
 
Article 44 Mental Insane Accused 
 
1. If during the trial it appears that the accused suffers of a mental illness which 
prevents him from the possibility of defense, the Court either ex officio or at the 
request of the Primary Saranwal stays the proceeding submitting the accused to 
mental examination. 
2. Should examination confirm the above indicated mental state, the resumption of 
the proceedings is postponed until the suspect recovers. 
3. In case the accused is later on sentenced to imprisonment, the time spent in a 
close institution for the mental examination is detracted from the prison term.  
 
Article 45 Accused’s Obligation to Appear 
 
1. The accused, either under detention or at liberty, shall be obliged to appear before 
the court when confrontations or experiments involving his physical presence are 
scheduled. 
2. The accused at liberty refusing to appear in the instances indicated in the previous 
paragraph shall be accompanied by the police. 
 
Article 46 Trial in Absence of the Not Found Accused 
 
1. When it has not been possible to serve the notifications on the accused in any of 
the forms provided for in article 17, because none of the places there indicated are 
known, the Court shall issue a decree stating that the accused cannot be found, 
appointing a defense counsel for him. 
2. Later on the notifications shall be served on the defense counsel. 
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3. Notifications made in this way are valid to all intents and purposes. The accused 
that cannot be found is represented by the defense counsel. 
4. The decree indicated in the first paragraph ceases to take effect at the end of the 
degree in which has been issued and shall be re-issued in each of the following 
degrees. 
5. Every decree must be preceded by a new search in the places indicated in article 
17. 
 
Article 47 Trial in Absence of the Summoned Accused 
 
1. When the notification indicated in article 42 has been delivered to the accused and 
he does not appear, the judge appoints a defense counsel for him. 
2. Notifications continue to be served on the accused following the provisions of 
article 17. 
 
Article 48 Hearings in Progress 
 
1. When the trial requires more than one hearing, the Court fixes the date and hour 
of the successive hearing, giving verbal notice to the accused, the defense counsel 
and the other persons who have to appear. 
 
Article 49 Attendance of Witnesses and Experts 
 
1. Witnesses and experts are duty bound to be present in the hearing indicated in the 
notification served on them. 
2. If they do not appear without grounded justifications the Court orders their 
accompaniment by the police imposing on them a fine up to 500 Afghani. 
 
Article 50 Oaths 
 
1.  Witnesses who have completed fourteen years of age are duty bound to swear, 
before giving evidence in Allah’s name to tell the truth and be honest in their 
testimony.  
2. If the witness has used the term “Ash-ha-do” knowing that the term itself implies 
taking an oath, he or she is not required to swear in that terms.  However, it is 
permissible for information gathering to hear the testimony of a witness under 
fourteen years of age without making him take the oath of truthfulness. 
 
Article 51 Admission of Witnesses and Experts 
 
1. The Primary Saranwal submits to the Court the list of the witnesses and experts he 
wants to be heard together with the act of indictment, indicating the reasons of the 
relevance of their testimony and exams. 
2. The accused and/or his defense counsel have the right to present their own lists of 
witnesses and experts indicating the reasons of the relevance of their testimony 
and exams. 
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3. The Court can exclude those witnesses or experts that in its view do not appear 
material for the adjudication of the case. 
4. The Court, on its own initiative, can order the appearance of witnesses or experts 
who are not included in the above mentioned lists. 
 
Article 52 Order of the Hearing 
 
1. The order of the hearing is explained to the persons present by the Head of the 
Court. 
2. The court keeps the order of the hearing.  Hearings are open to the public except 
when the court decides that all or part of it shall be run without the presence of the 
public for reasons of morality, family confidentiality or public order. 
3. The Primary Saranwal, the accused and his defense counsel have the right to be 
always present. 
4. The accused that with his behavior disrupts the proceedings can be excluded by 
the Court for part or all the duration of the hearing.  He is anyhow readmitted in 
the room when the verdict is read out. 
 
Article 53 Conduct of the Hearing 
 
1. The Primary Saranwal is duty bound to take part in the hearing. 
2.   The accused and his defense counsel have the right to be present. 
3.   The Court proceedings are conducted according to the following order: 
a. At the opening of the hearing the Court reads out the act of indictment;   
b. When the accused is under detention the Court shall immediately assess 
the legality of the arrest and order the liberation of the accused when 
realizes that the arrest was unlawful or not necessary; 
c. The Primary Saranwal makes an oral presentation of the case and of the 
findings of the investigations; 
d. The judicial police officers who have conducted the investigations make 
oral reports of the activities accomplished; 
e. The first witness to be heard is the victim; 
f. Then the other witnesses and the experts are heard; 
g. The accused can testify if he does not avail himself of the right to remain 
silent and the accused or his defense counsel can ask questions to the 
witnesses and the experts; 
h. In case the witness cannot be present for health reasons the Court can hear 
him in his domicile; 
i. The primary Saranwal and the defense lawyer can ask question to the 
accused.  
4.     The Court can, at any time, address questions to the accused, to any witness in 
the hearing and order confrontations.   
5. The accused can refuse to answer the questions of the Court consistent with his 
right to remain silent. 
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Article 54 Exemption from Testimony 
 
1.  Spouses have the right not to give evidence against each other, even though their 
marital relation be ended. 
2.  The accused’s ancestors and descendants and their relatives of second degree have 
the right to avoid testifying against one another except when: 
         a. the charge legally attributed to the accused is not committed against the witness 
himself; or  
         b. they reported the criminal offense. 
 
Article 55 Evidentiary Value of Investigative Activities 
 
1. The records of the testimonies of the witnesses as well as of the expert exams, 
collected during the investigative phase, can have the value of evidence as basis 
for the decision only if it results that the accused and/or his defense counsel were 
present during the operations and were in a position to raise questions and make 
objections. 
2. Otherwise the related deeds have the sole value of clues. 
 
Article 56 Concurrent Crimes and Circumstances 
 
1. If from the deeds of the investigations or during the trial it results that there are 
alleged additional crimes and/or facts contributing as aggravating circumstances 
which have not been included in the act of indictment the Court, at the request of 
the Primary Saranwal, makes the related accusation to the accused and/or to his 
defense counsel, when present, giving them adequate time to prepare the defense. 
 
Article 57 Different Definition of the Crime  
 
When the Court deems that the crime is to be given a different definition from 
that indicated in the act of indictment on the basis of the same facts and 
circumstances included in the accusation shall grant the accused and the defense 
counsel a time allowance for presenting a defense vis-à-vis the change in the 
definition.  
 
Article 58 Conclusion of the Trial 
 
1. At the conclusion of the operations indicated in the previous articles, the Primary 
Saranwal expresses his opinion requesting the Court to make a decision of 
dismissal or sentence, indicating the kind and the amount of punishment he deems 
adequate. 
2. The accused or the defense counsel, when present, submits to the Court arguments 
in rebuttal of the accusation. 
 
 
 
 23
Article 59 Decision of the Court 
 
1. At the completion of the activities, the Court declares the closing of the hearing 
and leaves the trial room for writing down ‘in chamber’ the decision of the case. 
2. Later on, the Court enters the trial room again and reads out the verdict together 
with its reasons.  This reading has the value of notification.  If the reasons of the 
verdict are not read out by the Court in the same context, they shall be deposited 
in the office of the secretary of the Court within fifteen days from the moment of 
the decision. 
3. The Primary Saranwal, the accused and his defense counsel shall receive 
notification of the deposit indicated in pararagraph 2 of this article. 
4. The accused tried in absentia, in the case of article 47, shall receive notification of 
the decision read out by the Court together with the reasons deposited later on in 
the office of the secretary of the Court. 
5. The notification indicated in the previous paragraph is served on the defense 
counsel of the accused in the case of article 46. 
 
Article 60 Order of Arrest in the Decision 
 
1. When the Court decides to impose a sentence of more than three years of 
imprisonment in the same decision can include an order of arrest. 
 
Article 61 Requirements of the Decision 
 
1. The decision shall contain: 
a. The identification of the accused; 
b. The description of the facts and of the circumstances included in the 
accusation;  
c. A terse exposition of the reasons of the same decision with reference to 
facts and law provisions; 
d. The verdict 
 
Article 62 Payment of Expenses of the Procedure 
 
1. In imposing the sentence, the Court shall also order that the sentenced person pays 
the expenses incurred during the procedure. 
2. If the related amount cannot be specified in that moment the order shall be given 
in generic terms mandating the administrative office to make the calculation. 
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Chapter 9 Appeal Procedure 
 
Article 63 Appeal against the Decision of the Primary Court 
 
1. The person who has been sentenced or the Primary Saranwal can contest the 
decision of the Court by filing an appeal. 
2. The competent Court of Appeal is the Provincial Court. 
3. The act of appeal shall be deposited with the secretary of the Court, which has 
made the decision, or with the secretary of the competent Court of Appeal within 
twenty days from the moments in which: 
a. The Court has read out in the Court room, in the same context, the verdict 
and its reasons at the conclusion of a trial in which the accused and/or his 
defense council were present; 
b. The reasons of the verdict, which were not read out together with the 
verdict, have been notified to the accused and to the defense counsel; in 
this case the second notification is considered the beginning of the term; 
c. The accused tried in absentia has received the notification of the decision. 
4. When in the same decision more than one person has been sentenced the last 
notification is considered the beginning of the term for all sentenced. 
 
Article 64 Stay of the Procedure and Appeal of the decision in case of the not found 
accused 
 
1. After the decision of the court in case of the not found accused the procedure 
stays until when the accused personally or the defense counsel delegated by 
him/her lays down an appeal.  
2. In this case the beginning of the appeal term starts for the accused from the 
moment in which the same has been found and also a notification according to 
article 17 has been delivered to him/her.  
3. The beginning of the appeal term starts for the Saranwal from the moment in 
which the Court notifies him about the notification delivered to the accused.  
4. If the accused and the Saranwal do not lay down an appeal during the said term 
the decision becomes final. 
 
Article 65 Modalities of the Appeal 
 
1. The act of appeal shall be signed by the accused or by his defense counsel when 
the latter has represented the accused during the trial or by the Primary Saranwal. 
2. The secretary of the Court receiving the act of appeal has to register it specifying 
the date and hour of the delivery. 
3. If the accused who wants to file the appeal and delivers a written text is unable to 
sign it because illiterate or for any other reason he/she can fingerprint it and the 
secretary of the Court shall certify this in the register. 
4. If an illiterate person wants to file an appeal but is not in a position to present a 
written text, the secretary of the Court shall write down in the register his verbal 
statements. 
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Article 66 Content of Appeal 
 
1. The act of appeal shall contain the indication of the contested decision and expose 
the reasons according to which the decision is considered wrong. 
2. The denunciation of the errors of the decision shall make reference to: 
a. Wrong application of the law and definition of crime; 
b.   Wrong evaluation of facts and circumstances; 
c.    Wrong application of the penalty and/or of its amount. 
 
Article 67 Introductory Activities to the Appeal Trial 
 
1. When the act of appeal has been deposited with the secretary of the Court which 
has made the contested decision, he shall immediately transmit to the Provincial 
Court the act of appeal deposited with him, and a copy of the related annotations 
on the register. 
2. In the same time he shall forward to the Provincial Court the file containing all 
documents produced in the previous procedural phases, and the objects and 
documents seized. 
3. When the act of appeal has been deposited with the secretary of the competent 
court of appeal, the President of the Provincial Court shall request the secretary of 
the court, which has made the contested decision to transmit the file containing 
the documents produced in the previous procedural phases, the objects and 
documents seized.  
4.  The President of the Provincial Court, upon reception of the above indicated 
material, shall fix the date and hour of the hearing for discussing the appeal and 
shall order the police to notify to the appealer and the Provincial Saranwal his 
decision.  Similar notification shall be made to the appealing Primary Saranwal 
and to the adjudicated person in case the appeal was filed by the Primary 
Saranwal. 
5. The notification shall be served to the accused, the adjudicated person and the 
primary Saranwal at least five days before the date of the hearing. 
6.  The Provincial Saranwal, the accused, the adjudicated person and defense counsels 
have the right to consult the documents and to vision the seized material. 
 
Article 68 Powers of the Court of Appeal 
 
1. The Court of Appeal shall confine its review to the points of the decision to which 
the act of appeal makes reference. 
2.  When the Appeal is filed by the primary Saranwal the Court can: 
a. impose punishment in the case the accused was found not guilty in the 
Primary Court; 
b. increase the punishment in the case the decision was founded on an error 
in the    interpretation or application of the law.  
3.  When the appeal is filed only by the accused the Court can in no case increase the 
punishment inflicted by the Primary Court. 
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Article 69 Appeal Hearing 
 
1. Whether the Court of Appeal deems that the activities accomplished in the 
previous procedure are not sufficient for making a sound decision, it can hear the 
witnesses and experts already appeared in the Primary Court and collect new 
documents and explore new proofs. 
2. Otherwise the Court makes its decision on the basis of the existing material and of 
the arguments presented during the discussion. 
 
 
Article 70 Decision of the Court of Appeal 
 
1. The appeal is rejected if it has not been filed within the established term. 
2. The decision of the Court of Appeal can confirm or modify in all or in part the 
previous decision. 
3. In the verdict the Court can order the arrest of the accused or release the accused 
under arrest. 
4. The provisions of article 59 are applicable. 
 
 27
Chapter 10 Recourse to the Supreme Court 
 
Article 71 Recourse against the Decision of the Court of Appeal 
 
1. The person sentenced by the Court of Appeal, the victim or the Saranwal can 
lodge a recourse to the Supreme Court only if the complaint refers to: 
a. Violations in the application of the law or wrong interpretation of the law; 
and 
b. A decision based on the provisions of article 7. 
 
Article 72 Terms of the Recourse 
 
1. The act of recourse shall be deposited with the secretary of the Court of Appeal 
which has made the decision or with the secretary of the competent collegium of 
the Supreme Court within thirty days from the moments indicated in paragraph 3 
of article 63. 
 
Article 73 Modalities of the Recourse 
 
1. For the modalities of the act of recourse the provisions of article 65 are 
applicable. 
 
Article 74 Introductory Activities to the Supreme Court Trial 
 
1. When the act of recourse has been deposited with the secretary of the Court of 
Appeal, this shall immediately transmit to the Supreme Court the act of recourse 
deposited with him and a copy of the related annotations on the register. 
2. In the same time he shall forward to the Supreme Court the file containing all 
documents produced in the previous procedural phases, the objects and 
documents seized. 
3. When the act of recourse has been deposited with the secretary of the competent 
collegium of the Supreme Court this shall request the secretary of the Court of 
Appeal, which has made the contested decision to transmit the file containing all 
documents produced in the previous procedural phases, the objects and 
documents seized. 
4. The competent collegium of the Supreme Court, upon reception of the above 
indicated material shall fix the date and the hour of the hearing for discussing the 
recourse and shall order the police to notify to the accused claimant and to the 
Saranwal his decision.  Similar notification shall be made to the claimant 
Saranwal and to the adjudicated person when the recourse has been filed by the 
Saranwal. 
5. The notification shall be served to the accused, the adjudicated person and the 
Saranwal at least five days before the date of the hearing. 
6. The accused, the adjudicated person, defense counsels and the Saranwal have the 
right to consult the documents and to vision the seized material. 
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Article 75 Supreme Court Hearing 
 
1. At the opening of the hearing a judge of the collegium of Supreme Court makes 
an oral exposition of the case indicating the points of the Court of Appeal’s 
decision which are in question and the reasons of the complaint. 
2. Then the party which has filed the recourse makes an oral presentation of the 
recourse with comments on the alleged errors or violation of the law. 
3. Thirdly, the other party takes the floor presenting arguments in support of the 
appeal decision. 
4. During the discussion the President and the members of the Court can address 
question in order to receive clarifications on given issues.  At the end of the 
discussion the Court leaves the trial room and takes its decision in Chamber.  
Later on the Court enters the trial room and the President reads out the adopted 
verdict. 
5. The Court can read out the reasons of the decisions in the same context, or 
otherwise, deposit them with the secretariat later on. 
 
Article 76 Reject of the Recourse 
 
1. The Supreme Court rejects the recourse and confirms the decision when: 
a. It has not been lodged within the established term; 
b. The complaint does not concern one of the issues indicated in article 71; 
c. It results that the complaint is not grounded. 
 
Article 77 Amendment of the Protested Decision 
 
1. Wrong interpretations of the law or wrong references to law provisions contained 
in the reasons of the verdict of the Court of Appeal do not bring about the 
annulment of the protested decision if they have not had a decisive influence on 
the verdict.  In this case, the Supreme Court makes the amendments on its own 
and informs the Court which made the protested decisions about the errors. 
2. When in the protested decisions must be corrected only the kind or the amount of 
the punishment, because they were wrongly indicated or calculated, the correction 
is made directly by the Supreme Court. 
3. The Supreme Court amends directly the protested decision when law provisions 
more favorable to the accused, even if supervened after the filing of the recourse, 
must be applied. 
 
Article 78 Decision of the Supreme Court without Referral 
 
1. The Supreme Court quashes the protested decision when: 
a. The accusation does not constitute a crime, statute limitation has occurred 
or the prosecution was not permitted; 
b. The decision concerns matters which are beyond the jurisdiction powers; 
c. The sentence was adopted against a wrong person; 
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d. Results that for the same person and the same facts a previous decision 
was already adopted; 
e. The same Supreme Court deems superfluous to refer the decision or can 
amend it on the basis of the already existing documentation. 
 
Article 79 Referral to the Court of Appeal 
 
1. In any other case different from those indicated in articles 76, 77 and 78 the 
Supreme Court quashes the decision and refers the case to a Court of Appeal 
different from the one which made the decision or to the same Court composed by 
different judges. 
2. In its referral the Supreme Court gives directions to be followed in reviewing the 
case. 
3. The decision of the Court of Appeal can be protested according to the provisions 
of article 71 and following. 
 
Article 80 Scope of the Supreme Court Decision 
 
1. The protested decision can be quashed in full or in part. 
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Chapter 11 Review of Court Sentences 
 
Article 81 Cases of Revision 
 
1. It is permitted, at all times, the revision, in favor of the person sentenced for 
misdemeanors or felonies, of the final decision in the following cases: 
a. When the facts on which the sentence is based cannot be reconciled with 
the facts established in another final decision; 
b. When a judgment drawn up by a civil Court upon which the sentence is 
grounded has been quashed; 
c. When facts, circumstances or documents, demonstrating the innocence of 
the sentenced person, which were not known before the sentence, are 
newly disclosed or emerged; 
d. When it turns out by means of judicial assessment that the sentence was 
based on false testimonies, forged documents or any other fact of criminal 
nature which have been assessed by a final judicial decision; 
e. When after a sentence for murder new evidentiary elements supervene or 
emerge according to which results that the death of the person did not 
occur; 
f. When the sentence was adopted at the end of a process conducted without 
informing the accused by regular notifications or not giving him the 
possibility to appear so to deprive him of the right of defense or when a 
real impediment for appearing was not known or disregarded by the Court. 
 
Article 82 Right to Revision 
 
1. The revision can be requested by the Saranwal, the sentenced person, or his or her 
defense counsel, or a close relative or heir.  
2. In any instance, the request for revision must have the consent of the sentenced 
person unless the sentenced person is determined by the court to be incompetent, 
in which case the revision may be requested by the defense counsel or a close 
relative or heir without consent of the sentenced person. 
 
Article 83 Revision Procedure 
 
1. The petition for revision shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court together with 
the documents on which it is grounded. 
2. Filing a revision petition does not stay the execution of the protested sentence 
except in the case of capital punishment. 
3. The petition is evaluated by a Committee composed of a Supreme Court Justice 
and two appellate judges who are assigned by the Court’s Presidents for 
consideration of the case. 
4. The Attorney General shall express his opinion on the granting of the petition. 
5. If the Committee finds that the petition is not convincingly grounded rejects the 
same, otherwise submits the petition to the Supreme Court delivering together 
with it the related file. 
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6. The decision of the Committee cannot be protested. 
7. The Supreme Court upon reception of the petition and the related file shall fix a 
hearing ordering the notification of its decision to the requesting person and the 
attorney General that shall be served at least five days before the day of the 
hearing. 
8. During the hearing the sentenced person or his defense counsel and the Saranwal 
express their views on the fundament of the petition. 
9. In the event the Court approves the petition, it quashes the sentence and acquits 
the sentenced person if his innocence is obvious. 
10. If the Court deems that the petition is not based on valid grounds, rejects the 
same. 
11. When the Court finds that the case needs to be reassessed it shall dispatch the case 
to the Court that adopted the protested decision composed of different judges, or 
to another Court of the same level, giving it instructions for a proper review. 
12. The review shall be conducted according to the rules applicable for normal 
hearings and the decision adopted replaces the previous one, remaining subject to 
protests which were allowed against the latter. 
13. When as a consequence of the revision the sentenced person is acquitted the court, 
composed of different judges, shall order the restitution of the procedural 
expenses and any other cost paid as a result of the previous sentence.  In case the 
concerned person is dead the restitution shall be made to his heirs. 
14. Whenever a revision petition is rejected it is not allowed to file it again on the 
same grounds. 
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Chapter 12 Execution of Courts’ Final Decisions 
 
Article 84 Authority Responsible for Execution 
 
1. The execution of final decisions is the responsibility of the Saranwal indicated in 
paragraph 4 of article 8.    
 
Article 85 Execution of Prison Punishments 
 
1. The Saranwal shall transmit to the Commander of the local police office the order 
to commit the sentenced person to prison when the latter is not already detained. 
2. When the sentenced person is outside the jurisdiction of the local police office the 
police commander who has received the order shall forward it to the Commander 
of the police having jurisdiction on that place. 
3. The same Saranwal can send the order directly to the said Commander. 
4. If the sentenced person is already detained the Saranwal shall inform the Ministry 
of Justice about the sentence requesting its execution. 
5. The above mentioned order and information shall contain personal particulars and 
whatever is needed to identify the person as well as the indications of the judicial 
decision and of the penalty imposed. 
 
 
Article 86 Execution of Sanctions Alternative to Imprisonment 
 
1. The Saranwal shall transmit to the Commander of the local police office the order 
for the execution of sanctions alternative to imprisonment. 
2. The provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of article 85 are applicable. 
3. The police shall supervise the regularity of the execution and report to the 
Saranwal periodically about the behavior of the sentenced person. 
4. If the sentenced person infringes the prescriptions contained in the execution 
order the Saranwal shall report the case to the competent Court which can replace 
the adopted sanction with a prison term of original duration. 
 
Article 87 Execution of Fines 
 
1. The Saranwal shall transmit to the Ministry of Justice the order for the execution 
of fines.  
2. The Ministry of Justice, directly or requesting the collaboration of financial 
institutions, shall collect the indicated sums which will be delivered to the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
Article 88 Execution of Decisions for Confiscation of Objects and Assets 
 
1. The Saranwal shall transmit to the Command of the police having jurisdiction on 
the place where the objects and assets to be confiscated are located the related 
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order containing the indications needed for the identification of the said objects 
and assets. 
2. The confiscation and the destination of the objects and assets are performed by 
the police. 
 
Article 89 Special Provisions for the Execution 
 
1. The time spent under arrest before the final decision shall be deducted from the 
prison or alternative sanction term to be executed. 
2. When a prison sentence is to be executed towards a woman who is six months 
pregnant the Saranwal can stay the execution until four months after the 
delivering of the child. 
3. When a prison sentence is to be executed towards a person who results to be 
mental insane the execution is stayed until his recovery.  The Saranwal orders his 
transfer to a medical centre for the treatment of the mental illness.  The time spent 
in intramural treatment shall be deducted from the prison term. 
4. When a prison sentence is to be executed against a person affected by a serious 
physical illness, the Saranwal can stay the execution at the suggestion of a 
medical doctor who certifies that the imprisonment could be seriously prejudicial 
for the health of that person.  The execution shall start as soon as the physical 
conditions of the concerned person permit the imprisonment.  In this case no time 
is deducted from the prison term. 
5. When a husband and his wife have been sentenced to prison for a term not 
exceeding one year, though for different charges, the Saranwal can stay the 
execution against one of them if he/she is not a recidivist and is supporting a child 
of less than fifteen years.  The execution shall start when the child reaches the age 
of fifteen. 
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Chapter 13 Conditional Release 
 
Article 90  Definition 
 
1. Conditional release is the decision to put at liberty, under given conditions, a 
sentenced person before the expiration of his prison term, for a period equivalent 
to the duration of the same term. 
 
Article 91   Conditions 
 
1. Conditional release can be granted to a person serving a prison term as 
consequence of one of more crimes who, during the execution of the penalty, has 
behaved in such a way to demonstrate his social rehabilitation. 
2. This benefit can be granted only if the person has served three quarters of the term 
and at least nine months of imprisonment. 
3. In case of life sentence the benefit can be granted only after fifteen years of 
imprisonment. 
4. The decision is adopted ex officio or following the proposal of the Director 
General of the Prisons, by the Court having jurisdiction on the place where the 
sentenced person is detained. 
5. In its decision the Court shall indicate the behavioral prescriptions that the person 
must follow in the future. 
6. The police shall report periodically to the Saranwal about the behavior of the 
person under conditional release. 
 
Article 92 Revocation 
 
1. Conditional release is revoked if before the expiration of the original term the 
person commits another crime or commits gross violations of the prescriptions. 
2. In case of revocation half of the time spent under conditional release is subtracted 
from the prison term. 
3. The revocation is decided by the same Court that has granted the benefit at the 
request of the Saranwal. 
 
Article 93 Procedure 
 
1. Both the decisions for granting conditional release and for its revocation are 
adopted by the Court after having heard the concerned person and the Saranwal in 
an informal hearing. 
2. Before adopting the decision for granting the release the Court shall also hear the 
Director of the prison in which the sentenced person has served the previous 
prison time. 
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Chapter 14 Problems of Execution 
 
Article 94 Competence and Procedure 
 
1. The Court indicated in paragraph 4 of article 8 is competent to consider, at the 
request of the sentenced person or of the Saranwal, any problem raised in the 
course of the execution. 
2. Whenever the Court finds the raised problem of no or scarce relevance it declares 
it inadmissible, otherwise, after having informally heard the complainer, the 
Saranwal and, in case of imprisonment execution, the Director of the prison 
adopts a decision giving instructions for redressing the situation. 
3. The decision is notified to the person under execution, the Saranwal and the 
Director of the prison. 
4. The decision can be appealed to the Provincial Court only in case of a gross 
violation of human rights in question. 
 
Article 95 Disputes on Property 
 
1. When a dispute arises on the belonging of objects or assets seized or confiscated 
and the case cannot be solved by the penal Court on the basis of existing 
documents and evidence, the dispute shall be handled by the civil Court or 
traditional justice entities. 
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Chapter 15 Miscellaneous Provisions 
 
Article 96 Interim Defense Counsel 
 
1. Up to when in the Country there will be not available a sufficient number of 
defense counsels, as established in article 18, the suspect or the accused can make 
recourse to the assistance of an educated person having some knowledge of legal 
issues. 
2. To this end the President of each Court shall institute a list of persons having the 
qualities indicated in the previous paragraph following the indications for the 
Capital of the Ministry of Justice and for Districts and Provincial Courts of 
Government Cases Department. 
 
 
Article 97 Districts with no Functioning or Established Courts 
 
Whenever there is no district court established or functioning in a given district, the 
district court in the capital city of the Province will have territorial jurisdiction over all 
crimes committed within said district. 
 
 
Article 98 Effective Date and Duration 
 
1.   This code shall become effective upon the execution of a Decree by the President 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan published on the Official Gazette.    
2.  This code will remain in force until the enactment of rules of criminal procedure 
by the newly elected National Assembly, unless the National Assembly adopts 
this code with or without modifications.  
3.  Upon entry of the Presidential decree, any existing laws and decrees contrary to 
the provisions of this code are abrogated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Counter Narcotics
Drug Law
17 December 2005
English translation prepared from the Official Dari
By Dr. Abdul Jabbar Sabit 
Legal Advisor to the Ministry of Interior. 
CONTENTS
Chapter I General Provisions
Chapter II Classification and Regulation of Drugs
Chapter III Licensing Provisions
Chapter IV Drug Trafficking Offenses and Penalties 
Chapter V Adjudication of drug-related offenses
Chapter VI Search, Seizure, and Investigation Techniques
Chapter VII Ministerial Duties and Responsibilities 
Chapter VIII Final Provisions
CHAPTER I
General Provisions
Article 1:
Basis
This Law is enacted pursuant to Article 7 of the Constitution of Afghanistan in order to
prevent the cultivation of opium poppy, cannabis plants, and coca bush, and the
trafficking of narcotic drugs, and to control psychotropic substances, chemical
precursors, and equipment used in manufacturing, producing, or processing of narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances.
Article 2:
Objectives
The objectives of this Law are:
1. To prevent the cultivation of opium poppy, cannabis plants, and coca bush, and
prescribe penalties for persons engaging in these activities.
2. To regulate and control narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, chemical
precursors, and substances and equipment used in the manufacture, production, or
processing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in order to prevent their
use for illicit purposes and to ensure their use for medical, scientific, research and
industrial purposes in accordance with the provisions of the law.
3. To prescribe penalties for persons engaging in and to prevent the cultivation,
production, processing, acquisition, possession, distribution, manufacture, trade,
brokering, importation, exportation, transportation, offering, use, storage, and
concealment of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, and of the chemical
precursors, other illicit substances, and equipment used for these illicit activities.
4. To coordinate, monitor, and evaluate the counter narcotics activities, policies, and
programs of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
5. To encourage farmers to cultivate licit crops instead of opium poppy, coca bush,
and cannabis plants.
6. To establish health centers for detoxification, treatment, rehabilitation, and harm
reduction services for drug-addicted and drug dependent persons in order to
reintegrate them into society.
7. To attract the cooperation and assistance of national and international
organizations in the task of combating cultivation, trafficking and use of narcotic
drugs, psychotropic substances, and the chemical precursors used in their
production, manufacturing, and processing.
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ARTICLE 3:
Definitions
Terms: The following terms have the following meanings in this law:
1) "Narcotic Drug" means a plant, substance or preparation classified as such in the
Tables annexed to this law.
2) “Analogue” means any substance which is not included in any of the Tables annexed
to this law but whose chemical structure combination and whose psychotropic effects are
similar to those of a substance included in the Tables annexed to this law
3) “Controlled delivery” means allowing the transportation and passage of illicit or
suspected consignments of prohibited articles, including drugs, precursors, analogues or
substances substituted for them, equipment of clandestine laboratories, or laundered
money into or through Afghanistan or one or more countries, with the knowledge and
under the supervision of the competent law enforcement authorities, in efforts to identify
persons and investigate and establish proof of criminal offenses. 
4) “Dependence” is a condition in which the use of drugs is compulsive, and stopping
gives rise to psychological and even physical disorders, which leads the person to
continue using the drug.
5) “Detoxification treatment” means treatment intended to eliminate physical dependence
on a drug.
6) “Drug abuse” and “illicit drug use” mean the use of any regulated drug without a
medical prescription and medical instructions for non-scientific and non-medical
purposes.
7) “Drug addict” means a person in a state of physical and/or psychic dependence on a
drug.
8) “Industrial use” of a drug means its exclusive use in a manufacturing process.
9) “Medical prescription” means a written document signed by a physician or a person
holding a medical license, issued for the medical treatment of a patient and authorizing
the dispensing by a pharmacist to that person of a specific quantity of controlled drugs.
10) “Medical use” means the consumption or use of drugs controlled by this law under a
medical prescription and in accordance with international conventions.
11) “Money-laundering” means the same concepts as defined under article 3 of the Law
against Money-Laundering and Criminal Proceeds published in the Official Gazette No.
840 on 10.08.1383.
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12) “Precursor” means a substance used in drug manufacture or processing and classified
as such under Table IV of this law.
13) “Psychotropic substance” means a drug in one of the Tables annexed to the
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
14) "Regulated drugs" are defined as all plants and substances, including their chemical
preparations and their derivatives, and chemical precursors that are listed in Tables 1 - 4,
derived from the United Nations International Conventions on Drugs, attached to this
law.
15) "Mixture" or "Compound" means any preparation that contains any detectable
amount of a controlled or regulated drug substance under this law.
16) "Covert Operations" means the investigation of criminal offences by law enforcement
agencies’ use of methods that include surveillance, the use of informants, undercover
operations and the exchange of intelligence with appropriate law enforcement agencies or
other organisations.
17) "Vehicle" means any mode of transportation used in drug-trafficking].
18) "Undercover Operations" means operations carried out in secret by the police in
which the officers' identities are concealed from third parties by the use of an alias and
false identity so as to enable the infiltration of existing criminal groups in order to arrest
suspected criminals.
19) "Surveillance" means the covert watching of a person or group of persons or the
covert listening to their conversations over a period of time by a human being or through
the use of technical devices.
20) "Secret or Electronic Surveillance" means surveillance authorized by a competent
court in accordance with the provisions of law. This surveillance includes the following
activities:
· watching in private places using human or technical means; 
· interception of communications;
· opening of mail; and, 
· inspection of bank accounts and records of other financial activity.
21) "Conspiracy" or “Complicity” means the same as defined under article 49 of the 1355
Penal Code published in the Official Gazette No. 347.
22) "Possession" means the ability to exert control over an object, including cases where
a person is not in physical contact with the object, but has the power to exercise control
over it, either directly or through others.
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23) "Distribution" is the transfer or attempted transfer of possession from one person to
another.
24) "Aid" or "abet" means the same as defined under article 39 of the 1355 Penal Code
published in the Official Gazette No. 347.
25) "Attempt" means the same as defined under article 29 of the 1355 Penal Code
published in the Official Gazette No. 347. 
26) "Public official" shall mean any officer, employee, or person acting for, on behalf, or
under the authority of a government agency.
27) "Official act" shall mean any decision or action on any matter, controversy, or legal
proceeding by a public official.
28) "Bribe" shall mean corruptly giving, offering, or promising anything of value to any
person or entity, directly or indirectly, with the purpose of:
(1) influencing an official act;
(2) influencing a public official to commit or omit any act in violation of his
lawful duty; or
(3) influencing witnesses, detection, investigation, or trial proceedings;
(4) compelling any witness to be absent from any legal or court proceedings;
(5) influencing any agency, commission, or officer authorized by the law to
hear and record the testimony of witnesses.
29) "Weapon" means any beating or injuring tools and devices, firearms, and explosives
capable of inflicting injury or destruction, or that can cause death.
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CHAPTER II
Classification and regulation of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and 
chemicals used in the manufacture, production, or processing of narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances
Article 4:
Classification and Regulation of Narcotic Drugs
1. For purposes of this law, regulated drugs are defined as all plants and substances
that are listed in Tables 1-3, including their chemical derivatives, and all chemical
precursors that are listed in Table 4 of the Tables attached hereto. The regulated
drugs covered by this law shall be classified in four tables:
• Table 1: Prohibited plants and substances with no medical use;
• Table 2: Strictly controlled plants and substances with a medical use;
• Table 3: Controlled plants and substances with a medical use;
• Table 4: Chemical precursors and other substances used in the illicit 
manufacture or processing of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
Article 5:
Drug Regulation Committee
1) A Drug Regulation Committee is hereby established which shall be composed of five
members with the following composition:
a) One medical and one pharmaceutical expert from the Ministry of Public Health;
b) Two experts from the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics;
c) One customs expert from the Ministry of Finance.
2) Members of the Drug Regulation Committee mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article
shall be appointed by their respective ministries for a period of four years. The
Chairperson of the Drug Regulation Committee shall be appointed by the Minister of
Counter-Narcotics from among its members.
3) Decisions and regulations of the Drug Regulation Committee shall be made by a
majority of its members and shall be recorded in a special book.
4) In case any member of the Drug Regulation Committee fails to carry out his/her
duties in a satisfactory fashion, he/she can be removed from his membership in the
Committee by the Minister of Counter Narcotics.
5) The administrative costs of the Drug Regulation Committee and those of its
secretariat shall be paid directly from the budget of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics.
Members of the Drug Regulation Committee shall be paid appropriate attendance fees 
by the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.
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6) The Drug Regulation Committee shall prepare one quarterly and one annual report to
the Minister of Counter Narcotics on its activities. The Minister may direct the Drug
Regulation Committee to provide the necessary information in accordance with this Law
and relevant regulations.
7) The Drug Regulation Committee will hereinafter be called the Committee.
Article 6:
Duties of the Committee
1. The classifications of the regulated drugs in Tables 1 through 4 shall be
established and amended, in particular by new inclusions, deletions, or transfers
from one Table to another, by the Committee, taking into account any
amendments or additions ordered by the United Nations Commission on Narcotic
Drugs. Plants and substances shall be included under their international non-
proprietary name or, failing this, under their commercial, scientific, or common
name.
2. The Committee may not include an internationally controlled substance in a Table
subject to a regime less strict than that required under the United Nations
Conventions for the substance in question.
3. The Committee shall not transfer any substance from Table 1 to Table 2 or 3,
except as provided in paragraph 1 of this Article.
4. Inclusions, deletions or transfers from one Table to another in accordance with
paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 above shall be valid when they are published in the official
gazette.
5. Except as otherwise provided by this law, a preparation, compound, or mixture of
any regulated drug shall be subject to the same regulations, prohibitions, and
penalties as the regulated drug which it contains, and if it contains two or more
regulated drugs it shall be subject to the conditions governing the most strictly
controlled regulated drug that it contains.
6. A preparation, compound, or mixture containing a substance listed in Tables 2, 3
or 4 that is compounded in such a way as to present no, or a negligible, risk of
abuse or diversion and from which the substance cannot be recovered by readily
applicable means in a quantity liable to illicit use, abuse, or diversion may be
exempt from certain of the control measures set forth in this law by decision of
the Committee.
7. If the substances listed in Tables 2 and 3 and their preparations can be used in
medicine they shall be subject to the provisions applicable to all substances and
preparations intended for use in human or veterinary medicine to the extent that
such provisions are compatible with those established in this law.
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CHAPTER III
Licensing, Cultivation, Production, Manufacture, Trade, Distribution, and Use of 
Plants, Substances and Preparations Listed in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4
Article 7:
Licenses
1. No person shall cultivate, produce, process, manufacture, trade, distribute,
possess, supply, traffic, transport, transfer, acquire, purchase, sell, import, export,
or transit, plants, substances and preparations listed in Tables 2 and 3 in the
territory of Afghanistan, unless he has been licensed by the Committee.
2. No person may engage in any of the operations set forth in paragraph 1 of this
article at any building or on any premises not expressly identified on a license
issued under this Article, or separately licensed by the Committee for use by
specially designated State enterprises, or exempt from licensing under this law.
3. The Committee may issue a license to cultivate, manufacture, distribute
(including dispensing), import or export one or more of the plants, substances and
preparations listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 at the building or on the premises
identified in the license. Such a license shall permit any of the operations set forth
in the first paragraph of this article that are necessarily involved in the licensed
activity.
4. A license to engage in the operations set forth in paragraph 1 of this article may
be issued only if the use of the plants, substances and preparations in question is
restricted to medical or scientific purposes. This license shall be valid for one
year. Licensing shall be subject to verification of the character and professional
qualifications of the applicant. A license may not be granted to any person
convicted of a narcotics or money laundering offense.
5. The industrial production and use of a substance listed in Tables 1, 2 or 3 for
other than medical or scientific purposes may be authorized by the Committee if
the applicant satisfactorily shows that such production or use is necessary to a
industrial process, he shall ensure that the products manufactured, other than
another regulated drug subject to this Law, cannot be abused or produce harmful
effects, and he shall ensure that any regulated drug included in this authorization
and used in the composition of the products manufactured cannot be easily
recovered. The person or entity so authorized shall destroy all quantities of the
regulated drug included in this authorization that cannot be rendered harmless or
sufficiently irretrievable and reports to the Committee the quantity of the
regulated drug produced, used or destroyed.
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6. A person can operate in places set forth in paragraphs 3 and 7 of this article which
have been designated for the manufacture, distribution (including dispensing),
importation or exportation of regulated drugs only when those places comply with
the security standards established by the Committee.
7. State enterprises specially designated by the Committee to engage in the
operations set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be required to apply for a
license to use buildings and premises for such operations, and the Committee may
issue such license in accordance with the requirements of paragraph 6 of this
Article.
8. For the better implementation of this article, the Committee may establish
regulations, in particular those governing applications for and the granting,
content, scope, withdrawal and suspension of licenses.
Article 8:
Possessing Needed Amounts of Narcotic Drugs
1. Authorized regulated drug manufacturers and distributors may hold the quantities
of the various regulated drugs required for the smooth functioning of business.
The distributors who only dispense regulated drugs are excepted from this
provision.
2. The Committee shall establish for each year, taking into account the prevailing
market conditions, the anticipated medical, scientific, research, and industrial
needs for the regulated drugs in Tables 1, 2 and 3, and the anticipated lawful
exports of such regulated drugs, the maximum quantities of these regulated drugs
that shall be manufactured and the maximum quantities that each licensee and
each specially designated State enterprise shall be entitled to manufacture. These
limits may be changed during the year if necessary.
3. The Committee may establish and publish regulations and procedures for the
implementation of this Article.
Article 9:
Exports and imports
1. The export and import of substances on Tables 1, 2 and 3 shall be subject to
separate authorization issued by the Committee.
2. This authorization shall be subject to the completion of a form which includes the
requirements established by the Committee and the United Nations Economic and
Social Council. 
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3. The Committee may authorize an importation of a substance listed in Tables1, 2,
or 3 only to meet legitimate medical, scientific, and industrial needs. The import
authorization shall not be necessary in the event of a catastrophe or an emergency
as determined by the Committee, but the importer shall maintain a record of the
importation as prescribed by the Committee.
4. The Committee may authorize an exportation of a substance listed on Tables 1, 2,
or 3 only to a country that maintains effective controls over the use of the
regulated drug and only if the regulated drug is to be used for medical, scientific,
or other legitimate purposes.
5. An authorization for the importation or exportation of a substance listed on Tables
1, 2, or 3 is not transferable. 
6. An application for import or export authorization of a substance listed on Tables
1, 2, or 3  shall indicate the following:
a) The name and address of the importer or exporter;
b) The names and addresses of any consignee, if known;
c) The international non-proprietary name of each substance or, failing this, the
name of the substance in the tables of the international conventions;
d) The pharmaceutical form and characteristics of each substance and, in the
case of a preparation, its trade name;
e) The quantity of each substance and preparation involved in the operation;
f) The period during which the operation is to take place;
g) The mode of transport or shipment; and
h) The border custom house of the importation and exportation.
7. An import certificate or other documentation issued by the Government of the
importing country shall be attached to the export application.
8. An import or export authorization shall contain, in addition to the expiration date
and the name of the issuing authority, the same types of details as the application.
9. The import authorization shall specify whether the import is to be effected in a
single consignment or may be effected in more than one consignment, and shall
establish the time in which the import of all consignments must be effected.
10. The export authorization shall also indicate the number and date of the import
certificate issued by the Government of the importing country;
11. A copy of the export authorization shall accompany each consignment and the
Committee shall send a copy to the Government of the importing country.
12. If the quantity of plants, substances or preparations actually exported is smaller
than that specified in the export authorization, and is certified by the customs
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office, the Committee shall note that fact on the related document and on all
official copies thereof.
13. Once the consignment has entered the national territory or when the period
stipulated in the import authorization has expired, the Committee shall send the
export authorization to the Government of the exporting country, with an
endorsement specifying the quantity of each regulated drug actually imported.
14. Commercial documents such as invoices, cargo manifests, customs or transport
documents and other shipping documents shall include the name of the plants and
substances as set out in the tables of the international conventions and the trade
name of the preparations, the quantities exported from the national territory or to
be imported into it, and the names and addresses of the exporter, the importer and
the consignee.
15. Exports from the national territory of consignments to the address or account of a
person other than the person named in the import certificate issued by the
Government of the importing country or in other documentation demonstrating
authorization for the import into that country shall be prohibited. This same
provision shall apply to the importation of consignments into the national
territory.
16. Exports from the national territory of consignments to a bonded warehouse shall
be prohibited unless the Government of the importing country certifies on the
import certificate or other authorization that it has approved such a consignment.
17. Imports to the national territory of consignments to a bonded warehouse shall be
prohibited unless the Government certifies on the import certificate that it
approves such a consignment. Withdrawal from the bonded warehouse shall
require a permit from the authorities having jurisdiction over the warehouse. In
the case of a consignment to a foreign destination, such withdrawal shall be
treated as if it were a new export within the meaning of the present Article. The
regulated drugs stored in the bonded warehouse may not be subjected to any
process, which would modify their nature, nor may their packaging be altered
without the permission of the authorities having jurisdiction over the warehouse.
18. A consignment entering or leaving the national territory which is not
accompanied by a proper import or export authorization or does not comply with
the authorization shall be detained by the competent authorities until the
legitimacy of the consignment is established or until a court rules on its status.
19. The Committee shall specify those customs offices operating in the national
territory that are to deal with the import or export of the regulated drugs listed in
Tables 1, 2 and 3.
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20. The transit of any consignment of plants, substances or preparations listed in
Tables 1, 2 and 3 through the national territory shall be prohibited, whether or not
the consignment is removed from the conveyance in which it is carried, unless a
copy of the export authorization issued by the Government of the exporting
country for such consignment is produced to the department designated by the
Committee
21. The route specified by the export license for a consignment which is in transit in
Afghanistan shall not be changed.
22. An application for authorization to change the itinerary or the consignee shall be
treated as if the export in question were from the national territory to the new
country or consignee concerned.
23. No consignment of plants, substances and preparations in transit through the
national territory may be subjected to any process that might change their nature,
nor may its packaging be altered without the permission of the Committee.
24. If there is a conflict between the provisions of this article and those of an
international agreement that Afghanistan has signed, the provisions of the
international agreement prevail.
25. The provisions of this article shall not apply where the consignment in question is
transported by air to another country. If the aircraft stops over or makes an
emergency landing in the national territory, the consignment shall be treated as an
export from the national territory to the country of destination only if it is
removed from the aircraft.
26. Free ports and free trade zones shall be subject to the same controls and
supervision as other parts of the national territory regarding the importation of
plants, substances, or preparations listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3.
27. Transport companies and enterprises shall abide by the regulations of the
Committee with regard to taking reasonable measures to prevent the use of their
means of transport for illicit trafficking in the regulated drugs covered by the
present law, and shall also be required: 
• To submit cargo manifests in advance, whenever possible;
• To keep the products in sealed containers having tamper-resistant,
individually verifiable seals, and in which every kind of alteration should
be easily discernable;
• To report to the appropriate authorities, at the earliest opportunity, any
suspicious consignments.
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Article 10:
Retail Trade and Distribution
1. Purchases of regulated drugs listed in Tables 2 and 3 for the purpose of
professional supply may be made only from a private individual or state enterprise
holding a license issued under this law.
2. Only the following persons and state entities may, without having to apply for a
license, purchase and hold plants and regulated drugs listed in Tables 2 and 3 for
their professional needs:
• Pharmacists holding a license to practice when acting in the usual course
of business as an agent or employee of a person or entity holding a valid
license to distribute regulated drugs;
• Pharmacists at a public or private hospital or health care institutions that is
licensed to distribute regulated drugs when acting in the usual course of
business as an agent or employee of that hospital or health care
institutions;
• Pharmacists holding a license to practice in charge of public or private
warehouses;
• Hospitals or health care institutions without a pharmacist in charge, in
emergency cases and unanticipated events provided that a qualified
physician attached to the establishment who holds a license to practice and
to dispense regulated drugs has agreed to take responsibility for the stocks
in question;
• Physicians, dental surgeons, and veterinary surgeons holding a license to
practice and authorized to dispense regulated drugs, including the
preparations included in a list drawn up by the Committee;
3. Physicians, dental surgeons, and veterinary surgeons holding a license to practice
may, without having to apply for a drug distribution license, purchase and hold
the needed quantities of preparations included in a list drawn up by the
Committee.
4. Dental surgeons, midwives, and nurses holding a license to practice may, without
having to apply for a license, purchase and hold for their professional activities
quantities of preparations included in a list drawn up by the Committee. 
5. The regulated drugs listed in Tables 2 and 3 may be prescribed to individuals and
animals only in the form of pharmaceutical preparations and only on a medical
prescription issued by one of the following professionals:
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• A physician holding a license to practice and to dispense regulated drugs;
• A dental surgeon holding a license to practice and to dispense regulated
drugs, for treatment of a dental nature;
• A veterinary surgeon holding a license to practice and to dispense
regulated drugs, for treatment of animals;
• A nurse or midwife holding a license to practice for treatment connected
with their professional duties and within the limits set by the competent
authority.
6. Pharmaceutical preparations listed in Tables 2 and 3 may be dispensed only by:
• Dispensing pharmacists holding a license;
• Pharmacists at public or private hospitals or health care institutions when
such hospitals or institutions hold a license to dispense regulated drugs;
• Physicians and veterinary surgeons holding a license to practice and
authorized to dispense regulated drugs;
• Nurses and midwives in the conduct of their professional duties.
7. The Committee, if the situation so requires and under such conditions as it may
determine, may authorize, in all or part of the national territory, licensed
pharmacists or any other licensed retail distributors to supply, without
prescription, small quantities of therapeutic doses of pharmaceutical preparations
containing one or more of the regulated drugs listed in Table 3.
8. The Committee shall establish regulations for the implementation of this Article,
in particular the rules concerning the writing and filling of prescriptions for
pharmaceutical preparations listed in Tables 2 and 3.
Article 11:
Private institutions and state enterprises
1. Private institutions and State enterprises holding licenses to engage in operations
involving regulated drugs shall furnish to the Committee in respect of their
activities:
• Not later than 15 days after the end of each quarter, a quarterly report on
the quantities of each substance and each preparation imported or
exported, indicating the country of origin and the country of destination;
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• Not later than 5 May of each year, a report for the previous calendar year
indicating:
o The quantities of each substance and each preparation produced or
manufactured;
o The quantities of each substance used for producing preparations
and other:
§ Other substances covered by the present legislation; and
§ Substances not covered by the present legislation;
o The quantities of each substance and each preparation supplied for
retail distribution, medical or scientific research or teaching;
o The quantities of each substance and each preparation in stock as
of 29 March of the year to which the information refers;
o The quantities of each substance necessary for the new calendar
year.
2. The Committee shall establish procedures for the purchase of and placing orders
for plants, substances and preparations listed in Tables 2, 3, and 4 required for the
conduct of professional activities.
3. The Committee shall establish procedures for any purchase, transfer, export,
import or dispensing of plants, substances and preparations listed in Table 2, and
all related transactions shall be recorded in accordance with regulations
established by the Committee.
4. Any person, private enterprise, or state enterprise holding, for professional
purposes, any plants, substances and preparations listed in Tables 2, 3, and 4 shall
be required to keep them under regulations established by the Committee so as to
prevent theft or any other form of diversion.
5. Any person, private enterprise, State enterprise, medical or scientific institution
engaged in any activity or operation involving plants, substances or preparations
covered by the present law shall be controlled and monitored by regulations
established by the Committee. Such control and monitoring shall extend to the
compartments containing first-aid kits of public transport conveyances engaged in
international travel. The Committee shall, in particular, arrange for inspectors or
any other body legally empowered to conduct inspections to make ordinary
inspections of the establishments, premises, stocks and records at least once every
two years. Extraordinary inspections can be done at any time. 
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Article 12:
Monitoring and Control
1. State enterprises, private enterprises, medical and scientific institutions and other
persons referred to in Article 11 shall be required, at the beginning of each year,
to make an inventory of the plants, substances and preparations listed in Tables
1, 2 and 3 held by them and to compare the total quantities in stock at the time of
the previous inventory, calculated together with those entered over the previous
year and the total quantities withdrawn during the year, with those held at the time 
of the latest inventory.
2. Licensees, pharmacists and persons authorized to dispense drugs through
wholesale pharmacies or drugstores shall be required to make an inventory and
calculate the balance as stipulated in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. Any discrepancies noted in a balance or between the results of the balance and
those of the inventory shall be immediately reported by the licensee, pharmacist
or person authorized to dispense drugs to the Committee, which shall
acknowledge receipt of the notification.
4. It shall be forbidden to distribute substances and preparations listed in Tables 2
and 3 unless they are enclosed in wrappers or containers bearing their name and,
in the case of consignments of substances and preparations listed in Table 2, a
double red band.
5. The outer wrappings of parcels described in paragraph 4 shall bear no information
other than the names and addresses of the sender and the consignee. They shall be
sealed with the sender’s mark.
6. The label under which a preparation is offered for sale shall indicate the names of
the substances listed in Tables 1, 2 and 3 that it contains, together with their
weight and percentage.
7. Labels accompanying packages for retail sale or distribution as described in
paragraph 4 shall indicate the directions for use as well as the cautions and
warnings necessary for the safety of the user.
8. If necessary, additional requirements in respect of packaging and labeling shall be
stipulated by regulations established by the Committee.
Article 13:
Regulation of Substances (Precursors) In Table 4
1. The manufacture, distribution or trading of the substances listed in Table 4 shall
be subject to the provisions of this article.
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2. Import or export authorizations shall be refused if a consignment is possibly [?!!!]
intended for the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
3. Export or import consignments of substances listed in Table 4 annexed to this law
shall be clearly labeled to show their contents.
4. Any person who, because of his job requirements, becomes aware of the
economic, industrial, trade or professional secrets or trade processes of the
substances listed on Table 4 annexed to this law shall be required to avoid
disclosing the same to other people. 
5. Manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesalers and retailers shall be required to
enter in a register established by the Committee any purchase or transfer of
substances listed in Table 4. The entry shall be made with no blank spaces,
erasures or overwriting. It shall indicate the date of the transaction, the name and
the quantity of the product purchased or transferred and the name, address and
occupation of the purchaser and seller. However, retailers shall not be required to
enter the name of the purchaser. The registers shall be kept for ten years pursuant
to regulations established by the Committee.
6. Manufacturers, importers, exporters, wholesalers and retailers of the substances
listed in Table 4 shall be required to inform the appropriate police authority of any
orders or transactions that appear suspicious, in particular by reason of the
quantity of the substances being purchased or ordered, the repetition of such
orders or purchases or the means of payment or transport used.
7. If there is strong evidence to warrant the suspicion that a substance listed in
Table 4 is for use in the illicit manufacture of a narcotic drug, such substance shall 
be immediately seized pending the outcome of a judicial investigation.
8. The Committee shall submit to the Minister of Counter-Narcotics information on
the import and export of precursor substances listed in Table 4.
Article 14:
Medical and Scientific Research and Teaching
1. For purposes of medical or scientific research, teaching or forensic work, the
Committee may authorize, in accordance with a separate procedure and without
requiring the licenses referred to in this Chapter, the cultivation, manufacturing,
acquiring, importation, use, or possession of plants, substances and preparations
in Tables 1, 2 and 3 in quantities not exceeding those strictly necessary for the
purpose in question.
2. The applicant of the authorization referred to in paragraph 1 of this article shall
enter in a register, which he shall keep for 5 years, the quantities of plants,
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substances and preparations that he imports, acquires, manufactures, uses, and
destroys. He shall also record the dates of the operations and the names of his
suppliers. He shall furnish the Committee with an annual report on the quantities
used or destroyed and those held in stock. The Committee shall be entitled to
inspect registers maintained in accordance with this provision.
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Chapter IV
Offenses and Penalties
Article 15:
Drug Trafficking Offenses and Penalties
1. Any person who engages in the following acts without a license or authorization
issued according to the provisions of this law has committed a drug trafficking
offense and shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of this law:
(a) The production, manufacture, distribution, possession, extraction,
preparation, processing, offering for sale, purchasing, selling, delivery,
brokerage, dispatch, transportation, importation, exportation, purchase,
concealment, or storage of any substance or mixture containing a
substance listed in Tables 1 through 3 annexed to this law;
(b) Any of the operations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article in relation
to any chemicals or precursors listed in Table 4 for the illicit cultivation,
production or manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. 
Article 16:
Drug Trafficking Penalties
1. Whoever commits a drug trafficking offense involving the following quantities of
heroin, morphine, or cocaine, or any mixture containing those substances, shall be
sentenced as follows: 
(i) Less than 10 grams, imprisonment for between 6 months and one year,
and a fine of between 30,000 Afs and 50,000 Afs.
(ii) Between 10 grams and 100 grams, imprisonment for between one and
three years, and a fine of between 50,000 and 100,000 Afs.
(iii) Between 100 grams and 500 grams, imprisonment for between three and
five years, and a fine of between 100,000 Afs and 250,000 Afs.
(iv) Between 500g and 1kg, imprisonment for between seven and ten years,
and a fine of between 300,000 Afs and 500,000 Afs. 
(v) Between 1kg and 5kg, imprisonment for between ten and fifteen years,
and a fine of between 500,000 Afs and 1,000,000Afs.
(vi) Over 5kg, life imprisonment, and a fine of between 1,000,000 Afs and
10,000,000Afs.
[ 21 ]
2. Whoever commits a drug trafficking offense involving the following quantities of
opium or any mixture containing that substance shall be sentenced as follows:
(i) Less than 10 grams, imprisonment for up to three months, and a fine of
between 5000 Afs and 10,000 Afs.
(ii) Between 10 grams and 100g, imprisonment between six months and one
year, and a fine of between 10,000 Afs and 50,000 Afs.
(iii) Between 100g and 500g, imprisonment for between one and three years,
and a fine of between 50,000 and 100,000 Afs. 
(iv) Between 500g and 1kg, imprisonment for between three and five years,
and a fine of between 100,000 Afs and 500,000 Afs.
(v) Between 1kg and 5kg, imprisonment for between five and ten years, and a
fine of between 500,000 Afs and 1,000,000 Afs.
(vi) Between 5kg and 50kg, imprisonment for between ten and fifteen years,
and a fine of between 700,000 Afs and 1,500,000 Afs.
(vii) Over 50kg, life imprisonment and a fine of between 1,500,000 Afs and
5,000,000 Afs. 
3. Whoever commits a drug trafficking offense involving the following quantities of
the substances or any mixture containing substances listed in Tables 1 through 4,
with the exception of heroin, morphine, cocaine, and opium, shall be sentenced as
follows:
(i) Less than 250 grams, imprisonment for up to three months, and a fine of
between 5000 Afs and 10,000 Afs.
(ii) Between 250 grams and 500g, imprisonment for between three months
and six months and a fine of between 10,000 Afs and 50,000 Afs.
(iii) Between 500g and 1 kg, imprisonment for between six months and 1 year,
and a fine of between 50,000 Afs and 100,000 Afs.
(iv) Between 1kg and 5kg, imprisonment for between one and three years, and
a fine of between 100,000 Afs and 500,000 Afs.
(v) Between 5kg and 10kg, imprisonment for between five and ten years and a
fine of between 500,000 Afs and up to 1,000,000 Afs.
(vi) Over 10kg, imprisonment for between ten and fifteen years, and a fine of
between1, 000,000Afs and 1,500,000 Afs.
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4. Any person who, during the course of any of the offenses set forth in paragraphs
1, 2, and 3 of this article, directs, controls, organizes, finances, or guides three or
more persons, shall be sentenced to penalties thrice as severe as the maximum
penalties prescribed for that crime under the sub-paragraphs of paragraphs 1, 2,
and 3 of this article, provided that the term of imprisonment does not exceed 20
years.
Article 17:
Aggregation of Amounts
1. If several persons are responsible for the commission of a drug trafficking
offense, and the amounts of drugs trafficked by each of them is known, each of
the offenders shall be punished under the provisions of this law pursuant to his
share in the overall amount trafficked.
2. If several persons are responsible for the commission of a drug trafficking
offense, but the share of each in the amount of drug trafficked is not known, each
of them shall be sentenced to a penalty prescribed for the total amount trafficked. 
Article 18:
Conspiracy, Aiding, Abetting, Facilitation, Incitement
Any person who attempts, conspires, or engages in preparatory acts to commit any
offense under this law shall be subject to the same penalties as the principal offender.
Article 19:
Drug laboratories, manufacturing, and storage
Whoever without authorization under this law opens, maintains, manages, or controls any
property, building, room, or facility, as an owner, lessee, manager, agent, employee, or
mortgagee, and intentionally rents, leases, or makes available for use, with or without
compensation, such a place for the purpose of cultivating, manufacturing, processing,
storing, concealing, or distributing any substance or mixture listed in Tables 1 through 4,
or participates in or obtains an income from such activity, shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment between 10 and 20 years and a fine of between 500,000Af. and 1,000,000
Afs.
Article 20:
Importation or use of equipment for drug trafficking
1. Whoever imports equipment or materials used in or for the production and
processing of regulated drugs without having a license, shall be sentenced to
imprisonment for 5 to 10 years and a fine of between 100,000 and 500,000 Afs,
and shall have the equipment or materials confiscated.
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2. Whoever lawfully imports equipment or materials used in or for the production
and processing of drugs but uses them in the illicit production or processing of the
regulated drugs, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for 10 to 15 years and a fine
of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Afs, and shall have the equipment or materials
confiscated.
3. Whoever possesses or uses the equipment or materials referred to in paragraph 1
of this article for the illicit production or processing of regulated drugs, shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for 15 to 20 years and a fine of between 1,000,000 and
2,000,000 Afs, and shall have the equipment and materials confiscated. 
Article 21:
Drug-related corruption and intimidation
1. Any public official who intentionally commits one of the following acts shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for 5 to 10 years and shall be fined twice the amount
of the bribe:
(a) facilitating or assisting any offense under this law; 
(b) obstructing an official investigation of an offense under this law or
obstructing a trial of any offense under this law, including by failing to
carry out lawful obligations; or
(c) directly or indirectly demanding, seeking, receiving, accepting, or
agreeing to accept or receive a bribe in relation to drug trafficking or any
official duty connected directly or indirectly to drug law enforcement,
A bribe-giver and a bribe-agent shall be sentenced to the same penalties as the
bribe-taker.
2. Any person who threatens or intimidates another for the purpose of committing
the following acts shall be sentenced to imprisonment between 5 and 8 years and
fined between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Afs.
(a) committing or facilitating an offense under this law; or
(b) impeding a drug trafficking investigation or prosecution,
3. Any person who receives or accepts any benefit for the purpose of impeding or
interfering with an investigation or criminal trial of a drug trafficking offense
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for between 5 and 10 years, and shall
relinquish the benefit.
4. Any person who threatens or seeks to intimidate any public official in connection
with the detection of any drug trafficking offense, or an investigation or criminal
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trial of any drug trafficking offense, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for
between 5 and 10 years, and a fine of between 1,000,000Afs and 2,000,000 Afs.
5. Any person who injures any public official in connection with the detection,
investigation or criminal trial of any drug trafficking offense, shall be sentenced
to imprisonment between 10 to 15 years, and a fine of between 1,000,000Afs and
3,000,000 Afs.
6. Subject to the provisions of Chapter Seven of the Penal Code, the penalties set
forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this article shall be in addition to other
penalties that an offender may be sentenced to for committing other criminal
offenses.
Article 22:
Use of Weapons
1. Any person who uses, or causes the use of, any weapon during or in relation to
any drug trafficking offense shall be punished by a term of five to ten years
imprisonment, and a fine between 500,000 Afs and 1000,000 Afs. 
2. Any person who carries or possesses any weapon, or causes another person to
carry or possess any weapon, during or in relation to any drug trafficking offense
shall be punished by a term of 3 to 5 years imprisonment, and a fine of between
500,000 Afs and 1,000,000 Afs.
Article 23:
Intimidation Leading to Drug-related Offenses
Any person who intentionally commits the following acts shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of between 5 and 8 years, and a fine of between 50,000 Afs and 200,000
Afs.
(a) Compelling another by force or intimidation to cultivate, manufacture,
distribute, possess, sell, transport, store, or use substances or any mixture
containing substances on Tables 1 through 4;
(b) Mixing substances on Tables 1 through 4 in food or drink intending that
they be consumed by others;
(c) Distributing or sells any substance or mixture containing substances on
Tables 1 through 4 to a child or to a person with mental health problems;
(d) Distributing any substance or mixture containing substances on Tables 1
through 4 in educational, military training, health or social service centers,
or prisons;
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(e) Employing or using a child to commit a drug trafficking offense; or
(f) Allowing the consumption of substances or any mixture containing
substances on Tables 1 through 4 in restaurants, hotels, shops or any other
premises.
Article 24:
Illicit Prescription of Drugs
Any person who intentionally commits the following acts shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of between 3 and 5 years, and a fine of between 50,000 Afs and 100,000
Afs.
(a) Prescribing a regulated drug knowing it is to be used illegally; or
(b) Selling and buying regulated drugs using fraudulent prescriptions,
Article 25
Prohibition on Cultivation
1. Planting or cultivating opium poppy and seeds, coca bush, and cannabis plants
within Afghanistan is a criminal offense and prohibited.
2. The owners, occupiers, or cultivators of lands are obligated to destroy
opium poppy, coco bush, and cannabis plants growing on their lands. If they fail
to do so shall be punished pursuant to the provisions of Article 26.
Article 26:
Penalties for Cultivation
1. Whoever plants or cultivates less than 1 jerib of opium poppy or coca bush
without having a license shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment between 6
months and 1 year and a fine between 10,000 Afs and 50,000 Afs.
2. Whoever plants or cultivates 1 jerib or more of opium poppy or coca bush shall,
for each “beswa” (100 square meters) in excess of 1 jerib, be sentenced to
imprisonment for 1 month and fine of 5,000 Afs, which penalty shall be in
addition to the penalty prescribed in paragraph 1 of this article.
3. Whoever plants or cultivates less than 1 jerib of cannabis plants shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for 3 to 9 months and a fine between 5,000 and 20,000
Afs.
4. Whoever plants or cultivates more than 1 jerib of cannabis plants, shall, for each
beswa in excess of 1 jerib, be sentenced to imprisonment for 15 days and a fine of
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2,500 Afs, which penalty shall be in addition to the penalty prescribed in
paragraph 3 of this article.
5. Whoever encourages, causes, incites, or finances any person to plant or cultivate
opium poppy, coca bush, or cannabis plants shall be sentenced to twice the
penalties of the farmer in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 1, 2, 3,
and 4 of this article. 
6. Illicit opium poppy, coca bush, or cannabis plants shall be destroyed and any
person associated with the cultivation or planting shall not be entitled to any
compensation, in addition to the penalties set forth in this article.
Article 27:
Consumption of illegal drugs, and treatment of dependant persons or addicts
1. Any person who uses or possesses for the purpose of personal consumption any
substance or mixture containing a substance listed in Tables 1 through 4, other
than as authorized for medical treatment or by this law, shall be punished as
follows:
(a) Heroin, morphine, and cocaine, or any mixture containing those
substances: 6 months to 1 year imprisonment and a fine between 20,000 to
50,000 Afs.
(b) Opium or any mixture containing that substance: 3 months to 6 months
imprisonment and a fine of between 10,000 Afs to 25,000 Afs.
(c) Substances or any mixture containing substances listed in Tables 1
through 4, with the exception of those in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article:
1 month to 3 months imprisonment and a fine of between 5,000 Afs to
10,000 Afs.
(d) Possession of more than 1 gram of heroin, morphine, or cocaine, or 10
grams of opium or hashish, shall be subject to the penalties set forth in
Article 16.
2. If a medical doctor certifies that a person is addicted to an illegal drug substance
listed in Tables 1 through 4, the court may exempt the person from imprisonment
and fine. In this case, the court may require an addicted person to attend a
detoxification or drug treatment center.
3. Detoxification or drug treatment centers shall report to the sentencing court
through the office of the prosecutor every 15 days on the health condition of
persons sentenced to detention and treatment. On the basis of the report received,
the court can abrogate or extend the period of detention and treatment.
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4. Any person sentenced to a period of detention in a detoxification or drug
treatment center shall receive credit on any sentence of imprisonment for the time
served in the treatment center.
5. Any person in control of a vehicle while under the influence of any narcotic or
psychotropic substance listed in Tables 1 through 3 shall be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of between six months and one year and a fine of 10,000 to 20,000
Afs.
Article 28:
Vehicles
1. Whoever without legal authorization intentionally carries, transports, or conceals
more than 10 grams of heroin, morphine, or cocaine; or more than 20 grams of
opium; or more than 100 grams of hashish or any other substance listed in Tables
1 through 4 in his vehicle shall have the vehicle confiscated, in addition to the
punishment prescribed in this law.
2. Any vehicle owner who without legal authorization intentionally allows a vehicle
to be used to carry, transport, or conceal more than 10 grams of heroin, morphine,
or cocaine; or more than 20 grams of opium; or more than 100 grams of hashish
or any other substance listed in Tables 1 through 4 shall be punished as an
accomplice to the crime and shall have the vehicle confiscated.
3. Any vehicle seized in relation to a drug-trafficking offense shall be registered and
officially handed over to the nearest customs office and following the completion
of its confiscation in accordance with the provisions of the relevant law, it shall be 
placed on sale and the proceeds be deposited to the government treasury.
Article 29:
Repeat offenders
If any person who has been convicted more than once of an offense listed in Articles 16,
18,19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, or 28 of this law commits a narcotics offense again,
he shall be sentenced to the maximum penalty provided for that offense.
Article 30:
Home Leave
The provisions of Article 37 of the Law of Prisons and Detention Centers shall not apply
to those who have committed crimes prescribed in this law and have been sentenced to a
term of more than 5 years imprisonment.
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Article 31:
Penalty Aggravation
1. Except as provided for under this law, the penalty aggravation provisions of the 
Penal Code shall apply to violent actions of drug-trafficking offenders.
2. The provisions of other laws with regard to the suspension of sentences, judicial
leniency, and probation shall not apply to convicts of drug-trafficking offenses.
Article 32:
Licensing and Reporting Violations
Whoever does not comply with the provisions of this law and the relevant regulation on
the issuance of licenses, authorizations or reporting, and provides for the issuance of a
license or an authorization knowing that it will be abused, shall be sentenced to 6 months
to 1 year imprisonment and a fine between 50,000 and 100,000 Afs. If the person repeats
the violation, he shall be sentenced to 1 to 3 years imprisonment and a fine between
150,000 and 350,000 Afs.
Article 33:
Commission on the Assessment of Drug-Related Offenses and Penalties
1. In order to study and assess the patterns of drug-trafficking offenses across the
country, the Commission on the Assessment of Drug-Related Offenses and
Penalties (hereinafter the Commission) shall be established with the following
composition:
a. One authorized representative from the Supreme Court;
b. One authorized representative from the Office of the Attorney General;
c. One authorized representative from the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics;
d. One authorized representative from the Ministry of Interior;
e. One authorized representative from the Ministry of Public Health;
f. One authorized representative from the National Security Directorate;
g. One defense lawyer appointed by the Minister of Justice.
Members of the Commission shall be appointed for a period of four years and
shall elect one from among themselves as Chairperson for a two-year term. 
3. The Commission shall have the following duties and authorities:
a. Studying and assessing the patterns of drug-trafficking offenses in the
country and collecting the relevant data;
b. Preparing proposals on the amendment of the provisions of this law on
drug-related offenses and penalties on the basis of the data collected on the 
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offenses and presenting the same, through the Ministry of Counter-
Narcotics, to the Government within 60 days of their development;
c. Recording the committed drug-trafficking offenses;
d. Preparing an annual report on drug-trafficking offenses and presenting it
to the Government;
e. Holding hearing sessions for considering possible changes in the penalties
prescribed for drug-related offenses.
4. The administrative costs of the Commission and its secretariat shall be funded
from the budget of the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. The Ministry shall also pay
an appropriate salary to the defense lawyer and appropriate attendance fees to
other members of the Commission. 
5. Citizens of Afghanistan may freely file their complaints on drug-related offenses
with the Commission. Reviewing complaints, holding meetings and other
activities of the Commission shall be regulated through procedures adopted by the
Commission.
6. Any amendment to this law proposed by the Commission shall be presented to the
National Assembly following its approval by the Government.
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CHAPTER V
Adjudication of drug-related offenses
Article 34:
Narcotics Tribunals
1. In accordance with the provisions of Articles 32 and 50 of the Law Concerning
the Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, a Narcotics Tribunal within the Kabul Primary Provincial Court and
a Narcotics Tribunal within the Kabul Appellate Provincial Court are hereby
established.
2. Each of the tribunals set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall be composed of
one President and six members. 
3. The Presidents of the tribunals shall be responsible for leading and managing the
affairs of their respective tribunals and shall preside over judicial proceedings in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 37 and 43 of the Law Concerning the
Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
4. The tribunals set forth in paragraph 1 of this article shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction throughout Afghanistan over drug trafficking offenses in the
following cases:
(a) Two or more kgs. of heroin, morphine, or cocaine, or any mixture
containing those substances;
(b) Ten or more kgs. of opium or any mixture containing opium; and
(c) Fifty or more kgs. of hashish or any mixture containing substances listed
in Tables 1 through 4, with the exception of heroin, morphine, cocaine,
and opium.
5. If the amount of narcotic drugs is less than those set forth in paragraph 4 of this
article, the case comes under jurisdiction of the Public Security Tribunals of
Provincial Courts.
6. Adjudication of drug-related offenses shall be in conformity with the provisions
of the Law Concerning the Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts of the Islamic
Republic of Afghanistan and other relevant laws.
7. The appointment of the Judges of the Central Narcotics Tribunals and the
regulation of other affairs related to their promotion and retirement shall be
conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Law Concerning the
Organization and Jurisdiction of Courts of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
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8. The amounts and types of narcotic drugs set forth in paragraph 4 over which the
Narcotics Tribunals shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction throughout Afghanistan
shall be subject to amendment in accordance with the procedures set forth in
Article 33. 
9. The Central Narcotics Tribunal shall also have jurisdiction over criminal offenses
connected or related to drug trafficking offenses set forth in sub-paragraphs 1, 2,
and 3 of paragraph 4 of this article. 
Article 35:
Investigation, Prosecution, Trial, and Extradition
1. Investigation, prosecution, and the trial of persons involved in drug-trafficking
offenses shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code and other relevant laws, and the penalties shall be prescribed in
accordance with the provisions of this law. In case this law lacks the required
provisions to decide on a penalty, the provisions of the Penal Code shall apply.
2. Suspects accused or convicted of drug trafficking offenses shall be extradited in
accordance with the provisions of the 1988 United Nations Convention Against
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and in accordance
with international agreements that may be signed with other countries.
Article 36:
Special Counter Narcotics Saranwal
1. The Office of the Attorney General shall create a Special Counter Narcotics
Saranwal within its office to investigate and prosecute the offenses under this law.
2. The Special Counter Narcotics Saranwal shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
investigation and prosecution of drug-trafficking offenses set forth in paragraph 4
of Article 34 of this law, and shall cooperate with other law enforcement officials
in conducting their investigations.
3. The investigation and prosecution of drug-trafficking offenses involving amounts
of drugs less than those set forth in paragraph 4 of article 34 of this law shall be
the jurisdiction of other relevant Saranwalis in accordance with the provisions of
law.
4. The appointment of the prosecutors and the handling of other affairs related to
their promotion and retirement shall be carried out in accordance with the
provisions of the law.
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Article 37:
Duties of the Counter Narcotics Police
1. The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan and other law enforcement
authorities referred to in paragraph 2 of this article shall be responsible for
detecting drug trafficking offenses in Afghanistan.
2. The following law enforcement agencies may seize illegal drugs, drug crimes
proceeds, and related materials and equipment:
(a) the Counter Narcotics Police;
(b) the Afghan Special Narcotics Force;
(c) the National Police;
(d) the Border Police;
(e) the Afghanistan Customs staff.
3. All seizures of illegal drug substances, evidence, and proceeds by any of the law
enforcement agencies referred to in paragraph 2 of this article shall be reported
immediately to the Counter Narcotics Police. The Counter Narcotics Police shall
transmit the report as soon as practicable to the National Headquarters of the
Counter Narcotics Police, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, the Office of the
Attorney General, and the Commission on the Assessment of Drug-Related
Offenses and Penalties.
4. All seizures of illegal drug substances, evidence, and proceeds by any law
enforcement authorities referred to in paragraph 2 of this article shall be turned
over to the Counter Narcotics Police as soon as practicable. 
5. Law enforcement agencies referred to in paragraph 2 of this article shall, at the
request of Counter Narcotics Police, provide additional security to protect seized
drugs, evidence, proceeds, and suspects.
6. The Counter Narcotics Police shall have the authority to question and interrogate
all the perpetrators of the drug-trafficking offenses under this law.
7. The Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan shall refer perpetrators of the
offenses under paragraph 4 of Article 34 of this law to the Special Counter
Narcotics Saranwal for investigation and prosecution. If the amount of drugs
seized is less than those set under paragraph 4 of article 34 of this law, the
respective cases shall be referred to the concerned Saranwalis for investigation
and judicial prosecution. 
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8. If the amount of drugs seized is less than those set under paragraph 4 of Article 34 
of this law, the law enforcement agencies named under paragraph 2 of this article
shall complete the questioning and interrogation of the suspects within 72 hours
and refer the concerned cases to the respective Saranwalis for investigation and
judicial prosecution. 
9. In cases where a seizure of quantities of narcotic drugs as set under paragraph 4 of 
Article 34 of this law is made outside Kabul Province and the offenders are
arrested, the law enforcement agencies referred to in paragraph 2 of this article
shall have up to, but not longer than, 72 hours from the time of arrest to prepare a
report of the arrest and turn the accused over to the Primary Saranwal. As soon as
possible, but not longer than 15 days after the arrest, the Counter Narcotics Police
shall transfer the investigation, the evidence, and the accused to the Headquarters
of the Counter Narcotics Police in Kabul for further questioning and interrogation.
The time period for the questioning and interrogation of the accused shall begin
upon the date the accused physically arrives in Kabul in the custody of the
Counter Narcotics Police, but the time period for the turning over of the accused
to the Special Counter Narcotics Saranwal shall in no event exceed 15 days from
the date of arrest. The Special Narcotics Saranwal, upon being notified, shall
inform the Primary Central Narcotics Tribunal in Kabul of such arrests outside
Kabul Province, and obtain an order from the Court extending the dates for
indictment. It shall investigate and prosecute the case in accordance with the
provisions set forth in Article 36 of the Interim Criminal Procedure Code.
Article 38:
Reports on drug seizures
1. A report shall be prepared by the person responsible for the seizure of illegal
drugs and shall contain the following information:
(a) The type of illegal drug seized, and a physical description of the seizure,
including any packaging containing the drugs;
(b) The quantity of illegal drugs seized;
(c) The time, date and place of the seizure;
(d) The organization and person responsible for the seizure;
(e) The name, date of birth, address, and signature and fingerprints of any
person arrested in connection with the seizure;
(f) A factual description of the circumstances of the seizure.
2. The report shall be signed by the person responsible for the seizure and a member
of the Counter Narcotics Police if present. One copy of the report shall be kept by
[ 34 ]
each of the signatories to the report. Additional copies shall be submitted to the
Saranwal for inclusion in the investigation dossier, and to the Ministry of Counter
Narcotics.
Article 39:
Destruction of illegal drugs and preservation of evidence
The illegal drugs seized shall be destroyed in accordance with the following procedures:
(a) All drugs seized shall be turned over to the custody of the Counter
Narcotics Police as soon as possible.
(b) Authorized representatives of the Counter Narcotics Police and the
concerned Saranwal shall weigh and photograph the entire amount seized,
and take samples of the drugs for testing, in accordance with written
procedures which shall be established by the Attorney General. The
Ministry of Counter Narcotics, or its provincial offices, shall be informed
about this sampling process. 
(c) After samples of the drugs are taken, the remaining drugs shall be re-
weighed to ensure that the original amount seized is not less than it was
after the sample was taken.
(d) The Saranwal shall issue a written order authorizing the destruction of the
drugs after they have been photographed, sampled, and reweighed.
(e) Representatives of the Counter Narcotics Police and the Saranwal shall
prepare and sign an exact report containing the information required under
this article and keep a record of the same.
(f) The Counter Narcotics Police shall destroy the remaining illegal drugs as
soon as possible in the presence of representatives of the Saranwal. The
Ministry of Counter Narcotics shall be advised of and may participate in
this process.
Article 40:
Afghan Special Narcotics Force
1. A Special Narcotics Force is established within the Ministry of Interior to detain
those involved in drug trafficking, to seize illegal drugs, and to use reasonable
force in the conduct of its operations, including against those who impede its
operations.
2. The Special Narcotics Force shall hand over any suspects and evidence in its
custody associated with a drug seizure to the Counter Narcotics Police of
Afghanistan pursuant to the procedures set forth in Articles 37, 38, and 39.
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3. The Special Narcotics Force shall have the power to destroy illegal drugs, if
necessary.
Article 41:
Co-operation with law enforcement agencies
1. If an accused cooperates considerably with the responsible authorities in
investigation and trial in detecting or arresting other perpetrators, the prosecutor
can request to sentence the accused to up to 50% of the minimum penalty
prescribed for the perpetrated crime.
2. Any person who provides authentic information relating to drug trafficking
offenses or offenders, or arrests, or assists in the arrest of, the offenders may be
awarded money, depending on the circumstances and the quality and quantity of
the drugs seized, at the discretion of the Counter Narcotics Police and in
accordance with guidelines which shall be established by the Ministry of Interior.
Article 42:
Confiscation of Assets
1. No person may retain any benefits or assets, whether immovable or movable,
acquired directly or indirectly by the commission of a criminal offense under this
law.
2. The prosecutor shall provide sufficient evidence in support of the confiscation of
benefits or assets in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. The court shall
consider any evidence produced by the accused to refute the evidence produced
by the prosecutor, and shall order confiscation only after it is certain that benefits
or assets were acquired directly or indirectly as the result of the commission of a
criminal offense under this law. 
3. Benefits and immovable or movable assets that may be confiscated or forfeited as
a result of the commission of a criminal offense under this law shall include the
following:
(a) Facilities, material, equipment, movable or immovable assets, funds or
any other objects of value directly or indirectly used or intended to be used
in committing the crime.
(b) Money, funds, objects of material value, and any other income acquired
directly or indirectly through committing the crime.
(c) Moveable or immovable materials purchased or acquired with the
proceeds or income of the crime.
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(d) Salary or other privileges received by legal or natural persons in
connection with the crime.
4. When funds or assets ordered to be confiscated are not available, funds or assets
of equivalent value shall be ordered to be confiscated. This order shall be
applicable to funds or assets belonging directly or indirectly to the perpetrators of
the offenses under this law.
5. If the funds or assets whose confiscation has been ordered have been transferred
to another person, the transferred funds or assets shall be confiscated, provided
that the person to whom the funds or assets have been transferred was aware of
the origin of the funds or assets.
6. If the transferee did not know that the funds or assets transferred to him had been
acquired by the commission of a criminal offense under this law, he shall have the
right to present evidence of his lack of knowledge on this regard to the court.
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Chapter VI
Search, Seizure, and Investigation Techniques
Article 43:
Detection, Investigation, and Prosecution
The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to the detection, investigation, and prosecution
of drug trafficking and drug trafficking-related offenses, including offenses involving
bribery and corruption, violence, and money laundering.
Article 44:
Search of Person
1. Law enforcement authorities search a person where there are justifiable reasons to
believe that evidence and forfeitable objects or instruments and funds related to
drug-trafficking are concealed on or in the suspect’s clothing or body.
2. A strip-search may only be conducted by a law enforcement officer of the same
sex. Internal examinations of body orifices may only be carried out by an
authorized medical examiner after approval by a local court. Where an individual
consents to a body search, the authorization from a court is not needed.
3. Any object or article reasonably relevant to criminal activity may be seized during
a search of a person. A record of the reasons for and circumstances of the search,
the name of the Judge or other authorizing officer, where applicable, and the
disposition of any seized items shall be made. This record can be produced in the
future legal proceedings.
4. Evidence properly obtained as a result of a search shall be admissible in all court
and other legal proceedings.
Article 45:
Search of Property
1. Law enforcement authorities may enter and search private residences after
obtaining a warrant from a relevant court.
2. Convincing reasons that justify the search, and the exact address of the property to
be searched, should be explicitly mentioned in the search warrant application.
3. A court may issue a search warrant where there is reasonable cause to believe that
evidence, instrumentalities, or proceeds of drug-trafficking, or of other offenses,
are stored, maintained, or concealed in or on the premises to be searched. If the
owner or the resident of the property consents to a search, there is no need for the
court authorization.
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4. In exceptional circumstances where there is reasonable cause to believe that
evidence, instrumentalities, or proceeds of criminal activity or offenses may be
removed or destroyed and the issuance of a search warrant by a court is not
possible, law enforcement officers may act pursuant to the provisions of the
Criminal Procedure Code.
5. Law enforcement officers may seize all evidence, instrumentalities, or proceeds of 
criminal activities or offenses, including records maintained in any form, format,
or medium, specified in the warrant and are related to drug trafficking offenses. A
record of the reasons for and circumstances of the search, the name of the judge or
other authorizing officer, where applicable, and the disposition of any seized
items shall be made and maintained for all future legal proceedings. Where a
search warrant was not obtained prior to a search because of exceptional
circumstances, the record shall also include a description of such exceptional
circumstances and the attempts made to contact a Sarwanal before the search.
6. Evidence properly obtained pursuant to a search warrant or consent shall be
admissible in all court and other legal proceedings. Law enforcement officers
shall, following entering and searching a property, obtain a court order
establishing the legality of their action within a period of time as set under the
law.
Article 46:
Search of Vehicles
1. Law enforcement authorities may stop and search a vehicle where there is
reasonable cause to believe that evidence, instrumentalities, or proceeds of drug-
trafficking offenses are stored, maintained, or concealed on or within the vehicle,
its load, or any trailer.
2. Law enforcement authorities may seize the vehicle and any evidence,
instrumentalities, or proceeds of drug-trafficking offenses, including records
maintained in any form, format or medium, relevant to such criminal activities or
offenses. A record of the reasons for and circumstances of the search and the
disposition of any seized items shall be made and maintained for all future legal
proceedings. Evidence properly obtained pursuant to an authorized vehicle search
shall be admissible in all court and other legal proceedings.
Article 47:
Covert Surveillance
1. Law enforcement authorities and their authorized agents may conduct covert
investigative and surveillance activities to gather intelligence and evidence of
criminal activities or offenses. Covert investigative and surveillance activities
may include:
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• recording conversations in public places;
• conducting mobile or static surveillance with or without the use of
electronic or photographic equipment;
• collecting data related to using, providing, and transmitting
telecommunications and other electronic communications, pursuant to
written regulations that shall be established by the Attorney General;
• controlled deliveries of prohibited or other items. 
2. A record of the covert surveillance conducted shall be kept.
3. Evidence properly gained through the authorized use of covert investigative and
surveillance methods shall be admissible in all court and other legal proceedings.
Article 48:
Intrusive or Electronic Surveillance
1. Law enforcement authorities and their authorized agents may conduct intrusive
investigative and electronic surveillance activities during and in connection with
efforts to gather intelligence and evidence relevant to the commission of drug-
trafficking offenses. Intrusive or electronic surveillance methods may include:
• overt or covert recording of conversations in private property, places, and
residences;
• installation and use of electronic or photographic equipment in or on
private property, places, or residences;
• interception of communications, including voice, data and internet
communications, conversations and information transmitted by electronic
means or media by, from, or through telecommunications companies,
internet and computer service providers, or other electronic
communications service providers;
• inspecting bank accounts and records of financial transactions or transfers;
and
• opening and inspecting mail.
2. Evidence properly obtained through the authorized use of overt or covert intrusive
investigative and electronic surveillance methods shall be admissible in all court
and other legal proceedings.
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3. In all cases under this article, the confidentiality of the conversations, mailings,
and communications between the accused and his lawyer shall be kept immune
from any form of intrusion. 
Article 49:
Electronic Interception and Surveillance Standards
1. With the exception of law enforcement agencies or their agents, any person who
intentionally —
(a) intercepts any wire, oral, or electronic communication;
(b) uses any electronic, mechanical, or other device to intercept any oral
communication;
(c) discloses to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing that the information was obtained through the
interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation of
this Article;
(d) uses the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication, knowing
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, oral,
or electronic communication in violation of this Article; or
(e) discloses to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, intercepted by means authorized by this Article,
(i) knowing that the information was obtained through the
interception of such a communication in connection with a
criminal investigation,
(ii) having obtained or received the information in connection with a
criminal investigation, and
(iii) with intent to improperly obstruct, impede, or interfere with a duly
authorized criminal investigation,
shall be subject to 1 to 5 years imprisonment and a fine of between 20,000 and
100,000 Afs.
2. It shall not be unlawful for an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or
electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of
a wire or electronic communication, to intercept, disclose, or use that
communication in the normal course of his employment.
3. A person or entity providing an electronic communication service to the public
shall not intentionally divulge the contents of any communication to any person or 
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entity other than an addressee or intended recipient of such communication or an
agent of such addressee or intended recipient, except -
(i) as authorized in this Article; 
(ii) with the lawful consent of the originator or any addressee or
intended recipient of such communication; 
(iii) to a person employed or authorized, or whose facilities are used, to
forward such communication to its destination; or
(iv) the communications were inadvertently obtained by the service
provider and which appear to pertain to the commission of a crime,
if such divulgence is made to a law enforcement agency.
4. Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom shall be
admissible as evidence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding or before any
other official authority if the disclosure of that information would be in violation
of this Article.
5. The consent of one of the parties to the communication shall constitute
authorization for surveillance, interception, or inspection of communications and
information under this Article.
6. An application for the interception of communications shall be prepared by a
Saranwal and approved by an authorized official of the Office of the Attorney
General. The application shall specify the reasons to believe that:
(a) the named suspects and others are engaged in the commission of drug
trafficking or drug-related offenses; 
(b) the named suspects and others are using a particular telephone or premises
in connection with the commission of the offenses;
(c) that wire and/or oral communications of the named suspects and others
will be intercepted either over the particular telephone facility and/or
within the described premises;
(d) the time for which the interception is required to be maintained; and
(e) where the application is for the extension of a previous order, a statement
setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a
reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.
7. The application for and authorization of surveillance or interception under this
section should be in writing but may be made orally if there are urgent or
emergency circumstances. The application to conduct an interception shall
include sufficient information to justify the use of the type of interception sought.
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The court issuing the Order shall state any conditions or limits to the planned
interception or surveillance in the Order authorizing the application. Urgent oral
applications and authorizations require the same information and justification as
written ones. Written applications and authorizations will be made as soon as
practicable following oral authorization and will state the need for urgency.
8. Each Order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication under this chapter shall specify—
(a) the identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be
intercepted;
(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as to which, or the
place where, authority to intercept is granted;
(c) a particular description of the type of communication sought to be
intercepted, and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;
(d) the identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications, and
of the person approving the application; and
(e) the period of time during which such interception is authorized, including
a statement as to whether or not the interception shall automatically
terminate when the described communication has been first obtained. 
9. An Interception Order is valid until the objectives authorized in the Order are
attained or 60 days from the day on which the law enforcement officers first begin
to conduct an interception under the Order. It shall be renewable for additional 60
day periods upon a showing of continued necessity for interception.
10. The authorization given shall apply to the target telephone number as well as any
changed telephone number within the 60 day period. If the telephone is a cellular
telephone, the authorization applies both to the target telephone number as well as
any changed telephone number or any other telephone number subsequently
assigned to or used by the instrument bearing the same electronic serial number as
the target cellular phone within the 60 day period.
11. Monitoring personnel may listen only to criminal conversations, and must turn off
the interception devices when the parties to the conversation engage in non-
criminal conversations.
12. The recordings of the intercepted communications shall be sealed in a container
and taken to the court which issued the interception order within 30 days of the
end of the authorized interception period in order to protect the recordings from
tampering or destruction and to ensure that the contents are not unlawfully
disclosed.
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13. No provider of wire or electronic communication service, officer, employee, or
agent thereof shall disclose the existence of any interception or surveillance or the
device used to accomplish the interception or surveillance with respect to which
the person has been furnished a court order under this Article, except in case of
exigency and then only after prior notification to the Attorney General.
14. When a law enforcement officer intercepts wire, oral, or electronic
communications relating to offenses other than those specified in the Interception
Order, the contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or
used for law enforcement purposes, or disclosed under oath in any proceeding,
when the judge finds on subsequent application that the contents were otherwise
intercepted in accordance with this Article and the original order. The court shall
be notified as soon as practicable that conversations about other offenses are
being monitored, and the new offenses shall be added to the original application
for the order if an extension order is obtained. If no extension order is obtained
and the prosecution wishes to use that evidence in a future proceeding, an order
should be obtained as soon as practicable pursuant to this Article.
15. Disclosure of information obtained pursuant to a court-authorized interception
order is authorized in the following circumstances:
• to law enforcement officers for the performance of their official duties. In
this case, the law enforcement officers may use the information as
required.
• information may be disclosed during testimony under oath. 
16. Information regarding offenses other than those authorized in the order may be
disclosed to other law enforcement officers with a court authorization. In this
case, they may use the information as required.
17. A law enforcement officer may disclose interception information to other law
enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense, or national
security officials, if the information includes intelligence or counterintelligence,
to assist the receiving officials in the performance of their official duties.
18. A law enforcement officer, or other Government official engaged in carrying out
official duties, may disclose the contents of intercepted communications and
evidence derived therefrom to foreign or domestic investigative or law
enforcement officers if such disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance
of the official duties of the officers who disclose and who receive the information.
Foreign investigative or law enforcement officers may use or disclose such
contents or derivative evidence to the extent appropriate to the performance of
their official duties.
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19. If the contents of intercepted communications or derivative evidence reveals a
threat of actual or potential attack or other grave hostile acts of a foreign power or
an agent of a foreign power, sabotage, terrorism, or clandestine intelligence
gathering activities by an intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by
an agent of a foreign power, within Afghanistan or elsewhere, a law enforcement
officer, or other Government official engaged in carrying out official duties, may
disclose the contents of intercepted communications and evidence derived
therefrom to any appropriate Government or foreign government official, for the
purpose of preventing or responding to such threat. The foreign official who
receives such information may use it consistent with such guidelines as the Office
of the Attorney General and the National Security Directorate (NDS) shall jointly
issue.
20. The Interception Order issued by the judge may provide in appropriate
circumstances and for good cause that the order be sealed, and the surveillance or
interception conducted not be disclosed until the conclusion of the investigation
or until further order of the court. The order of the court may specify that the
methods, means, and techniques used in the interception or surveillance remain
secret.
21. The Interception Order issued by the judge may permit law enforcement officers
to surreptitiously enter the premises to be surveilled at any time to install or
replace a recording or surveillance device, or replace the battery.
22. Communications service providers shall allow designated law enforcement
authorities access, as per the Interception Order, to the content of the specified
communications at the time of transmission or as soon as practicable thereafter,
and shall cooperate with law enforcement authorities in the installation or
connection of all technical equipment necessary to the interception and
recordation of the communications. Communications service providers and their
employees and agents are forbidden to disclose the installation of interception
equipment.
Article 50:
Use of Informants
1. Law enforcement authorities may use informants to prevent, detect, and
investigate drug-trafficking offenses by gathering intelligence and evidence
relevant to the commission of such offenses. 
2. An informant may establish or maintain a relationship with a person in order to
acquire information or evidence of illegal activities and to provide that
information and evidence to law enforcement authorities. Informants may use
surveillance techniques described in this Article if authorized by appropriate law
enforcement authorities.
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3. Informants may not participate in the commission of drug-trafficking offenses in
connection with criminal investigations without prior authorization from the
appropriate law enforcement authorities. An informant who conducts or
participates in criminal activity outside the limit of the authorized conduct may be
subject to prosecution for any offense committed.
4. Authorizations for informants to acquire information or participate in crimes shall
be recorded in writing and shall specify to the extent practicable the types of
actions the informant may engage in or conduct. All information provided by an
informant shall be recorded by the officer receiving it.
5. The identity of an informant may be withheld by an order of a court where there is
reasonable cause to believe that identifying the informant will subject him to
danger or compromise lawful investigations. The order issued by the court may
provide in appropriate circumstances that the order be sealed and not be disclosed
to another party until the conclusion of the investigation or until further order of
the court, and that the methods, means, and techniques used in the investigation
remain secret. 
6. An informant may testify in court. 
7. Evidence properly gained through the authorized use of informants shall be
admissible in all detection, investigation, and trial proceedings.
8. Informants shall be recruited in accordance with special procedures established by
the Ministry of Interior.
Article 51:
Undercover Operations 
1. Law enforcement authorities may conduct undercover or covert operations during
and in connection with investigations to gather intelligence and evidence relevant
to the commission of drug-trafficking offenses. Undercover or covert operations
and methods may include purchasing, selling, or offering to purchase or sell,
illicit drugs and controlled substances, or other activities. Undercover or covert
operations and methods shall not be used to initiate crimes that would [not]
otherwise have been committed. A record of all undercover or covert operations
conducted shall be made and maintained.
2. Intelligence includes information relevant to the detection and prevention of drug-
trafficking offenses. The source of intelligence may be protected.
3. Evidence properly obtained through the authorized use of undercover or covert
operations shall be admissible in all detection, investigation, and trial
proceedings.
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CHAPTER VII
Duties and Responsibilities of the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and other
Ministries
Article 52:
Duties and responsibilities
1. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics shall coordinate the counter-narcotics
activities and programs of the Government of Afghanistan with other
Ministries, independent bodies, and other concerned organizations.
2. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics, as the leading Ministry in counter
narcotics affairs, shall be responsible for coordinating and evaluating the
implementation of this Law and the National Drug Control Strategy in the
concerned Ministries and organizations, and shall adopt the necessary
measures for this purpose in the relevant central and provincial offices.
3. The concerned Ministries and organizations shall present a report, on a
monthly basis or upon request, on their counter-narcotic activities to the
Ministry of Counter Narcotics. 
4. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics shall submit to the Government a quarterly
report on the results obtained from the evaluation of the activities and
performances of the concerned organizations in combating narcotic drugs.
5. Ministries, agencies and other concerned organizations shall be responsible
for the implementation of this law and the National Drug Control Strategy in
their respective areas of activity.
6. The Minister for Counter Narcotics, assisted by other Ministries, and other
bodies and institutions, shall prepare a National Drug Control Strategy
(NDCS), and propose revisions to the strategy at regular intervals but not less
than every three years. The Ministry shall be responsible for evaluating the
implementation of the NDCS. 
7. The Ministry of Counter Narcotics shall coordinate the annual budget of the
National Drug Control Strategy with the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of
Counter Narcotics and the Ministry of Finance shall be jointly responsible for
the management and implementation of the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund.
8. The Ministries of Counter Narcotics, Interior, Finance, National Defense and
other Ministries, bodies and institutions, including but not limited to the
Supreme Court, Office of the Attorney General, and National Directorate of
Security, shall cooperate and assist one another as required to perform their
lawful duties and functions under this law.
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Article 53:
Intelligence Duties
1. The National Directorate of Security shall obtain intelligence on drug cultivation,
production, and trafficking, and shall prepare strategic and operational
intelligence reports related to counter narcotics. 
2. Strategic intelligence reports on counter narcotics shall be submitted on a regular
basis to the Office of the National Security Adviser, the Ministry of Interior, and
the Ministry of Counter Narcotics.
Article 54:
Duties of Other Ministries
1. The Ministry of Public Health, in consultation with the Ministry of Counter
Narcotics, shall establish community-based and residential detoxification, harm
reduction, treatment and rehabilitation services for persons addicted to or
dependant on narcotic drugs and/or psychotropic substances.
2. The Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education shall, in consultation
with the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, include illicit drug use prevention-related
subjects into the curriculum of their educational institutions.
3. The Ministries of Culture and Information, Public Health, Religious Affairs (Hajj
and Awqaf) and other relevant bodies shall, in consultation with the Ministry of
Counter Narcotics, promote public campaigns against illegal drug cultivation,
production, trafficking, and use.
4. In accordance with the National Drug Control Strategy, and within their
competence, the Ministries of Agriculture, Food Stuff and Animal Husbandry,
Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Public Health, and Interior shall adopt
measures to:
(i) Prevent opium poppy and cannabis cultivation through all possible
means;
(ii) Persuade and encourage farmers to cultivate licit crops.
(iii) Provide assistance to farmers.
5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall adopt measures to:
(i) Attract assistance from international organizations to assist farmers.
(ii) Acquire assistance from international organizations to equip and
expand hospitals and rehabilitation centers for drug addicts.
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(iii) Collect reports, publications and information material related to the
struggle against drugs from regional and international organizations,
and translate and distribute them;
(iv) Initiate efforts to negotiate agreements with other countries and
organizations regarding co-operation in detection, investigation, arrest,
prosecution, trial, and extradition of drug-trafficking suspects.
(v) Negotiate agreements with other countries and international
organizations for cooperation and technical and financial assistance to
prevent opium, cannabis, and coca cultivation and to combat drug
trafficking in Afghanistan.
(vi) Cooperate with the United Nations and other foreign authorities to
prevent the manufacture of instruments, equipment, and machinery
used for producing and processing narcotic drugs and psychotropic
substances.
(vii) Present to the Secretary-General of the United Nations an annual
report, drafted by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, on the
implementation of the international conventions on illegal drugs.
(viii) Exchange information and counter-narcotic activities with foreign
countries and international organizations.
(ix) Establishing relations between the International Narcotics Control
Board (INCB) and the Counter Narcotics Ministry and other relevant
ministries and institutions.
(x) Designate, in consultation with the Counter Narcotics Ministry, Drug
Liaison Officers (DLO) in neighboring, regional and other interested
countries.
(xi) Cooperate with the Counter Narcotics Ministry in holding regional
and international conferences on counter-narcotic issues.
(xii) Consult with the Ministry of Counter Narcotics in formulating and
implementing the duties and responsibilities set forth in this
paragraph.
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CHAPTER VIII
Final Provisions
Article 55:
Responsibility of Security Authorities
All security authorities shall be responsible for preventing and eradicating the cultivation
of opium poppy, cannabis plants, and coca bush in accordance with the instructions of the
Government.
Article 56:
Primacy of this law
1. Where existing laws and regulations conflict with this law, this law shall prevail.
All regulations that are incompatible with this law shall be conformed to this law
no later than 6 months after the promulgation of this law. 
2. The Counter Narcotics Ministry shall issue all regulations required by this law
within one year of the promulgation of this law. Pending the promulgation of such
regulations, the existing regulations concerning counter narcotics activities shall
remain in force if such regulations are not inconsistent with this law.
Article 57:
Cooperation of Ministries
1. Within 60 days of the promulgation of this law, the Ministry of Counter
Narcotics, with the assistance of the Ministry of Interior, shall take the measures
necessary to meet the organizational, staffing, funding, and resource requirements
of this law.
2. Within 60 days of the promulgation of this law, the Ministry of Counter Narcotics
shall, in consultation with the Ministry of Public Health, prepare an organizational
plan for the establishment of the Committee on Drug Control. Within 120 days of
the promulgation of this Law, the Committee shall convene its inaugural meeting.
3. Within 120 days of the promulgation of this law, the Ministry for Counter
Narcotics shall formulate and publish regulations pertaining to its activities and
governance.
Article 58:
Entry into Force
This law shall enter into force from the date of its signing by the President and shall be
published in the Official Gazette. Following the promulgation of this law, the Counter
Narcotics Law published in the Official Gazette No. 813 dated 13.08.1383 shall be
nullified.
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Classification Tables
Afghan national classification of narcotic drugs, Psychotropic substances and
preparations thereof, as well as substances used in their manufacture
Table 1 Prohibited drugs of abuse
Table 2
Strictly controlled substances and 
pharmaceutical preparations
(High risk drugs of abuse)
Table 3
Controlled substances and pharmaceutical
preparations
(Risk drugs of abuse)
Table 4
Substances used in the manufacture of 
narcotics drugs and psychotropic
substances  (Precursors)
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Table 1 – Prohibited Drug of Abuse with No Medical Use
1. (+)-LYSERGIDE
2. 2C-B
3. 3-methylfentanyl
4. 3-methylthiofentanyl
5. 4-MTA
6. Acetorphine
7. Acetyl-alpha-methylfentanyl
8. Acetyldihydrocodeine
9. Acetylmethadol
10. Allylprodine
11. Alphameprodine
12. Alphamethadol
13. Alpha-methylfentanyl
14. Alpha-methylthiofentanyl
15. Aminorex
16. Benzethidine
17. Benzylmorphine
18. Betacetylmethadol
19. Bêta-hydroxyfentanyl
20. Bêta-hydroxy-methylfentanyl
21. Betameprodine
22. Betamethadol
23. Betaprodine
24. Brolamfetamine
25. Butyrate de dioxaphetyl
26. Cannabis and cannabis resin
27. Cathinone
28. Clonitazene
29. Concentrate of poppy straw
30. Desomorphine
31. DET
32. Dextromoramide
33. Diampromide
34. Diethylthiambutene
35. Difenoxine
36. Dimenoxadol
37. Dimepheptanol
38. Dimethylthiambutene
39. Dipipanone
40. DMA
41. DMHP
42. DMT
43. DOET
44. Drotebanol
45. Ethylmethylthiambutene
46. Eticyclidine
47. Etilamfetamine
48. Etonitazene
49. Etorphine
50. Etoxeridine
51. Etryptamine
52. Fenetylline
53. Furethidine
54. Heroin
55. Hydromorphinol
56. Hydroxypethidine
57. Ketobemidone
58. Levomoramide
59. Levophenacylmorphane
60. MDE, N-ethyl MDA
61. MDMA
62. Mecloqualone
63. Mescaline
64. Methaqualone
65. Methcathinone
66. Methyl-4 aminorex
67. Methyldesorphine
68. Methyldihydromorphine
69. MMDA
70. Morpheridine
71. Morphine methobromide and other
pentavent nitrogen morphine
derivative
72. MPPP
73. Myrophine
74. N-hydroxy MDA
75. Nicocodine
76. Nicomorphine
77. Noracymethadol
78. Norlevorphanol
79. Normethadone
80. Normorphine
81. Norpipanone
82. Para-fluorofentanyl
83. Parahexyl
84. PEPAP
85. Phenadoxone
86. Phenampromide
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87. Phenomorphane
88. Phenoperidine
89. Pholcodine
90. Piritramide
91. PMA
92. Poppy seeds
93. Poppy straw
94. Proheptazine
95. Properidine
96. Propiram
97. Psilocine, psilotsin
98. Psilocybine
99. Racemoramide
100. Rolicyclidine
101. STP, DOM
102. Tenamfetamine
103. Tenocyclidine
104. Tetrahydrocannabinol, the
following isomers and their
stereochemical variants:
• tetrahydro-7,8,9,10 trimethyl-6,6,9
pentyl-3 6H-dibenzo[b,d] pyranne
o1-1
• (9R, 10aR)-tetrahydro-8,9,10,10a
trimethyl-6,6,9 pentyl-3 6H-
dibenzo[b,d]pyranne o1-1
• (6aR,9R, 10aR)-tetrahydro-
6a,9,10,10a trimethyl-6,6,9 pentyl-
3 6H-dibenzo[b,d] pyranne o1-1
• (6aR,10aR)-tetrahydro-6a,7,10,10a
trimethyl-6,6,9 pentyl-3 6H-
dibenzo[b,d] pyranne o1-1
• tetrahydro-6a,7,8,9-trimethyl-6,6,9
pentyl-3 6H-dibenzo[b,d] pyranne
o1-1
• (6aR,10aR)-hexahydro-
6a,7,8,9,10,10a dimethyl-6,6
methylene-9 pentyl-3 6Hdibenzo 
[b,d] pyranne o1-1
105. Thebacone
106. Thiofentanyl
107. Tilidine
108. TMA
109. Trimeperidine
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Table 2 – Strictly controlled plants and substances with a medical use
1. Alfentanil
2. Alphaprodine
3. Amfetamine
4. Amobarbital
5. Aniledirine
6. Bezitramide
7. Coca, (leaf)
8. Cocaïne
9. Codeine
10. Codoxime
11. Delta-9-tetrahydro cannabinol and its 
variants
12. Dexamfetamine
13. Dextropropoxyphene
14. Dihydrocodeine
15. Dihydromorphine
16. Diphenoxylate
17. Dronabinol
18. Ecgonine, its esters and derivatives
19. Ethylmorphine
20. Fentanyl
21. Glutethimide
22. Hydrocodone
23. Hydromorphone
24. Isomethadone
25. Levamfetamine
26. Levomethamphetamine
27. Levomethorphane1
28. Levorphanol
29. Metamfetamine
30. Metazocine
31. Methadone
32. Methadone intermediate
33. Methylphenidate
34. Metopon
35. Moramide, intermediaire du
36. Morphine
37. Nicodicodine
38. Norcodeine
39. N-oxymorphine
40. Opium
41. Oxycodone
42. Oxymorphone
43. Pethidine
44. Pethidine, intermediate A
45. Pethidine, intermediate B
46. Pethidine, intermediate C
47. Phenazocine
48. Phencyclidine
49. Phenmetrazine
50. Piminodine
51. Racemate de metamfetamine
52. Racemethorphane
53. Racemorphane
54. Remifentanil
55. Secobarbital
56. Sufentanil
57. Thebaïne
58. Zipeprol
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Table 3 – Controlled plants and substances with a medical use
1. Acetyldihydrocodeine
2. Allobarbital
3. Alprazolam
4. Amfepramone
5. Barbital
6. Benzfetamine
7. Bromazepam
8. Brotizolam
9. Buprenorphine
10. Butalbital
11. Butobarbital
12. Camazepam
13. Cathine
14. Chlordiazepoxide
15. Clobazam
16. Clonazepam
17. Clorazepate
18. Clotiazepam
19. Cloxazolam
20. Codeine
21. Cyclobarbital
22. Delorazepam
23. Diazepam
24. Dihydrocodeine
25. Estazolam
26. Ethchlorvynol
27. Ethinamate
28. Ethylmorphine
29. Fencamfamine
30. Fenproporex
31. Fludiazepam
32. Flunitrazepam
33. Flurazepam
34. GHB
35. Halazepam
36. Haloxazolam
37. Ketazolam
38. Lefetamine
39. Loflazepate Ethyl
40. Loprazolam
41. Lorazepam
42. Lormetazepam
43. Mazindol
44. Medazepam
45. Mefenorex
46. Meprobamate
47. Mesocarbe
48. Methylpheno-barbital
49. Methyprylone
50. Midazolam
51. Nicocodine
52. Nicodicodine
53. Nimetazepam
54. Nitrazepam
55. Norcodeine
56. Nordazepam
57. Oxazepam
58. Oxazolam
59. Pemoline
60. Pentazocine
61. Pentobarbital
62. Phendimetrazine
63. Phenobarbital
64. Phentermine
65. Pholcodine
66. Pinazepam
67. Pipradrol
68. Prazepam
69. Pyrovalerone
70. Secbutabarbital
71. Temazepam
72. Tetrazepam
73. Triazolam
74. Vinylbital
75. Zolpidem
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Table 4 – Substances frequently used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances (chemical precursors)
1. Acid N-acetylanthranilic
2. Acid lysergic
3. Anhydride acetic
4. Ephedrine
5. Ergometrine
6. Ergotamine
7. Isosafrole
8. Methylenedioxy-3,4 phenyl
propanone-2
9. Norephedrine
10. Potassium Permanganate
11. Phenyl-1 propanone-2
12. Piperonal
13. Pseudoephedrine
14. Safrole
15. Acetone
16. Acid anthranilic
17. Acid chlorhydric
18. Acid phenylacetic
19. Acid sulfuric
20. Methylethylcetone
21. Piperidine
22. Toluene
23. Ethyl ether
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON CRIMINAL LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. It relates to efforts to reform the criminal 
justice system in Afghanistan and specifically to the Interim Criminal Procedure Code for Courts 
2003(‘ICPC’). It would be very helpful if you could complete it to the best of your ability and return it to 
me at the address provided at the end of the questionnaire.  All responses will remain anonymous. 
 
 
1. What organisation to you work for? 
 
 
 
2. Which one of the following best describes your occupation or role in the justice sector in 
Afghanistan? 
 
(a) Judge 
(b) Prosecutor 
(c) Defence lawyer 
(d) International advisor 
(e) Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
3. How long have you been in practicing in this capacity? 
 
 
 
4. What is your citizenship? 
 
 
 
 
 
INTERIM CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE 2004 
 
If you have experience or knowledge of the Interim Criminal Procedure Code 2004 (‘ICPC’), please 
answer the following questions.  
 
 
1. Do you feel that you have had sufficient resources (books, transport etc) in order to be 
able to fulfil your responsibilities and meet the timelines (for example, in relation to 
investigation, trial and detention) laid down by the ICPC? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
 
2. In your experience do the police and legal practitioners who use and apply the ICPC 
regard formal state legislation such as the ICPC as meaningful and appropriate for 
Afghanistan as a means of investigating and prosecuting criminal offences? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Do you regard the provisions of the ICPC as appropriate for Afghanistan as a means of 
investigating and prosecuting criminal offences in Afghanistan? 
 
LA/ICPC 2 
4. To what extent in general terms do you feel the ICPC has been successful in providing 
enforcement agencies and judicial actors (police, prosecutors and judges) with effective 
mechanisms to investigate and prosecute criminal offences in Afghanistan? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Do you believe that the establishment of formal state legislation such as the ICPC is the 
most appropriate way of improving criminal justice in Afghanistan? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
 
6. If the provisions of the ICPC were designed to make the work of the Afghan criminal 
police and judges easier and compliant with international human rights do you think that it 
has succeeded in this respect? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
 
7. How, in your experience, is the ICPC being applied by the police and by legal 
practitioners?  
 
 
 
 
 
8. Do you believe that a more effective formal state criminal procedure code could have 
been drafted and enacted in 2003 or that the ICPC was appropriate at the time? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer. If ‘yes’ please explain what measures you feel the 
legislation should have contained which are not included in the 
 
 
 
 
 
9. In your experience do legal practitioners always adhere to the provisions of the ICPC 
when they are applicable? 
 
Yes/No. If ‘no’, please specify any examples without naming any individuals who may be 
concerned to ensure anonymity. 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Do you think that it is difficult to know which state legislation to apply in certain 
circumstances? (Police Law, ICPC, CNL, Penal Code etc)  
 
No/Yes.  
If ‘yes’, please specify examples. 
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11. Do you think the training was sufficient and appropriate in relation to the provisions and 
procedures of the ICPC? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Do you believe that the ICPC would be more effective if it contained more traditional 
customary justice mechanisms to investigate and prosecute criminal offences in 
Afghanistan? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
13. Do you believe that there was a sufficient and appropriate level of input by foreign 
consultants and international actors in the drafting of the ICPC? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
 
14. In your view has the involvement of international actors in the drafting and implementation 
of the ICPC affected its legitimacy in Afghanistan? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer. If ‘yes’ please explain why and also whether you think 
that it could have been foreseen. 
 
 
 
 
15. In what ways, if any, could the ICPC be improved in your view? 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please return it to John Jupp on 
j.jupp@londonmet.ac.uk or post it to me at LPC Department, The Department of Law, 
Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan University, 16 Goulston Street, 
London E1 7TP, United Kingdom. As stated above, all answers will remain anonymous. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON CRIMINAL LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. It relates to efforts to 
reform the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and specifically to the Interim 
Criminal Procedure Code for Courts 2004 (‘ICPC’). It would be very helpful if you 
could complete it to the best of your ability and return it to me at the address provided 
at the end of the questionnaire.  ALL RESPONSES WILL REMAIN ANONYMOUS. 
 
 
1. What kind of organization do you work for? 
(a) Governmental 
(b) Non-Governmental  (NGO) 
(c) Inter-Governmental 
(d) Bi-lateral 
(e) Other (please describe) 
 
 
2. At what level do you work? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What are your job responsibilities? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. How long have you worked in this capacity? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. What is your citizenship? 
 
 
 
 
 
6.  What has been your involvement with the criminal justice system in 
Afghanistan? 
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INTERIM CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE FOR COURTS 2004 
Please answer the following questions relative to your experience of the Interim 
Criminal Procedure Code for Courts 2004 (‘ICPC’). The terms ‘judicial actors’ and 
‘enforcement agencies’ refer to police, prosecutors and judges. If you are not familiar 
with the ICPC please forward this questionnaire to anyone you know who is.   
 
 
 
1. What aspects of the ICPC are in your view least well understood by the 
enforcement agencies, judicial actors and the local population?   
 
 
 
 
 
2. Have the enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in your view received 
sufficient and appropriate training in relation to the provisions of the ICPC, their 
use and application? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
3. Is the ICPC effectively and equally applied and enforced by judicial actors and 
enforcement agencies across the country? 
 
If not, why not? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Do enforcement agencies and judicial authorities have sufficient resources and/or 
capacity to meet the timelines laid down by the ICPC for detention, investigation 
and trial? 
 
If not, why not? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. To what extent has the ICPC achieved its objectives of providing an efficient and 
fair criminal justice procedure compliant with international human rights? 
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6. Do you think that the ICPC is meaningful and appropriate for Afghanistan as a 
means of investigating and prosecuting criminal offences? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
7. Is it appropriate for Afghanistan to have a codified state law on criminal 
procedure or would it be more meaningful for Afghans to rely on customary 
justice mechanisms? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. What do you think are the benefits of the ICPC and what are the problems with 
it?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Do you have any further comments on the ICPC generally? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please return it to John 
Jupp on j.jupp@londonmet.ac.uk or post it to me at LPC Department, The 
Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London Metropolitan 
University, 16 Goulston Street, London E1 7TP, United Kingdom. ALL RESPONSES  
WILL REMAIN ANONYMOUS. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON CRIMINAL LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. It relates to efforts to reform the criminal 
justice system in Afghanistan and specifically to the Counter Narcotics Law 2005 (‘CNL’). It would be 
very helpful if you could complete it to the best of your ability and return it to me at the address provided 
at the end of the questionnaire.  All responses will remain anonymous. 
 
 
1. What organisation to you work for? 
 
 
 
 
2. Which one of the following best describes your occupation or role in the justice 
sector in Afghanistan? 
 
(a) Judge 
(b) Prosecutor 
(c) Defence lawyer 
(d) International advisor 
(e) Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
3. How long have you been in practicing in this capacity? 
 
 
 
 
4. What is your citizenship? 
 
 
 
 
COUNTER NARCOTICS LAW 2005  
 
If you have experience or knowledge of the Counter Narcotics Law 2005 (‘CNL’), please answer the 
following questions. Please note that for the purposes of this questionnaire, ‘police’ includes the Counter 
Narcotics Police of Afghanistan, the Afghan Special Narcotics Force, the Afghanistan National Police, 
the Afghanistan Border Police and the Afghanistan customs staff: 
 
 
1. What is your experience of working with the CNL? 
 
(a) As a judge 
(b) As a prosecutor 
(c) As a defence lawyer 
(d) Other (please specify) 
 
 
 
 
2. Do you feel that you have had sufficient resources (books, transport etc) in 
order to be able to fulfil your responsibilities and meet the timelines (for 
example, in relation to investigation, trial and detention) laid down by the 
CNL? 
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3. In your experience do the police and legal practitioners who use and apply  
CNL regard formal state legislation such as the CNL as a meaningful and 
appropriate for Afghanistan as a means of investigating and prosecuting 
criminal offences related to narcotics in Afghanistan? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Do you regard the provisions of the CNL as appropriate for Afghanistan as a 
means of prosecuting offences related to the cultivation, production, use and 
trafficking of narcotic drugs in Afghanistan? 
 
Yes/No 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
 
5. To what extent in general terms do you feel the CNL has been successful in 
providing enforcement agencies and judicial actors (police, prosecutors and 
judges) with effective mechanisms to investigate and prosecute criminal 
offences related to narcotics in Afghanistan? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Do you believe that the establishment of formal state legislation such as the 
CNL is the most appropriate way of improving criminal justice in relation to 
narcotics in Afghanistan? 
 
Yes/No 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
7. How, in your experience, is the CNL being applied by the police and by legal 
practitioners?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. In your experience do legal practitioners always adhere to the provisions of 
the CNL when they are applicable? 
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Yes/No. If ‘no’, please specify any examples without naming any individuals who may 
be concerned to ensure anonymity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Have you any experience of any difficulty personally or by anyone else in 
understanding which law to apply in any given circumstance (Police Law, 
ICPC, CNL etc)?  
 
No/Yes. If so, please specify examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. What training have you received in relation to the provisions and procedures 
of the CNL? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Do you think the training was sufficient and appropriate? 
 
Yes/No 
Give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Do you believe that the CNL would be more effective if it contained more 
traditional customary justice mechanisms to investigate and prosecute 
narcotics offences in Afghanistan? 
 
Yes/No 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
13. In what ways, if any, could the CNL be improved in your view? 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please return the survey to John Jupp on 
j.jupp@londonmet.ac.uk or post it to me at LPC Department, The Department of Law, Governance and 
International Relations, London Metropolitan University, 16 Goulston Street, London E1 7TP, United 
Kingdom. As stated above, all answers will remain anonymous. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON CRIMINAL LAW IN AFGHANISTAN 
 
Thank you for taking the time to fill out this questionnaire. It relates to efforts to 
reform the criminal justice system in Afghanistan and specifically to the Counter 
Narcotics Law 2005 (‘CNL’). It would be very helpful if you could complete it to the 
best of your ability and return it to me at the address provided at the end of the 
questionnaire.   ALL RESPONSES WILL REMAIN ANONYMOUS.   
 
What kind of organization do you work for? 
(a) Governmental 
(b) Non-Governmental  (NGO) 
(c) Inter-Governmental 
(d) Bi-lateral 
(e) Other (please describe) 
 
 
 
2. At what level do you work? 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What are your job responsibilities? 
 
 
 
 
 
4. How long have you worked in this capacity? 
 
 
 
 
 
5. What is your citizenship? 
 
 
 
 
 
6.  What has been your involvement with the criminal justice system in 
Afghanistan? 
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COUNTER NARCOTICS LAW 2005  
Please answer the following questions relative to your experience of the Counter 
Narcotics Law 2005 (‘CNL’). The terms ‘judicial actors’ and ‘enforcement agencies’ 
refer to the police, prosecutors and judges. ‘Police’ includes the Counter Narcotics 
Police of Afghanistan, the Afghan Special Narcotics Force, the Afghanistan National 
Police, the Afghanistan Border Police and the Afghanistan customs staff. If you are 
not familiar with the CNL please forward this questionnaire to anyone you know who 
is.   
 
USE AND APPLICATION 
 
1. What aspects of the CNL are in your view least well understood by the 
enforcement agencies, judicial actors and the local population?   
 
 
 
 
2. Have the enforcement agencies and judicial authorities in your view received 
sufficient and appropriate training in relation to the provisions of the CNL, their 
use and application? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer 
 
 
 
3. Is the CNL effectively and equally applied and enforced by judicial actors and 
enforcement agencies across the country? 
 
If not, why not? 
 
 
 
 
4. Do enforcement agencies and judicial authorities have sufficient resources and/or 
capacity to meet the timelines laid down by the CNL for detention, investigation 
and trial? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. To what extent has the CNL achieved its objectives and provided enforcement 
agencies and judicial actors with effective mechanisms to arrest, detain, 
investigate, prosecute and convict suspects connected with the cultivation, 
production, trafficking and use of narcotic drugs in Afghanistan? 
 
 
 
 
 
6. In your view has the CNL helped the Afghan government to attract the co-
operation of national and international organisations, and to monitor and evaluate 
its counter narcotics programmes? 
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7. Was there a need, in your view, for formal state legislation in the form of the CNL 
in 2005? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Do you think that the CNL is meaningful and appropriate for Afghanistan as a 
means of investigating and prosecuting drug-related criminal offences? 
 
Please give reasons for your answer  
 
 
 
 
9. Is it appropriate for Afghanistan to have a codified counter-narcotics state law or 
would it be more meaningful for Afghans to rely on customary justice 
mechanisms? 
 
 
 
 
 
10. What do you think are the benefits of the CNL and what are the problems with it?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. Do you have any further comments on the CNL? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please return the 
survey to John Jupp on j.jupp@londonmet.ac.uk or post it to me at LPC Department, 
The Department of Law, Governance and International Relations, London 
Metropolitan University, 16 Goulston Street, London E1 7TP, United Kingdom. ALL 
RESPONSES WILL REMAIN ANONYMOUS   
 
